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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
PENNSYLVANIA’S LOYALISTS AND DISAFFECTED IN THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION: DEFINING THE TERRAIN OF REINTEGRATION, 1765-1800
by
René José Silva
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Kirsten Wood, Major Professor
This study examines the reintegration of loyalists and disaffected residents in
Pennsylvania who opposed the American Revolution from the Stamp Act crisis in 1765
through the Age of Federalism in 1790s. The inquiry argues that postwar loyalist
reintegration in Pennsylvania succeeded because of the attitudes, behavior, actions and
contributions of both disaffected residents and patriot citizens. The focus is chiefly on the
legal battle over citizenship, especially the responses of the disaffected to patriot
legislative measures such as treason, oaths of allegiance, attainders, confiscation, and
militia service laws that revolutionaries employed to sanction dissent in the state.
Loyalists and the disaffected contributed to their own successful reintegration in
three ways. First, the departure of loyalist militants at the British evacuation of occupied
Philadelphia in June 1778 and later substantially lessened internal political tensions
associated with the rebellion. Second, the overwhelming majority of the disaffected who
stayed in Pennsylvania adopted non-threatening attitudes and behaviors towards
republican rule. And third, the disaffected who remained ultimately chose to embrace the
new republican form of government they had earlier resisted.
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Patriots contributed to the successful reintegration of the disaffected chiefly
through the outcome of the factional struggle for internal political supremacy between
revolutionary radicals and moderates. Pennsylvania radicals used the rule of law to deny
citizenship to opponents of the Revolution and pushed for their permanent exclusion from
the body politic. Moderates favored a reincorporation of those who had not supported the
rebellion, utilizing the law to foster inclusion. Moderate electoral victories in the decade
of the 1780s led to solid majorities in the state assembly that rescinded all repressive
measures against former opponents, in particular the 1789 repeal of the Test Act of 1777.
The analysis stresses the activities of loyalists and the disaffected, exploring elite
loyalist militants such as Joseph Galloway and the sons of Chief Justice William Allen;
ordinary loyalist militants like John Connolly and the Rankin brothers of York County;
Quaker pacifists such as the Pemberton siblings; loyalists whom patriots perceived as
defiant, such as the Doan guerrilla gang and British collaborators Abraham Carlisle and
John Roberts; and the Penn family proprietors. Each of these protagonists epitomized a
particular strain of loyalism or disaffection in Pennsylvania, ranging from armed
resistance to pacifism. Reintegration experiences and outcomes are therefore assessed in
relation to these Pennsylvanians’ conduct before, during, and after the Revolutionary
War.
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PENNSYLVANIA’S LOYALISTS AND DISAFFECTED IN THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION: DEFINING THE TERRAIN OF REINTEGRATION, 1765-1800
INTRODUCTION
“PHILADELPHIA, July 4 [1778],
On Thursday the 18th ult. the British army, under the command of Sir Henry Clinton,
compleated their evacuation of this city, after having possession of it about nine months.
The indiscriminate destruction of whig and tory property to be seen in the neighbourhood
of the city strongly mark the character of those British savages. They have increased the
resentment of their old enemies and turned the hearts of their friends: Many who
welcomed them into the city and who were deceived and seduced by their specious
proclamations, followed them with the bitterest execrations. A few citizens, whose
conduct and crimes gave them no reason to hope for mercy from their injured
countrymen, went off with the British army.”1
In such terms did patriot and printer John Dunlap portray conditions in his native
city in the first locally published edition of his newspaper after returning from temporary
exile at Lancaster following the British occupation of Philadelphia. Pennsylvania’s
Supreme Executive Council and General Assembly, the leading manifestations of
insurrectionist power in the province, joined Dunlap in his homecoming from Lancaster.
Returning from York, the Continental Congress reassembled at Independence Hall.
Revolutionaries had regained control. Fear of rebel retribution induced several thousand
loyalists who backed the British Crown to depart with General Clinton’s forces.2
Unbeknownst to all sides, patriots would never again relinquish their hold over
Pennsylvania. The British retreat set in motion the first phase of a protracted and complex
process of legal, political and social reintegration for loyalists and disaffected residents
who stayed behind or later returned that extended into the next century.

1

The Pennsylvania Packet, Or the General Advertiser, Saturday, July 4, 1778, DLAR.

2

Estimates of the number of loyalist evacuees from Philadelphia in June 1778 ranged from three to five
thousand from a probable city population of about 30,000. Figures are discussed at length in Chapter 1.
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This inquiry examines loyalism and disaffection in William Penn’s royally
chartered colony during the era of the American Revolution from the Stamp Act Crisis in
1765 through the Age of Federalism in the 1790s, with a special emphasis on loyalist
reintegration. The crux of the investigation covers the decade-and-a-half from 1775 to
1790. The revolutionary and reintegrative processes are covered from the perspective of
both sides of the conflict. In terms of opposition to the Revolution, the study explores the
significance of militant loyalists, disaffected pacifists, and post-occupation armed
resistance to republican rule. On the reverse side, it examines both vengeful and
accommodating rebel reactions to ongoing dissent, as well as the revolutionary policies
and developments that refashioned Pennsylvania’s future.
For our purposes, pro-British Americans who favored royal rule and opposed
republican government are considered loyalists. Those loyalists who were willing to bear
arms and fight for the king or serve in the British civil administration during the
occupation of Philadelphia are further regarded as militants. Pennsylvanians who disliked
revolutionary rule but did not necessarily support the British are defined as disaffected
rather than loyalist. Hence, all loyalists are disaffected but not all the disaffected are
necessarily loyalists.3 Since British defeat and George III’s renunciation of sovereignty
over the rebellious colonies made the notion of loyalism anachronistic, patriots in the
postwar era reclassified ex-loyalists and disaffected residents who stayed in Pennsylvania
as nonjurors – that is, unwilling to swear allegiance to the state. I strive to apply the most

3

While contemporaries used the term “disaffected” quite frequently, patriots called those loyal to the
British during the war “tories,” not loyalists. The latter appellation became more common as the war neared
its end and the British began to consider what to do with those who had remained loyal.
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precise meaning for the terms loyalist, militant, disaffected, and nonjuror at each point in
the chronology, but all converge at the juncture of dissatisfaction with the Revolution.
The essence of this study revolves around the concept of legal and political
reintegration, defined as the reacquisition of the full rights of citizenship in the new
republic lost during the revolutionary turmoil. Reintegration as employed here concerns
possession of the full set of rights available under the system of government in force in
Pennsylvania at a given moment. Pre-independence colonials were English subjects and
not republican citizens. At that time, later revolutionaries and the disaffected together
possessed the same inherent rights of Englishmen under the British Constitution. Both
had their rights transformed under republican rule. But one group had their new rights
affirmed while the other lost the rights they once had. The idea of reintegration addresses
this disparity in treatment, not the transition from British subjecthood to republican
citizenship. Although reintegration takes into account important social, economic,
religious and cultural features which are intermittently woven into the analysis where
applicable, it is the legal and political aspects of reintegration that measure the success or
failure of the process here, for it is in that terrain where the critical battles over rights and
citizenship took place. Reintegration is understood as successful if and when those
legally marginalized by the Revolution recovered their rights as Pennsylvania citizens. It
is deemed a failure when legal deterrents such as retaliatory executions, permanent exile,
banishment, disenfranchisement, quarantine within exclusionary legal categories and the

3

like prohibited loyalists, the disaffected or nonjurors from exercising the basic rights they
once enjoyed before the dispute with Great Britain.4
Also central to the analysis is the concept of the rule of law, a term laden with
multiple meanings often defined by scholarly discipline or legal context. In this study, the
rule of law denotes the supremacy of legal principles and constitutional rights sanctioned
by the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 and later revolutionary acts passed by the state
legislature, set against the potentially arbitrary behavior of patriot factions, officials,
extralegal forces or individuals prone to violate, misapply, or ignore established law.
Here, the rule of law signifies an equal and evenhanded application of revolutionary legal
measures and the legal system to all of the province’s inhabitants, especially on matters
of allegiance. Patriot legal consistency – or lack thereof – is thus measured in relation to
the process of reintegration.
Disaffected or nonjuror residents who remained in or returned to the state
presented patriots with a grave and potentially dangerous social and political dilemma.
That constituency could become a perennially disenfranchised underclass whose
discontent would erode faith in the republican experiment. Revolutionaries had to choose
between reassimilation or accommodation of former opponents, on the one hand, and
ostracism or expulsion on the other.
The problem of the “inimical” or “obnoxious” who either favored the British
monarchy or opposed patriot rule, and yet chose to stay behind, was not unique to
Pennsylvania. It surfaced each time the British ceded occupied territory. In addition to the
Philadelphia withdrawal of June 1778, royal army evacuations took place at Boston in
4

Failed reintegration includes the departed who never sought to reintegrate because the root cause of
departure was a fear of patriot reprisals that generated a subsequent absence of an attempt to reintegrate.
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March 1776, Newport in October 1779, Wilmington, North Carolina in November 1781,
Savannah in July 1782, Charleston in December 1782, and New York in November 1783.
At every place and time, the debate over the future of the loyalists and disaffected who
remained grew heated. Less than a month before the final British evacuation from New
York City – the last imperial stronghold in the colonies – loyal Maryland exile Henry
Addison tensely awaited developments. Upon reading published resolutions impugning
the right of the disaffected to stay or return, he concluded that “there can be no Peace
here for half a century to come.”5 The conundrum of reintegration was arguably the
biggest – and certainly the most urgent – challenge that confronted the infant republic at
the end of the war. The nation’s viability seemed to depend on a palatable resolution of
what to do with the sizeable number of disgruntled residents in the new republic’s midst
who could conceivably develop into an enemy fifth column. While the conclusive peace
of 1783 forced all thirteen rebellious colonies to conjointly face the problem of
disaffection once and for all, each of the regions that British forces captured and
abandoned during the war had already tackled the issue on their own as the conflict
marched on.
In Pennsylvania, the process of reintegration began in the summer of 1778 and
transpired over three phases. From the British evacuation of 1778 to the war’s end, a first
phase under radical supremacy favored ostracism in legal, political, social, and economic
terms. Legally, disaffection led to the loss of core citizen rights and disenfranchisement.
The disaffected could not vote or hold office. Socially, the stigma of infidelity to the

5

Henry Addison to Jonathan Boucher, October 29, 1783, Henry Addison Papers, Clements Library, cited
in Judith Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies: Patriots and Loyalists in Revolutionary New York
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 172.

5

Revolution often brought the larger community’s repudiation and could result in extralegal raptures of violence. Economically, disaffection gave rise to financial penalties for
noncompliance with patriot directives on issues such as militia service, as well as the
forfeiture of property and personal goods, and in some cases prohibitions on employment
in fields like teaching.
The arrival of peace in 1783 inaugurated a second stage of reintegration under
patriot moderates. With the reclassification of ex-loyalists and disaffected residents as
nonjurors, the new era moved retribution largely into the legal and political spheres.
Disenfranchisement and curtailed rights continued and nonjurors still could not vote or be
elected to office. But following an initial frenzy in both the press and the streets, set off
by treaty terms recommending a restitution of seized loyalist property totally ignored in
all thirteen states, social unrest over nonjuror status pointedly died down. Moderate
officials authorized no new property confiscations and did not press against pacifist
rebuffs of militia service or ban nonjurors the exercise of particular professions. Under
moderates, republican society gradually began to reincorporate the formerly disaffected.
A decisive moderate majority in the assembly finally repealed the Test Act in 1789,
launching the third and closing phase of reintegration. The revocation eliminated all test
oaths and restored nonjurors to full citizenship. No legal distinctions remained to detach
the newly enfranchised from fellow Pennsylvanians. The present study examines the
legal, political, social, economic, religious and ethnic aspects of reintegration, when
applicable, in all three historical phases. The spotlight, however, is on the legal battle
over the citizenship of former loyalists, the ex-disaffected, and nonjurors as the final
arbiter of the reintegration process.

6

The conflict over the legal recovery of core rights necessarily encompasses the
topic of republican citizenship, for those rights were a critical ingredient of citizenship in
the early republic. In Pennsylvania as elsewhere in the rebellious colonies, full citizenship
was largely the purview of males of European descent and legally excluded women and
people of color. The language of contemporary legislation tied to the privileges and
obligations of citizenship – such as militia service or oaths of allegiance – expressly
targeted “white males” only. For example, colonial assembly measures only six months
after the outbreak of armed hostilities at Lexington specifically urged “all male white
persons within this province” to join the Association for armed defense, while the
original Test Act put race/gender specifications directly into its title.6 Accordingly, this
study conforms to the framework established by Pennsylvania’s revolutionary authorities
and confines analysis of the expansion or restriction of republican citizenship to that
domain.
Loyalists and the disaffected manifested their opposition to the Revolution in
Pennsylvania in a variety of ways. Scores took up arms for the British, many became
what we would today call conscientious objectors, while others threw in the towel, swore
allegiance to the new state, and joined the rebels. Patriots too exhibited a range of
reactions to the problem of loyalism and disaffection. At times rebels marginalized or
expelled suspected enemies. On other occasions they tried to accommodate dissent. In
select instances, such as the application of the death penalty to a pair of Quakers who

6

See James T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders, eds., Statutes At Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801
(hereafter Statutes At Large of Pennsylvania), vol. 8, “Resolves of Assembly, Agreed to November 8,
1775,” Appendix XXVIII, 492-493; ibid., vol. 9, “An Act Obliging All White Male Inhabitants of This
State to Give Assurances of Allegiance to the Same and for Other Purposes Therein Mentioned,” June 13,
1777, Chapter 756, 110.
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collaborated with British officials, they exerted the full ferocity of revolutionary
retribution to chasten the allegedly blameworthy. The process of reintegration was shaped
by what happened at both ends of this dually driven dynamic. Correspondingly, the
present analysis argues broadly that postwar loyalist reintegration in Pennsylvania
succeeded because of the attitudes, behavior, actions and contributions of both
disaffected residents and patriot citizens.
Loyalists and the disaffected contributed to the successful reintegration of many
of their own number in three ways. First, the departure of most militant loyalists at the
British evacuation of Philadelphia in mid-1778 substantially lessened internal political
tensions along the acrimonious loyalist-patriot axis. The subsequent absence of most
militant opposition refocused domestic politics on the contrasts between competing
patriot factions rather than the need to suppress threats to the Revolution. Second, the
overwhelming majority of the disaffected who stayed in Pennsylvania adopted nonthreatening attitudes and behaviors towards republican rule, despite their initial
disconformity with its direction. In the postwar era, Pennsylvanians came to understand
that legally disenfranchised former loyalists and disaffected residents rebranded as
nonjurors were not much different from themselves and deserved an opportunity to
reintegrate into society as full citizens. Third, the disaffected who remained ultimately
chose to embrace the new republican form of government they had earlier resisted. Some
acquiesced during the war, others did so after the peace of 1783. Their collective
willingness to live and work within a republican framework created a climate conducive
to a reincorporation of actual or suspected former adversaries.

8

For their part, patriots contributed to the successful reintegration of the disaffected
chiefly through the outcome of the factional struggle for internal political supremacy.
Intense divisions between radical and moderate revolutionaries arose over the state
Constitution of 1776. The radical faction dominated the constitutional convention which
not only proposed and approved the new constitution on September 28, 1776 but months
earlier successfully steered Pennsylvania onto the path of independence. The moderate
faction objected to the new fundamental charter of the land for a variety of reasons. They
felt the constitution was illegitimate because the citizenry had been denied the chance to
vote for ratification. They feared the virtual omnipotence of the unicameral assembly as
there was no upper house and neither the executive branch nor the judiciary had any sort
of veto power over acts passed by the legislature. They contested the requirement that a
citizen had to subscribe an oath to the new constitution – which they opposed – in order
to cast a vote in elections or run for office. And not least, the affluent among moderates
viewed the lower and middling radical upstarts with disdain.7 Because radicals supported
the Constitution of 1776, they became known as Constitutionalists, while the moderates’
opposition converted them into Anti-Constitutionalists. Further complicating political
identities, radicals formed a Whig Society and then a Constitutionalist Society, while
moderates founded a Republican Society. These activities led to additional designations
as radical Whigs and moderate Republicans. A person’s initial views on the new state
constitution could also evolve and sometimes completely reversed. My demarcation of
factional lines relies mostly on political groupings in the late 1770s, after the British
evacuation of 1778 had cleared the road for radical ascendancy. It is important to
7

Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 (New York: Octagon Books,
1971; reprint of Pennsylvania Historical Commission’s 1942 edition), 15-16.
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emphasize that moderates as much as radicals remained committed to republican rule
after the Continental Congress passed the Declaration of Independence. Pennsylvania’s
revolutionary moderates had no monarchist proclivities.
The deep factional divisions over the Constitution of 1776 further manifested
themselves in contrary approaches to the treatment of loyalists, the disaffected and
nonjurors, generally along an exclusionary-inclusionary fault line constructed on the
basis of allegiance. After passage of the 1777 Test Act, radical Constitutionalists or
Whigs denied the rights of citizenship to those who did not swear allegiance to the
Revolution, demanding their permanent exclusion from the body politic. AntiConstitutionalist or Republican moderates believed all Pennsylvanians, except those
convicted of treason, had a right to citizenship regardless of wartime allegiance. When
radicals dominated provincial politics, they used the state’s legal apparatus to isolate and
penalize the disaffected. When moderates controlled state government, they used the
legal system to try to reestablish the rights of the disaffected. Consistent moderate wins at
the polls in the 1780s culminated in an interpretation and application of the law in which
the assembly repealed all tests of allegiance in 1789, restoring the rights of previously
marginalized citizens and promulgating their full legal reintegration.8

8

The two designations with the greatest potential for misinterpretation in this study are “radical” and
“Republican.” Radicals here are not Robespierre Jacobins intent on guillotining all opposition. They are
simply advocates of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution. While the small-r “republican” refers to a political
philosophy based on popular sovereignty, Pennsylvania’s “Republicans” are the moderates who opposed
radical “Constitutionalists” or “Whigs” during the revolutionary and postwar eras. They should not be
confused with the Jeffersonian Republicans or Democratic-Republicans of the forthcoming Federalist age
and early nineteenth century. For these, see Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a
Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); Peter S. Onuf & Leonard J. Sadosky, Jeffersonian
America (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002); Eugene Perry Link, The Democratic-Republican
Societies, 1790-1800 (New York: Octagon Books, 1973); and Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of
Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 303-374, 451-460, 549-580, 750-754.
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It is difficult to gauge just how many loyalists supported the British during the
Revolution. The chief problem lies in defining just who qualifies as a “loyalist.” A review
of contemporary sources quickly establishes a major division between those proactively
committed to the king’s cause and those who reactively opposed rebel rule. The two
could be one and the same, but often were not. Underlying motives and intentions
likewise created distinctions. While loyalist militants willingly picked up the sword to
defend the monarchy, pacifists who believed in the God-ordained sanctity of established
royal government and opposed the insurgency nonetheless refused to bear arms for the
king. Yet radical revolutionaries considered both groups equally loyal to the British.
Chronology also played a role. A decade of political resistance preceded the
outbreak of armed hostilities at Lexington in April 1775. During this prelude known as
the imperial crisis, virtually all Pennsylvania colonials contested what they perceived as
the arbitrary and unjust impositions of Parliament. Provincials considered the few who
defended that body’s right to legislate for the colonies as tories. Yet in the early years of
the Revolution, rebels expanded this label to apply to those who had actively resisted
parliamentary intrusions yet would not countenance a final separation from the mother
country. The meaning of the nomenclature was therefore subject to a revolutionary
timeline. Just how one became a loyalist can also influence classification. Throughout the
war, Pennsylvania’s radical government targeted suspected loyalists by name with a
series of punitive measures. Many of the accused remained in the state and surrendered
for trial as ordered, resulting in either discharge or acquittal. In other cases, those who
were truly loyal kept their feelings to themselves in private letters, diaries or journals, or
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acted on behalf of the British but were never discovered. All of this tends to muddle a
precise calculation of “loyalist” rolls.
In response, the present study draws the boundaries broadly while attending to
ambiguities among the purportedly loyal, as well as distinctions within those conditions.
Preference in the first instance is for a broad inclusivity. Besides those who clearly
supported the Crown such as armed militants or civil officials during the occupation,
anyone who self-identified as a loyalist or who patriots suspected of pro-British
tendencies is also considered disaffected, as are those individuals who got into trouble
with state officials for opposing revolutionary policies. Loyalism was therefore the
product of both self-imposed and externally driven factors. Timing or results do not
impact categorization. For example, a person who supported colonial resistance during
the imperial crisis and early Revolution in Pennsylvania but dove into obscurity for
political reasons after the Declaration of Independence is included. In the same way,
individuals tallied in the overall tabulation remain on record regardless of discharge,
acquittal or conviction in patriot adjudicatory venues. To date, research within these
parameters has unearthed 1,858 Pennsylvanians who supported the British or encountered
problems with the patriots, a number that continues to grow as new sources are scoured.
Since most people hid disaffection to rebel authority in the absence of overt British
support, identifiable loyalists were usually an artefact of official revolutionary sanctions
or suspicions – which takes us to the issue of distinctions. A division is drawn here
between those who were undeniably faithful in their adherence to king and empire and
those who disliked republican rule irrespective of their views towards royal governance.
The truly devoted to Britain are considered loyalists, the mere malcontents as disaffected.

12

While significant for the analysis, this distinction did not matter in the eyes of the radicals
who held the reins of power in Pennsylvania into the early 1780s, for they considered
equally at fault everyone who did not stand openly on the side of the Revolution. On
occasion, I use the term tory as a synonym for diehard loyalists, especially when stressed
by contemporary sources. The study strives to sustain the loyalist/disaffected dichotomy
for the war years, but all categories are lumped together in the conflict’s reintegrative
aftermath when revolutionaries legally referred to the disenfranchised as nonjurors.
With these definitions in mind, Paul H. Smith’s oft-cited computation of loyalist
numbers during the American Revolution merits a look. By examining the known
quantity of men who had served in the king’s Provincial Service from “a remarkably
complete record” in surviving British manuscripts, surveying the household patterns of
American loyalist exiles in Canada to reckon extended families, and extrapolating the
proportion of recruits in provincial regiments as a percentage of all loyalists in the
general white population from evidence in Lorenzo Sabine’s compilation of loyalist
biographies and Parliament’s Royal Claims Commission, Smith concluded that “loyalists
comprised about 16 per cent (513,000 out of 3,210,000) of the total population, or about
19.8 per cent of white Americans.”9 When applied to Pennsylvania, Smith’s calculations
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yield a hypothetical estimate of 59,400 loyalists in the state, or 19.8% of a provincial
white population of 300,000.10 Using Royal Claims Commission data, Wallace Brown
ranked the proportional total of Pennsylvania loyalists fifth among the thirteen colonies.
It is likely that disaffection was even greater in Pennsylvania, however, because the large
Quaker presence in the colony tended to stay rather than leave, more so than the loyally
inclined elsewhere, resulting in fewer compensation claims before the parliamentary
commission.11 Whatever the actual figure, disaffected Pennsylvanians were no doubt
substantial in number.
Although loyalism has received ample treatment in the historical literature of the
American Revolution, the scholarship on loyalist reintegration is relatively recent. The
middle third of the twentieth century saw explorations on the treatment of Connecticut,
New York and Massachusetts loyalists in the aftermath of rebellion and the postwar
effects of anti-loyalist property confiscations in Georgia and Massachusetts.12 In addition,
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some modern scholars have tentatively probed reintegration in the closing chapters of
studies focused on loyalists during the war or explored postwar expatriation.13
More comprehensive and targeted inquiries have appeared in the last decade.
Aaron Coleman’s 2008 dissertation “Loyalists in War, Americans in Peace: The
Reintegration of the Loyalists, 1775-1800” looks at reintegration from a broad-based
patriot perspective through ideologies of federalism and republicanism, anti-loyalist
legislation and jurisprudence, citizenship, rights, allegiance, and networks of families and
friends. Coleman argues popular sovereignty drove a national process of reintegration.
While popular will advocated legal persecution of loyalists during the war, reintegration
efforts succeeded in the postwar era because revolutionaries were able to rein in and
reconfigure that same ideology to reincorporate former opponents as new citizens.14 Brett
Palfreyman’s outstanding 2014 dissertation “Peace Process: The Reintegration of the
Loyalists in Post-Revolutionary America” tackles the problem of reintegration by
examining questions of citizenship through state politics, the law, and legal instruments
such as petitions and attainders, as well as culture and memory. Though also national in
scope, Palfreyman keys in on specific states for topical in-depth analysis. He uses South
Carolina and Virginia to examine the role of petitions, and New York and Pennsylvania
Loyalists’ Estates in Suffolk County, Massachusetts,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, vol.
21, no. 4 (October, 1964), 534-550.
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as Africa and India.
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to provide nationwide models for political reintegration. Palfreyman argues that loyalist
reintegration was one of the principal reasons that the American Revolution worked and
proved durable, succeeding through a peaceful process of demobilization, compromise,
and reconciliation in which the winners effectually accommodated the losers. This
settlement involved a patriot adaptability that recognized the benefits of reintegration for
the nation, grappled with the postwar pragmatic and procedural difficulties of separating
loyalists from neutrals and others who did not necessarily support the Revolution yet did
not actively oppose it either, and deferred to the inexorable passage of time and eventual
death of the loyalist generation.15
Two other studies look at reintegration in narrower though no less constructive
regional terms. Rebecca Brannon’s 2007 inquiry entitled “Reconciling the Revolution:
Resolving Conflict and Rebuilding Community in the Wake of Civil War in South
Carolina, 1775-1860” explores reintegration in South Carolina, which she argues was a
successful example of reconciliation in the wake of a violent civil war. Brannon posits
that South Carolinians achieved reintegration because of official government action,
influential and persuasive patriot voices that molded public opinion, and strong bottomup support from the lower and middling orders for a reassimilation of most – not all –
former loyalists. She examines confiscation and anti-loyalist legislation, the culture of
petitioning for forgiveness, legislative clemency, the activism of patriots Aedanus Burke
and Christopher Gadsden, and the loyalist legacy in the state well into the antebellum
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era.16 Before these more recent inquiries, David Maas’ dissertation “The Return of the
Massachusetts Loyalists” was the lone study for over three decades expansively probing
loyalist reintegration. Dating from 1972, Maas concentrates on 233 exiled loyalists from
the Bay State who decided to return after the war. He argues that the decision to return
“was shaped by, almost predetermined” by loyalists’ pre-war activity, whether the exile’s
experience had been favorable or negative, and the application of anti-loyalist legislation
to specific individual cases. Maas finds that ordinary loyalists found their way back to
Massachusetts far more easily than high ranking tories of Thomas Hutchinson’s old guard
who encountered far less rebel sympathy. His study has a strong quantitative bent and is
replete with tables and graphs, as per the historiography of his era. He digs deep into
demographic explanations – political, ideological, military, economic, occupational,
regional, religious and ethnic – for both loyalist and patriot actors.17
The present study is also the fifth generation in the subfield of Pennsylvania
loyalism, following Wilbur Siebert in 1920, Henry James Young in 1955, John Walter
High in 1974, and Anne Ousterhout in 1987. Siebert’s The Loyalists of Pennsylvania is a
descriptive work introducing the loyalist presence in the colony, including the Upper
Ohio, the northeast frontier, and the Indian Tract on Lake Erie. The crux of the study
portrays patriot repression against loyalists and neutrals before, during, and after the
British invasion and occupation of Philadelphia in 1777-1778, and specific issues such as
16

Rebecca Nathan Brannon, “Reconciling the Revolution: Resolving Conflict and Rebuilding Community
in the Wake of Civil War in South Carolina, 1775-1860,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan,
2007). Brannon’s work has recently been published under the title From Revolution to Reunion: The
Reintegration of the South Carolina Loyalists (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2016).
My references in this study are limited to her dissertation.
17

David E. Maas, “The Return of the Massachusetts Loyalists,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Wisconsin, 1972). Maas later published a biographical index of the loyalists in his study entitled Divided
Hearts: Massachusetts Loyalists 1765-1790 (Society of Colonial Wars, 1980).

17

the pardon of attainted loyalists, the sale of confiscated loyalist property, and postwar
loyalist exiles in Great Britain and Canada.18 Young’s unpublished dissertation entitled
“The Treatment of the Loyalists in Pennsylvania” concentrates on patriot military,
economic and political pressures against the “static” loyalists, revolutionary punishment
of “dynamic” loyalists, and a closing chapter on the rehabilitation of the disaffected
following the war. As the title posits, the focus is on patriot measures against the loyally
inclined.19 High’s similarly unpublished dissertation “The Philadelphia Loyalists, 17631783” limits analysis to the disaffected in the provincial capital through the war. He is
one of relatively few scholars, however, to give an active voice to the loyalists
themselves. High examines loyalist identity through ideology and religious attitudes,
what compelled them to remain loyal to Britain, and their failure to organize or act
vigorously in defense of the Crown which rendered their support for imperial aims
negligible.20 Ousterhout’s A State Divided: Opposition in Pennsylvania to the American
Revolution is the best and most extensive account of loyalism in Penn’s colony. Covering
all regions from the imperial crisis through the end of the war in 1783, she explores in
great detail loyalist types and characteristics, how they expressed dissent, the forces that
contributed to their disaffection, and revolutionary responses to their loyalism. Her
account ends with the peace of 1783. Ousterhout too succeeds in putting loyalist
articulations, rather than patriot treatment, front and center.21 The emphasis in these
18
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Pennsylvania-centric accounts is generally on loyalists during the war, not the process of
reintegration, though Siebert guardedly touches upon the postwar era and Young does
dedicate a full chapter to loyalist rehabilitation. The present inquiry therefore fills a
historiographical void at the essentially unexplored crossroads of reintegration and
Pennsylvania loyalism.
The methodology employed here adds a unique dimension to the above
intersection. None of the studies on either Pennsylvania loyalism or national/regional
reintegration rely on biographical case studies as the driving force of analysis. The
detailed personal explorations of the lives, motives and characters of loyal and
disaffected Pennsylvanians themselves, rather than a “big picture” thematic approach
from above, lends the present study another distinguishing feature. Given these
historiographical and methodological factors, my contribution to the overall historical
scholarship is threefold: one, to produce the first study of reintegration in Pennsylvania;
second, to place loyalist agency as a centerpiece of the state’s reintegration drama; and
third, to furnish the first intensively biographical work in both the Pennsylvania loyalist
and national/regional reintegration fields. It is the emphasis on the critical choices of
particular individuals who did not support the rebellion in determining their own destiny
– beyond the actions of the revolutionaries – that sets this work apart.
Accordingly, this inquiry is organized around the respective loyalist/disaffected
and patriot contributions to reintegration – in the first instance examining loyally inclined
militancy, pacifism and defiance, and in the second rebel vengeance, accommodation,
and the demand for permanent republican rule. Chapter one emphasizes patriot actions.
21
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Chapters two through four focus on disaffected attitudes and behaviors, while chapters
five and six blend both approaches. The radical vs. moderate factional struggle for
political supremacy in Pennsylvania provides a common thread through all chapters.
More specifically, the first chapter argues that the political struggle between
revolutionary factions in Pennsylvania set the context and helped determine the fate of
the disaffected. It examines the legal measures patriots engaged to combat loyalism and
disaffection from 1775 to 1794, according to radical Constitutionalist and moderate AntiConstitutionalist or Republican models for dealing with opponents of rebellion. The
analysis surveys disarmament, treason, test oath, attainder, confiscation and militia laws,
dividing the legal revolution against the disaffected into four phases. Radicals brandished
the law as an exclusionary mechanism to punish loyalist dissent while moderates in most
cases sought inclusion. Chapter two argues that the departure of elite loyalist militants
significantly diminished internal political friction and created a climate for a smoother
reintegration of the disaffected who stayed, while advancing the overthrow and
destruction of proprietary government. The focus is on rival colonial elites based in the
provincial capital represented by the sons of William Allen Sr. for the Proprietary party
and Joseph Galloway for the Quaker party. The probe shows how colonial enmity faded
and interests converged with the approach of revolution, why these pre-war foes wound
up on the same side, and what their collaboration meant for the reintegration of the
disaffected and the new republic.
Chapter three posits that the substantial number of loyalist militants from the
lower and middling echelons of society who went into exile likewise lessened internal
political tensions and created a favorable climate for reintegration. Class and regional
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considerations during the Revolution drive the analysis, rather than colonial factionalism
and Philadelphia elitism. Protagonists include the Rankin brothers of York County, John
Connolly in Cumberland County on the western frontier, Pennamites in Northumberland
County whose territorial dispute with Connecticut settlers split the two into loyalist and
patriot camps, and a broad swath of “ordinary” loyalist militants including locals that
served in the provincial regiments organized by the British. The fourth chapter contends
that the pacifist Quakers who stayed and refused to take the oath of allegiance personified
the non-threatening behavior and eventual acceptance of republican rule that facilitated
the postwar reassimilation of the ex-disaffected turned nonjurors. Scrutiny is centered on
members of the Society of Friends banished to Virginia as British invaders approached
Philadelphia in 1777 – especially Israel, James and John Pemberton. The Pembertons and
their fellow antiwar exiles provide an opportunity to investigate the large contingent of
reformist Quakers who opposed all violence and armed turmoil, a singular feature of
Pennsylvania’s Revolution within the national experience. Quaker refusal to submit to the
patriot oath of allegiance for religious reasons and their view that rebellion was unholy
because God had ordained established government guide the narrative through the 1789
Test Act repeal and into the early nineteenth century.
Chapter five argues that both radical and moderate patriot factions employed the
law to quash perceived existential threats to the Revolution, although perceptions of what
constituted such a menace differed significantly. The analysis contrasts the vengeful
radical-dominant government that pursued and succeeded in legally executing Quakers
Abraham Carlisle and John Roberts following the British evacuation with the joint
moderate-radical eradication of the Doan guerrilla gang in the postwar era. Whereas both
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moderates and radicals construed armed opposition as an existential threat, radicals
further defined that threat as any collaboration with the British. The chapter tracks the
reintegration experiences of surviving family members from the Carlisle, Roberts and
Doan clans to show how the advent of moderate government in the 1780s led to greater
leniency towards onetime opponents. The sixth and final chapter examines the heirs of
Pennsylvania founder William Penn. Patriot radicals used the revolutionary legal order to
overthrow the Penn proprietorship in Pennsylvania by first destroying their political
authority via the new Constitution of 1776 and then stripping the Penn family of most of
their property holdings through the Divestment Act of 1779. Radical treatment of the
Penn family was fair and comparatively lenient, however; radicals granted compensation
for seized properties and allowed the proprietors to retain portions of the lands known as
the Manors or Proprietary Tenths. The account follows the reintegration experience of the
Penn male heirs – brothers John Sr. and Richard, and their cousin John Penn Jr. – into the
postwar era, exploring questions of national identity tied to allegiance as each weighed
the merits or disadvantages of American citizenship vs. British subjecthood.
The reintegration saga in Pennsylvania reaches back into the colonial past and
extends well into the republican future. This largely ignored drama yields fruitful insights
on royal dominion in America, colonial resistance, rebellion, antirevolutionary dissent,
popular sovereignty, and the nature and character of the new republic. We begin our trek
with a detailed assessment of how Pennsylvania’s revolutionaries countered the challenge
that disaffection posed to “the glorious cause – the defense of republican freedom.”22
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CHAPTER 1
FROM REVOLUTION TO REINTEGRATION:
PENNSYLVANIA’S RESPONSE TO LOYALISM AND DISAFFECTION
Patriot governance in Pennsylvania encountered opposition to revolt from the
outbreak of armed hostilities. Rebel reaction to both overt loyalist support for the British
monarchy and internal disaffection with revolutionary trends encompassed legislative and
executive measures dealing with militia service, treason, disarmament, allegiance tests,
attainders and the confiscation of real and personal property. The breadth, severity and
enforcement of these legal instruments evolved over time in accordance with the relative
distribution of political power between insurrectionist radical and moderate factions.
Despite a great deal of unrest, patriot legal measures effectively checked active loyalism
and clamped down on passive disaffection. Hence, in the absence of direct support from
the British, local opposition never imperiled the revolutionary enterprise in Pennsylvania.
As a general rule, radicals exerted power more harshly than moderates.1 Four
discernible phases of the patriot response to disaffection illustrate this pattern. During the
first stage, radical Constitutionalists took control of the Revolution and overthrew the
reigning colonial government under the Penn proprietorship with encouragement from
the Continental Congress sitting at Philadelphia. The radical movement surged with
creation of an Association for provincial defense in the summer of 1775 and coalesced
with the Declaration of Independence, convocation of a state constitutional convention
and passage of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. Radicals consolidated their
revolutionary vision during the second phase, a particularly volatile interlude from the
first newly constituted general assembly in late 1776 through the British invasion,
1
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occupation, and evacuation of Philadelphia from September 1777 to June 1778. This
radical moment spawned the crucial treason, test oath and attainder laws which targeted
loyalists and the disaffected throughout the War of Independence and its aftermath. The
third phase commenced with the return to the capital of Congress and Pennsylvania’s
patriot government from their respective refuges at York and Lancaster. Radicals at this
time reestablished control of state government, punished disaffection, and seized most of
the Penn family’s extensive public land holdings. While this interval proved to be the
zenith of radical power in Pennsylvania, instability characterized much of the political
and economic landscape. The period closed with an upswing in support for moderates
beginning in the fall elections of 1781. During this lengthy final stage into the Age of
Federalism, moderate Anti-Constitutionalist/Republican ascendancy eradicated the
remaining vestiges of armed opposition to rebel rule and terminated all legal distinctions
between those who had earlier supported the British and those who had stood with the
Revolution.
Patriot factional politics greatly impacted the reintegration of the disaffected in
Pennsylvania, a process that transpired over the later phases of intrarevolutionary discord.
Although unresolved military conflict cast a fog of uncertainty over the future through
1783, the reintegrative struggle actually began with withdrawal of Sir Henry Clinton’s
army in the summer of 1778, introducing the peak of radical supremacy, rather than at the
war’s conclusion and the arrival of peace as in British-occupied New York.2 On the
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thorny issue of disaffection, Pennsylvania patriots clashed over more than a decade on an
exclusionary/inclusionary fault line constructed on the basis of allegiance. Allegiance to
the rebellion constituted the sine qua non for securing a citizen’s rights, the fundamental
issue which had originally sparked insurrection. Patriots thus applied the law to defend
the rights of those devoted to the Revolution. Both radical and moderate factions
accepted this paradigm. But they diverged in their approach to the disaffected who
spurned revolutionary fidelity during the war and after the peace.
Radicals demanded permanent exclusion of the “inimical” and “obnoxious” who
openly defied or failed to support the rebel movement. In the radical view, citizenship
was a privilege earned during the fight for independence. Only those who contributed to
the cause of republican liberty deserved to enjoy the advantages of republican rights.
Moderates disagreed. They upheld that all Pennsylvania inhabitants – except those who
had been found guilty of active treachery – had an intrinsic right to citizenship regardless
of their declared revolutionary allegiance, activism, or lack thereof.3 Although these
competing factions paid meticulous attention to the law in its composition and
enforcement, each configured and applied state law with this broader perspective on
rights and allegiance in mind. Contemporary anti-loyalist legislation therefore reflected
provincial power dynamics as well as the contours of fluctuating patriot interpretations of
the permissible, furnishing the framework for the battle over reintegration. When radicals

For the battle and British capture of New York City, see David McCullough, 1776 (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2005). For New York and the surrounding area during the War for Independence, see Ruma
Chopra, Unnatural Rebellion; and Judith Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies.
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dominated provincial politics, the concepts of inherent rights and the rule of law served to
isolate and penalize the disaffected. When moderates controlled state government, the
defense of citizens’ rights and corresponding legal mechanisms opened the door for a
reassimilation of the very people that law had once persecuted. Since only the consent of
the winners could countenance the full legal and social reincorporation of those once
considered toxic adversaries, it was moderate factional victory culminating in the repeal
of the Test Act in March of 1789 which ultimately crafted a suitable path for the
successful reintegration of the disaffected.
THE COLONIAL ORDER UNDER DURESS (April 1775 – November 1776)
From the advent of armed rebellion onward, radicals worked the law to separate,
disempower and punish loyalists and the disaffected, simultaneously reinforcing their
own political legitimacy while striving to build a new state. They did so on the basis of
allegiance, essentially restricting the rights of citizenship to only those who supported the
Revolution. Radical patriots improvised the path to the marginalization of those who did
not back the insurgency more so than subscribing to any predetermined design. As
conditions changed, radicals reacted. The first stage began spontaneously with the launch
of a makeshift military association to defend the Revolution and closed with a
repudiation of all allegiance to the British monarch, the overthrow of the colonial
proprietary regime, and the elevation of the principle of popular sovereignty as the basis
for government.
The factional antagonism which marked the road to reintegration developed long
before the onset of armed rebellion. Almost from its founding, Pennsylvania was rife
with factional dissonance. Quaker and proprietary “parties” vied for political dominance
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throughout the colonial era. The advent of the imperial crisis created new fissures. From
the 1765 Stamp Act forward, a tug-of-war between Pennsylvania’s radical and moderate
Whigs existed over how to best counter the overextension of parliamentary authority in
the colonies. Provincials in Pennsylvania and elsewhere dubbed those who sided with
Parliament as “tories” – but committed tories were few and far between in Penn’s colony.
For nearly a decade, virtually everyone agreed that Parliament’s overreach had to be
challenged. Just how that should be accomplished became the defining issue. Cautious
Philadelphia merchants aligned with popular sentiment to approve nonimportation
agreements in response to the Stamp Act, the Townsend Acts, and then the Intolerable
Acts that led to the closure of Boston harbor.4 The preferred approach among these
conservatives was to petition Parliament as colonial Englishmen for a redress of
grievances. But merchant will sometimes waned as they bore severe economic losses.5
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On the more radical margins, popular forces hosted crowd actions on five
occasions during the Stamp Act affair and replicated protests on customs issues five more
times from 1769 to 1774. In Philadelphia, the triumph of the “Mechanic Ticket” in the
unauthorized November 1774 Committee of Inspection and Observation elections
heralded a major shift in the on-the-ground power balance from conventional Quaker and
proprietary elites often at odds with each other to a novel contingent of “inferior” sorts
led by middling artisans. These mechanics set up an unsanctioned Committee of SixtySix, pressing for more aggressive counters to royal intransigence.6 The shots fired at
Lexington on April 19, 1775 suddenly transformed nonviolent colonial resistance into
armed rebellion. When news arrived in Philadelphia five days later, popular reaction was
instantaneous.7 In a city of thirty thousand inhabitants, eight thousand rallied on April 25
to launch an association for military defense against British aggression. Companies of
armed associators formed on the 29th. In June, the Committee of Sixty-Six petitioned the
colonial assembly for assistance in martial preparations. Two thousand militiamen
paraded in review through city center that month. Under bottom-up duress, the colonial
assembly hesitantly endorsed the official creation of an Association for defense – in
effect, a state militia – under Lockean principles “for the defense of their lives, liberty
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and property.”8 Association was an appellation inherited from the unofficial bodies
enforcing nonimportation agreements during the imperial crisis. By mid-September of
1775, a popularly elected Committee of Privates pushed to make the Association
compulsory for all white male adult citizens.9
Throughout the building storm, the Penn proprietary interest and the Quaker party
– historical foes – watched the agitation with mounting alarm. Conservatives from both
factions controlled the colonial assembly, still legally the final arbiter of local power.
There, resistance to radicalization was strong. Legislators were not the only ones wary of
the ominous turn of events. In September, a mob carted loyalists Isaac Hunt and Dr. John
Kearsley around the city, insulting and threatening to tar-and-feather each in turn. The
throng bayoneted the doctor’s hand and broke windows in his home after he discharged a
pistol into the crowd and insisted on singing “God Save the King.”10 In October, Quakers
presented the assembly with an address impugning the compulsory nature of the militia
association, asserting that “we, as a religious society, have declared to the World that we
could not for Conscience Sake bear Arms, nor be concerned in warlike Preparations,
either by personal Service or by paying any Fines, Penalties or Assessments, imposed in
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Consideration of our Exemption from such Services.”11 Other true blue supporters of the
king surfaced. Tory clubs toasting His Royal Majesty’s health and the victory of imperial
arms met secretly in loyal homes, as well as in taverns owned by champions of empire.12
As General George Washington and the Continental Army besieged Boston
through the winter of 1775-76, Pennsylvania revolutionaries tackled tangible and
surreptitious disaffection through militia laws and redoubled pressures on established
colonial institutions. Although not designed for that purpose, militia laws introduced the
first active measures against loyalism and disaffection in the province. Obligatory militia
service enabled the patriot government to distinguish between those committed to the
rebel cause and those who were not. To join or not to join – that was the question. The
answer told authorities much about where an individual stood. As Douglas Bradburn has
observed, “militia service… became both an important arbiter and agent of loyalty.”13
Militia regulations also pursued an equal apportionment of the burden of rebellion. On
November 8, 1775, the conservative colonial assembly caved to bottom-up exigencies,
adopting militia resolutions they surely would not have approved of their own accord. In
this and all future militia deliberations, white males were the sole target for compulsory
enlistment, a race/gender alignment which embraced all social classes. Two resolves
grappled with the problem of citizens who refused to join the Association. In deference to
the substantial Quaker presence in the colony, one allowed exemptions for men between
11
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sixteen and fifty years “conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms.” Another qualified
that statement by adding that those “capable of bearing arms, who shall not associate for
the defense of this province, ought to contribute an equivalent to the time spent by the
associators in acquiring the military discipline.”14
Later that month, the assembly passed a bill entitled “The articles of association in
Pennsylvania” defining rules of conduct for associators and regulating their commitment.
Significantly, it addressed the issue of non-association. A section of the articles dubbed
“Resolutions directing the Mode of Levying Taxes on Non-Associators in Pennsylvania”
authorized tax commissioners in each county to list the names of non-associators in order
to “charge every such person not associating, over and above the rates and assessments
set upon him by virtue of the laws of this province, the sum of two pounds ten shillings.”
The resolutions made no accommodation for non-associators with religious scruples
except in the case of assessors who refused to perform duties for that reason. In just over
two weeks, a nebulous “time” equivalency had morphed into a hard cash penalty and
pacifists no longer merited special consideration.15 Momentum lay with the radicals.
The Continental Congress, not the provincial government, first pushed the crucial
issue of treason to the forefront in Pennsylvania. By definition, treason drew lines in the
sand over allegiance, affording a mechanism to define who was for self-government and
who was against it. The concept claimed a long tradition in English law transplanted
14
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adeptly across the Atlantic. Treason was a breach of the sacred and reciprocal trust
between ruler and ruled. The ruler provided subjects with protection and justice; subjects
had a duty to bestow their allegiance on the sovereign.16 Sir William Blackstone,
arguably the most respected jurist in eighteenth century England and a legal authority the
revolutionaries held in the utmost esteem, defined treason as crimes against “the supreme
executive power, or the king and his government; which amount either to a total
renunciation of that allegiance, or at the least to criminal neglect of that duty, which is
due from every subject to his sovereign.”17
The treason question arose in part as a result of the arrest of John Connolly and
his co-conspirators – “persons inimical to the liberties of America” – captured in
Maryland in late 1775 en route to inciting a loyalist revolt near Fort Pitt in Cumberland
County and sent to Philadelphia for prosecution.18 Their case revealed a grave
incongruity between law and reality, for all provincials – including rebels – legally
remained His Royal Majesty’s obedient subjects. The only treason then possible in the
thirteen insubordinate colonies was treason against none other than King George III.
Although clearly acting in a seditious manner against the American rebellion, Connolly
and company had not technically committed treason for there was as yet no revolutionary
16
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law to that effect. The incident became a clarion call for Congress at Philadelphia. Their
response on January 2, 1776 became known as the Tory Act. Since there was no central
government to speak of at the time, Congress could not compel any single colony to act
in a certain way, much less obligate all thirteen at once to comply with their directives.
The best it could hope for was voluntary consent. Accordingly, delegates framed the act
as a set of proposals.19
This congressional resolution nonetheless proved to be a watershed moment for
the disaffected. It catapulted those loyal to Great Britain into the limelight; enlarged the
scope of cooperation between Congress and Pennsylvania radicals while injecting the
problem of political discontent into that collaboration; and most importantly, inaugurated
a redefinition of reciprocal allegiance. In the emerging reconfiguration, the ruled were to
rule themselves, owing fidelity only to representatives and officials of state and local
governments elected by popular sovereignty, as well as the Continental Congress the
elected provincial governments had freely joined.
The Tory Act itself was comparatively brief as far as governmental resolves go –
a single page with two columns, easily printed as a broadside. Divided thematically into
three sections, the first part defined its intended targets, the second provided specific
measures for its implementation, and the last fused justifications for its enactment with a
call for moderation in its application. The opening differentiated the viewpoints of two
19
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sets of colonials towards resistance against the Crown. It acknowledged “diverse and well
meaning, but uninformed people in these colonies [who] have been deceived and drawn
into erroneous opinions, respecting the American cause, and the probable issue of the
present contest.” Revolutionaries needed to treat these apprehensive souls with “kindness
and attention” and construe their errors as “proceeding rather from want of information,
than want of virtue or public spirit.” To win over the dubious, patriots had to instruct
them on the repeated failure of colonial petitions to the king and alert them to “the
various arts of administration to ensnare and enslave us” conducted through imperial
intrigues. As a remedy, the act suggested that officials widely distribute the proceedings
of the First and Second Continental Congresses, along with patriotic pamphlets, papers,
and the speeches of colonial allies in Britain’s Parliament which “elucidate the merits of
the American cause.”20
The resolution then pinpointed the ultimate target of the measure: “unworthy
Americans... [who] have taken part with our oppressors… regardless of their duty to their
creator, their country, and their posterity.” These reprobates were “influenced by the hope
or possession of ignominious rewards” and “recommend themselves to the bounty of
administration by misrepresenting and traducing the conduct and principles of the friends
of American liberty, and opposing every measure formed for its preservation and
security.” The act proposed remedies to “frustrate the mischievous machinations, and
restrain the wicked practices of these men” in rather tentative terms, demonstrating just
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how little power the congressional assembly actually exercised. “And it is the opinion of
this Congress”, the resolution continued, “that they ought to be disarmed and the more
dangerous among them either kept in safe custody, or bound with sufficient sureties to
their good behavior.” Towards this end, the national assembly disposed the placement of
continental troops under provincial authority and called for increasing unity among the
rebellious colonies. Finally, Congress advised caution. Despite a litany of “execrable
barbarity… on the part of our enemies” including the burning of colonial towns, seizing
provincials’ property, raining devastation and misery upon them, inducing Indians to
attack frontier settlements, jailing the opposition, and exposing the citizens of Boston to
the “insolence of the soldiery,” it was essential to exert restraint. “Cruelty should find no
admission among a free people,” counseled delegates.21 With this artful formulation, the
Continental Congress propelled the issue of allegiance into the revolutionary vanguard.
The resolution sent two clear messages: to the undecided, choose a side; to patriots,
disarm those who chose wrongly.
Twice more during that spring and summer, Congress resurrected the issues of
disarmament and allegiance. Ten weeks after the Tory Act, they exhorted authorities
“immediately to cause all persons to be disarmed within their respective colonies, who
are notoriously disaffected to the cause of America, or who have not associated, and shall
refuse to associate, to defend, by arms, these United Colonies, against the hostile attempts
of the British fleets and armies.” Stressing the rule of law over indiscriminate seizures,
Congress recommended payment for all commandeered arms after an appraisal “by
indifferent persons.” Provincial governments were to employ seized weapons to arm
21
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continental troops, militias and associators.22 In June, Congress tackled the nature of
allegiance and treason more directly. In response to a report from its Committee on Spies
– which in itself speaks volumes about internal strife only two weeks before the
Declaration of Independence – delegates “Resolved, That all persons abiding within any
of the United Colonies, and deriving protection from the laws of the same, owe allegiance
to said laws, and are members of such colony.” The resolution declared that those “who
shall levy war against any of the said colonies… be adherent to the king of Great Britain,
or others the enemies of said colonies… giving to him or them aid and comfort, are guilty
of treason against such a colony” and should be punished. Working once again within
prescribed jurisdictional limits, Congress suggested that provincial legislatures each
determine the extent of that punishment.23
Not surprisingly, Pennsylvania’s disjointed government stalled at this juncture.
Ambiguity towards disarmament, allegiance and treason bared a much larger problem:
proprietary rule was on the verge of collapse. Many colonial officials no doubt preferred
the stability of monarchy to feared turmoil under popular rule. Structurally, proprietor
John Penn Sr. continued as governor and his appointed provincial council remained in
place, at least nominally, but that body did not convene after November 25, 1775, when
Penn asked a Northumberland County magistrate to reassert Pennsylvania’s authority in
the frontier controversy with Connecticut.24 Meanwhile, the duly elected and much
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conflicted colonial assembly wavered under the decreasing influence of conservatives.
Although the assembly met intermittently through the spring and summer of 1776, it was
torn between a traditionalist inclination for the old order and popular demands. The
internal battle for control is evident in the legislative agenda.25 On the one hand,
representatives christened two bills about to expire in April of 1776 under the rubric of
“the Eleventh Year of the Reign of His Present Majesty King George the Third.” That the
assembly did not wish to sever ties with “His Present Majesty” at that late date rings
sonorously. On the other hand, the same House approved “sundry alterations” for the
military association and penalties for non-associators on April 5 and further disarmament
measures the following day. These alterations included an escalation in fines for failure to
serve to three pounds ten shillings, fines for masters or mistresses who prevented
apprentices from joining the association, and levies against commissioners who refused
to perform required duties. An exception was again granted for officials refusing to carry
out duties “from conscientious motives.”26 Even the radical Committee of Safety, perhaps
25
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still unsure of its footing, ignored the Tory Act recommendations at first. Instead, they
turned their attention to organizing military defense for a presumed British assault.
Committee Minutes for the ten days immediately following the Tory Act disclose a
recurring preoccupation with gunpowder, gun barrels, firelocks, “the manufactory of Salt
Petre,” munitions, muskets, officer appointments, the raising of regiments, and financial
matters related to acquisition and payment of the above.27 The sum of these events
reveals that disaffection was common even within government and radicals had not yet
achieved full control of the insurgency.
Radicals’ aspirations to employ the legal system as a weapon against loyalists and
the disaffected soon converged with congressional impatience over the state’s political
impasse. During the spring and summer of 1776, an increasingly militant Continental
Congress tilted the balance of power in Pennsylvania. Two decisive measures offered
radicals a justification for deposing the existing political regime. Although congressional
resolutions were usually national in scope, the first measure targeted Pennsylvania to a
large extent. On May 10, Congress “Resolved, That it be recommended to the respective
assemblies and conventions of the United Colonies, where no government sufficient to
the exigencies of their affairs have been hitherto established, to adopt such government as
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shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to the happiness
and safety of their constituents in particular, and America in general.” Radicals jumped
on the bandwagon. On June 8, the colonial assembly dramatically reversed its earlier
instructions to Pennsylvania’s delegates in the Continental Congress, “removing the
restrictions laid upon you” regarding separation from Great Britain and authorizing
provincial representatives to “concur with the other delegates in Congress, in forming
such compacts between the United Colonies… [as] shall be judged necessary for
promoting the liberty, safety and interests of America.” The coup de grace came in July
when the Declaration of Independence obliterated what little authority the reigning
assembly still retained.28
Pennsylvania radicals seized upon congressional calls for drastic change by
convening a provincial constitutional convention. Convention delegates gathered in
Philadelphia in late June and elected representatives to write a new constitution on July 8.
Arriving at the realization that they were the lone active political body in the province,
delegates adopted responsibilities not within their original mandate. The constitutional
convention passed nine ordinances before adjourning in late September. Issues of
disarmament, militia burdens and treason figured prominently on the agenda. On July 19,
radicals directed militia officers to “collect, receive and take all the arms… in the hands
of non-associators in the most expeditious and effectual manner.” On September 5,
convention delegates approved the first revolutionary treason ordinance. Then on the 14th

28

Congress’ May resolution for new state governments responded mainly to local elections in Pennsylvania
that had returned a conservative majority to the colonial assembly. Journals of the Continental Congress,
May 10, 1776, vol. 4, 342; ibid., July 4, 1776, “The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen United States of
America,” 510-515. For the revised instructions to Pennsylvania’s delegates in Congress, Statutes At Large
of Pennsylvania, vol. 8, “Resolves of Assembly, June 8 th, 1776,” 567-569.

39

they set fines for non-association at twenty shillings per month and added prorated
penalties of four shillings per pound on total estate values for neglect of militia service.
Monthly and annual penalties had replaced one-time fines.29 A zealous Council of Safety
did not lag far behind, exhorting Committees of Inspection to “a Vigorous Exertion of all
their Power” to ensure compliance with assembly disarmament orders, then determining
that Associators who had not marched to battle outside the state or enrolled in companies
for local defense “shall be deemed a Non Associator.”30 Clearer lines of allegiance were
emerging.
With declared independence creating a new political climate, militia penalties and
disarmament directives no longer seemed sufficient tools to combat disaffection. The
elephant in the room was treason. The convention responded with an ordinance defining
and punishing sedition. Grounding its authority on the notion that “government ought at
all times to take the most effectual measures for the safety and security of the state,” the
regulation declared that all inhabitants “do and shall owe and pay allegiance to the state
of Pennsylvania,” a condition that could not be renounced if a person remained in the
province. It established three offenses as high treason: first, to “levy war against this
state”; second, to “be adherent to the King of Great Britain or others the enemies of this
state or to the enemies of the United States of America”; and third, “giving him or them
29
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aid or assistance within the limits of this state or elsewhere.” For such breaches of
patriotic trust, an offender was to “forfeit his lands, tenements, goods and chattels to the
use of the state” and face imprisonment for “any term not exceeding the duration of the
present war with Great Britain.” Constitutional convention delegates also defined a less
seditious category for those not being traitors themselves who nonetheless knew of the
treason of others, concealed it, or assisted the wrongdoers. Misprision of treason carried a
reduced penalty forfeiting one-third of property and goods, but bore the same jail time as
high treason. Attuned to the public burden such an act might produce, a fourth section
stipulated that judges could use proceeds from forfeited estates to support wives and
children. Expediently, traitors would pay for the upkeep of their kin. The treason
ordinance was provisional, slated to last through the first session of the first assembly
under the new constitution.31 Radicals wanted to ensure that the new government lived by
the rule of law and left the final formulation to the coming legally constituted assembly.
Nevertheless, the convention had thrown down the gauntlet. Dissent was to be punished
officially with property confiscation and jail.
Unanimity on treason in Pennsylvania apparently did not exist even among fellow
patriots. There is a “Proposed Ordinance” published as a broadside, attributed to an
imprecise date in 1776 when “the General Convention met,” where penalties differed
from those of the first ordinance. Traitors were to “suffer death,” not prison, as well as
forfeiting half of their property and goods. Those convicted of misprision of treason were
to “suffer the Forfeiture to Two Thirds” of property and goods and be jailed for no more
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than a year.32 Whether the broadside appeared prior to the convention treason ordinance
as part of the civic debate or circulated thereafter to renew that debate is unclear.
The day before the official colonial assembly convened for the last time on
September 26, a majority voted to impugn the constitutional convention for “arbitrary
and oppressive” fines against non-associators, alleging convention delegates “have
derived no Authority from the good People of Pennsylvania to levy Taxes and dispose of
their Property.” Few listened and the assembly lost its will to fight thereafter.33 The next
day, conventioneers further tilted the political scales in favor of the radicals, approving a
resolution requiring voters under the new republican order take an oath or affirmation to
“be faithful and true to the commonwealth of Pennsylvania” and do nothing “prejudicial
or injurious to the constitution or government thereof, as established by the convention.”
This decree eliminated from the voter rolls patriot moderates who did not agree with the
convention itself or the direction it had taken, as well as scores of Quakers and other
pacifists who, bound by their religious strictures, declined to obey the directive to pledge
allegiance. Radicals had stacked the electoral deck.34
Congress’ May 10th exhortation to set up new governments culminated on
September 28 when the convention ratified the Constitution of 1776. The cornerstone of
the new order was a wholesale transfer of loyalty. Since Pennsylvanians’ “heretofore
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acknowledged allegiance to the king of Great Britain” had been corrupted and the king
had withdrawn his protection and initiated “with unabated vengeance, a most cruel and
unjust war,” the convention declared that “all allegiance and fealty to the said king and
his successors, are dissolved and at an end.” Government was now to be “founded on the
authority of the people only.” The new charter required state judicial, executive, and
military officers, but not the common citizenry, to take a two-part oath of allegiance and
do nothing “prejudicial or injurious” to the commonwealth.35 For those accustomed to
colonial authority, it was devastating moment. Politically, the Constitution of 1776 overthrew the proprietary government William Penn had founded nearly a century before.
The General Assembly convened for the first time under the new structure on
November 28, 1776, giving birth to a Pennsylvania built according to the vision of the
radical Constitutionalists. By then, increasing turbulence and harassment from the lower
sorts convinced some conservatives who had resisted parliamentary overextension but
opposed separation from Britain that there was no room for them in radical Pennsylvania.
Among them were John, Andrew and William Allen Jr., three of the four sons of the
former colonial chief justice, and Joseph Galloway, longtime colonial assembly speaker
and ex-Quaker party ally of Benjamin Franklin. In late 1776, these elites established
contact with General William Howe and joined the British at New York.36 Radicalization
had generated schism.
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QUELLING DISAFFECTION: THE RADICAL VISION (November 1776 – June 1778)
During the second phase of the patriot response to loyalism, radicals defined and
codified into law the crucial distinctions grounded on allegiance that served as the basis
for isolating, disempowering and penalizing those dissatisfied with the Revolution during
the war and after. Radical legal control generated a plethora of treason, test oath,
attainder, confiscation and militia measures that denied loyalists and the disaffected the
rights of citizenship and exacted stiff penalties for their dissent. The arm of radical rule
could not reach those Pennsylvania loyalists who sought the protection of the British
during the occupation of Philadelphia and, for a while, these legal instruments seemed
insignificant. But once it became apparent that the king’s army would evacuate the
captive provincial capital, the radical legal program created a climate of fear and disarray
in the ranks of the disaffected and resulted in the flight of many.
By the time the new state assembly gathered for the first time in late November
1776, it was impossible to escape the sharpened revolutionary divisions in Pennsylvania.
Three distinct blocs emerged. Radical Constitutionalists comprised the vanguard of the
Revolution. Their intervention had occasioned the political overthrow of the proprietary
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regime and, as their name implies, creation of the new constitutional order. Although an
individual’s factional affiliation sometimes oscillated or evolved over time, generallyspeaking Presbyterians, German “church people” and Quakers who eschewed that sect’s
pacifism and favored armed resistance against British injustice formed the radical core.
Among important non-Quaker elements within the leadership were Joseph Reed, George
Bryan, John Bayard, Charles Thomson, Charles Willson Peale, Thomas McKean and
Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg. Thomas Wharton Jr., Timothy Matlack and Christopher
Marshall typified the “fighting” Quakers in the group. While radical elements converged
on the need for an entirely new system of government, the acrimonious question of
independence split colonial conservatives in two. One group concluded that English
obstinacy and blindness would never redress colonial grievances. These moderates joined
the forces advocating separation from the mother country and often assumed important
positions within the revolutionary movement. James Wilson, George Gray, William
Moore, George Clymer, Thomas Mifflin, John Dickinson, Robert Morris, Benjamin Rush
and Alexander Graydon, among others, personified this penchant.37 Another conservative
contingent refused to support the emerging governmental structure. Of these, loyalists
wished to remain subjects of the king within the empire, while others placed their fear of
popular rule and armed rebellion above devotion to the royal standard. Both clusters
populate these pages. Whether openly loyal or not, however, patriots considered everyone
in this third group as disaffected.
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The late winter, spring and summer of 1777 proved critical for the destiny of
those opposed to revolutionary rule as the remodeled state government launched efforts
to establish a framework for curbing disaffection. Since the intent of patriot law was to
express the will of the people, Pennsylvania’s legal framework paints a portrait of what
rebels wanted republican society to look like. Official responses to disaffection evolved
in tandem with changing expressions of the popular will, along with military and political
conditions in constant flux. The radicals’ three-pronged approach anticipated a British
assault and toughened treason and militia laws while adding a controversial condition for
citizenship: a loyalty test.
On February 11, 1777, the General Assembly under the leadership of John Jacobs
of Chester County, the first elected speaker, reformulated the constitutional convention’s
treason ordinance, increasing the law’s severity in “An Act Declaring What Shall Be
Treason and What Other Crimes and Practices against the State Shall Be Misprision of
Treason.”38 The reformulated statute enumerated treasonous activities more precisely and
strengthened penalties. Reiterating that residents and travelers owed the state allegiance,
the new law targeted “internal enemies” for whom the act was to “provide punishments…
in order to deter… the perpetration of… horrid and dangerous crimes.” Nine offenses –
not three – now classified as high treason: taking a commission from the British monarch;
levying war against Pennsylvania or the United States; aiding enemies at war with the
province or the United States; joining the enemy’s armies; recruiting for the king’s
forces; supplying adversaries with ammunition, arms or provisions; “carrying on
traitorous correspondence”; conspiring against the state; and managing “to give or send
38
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any intelligence” to the enemy. Procedurally, convictions required two witnesses.
Forfeiture of the perpetrator’s estate to the commonwealth remained in place. But now,
ominously, the offender was to “suffer death” instead of prison for the war’s duration.
The harsher broadside published during the convention appears to have won the day.
A more rigorous reconstruction also occurred in cases of misprision of treason.
Seven instances fell under this category: conveying intelligence to enemies; publicly
speaking or writing “against our public defense”; exciting the people to resist the new
government; espousing a return to royal rule; dissuading others from enlisting in the
state’s forces; raising “tumults, disorders or insurrections” for the enemy; and trying to
prevent efforts to secure independence. Again, convictions needed two witnesses. The
statute maintained the penalty of imprisonment for the duration of the conflict, but set
forfeiture of one-half, rather than one-third, of all real and personal property as the
confiscatory norm.39 Definitions of high treason and misprision of treason apparently
could overlap. What was the difference between giving or sending intelligence for high
treason and conveying intelligence for misprision? Perhaps this was intended to provide
judges latitude in specific cases. Pennsylvania’s February 1777 treason law became the
bulwark of the allegiance framework that shaped the reintegration experience of the
disaffected and the basis for almost all definitions and measures affecting friend or foe
during the revolutionary conflict. Subsequent applications of the law against the
politically alienated invariably referenced this statute.
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While the treason law defined what made a traitor, it failed to provide a
mechanism for identifying turncoats. The problem of allegiance thus turned pragmatic.
The remedy came with a test. In addition to identifying traitors, loyalty oaths sought to
compel the pusillanimous and skeptical to choose sides. The radical General Assembly
approved “An Act Obliging All White Male Inhabitants of This State to Give Assurances
of Allegiance to the Same and for Other Purposes Therein Mentioned” four months after
the treason law. The legislature justified the regulation on three assumptions. First, some
still refused to support the new order: “sordid and mercenary motives” had induced
“sundry persons… to withhold their service and allegiance from the commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.” Two, others who did support the cause carried an unfair load “at the risk
of their lives and the hazard of their fortunes.” Good and bad were “at this time mixed
and in some measure undistinguished from each other, the disaffected deriving
undeserved service from the faithful and well affected.” Three, citizens had a duty to
give, not just receive: “whereas allegiance and protection are reciprocal… those who will
not bear the former are not nor ought to be entitled to the benefits of the latter.”40 For
Constitutionalists, the protection due to citizens was not automatic. It had to be earned.
Test legislation set up a system obliging white males over eighteen to take an oath
before a justice of the peace and promise to uphold four fundamental principles: renounce
allegiance to George III; swear to “be faithful and bear true allegiance” to Pennsylvania;
and do nothing “prejudicial or injurious to the freedom and independence” of the state.
These tenets did not entail any action beyond taking the oath itself. A fourth condition,
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however, demanded that oath-takers “discover and make known… all treasons or
traitorous conspiracies” against Pennsylvania or any of the United States to a justice of
the peace. Citizens now had to be proactive in their patriotic commitment. After avowing
fealty, the subscriber received a signed certificate from the presiding justice validating
the oath. Other clauses required traveling residents and outsiders, if suspected of noncompliance, to prove they had taken the Pennsylvania oath or a similar one in their own
state. Refusal to swear allegiance exacted a series of penalties: the inability to hold office;
vote or be elected; serve on juries; sue for collection of debts; buy, sell or bequeath land
or other real property; and in a linkage back to the earlier Tory Act, disarmament.
Exceptions were made for delegates of Congress, absentees such as war captives and
continental troops, and merchants or seamen from friendly powers trading in the ports of
Pennsylvania. The Test Act, as it came to be popularly called, proved imperfect, facing
revision several times over the next dozen years.41
Like the state Constitution of 1776, scores of moderates opposed the act. From
Lancaster, patriot John Hubley spoke for many when he prophesied that “you will hear a
loud cry against this Tiranical [sic] Oath, that it was intended for naught but to hinder
substantial, good disposed People to ellect or be ellected [sic]; depriving them of the
rights of Freemen.”42 As an instrument of radical Whig policy, the test served two
functions: developing a method for detecting disaffection and fortifying divisions in the
41

Statutes At Large of Pennsylvania, vol. 9, “An Act Obliging All White Male Inhabitants of This State to
Give Assurances of Allegiance to the Same and for Other Purposes Therein Mentioned,” June 13, 1777,
Chapter 756, 111-114. Just how many times the Test Act was modified depends on how one defines
modification. Legislation dealing with the Test Act itself was passed on at least five subsequent occasions.
However, key elements of the Test Act were modified in legislation concerned with other issues, primarily
security and elections. This study accepts the broader definition of modification.
42

John Hubley to Timothy Matlack, July, 1777, in Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 41
(emphasis in original).

49

internecine battle among provincial factions that lasted well past the end of the war. For
many of the disaffected, especially pacifists, the oaths produced a social stigma during
the war and proved to be their greatest barrier to reintegration in the postwar period.43
The Test Act cannot be viewed in isolation from revolutionary political and
military developments. In June 1777, rumors abounded that Howe’s next move from New
York was a strike at the rebel capital at Philadelphia. The new law thus bespoke an
urgency demanding compliance within three weeks of its passage in all counties except
those on the frontier, who had another month.44 Patriots needed to know who was with
them and who was against. In early July, redcoats and Hessians began embarking at
Staten Island for the anticipated assault. Imperial troops landed at Head of Elk on
Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay in late August and marched east and north towards
Philadelphia.45 For once, the rumormongers had it right.
Rebels responded to fears of collaboration between the invaders and loyalists with
targeted arrests and, in some cases, banishment. The radical council headed by Thomas
Wharton Jr. rounded up two stalwarts of the colonial regime, Governor John Penn and
Chief Justice Benjamin Chew, and shipped them off to exile in New Jersey. Panicky
patriot officials then deported twenty prominent citizens – mostly Quakers like brothers
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Israel, James and John Pemberton, Thomas Wharton Sr., and Henry Drinker – to Virginia
for refusing to sign paroles or take the test oath. More malleable suspects of disaffection
such as Provost William Smith, the Reverend Thomas Coombe and Phineas Bond signed
paroles promising good behavior, made arrangements to the satisfaction of radicals, or
fell through the cracks and avoided expulsion.46 As British forces neared the capital,
Congress bolted to York. The state government fled to Lancaster. A wave of
apprehensive revolutionaries in southeastern Pennsylvania also absconded. After
defeating Washington’s troops at Brandywine, General Charles Cornwallis entered
Philadelphia at the head of His Majesty’s army on September 26, 1777, accompanied by
a notable entourage of former residents who had embraced royal aims. Crowds lined the
streets to welcome the restoration of monarchical rule. When a patriot counterattack at
Germantown on October 4 failed to dislodge the British, the captive city became a refuge
for loyalists who feared rebel retribution and abuse elsewhere. Travelers crisscrossing to
and fro enhanced volatility.47
During the subsequent nine-month British occupation, the radical assembly honed
the Test Act with two supplements and fine-tuned penalties for non-associators. Most
significantly, it added attainders as a new procedural vehicle to legally arrest, detain,
46
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prosecute and punish those suspected of infidelity to the Revolution. When the General
Assembly was not in session, the Council of Safety led by Thomas Wharton Jr. exercised
provisional powers from its Lancaster exile that included the ability to seize the property
of local collaborators who “wickedly joined themselves to our unnatural enemies.”48
Legislators revisited the allegiance question in October of 1777 in the midst of
military defeat, general chaos, and a territorial reconfiguration dominated by Britishoccupied Philadelphia. The Test Act helped determine who was who but had not proven
effective in procuring the fidelity of many. The bill which followed admitted as much,
dryly declaring that it had been “found upon experience that the said act does not fully
answer all the good purposes by the same act intended.” In other words, it had no bite.
This corollary to the original hardened penalties and lowered the age of compliance from
eighteen to sixteen for white males. A single witness could force those under suspicion
for disaffection to present their certificate of allegiance or take the oath. Refusal carried a
penalty of prison without bail pending compliance. State residents traveling outside of
their city or county of residence merited special attention. Moreover, no one could be
admitted as security for the accused unless they too had taken the test. As with voter rolls,
radicals only trusted those verifiably patriotic. The doubling-down on penalties for failure
to affirm allegiance underscores the importance radicals placed on conformity throughout
the war. They refused to recognize any middle ground and used the law to force even the
timid to take a stand. Submission by legal coercion – even if insincere – was a lesser evil
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than neutrality or indifference, while refusal to take the oath was interpreted as a surefire
sign of disaffection regardless of the underlying reason for denial.49
Three weeks after passage of this first supplement to the Test Act, rebels received
word that English general John Burgoyne had suffered a catastrophic defeat at Saratoga
in New York.50 The loss triggered a diplomatic chain of events culminating in the
Franco-American alliance of February 1778 and the strategic decision of Lord North’s
ministry in London to abandon Philadelphia.51 In the interim, the General Assembly at
Lancaster approved new regulations against the disaffected on April 1 increasing
penalties on inheritances, reducing legal rights in court, imposing double taxation, and
curtailing participation in select professions. Doctors, merchants, professors, attorneys,
schoolteachers and the like under patriot suspicion were “ipso facto adjudged incapable
and disabled in law… to have, occupy or enjoy the said preferment or preferments [,]
office or offices, employment or employments.” Any two justices of the peace could
summon suspects to appear before them to take the oath and failure to obey could result
in a three-month jail sentence, fines not exceeding ten pounds plus legal costs, and
banishment, the forfeiture of goods and chattels to the state, and the immediate bequest of
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real estate to heirs who had taken the oath. Republican citizenship required tested
accreditation.
Further sections of the security law dealt with disarmament; the need for travelers
to and from British-occupied Philadelphia to obtain passes from authorities to prevent
visitors from “giving intelligence to the enemy”; permission for those who wanted to
leave and had not been attainted to sell their property within ninety days with consent of
the Supreme Executive Council; and a clause asking ex-colonial government officials
“who do now hold or exercise any office or offices by commission or commissions under
the authority of the said Crown of Great Britain… [to] renounce such commission or
commissions by taking the oath of allegiance… [or] be treated as an enemy or enemies of
the state.”52 This last provision shows that, two years after independence, allegiance in
Pennsylvania remained blurred as a result of earlier imperial commitments.
Militia concerns also resurfaced at this time, especially the state’s failure to
collect non-associator fines under prior resolutions. Lamenting this administrative
breakdown “to the great discouragement and dissatisfaction of the spirited and virtuous
associators in this state,” legislators set up procedures for enforcing collection of the
£3.10 fine prescribed by the law of April 5, 1776. Judging from a subsequent June statute
addressing additional procedural delays, these efforts did not fare well.53 Notably, the
assembly approved its first comprehensive modification of militia laws in the spring of
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1777. A key clause introduced surrogates as an alternative to personal militia service.
Those unwilling or unable “to serve in person” had to “find a sufficient person for a
substitute.” For the disaffected or indifferent who disregarded service or substitutes, the
law authorized militia lieutenants to find replacements on reasonable terms and charge
the corresponding amount. Refusal to pay subjected the negligent to the “distress and sale
of his goods and chattels, lands and tenements.” The new formula had the state procuring
a stand-in while the offender’s estate financed the effort. If proxies could not be found,
officials set fines in the amount of the average cost of a substitute within each battalion.
In December, the assembly penalized the estates of non-associators “an additional sum
equal to what such person shall be charged in the state tax” – in effect, double taxation.54
Over two years, militia penalties had evolved from a vague “time equivalent” with
exceptions for religious scruples, to concrete one-time monetary fines and obligatory
service for all, to monthly levies and annual estate charges, to compulsory substitutions
and double taxation. Radicals clearly expected everyone to carry their fair share of the
revolutionary load.
With treason delineated and test oaths furnishing evidence on allegiance,
revolutionaries harnessed the concept of attainders to the anti-disaffection cart. Attainders
provided a methodology for punitive action against the Crown’s devotees. Rooted in a
presumption of guilt, this legal tool expedited prosecutions and rapidly became the most
implacable of the retaliatory devices employed against the opposition. Attainders called
out those suspected of infidelity by name and instructed them to surrender for trial by a
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specified date. Failure to do so automatically validated guilt. In actual practice, the cases
of many attainted citizens ended in discharge or acquittal, especially when defendants
dared to face officials at a hearing or trial and few witnesses or evidence materialized.
For the accused whose absence automatically rendered a guilty verdict, only an official
pardon could overturn the tint of sedition, a major obstacle to later reintegration.55
Surrender for trial could also result in a conviction, though such cases were actually rare.
The individual decision to test revolutionary judicial waters was thus laden with risk.56
Philosophically, the negative premise of attainders contradicted the intrinsically
affirmative nature of republican rights. Yet as a technique to quash disaffection, the
instrument was a logical extension to the budding anti-loyalist apparatus, supplying a
workable mechanism for castigating the blameworthy.
Like treason, attainder theory stemmed from English common law. Sir William
Blackstone wrote the following in his Commentaries: “For when it is now clear beyond
all dispute, that the criminal is no longer fit to live upon this earth, but is to be
exterminated as a monster and a bane to human society, the law sets a note of infamy
upon him, puts him out of it’s [sic] protection, and takes no farther care of him than
barely to see him executed. He is then called attaint, attinctus, stained or blackened. He is
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no longer of any credit or reputation; he cannot be a witness in any court; neither is he
capable of performing the functions of another man: for, by an anticipation of his
punishment, he is already dead in law.” Blackstone clarified that death in law occurred
only after judgment, not during the time of indictment, since it was possible that the
accused could be found not guilty and thus pardoned. “Upon judgment therefore of death,
and not before,” he continued, “the attainder of a criminal commences: or upon such
circumstances as are equivalent to judgment of death; as outlawry on a capital crime,
pronounced for absconding or fleeing from justice, which tacitly confesses the guilt. And
therefore either upon judgment for outlawry, or of death, for treason or felony, a man
shall be said to be attainted.” He concluded by pointing out that forfeiture was one of the
principal penalties of attainder.
Blackstone’s appraisal encapsulates the fundamentals of Pennsylvania attainder
statutes while demonstrating how rebel concern for the rule of law stemmed from the
same political tradition as their English adversaries. Revolutionary attainders treated the
accused as a pariah who “had a note of infamy upon him” and as “a bane to human
society”; and in select execution cases quite literally as a “criminal… no longer fit to live
upon this earth.” They prohibited the attainted from serving on juries, comparable to the
eminent jurist’s “cannot be a witness in any court.” In turn, not “capable of performing
the functions of another man” and “no longer of any credit or reputation” became the
state’s basis for annulling the rights of citizenship – or becoming “dead in law.” English
precedent allowed for the forfeiture of real and personal property and permitted pardons,
key procedural elements the Pennsylvania General Assembly instituted and the Supreme
Executive Council implemented from 1778 onward. Most important of all, an attainder’s
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presumed culpability was a replication of the “absconding or fleeing from justice, which
tacitly confesses the guilt” phrase in the Commentaries. Such was the interpretation
Pennsylvania’s radical patriots chose to adopt: guilt was assumed until proven otherwise.
It was incumbent on the accused to exculpate himself.57
What strikes the modern scholar of attainders most glaringly is the disappearance
of such an unyielding concept in American jurisprudence. This lapse is not coincidental.
Postwar patriots well understood the paradox of liberty vs. attainders, since they had
applied its tenets so admirably during the conflict. A little celebrated but crucial clause of
the 1787 Constitution of the United States tersely states “No bill of attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed.” The entry equates attainders with laws that have a retroactive
effect. Federal constitutional convention delegates saw both as unfair. Conspicuously, the
attainder reference is an integral component of the first of seven articles in the original
constitution sent to the states for ratification, not part of the amendments incorporating
the Bill of Rights proposed later. The timing suggests it was a high priority item. A
similar clause prohibiting the states from passing attainders on their own immediately
follows.58 The nation’s founders knew attainders were inherently antithetical to freedom
– and they made sure the nascent republic did not do what they had once done.59
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to the full fury of the law. The “suffer death” penalty in the February 1777 treason law
suddenly bore very sharp teeth.62
Despite the tailored indictments, radicals did not aim the original attainder bill
solely at thirteen obnoxious turncoats. Their larger concerns were twofold: fix the
procedural parameters for dealing with current and future traitors; and design a system
facilitating the seizure of loyalist property. The bulk of the fifteen-page act responds to
these concerns. Procedurally, the legislation attainted commonwealth inhabitants who
“knowingly and willingly aid and assist the enemies of this state or of the United States
of America by having joined their armies” or who “hereafter shall do the same.” Bearing
arms against the cause of liberty continued to be a primary motive for prosecution. The
bill projected into the future, targeting those who “from and after the publication of this
act… willingly and voluntarily serve the King of Great Britain either by land or sea as a
civil or military officer, soldier or seaman.” The language made clear that treason could
be a civil as well as a military activity.
Given later practice, the provisions for seizure of real and personal property
proved to be the most significant features of the attainder statute. Forfeiture authorized
retribution without the need to resort to bloodletting. Lawmakers considered it “highly
reasonable” that the assets of those “engaged in the present most unnatural, unjust,
barbarous and execrable war… should be discovered and applied to the use of the
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state.”63 Confiscation’s almost universal application against those found guilty of treason
probably spared the lives of many. Because patriots of all views tended to adhere strictly
to the limits of the law, real property could be litigated, even after forfeiture, in cases
when the law itself was contradictory or not followed correctly. As a result, the
confiscation issue stayed in the public eye longer than any other postwar disaffection
problem and presented the state with an especially knotty reintegration challenge evident
in property restitution proceedings that sometimes extended into the nineteenth century.
As elsewhere, revolutionary justification for forfeiture came from English
common law. Here is Sir William Blackstone anew, for whom forfeiture was “twofold; of
real and personal estates,” a natural outcome of the blemish of attainder. The eighteenth
century magistrate underscored that a man attainted of treason “forfeits to the king all his
lands and tenements of inheritance… which he had at the time of the offense committed,
or at any time afterwards, to be forever vested in the crown.”64 The General Assembly
took the essence of this legal theory and traded the word “state” for “crown” and “king,”
crafting republican innovation from British constitutional tradition.
For those guilty of treason, the March attainder act authorized the seizure of “all
and every the lands, tenements, hereditaments, debts or sums of money, or goods or
chattels whatsoever, and generally the estates real and personal of what nature or kind
soever they be within this state.” The law drew July 4, 1776 as the grand fault line

63

Statutes At Large of Pennsylvania, vol. 9, “An Act for the Attainder of Divers Traitors…,” March 6,
1778, Chapter 784, 201-203. The last twelve of the act’s fifteen pages deal with structuring attainder
procedures, 203-215.
64

Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book the Fourth, Chapter 29, 381.

61

demarcating the pre and post treason eras.65 The Declaration of Independence had erased
blurred lines like the “opinions” of delegates to Congress in the Tory Act encouraging
loyalist disarmament. For a first-time stab at the myriad possibilities forfeitures entailed,
legislators did an excellent job. Rolfe Lyman Allen – who compiled and contrasted the
confiscation laws of all the rebellious colonies – noted admiringly that the Pennsylvania
assembly approached the issue “with legal skill and attention to administrative details
most unusual in the hastily prepared legislation of this troubled era.”66 Whigs gave ample
consideration to complicated issues such as creditors’ claims on attainted estates, debts
owed by the attainted, tenants on attainted land, prior conveyances of property, state use
of unsold lands, methods for gathering information on people and property, incentives for
those who “discovered” concealed assets of the accused, documentation of all real and
personal property, and the responsibilities of appointed commissioners, the state attorney
general, treasurer, and supreme court. Allen’s analysis is spot on for the legal structure
itself, but early enforcement was not always on par with the law’s finer points – often to
the benefit of the disaffected.
Forfeited loyalist estates were “to be sold by auction to the best and highest
bidder… within twelve months after the debts and claims upon the said estates shall be
respectively adjudged.” Proceeds went to the state for prosecution of the war: tories were
to fund the revolution’s success. Provisions also protected infants, wives, and “madmen,
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idiots, or lunatics” linked to the disaffected. Sedition was a private offense and penalties
could not be extended to heirs or relations. On the other hand, a prescient clause closed
potential legal loopholes, stipulating that title transfers to wives, heirs or relations after
July 4, 1776 “are hereby declared to be and shall forever hereafter be deemed to be
fraudulent and no claim shall hereafter be allowed for the same.” The disaffected could
not convey property to someone of trust to elude confiscation.67 Even so, some would try.
As the main penalty for loyalists found guilty of subversion, patriots saw the
attainder’s seizure of real and personal property as a coherent corollary to the treason and
test oath laws imposed earlier. Each set of measures flowed smoothly and sequentially
into the next. Application of forfeiture law completed the series and gave the other
precepts a tangible sting. The correlation between property and reintegration later proved
crucial for many of the disaffected who had their birthright or lifetimes of industry
upended by the stroke of a rebel pen. Those unable to recover lost property or who saw
such an enterprise as innately futile often stayed away. Yet obscured within the morass of
confiscatory anguish, the legalized seizure of loyalist property had an unexpected upside
for the politically marginalized: forfeiture gave authorities a peaceful means to redirect
and placate bottom-up revolutionary ardor. If patriots had not applied confiscation as the
dominant punitive alternative against the disaffected, it is probable that violence would
have escalated and the struggle for independence would have looked a great deal more
like later revolutionary upheavals around the globe.68 In Pennsylvania, the enticement of
property seizures – encased within the constraints of the law – transcended the lust for
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blood, mollified popular desire for stiffer reprisals, and enhanced long-term reintegration
success. Unfortunately, these outcomes offered little comfort to those who suffered the
loss of their property. Administratively, the attainder act assigned the Supreme Executive
Council the mission of identifying traitors by way of published proclamations configured
in set language. Prospective quislings were afforded up to forty days to surrender.69
The council under the leadership of radicals Thomas Wharton Jr. and George
Bryan quickly proved themselves up to the task, issuing three attainder proclamations
during May and June of 1778.70 By then, rumors abounded regarding an imminent British
evacuation from Philadelphia. The buzz blended with more certain knowledge that Sir
William Howe had resigned his command and was heading for England. On May 8, the
council attainted 57 loyalists. On May 21, another 75 Pennsylvanians faced similar
charges. Between these two dates, the outbound British general received the lavish tribute
of subordinates and locals at the notoriously opulent Meschianza feast organized by
Major John André, royal officers, and leading loyalists. On the day of the second May
attainder proclamation, recently arrived British commander Sir Henry Clinton confessed
to Philadelphia loyalist Samuel Shoemaker that his army was indeed leaving, suggesting
that the disaffected do what they could to make peace with the rebels.71 Elizabeth
Drinker’s diary contains this entry two day later: “the Army tis thought are going in
reality to leave us – to evacuate the City – some hope tis not the case, tho’ things look
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like it – many of the Inhabitants are preparing to go with them.” Only three days before
the withdrawal, the Bryan-led radical council attainted 198 more residents. This June 15
proclamation came after fleeing loyalists had boarded British ships and anxiously awaited
departure in the Delaware River harbor. In total, state officials formally charged 343
loyalists with high treason before Sir Henry Clinton’s army abandoned the city,
comprising the peak of attainder proclamations for the full war.72
Rebels hurriedly returned to the capital in the evacuation’s aftermath. They found
substantial devastation and disarray, despite the fact that British commanders had
refrained from ordering troops to destroy the city. Radical Whigs reinstituted government
swiftly. Since the king’s forces would never return to Pennsylvania despite sporadic
rumors to the contrary,73 from that point forward rebel leadership exercised a free hand
over matters of fidelity without fear of repercussions. The radical-dominated government
had not only survived military defeat and expulsion but, paradoxically, consolidated its
hold on provincial power while it was away.
LOYALIST CHOICES & THE RADICAL ZENITH (June 1778 – November 1781)
Enforcing allegiance, upholding the rights of the revolutionary faithful, and
implementing the radical Constitutionalist vision of the rule of law characterized the third
phase of the patriot response to loyalism and disaffection. As a key component of that
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vision, radicals expropriated the bulk of the lands still in possession of the Penns and
abolished the proprietary encumbrance once and for all. At the same time, the process of
reintegration began for disaffected residents who chose to stay in Pennsylvania after the
British evacuation. For these, fear and uncertainty marked much of the period. A great
deal of patriot effort also went into tightening existing anti-loyalist legislation, in most
cases stiffening penalties, restricting rights and further isolating the disaffected. The daily
reality of the legal order under the radicals did not live up to expectations, however, as
scarcity, disorder and instability plagued revolutionaries and disaffected alike. Radical
failures ushered in a new era of growing moderate dominance.
Loyalists and the disaffected faced a critical choice in June 1778: to stay and face
patriot ire or to accompany the British army and face an uncertain future. Fear of patriot
retaliation headed the list of motives for removal. The hard language of the treason, test
and attainder statutes magnified fears. Because of the personalized nature of attainders,
the attainted confronted higher risks than those not so charged. The council published all
attainder proclamations demanding that defendants surrender for trial and submit to the
verdict of a potentially ill-disposed tribunal. To be attainted was thus to be placed in a
distinctive and precarious legal category. For the accused, reintegrative alternatives
reflected this daunting prospect.
Not surprisingly, many left. Estimates of loyalist evacuees from Philadelphia
range from three to five thousand. Hessian Captain Johann Heinrichs projected “about
one thousand royally inclined families… willing to leave hearth and home and with their
chattels go with the army.” The Earl of Carlisle, who headed the king’s recently arrived
and doomed Peace Commission, referred to “about three thousand of the miserable
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inhabitants embarked on board our ships,” while William Eden, also member of the
commission, assessed the number of evacuees at five thousand.74 York County notables
James and John Rankin were among those who departed. So did Richard Hovenden,
Jacob James, William Thomas, Thomas Sandford and Alfred Clifton, officers in His
Majesty’s loyalist regiments recruited during the occupation of Philadelphia. All but
Sandford had been attainted prior to the evacuation. So too did ordinary loyalists forsake
their homeland, men like laborer Jacob Holder, carpenter Joseph Paxton, tallow chandler
Thomas Badge, and farmers Samuel Custard Jr., Hugh Pugh, and Henry Steininger.75
Concern for the safety of this civilian mass forced the British commander to alter his
original plans for a military evacuation to New York by sea. Instead, General Clinton
decided to deploy British shipping primarily for loyalist refugees and march his soldiers
north across New Jersey. His decision led to the dramatic engagement with Washington’s
Continental Army at Monmouth. The loyalist presence thus dictated British strategy.
Without the refugee burden, the battle of Monmouth may never have occurred.
For both the departed and those who stayed, imperial withdrawal signaled the
opening chapter in the reintegration drama. In Pennsylvania, reestablishment of patriot
government and implementation of the Constitutionalist legislative and political agenda
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took up much of the immediate post-evacuation period. Because speaker John Bayard’s
radical assembly was more concerned about applying the posited fidelity framework than
further elaborating its structure, George Bryan’s Supreme Executive Council and the
courts played a more prominent role than the legislature through the remainder of 1778
and the years closely following. Radical officials launched a wave of arrests in August as
a response to a popular uproar resulting from the destruction caused by the British
occupation. Treason trials began in late September and continued into the following
spring. Authorities executed two Quakers convicted of high treason in early November.76
By year’s end, reprisals had satiated popular ardor somewhat and radicals were
firmly entrenched in power. Political instability and economic scarcity plagued radical
government, though. Benedict Arnold, who George Washington had named commandant
of Philadelphia, contributed to this uncertainty. Seeking status and enrichment, Arnold
affiliated himself from the onset of his tenure with wealthy citizens of dubious allegiance
to the Revolution and quickly garnered local radical displeasure and hostility. 77 Other
factors added fuel to the fire. A dearth of key staples such as flour led to popular ferment.
Radicals adopted policies such as price controls which ultimately backfired, provoking
discontent among the very sectors they tried to satisfy. Public opinion frequently blamed
the disaffected who had chosen to stay for the prevailing insecurity, resulting in a series
of violent incidents. Response to these confrontations led to intrarevolutionary clashes
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between ruling radicals and disgruntled lower orders.78 Despite these events, the radical
faction continued to win elections and dominate government for the moment.
Enforcement of the allegiance agenda led the Supreme Executive Council under
radicals George Bryan and then Joseph Reed to issue seven attainder proclamations from
post-evacuation 1778 to 1781.79 An October 1778 attainder coincided with popular frenzy
over the treason trials and targeted 64 loyalists. It was the first issued after the English
had quit the capital. Attainder numbers successively diminished thereafter, since many
royalist sympathizers had headed off with the British. Although these departures clearly
lessened internal tensions, suspicions over concealed loyalists and enduring disaffection
persisted and officials promulgated four more group attainders between 1779 and 1781.
In June 1779, President Reed’s council attainted 30 more Pennsylvanians. A year later,
they proclaimed 33 more as seditious. After Benedict Arnold’s duplicitous leap to the
British in September 1780, two additional Reed proclamations attainted a total of 25
more suspected loyalists. The October 2 attainder that year included Arnold himself as
one of ten traitors, while one in March 1781 targeted fifteen people – mostly yeomen –
from seven separate counties, including the first and only woman. Authorities also issued
two attainder proclamations directed exclusively at single individuals – one against exile
Frederick Kesselman in May 1779 for joining the king’s armies and another in April
1781 against William Rankin who had reputedly organized a force of 1500 loyalists in
78
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the countryside and awaited instructions from the British high command in New York for
an armed uprising. The group’s “unabated zeal in the Royal Cause was never called into
Action,” however, and the signal never came. All told, the council attainted 154
suspected loyalists for high treason from the evacuation through 1781.80 In combination
with those accused during the British occupation of Philadelphia, the General Assembly
and the Supreme Executive Council proclaimed 498 instances of attainder for treason
during the war.81 In perhaps the most revealing piece of evidence differentiating the
respective approaches of patriot factions towards disaffection, radical majority
government was responsible all of the 498 attainders issued during the war.
The Supreme Executive Council’s campaign against disaffection culminating in
the seizure and sale of loyalist estates and personal property best illustrates the apex of
radical power. While the treason law’s “suffer death” penalty remained in place into the
Federalist period, patriot citizens who made up trial juries generally avoided the prospect
of such severe chastisement.82 Moreover, many of the attainted no longer resided in
80
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Pennsylvania. Officials could not take them into custody. Over time, the confiscation of
real and personal property became the preferred mode for penalizing the culpable. Rebel
authorities began applying forfeiture penalties for treason almost immediately after
retaking Philadelphia. For example, confiscation agents appraised John Wright’s seized
personal goods on July 3, 1778, only two weeks after the British withdrew.83 Sales began
in earnest in 1779, peaked in the later stages of the war, and continued even after the
peace. Real estate by far comprised the most valuable seized assets. Agents sold the real
property of exiled loyalists at public auction. Many attainted advocates of the king failed
to surrender for trial and thereby “admitted” guilt by default. Proceeds from forfeiture
sales went to state coffers to fund the war effort.84
While the executive branch of government applied the radical repressive program,
the legislature tweaked confiscation policies, militia service requirements, and test oaths.
In late March and early April 1779, the general assembly headed by speaker John Bayard
passed two measures directed at streamlining the sale of forfeited estates and alleviating
the state’s financial crunch. A March supplement to the attainder act urged officials to
sell forfeited estates “with all convenient speed,” expedited claims and stacked the law in
favor of buyers by protecting their title and placing responsibility for legal miscues on the
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state – all to promote sales. Pennsylvania needed money. The stalled forfeiture inventory
promised a bonanza.85
Five days later, “An Act Declaring Replevins, Attachments, Judgments, and
Executions in Certain Cases To Be Erroneous and Void” addressed the administrative
bottleneck more directly. Replevin meant the provisional recovery of property by persons
claiming to own it until the case could be decided in court. Blackstone defined it thus:
“To replevy (replegiare, that is to take back the pledge) is, when a person distreined [sic]
upon applies to the sheriff or his officers, and has the distress returned into his own
possession; upon giving good security to try the right of taking it in a suit at law.”86 That
the assembly felt a need for such a statute presupposes a heavy legal backlog. The
replevin act went to the straight and narrow. “To the delay of public justice and to the
great vexation of the officers concerned,” writs were “preventing a proper inquiry into the
justice of the claims and demands of such [creditors] suitors... to the great waste of the
estates, accumulation of suits and unnecessary costs.” The act declared all such writs
“irregular, erroneous and void” and all judgments “entered by virtue of any warrant of
attorney… to be void and of no effect.” Speed sacrificed process.87 Unfortunately for the
disaffected, the provincial government’s revised enforcement apparatus proved effective.
Not only was Pennsylvania “the first of the large states to undertake a policy of general
seizure of the estates of those in opposition to the revolution,” but state authorities in due
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course put together a “relatively flexible and efficient administration… standing in
marked contrast to the faulty machinery set up in some states.”88
At this highpoint of radical rule, the portions of militia legislation dealing with
disaffection concentrated on two main issues: fines for neglecting to serve and the
apprehension of those for whom “there is just reason to suspect he is an enemy to the
American cause, or that he hath manifested a general disaffection thereunto.” Over the
course of eighteen months, speaker Bayard’s legislature addressed the link between
disaffection and militia service six times. An April 1779 bill increased fines from £40 to
£100. An October measure increased fines again to a range between £100 and £1000 and
proposed arrests and jail for the disaffected “until the first sitting of the next assembly.”
A November act rescinded earlier double-taxation penalties on the estates of those above
militia age because it was “found by experience to be burdensome and inconvenient” but
extended the October provisions for arrests, fines and prison of those required to serve.
The assembly passed a major restructuring of the militia in March 1780, stressing that “a
well regulated militia is the only safe and constitutional method of defending a free
state.” This reorganization repealed all earlier fines and set up a new fine-or-jail
dichotomy driven by the forced sale of a perpetrator’s seized assets. Four days later, an
act extending the executive branch’s powers to detain and jail disaffected persons passed.
Then a September 1780 supplement set fines and penalties for neglect of militia duty at
“the average price of common labor by the day in the city of Philadelphia and counties of
this state.”89 This year-and-a-half of militia legislation exposes key deficiencies in radical
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government and foreshadows the moderate upswing starting in 1781. Runaway inflation,
severe food and supply shortages, ineffective price-fixing, extralegal violence, and class
tensions characterized life under revolutionary radicals. The constant readjustment of
militia fines to keep up with inflation reflects this dynamic. Unable to fix the value of
penalties with any certainty, radicals threw in the towel and linked amounts to the going
elastic rate of daily unskilled wages.90 Radical control was slipping.
With implementation of attainders and confiscations dictating the council’s
agenda, fine tuning tests of allegiance dominated the radical legislature’s concerns at this
time. From September 1778 to October 1779, speaker Bayard’s assembly passed four
bills on this subject. Like the April 1778 act, lawmakers couched three of the four in
terms of security rather than tests. The first security supplement explicitly linked voting
rights to the test of allegiance. No one could vote in any election without a certificate
asserting that he had taken the oath. In order to ensure compliance, authorities levied a
heavy fine on patriot election officials who ignored or violated the test oath stipulation –
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Regulation of the Militia of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,” March 20, 1780, Chapter 902, 144, 160,
172; ibid., vol. 10, “An Act Further to Continue Such Parts of an Act Entitled ‘An Act to Empower the
Supreme Executive Council and Justices of the Supreme Court to Apprehend Suspected Persons, and to
Increase the Fines to Which Persons Are Liable, for Neglecting to Perform Their Tour of Militia Duty,’”
March 24, 1780, Chapter 906, 182-183; ibid., vol. 10, “A Supplement to the Act Entitled ‘An Act for the
Regulation of the Militia of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,’” September 22, 1780, Chapter 916, 226.
90

In still another example, Rosswurm cites a later 300% rise in wholesale prices for staples such as flour,
beef, sugar loaf, and molasses from October to December 1779 – Arms, Country and Class, 228.

74

one hundred pounds “for every such offense.” Constitutionalists meant to adhere to the
letter of the law. Since the vote decided power in a republic grounded on popular
sovereignty, radicals wanted to guarantee that only revolutionaries voted, thus elevating
their chances at the ballot box.91
Three months later, assembly radicals rewrote the loyalty oath itself in a further
supplement. The December 1778 wording reveals two important aspects of the ongoing
dispute among Pennsylvania factions. First, the idea of a test oath remained highly
contested. Second, attempts to accurately target potential enemies of the state had not
been entirely successful. This new supplement recognized that many “faithful subjects”
had not taken the oath on account of “sickness, absence, want of information, and other
unavoidable causes” and confessed that “doubts have also arisen on the construction of
said acts” – that is, it had been misinterpreted and contained omissions.92
A comparison of the semantics in the original June 13, 1777 oath and the
December 5, 1778 redesigned pledge shows the effects of the political transformation that
had occurred in Pennsylvania between the British military incursion and the return of
patriot government. While both affirmations obligated the oath-taker to “renounce and
refuse all allegiance” to the monarch, the first version cited George III by name and the
latter only mentioned the “King or crown.” Depersonalization shows His Majesty’s
hegemony in decline. The second version expanded renunciation and refusal to include
not only allegiance but all “subjection and obedience” to the king, improper behaviors
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exhibited by loyalists during the occupation. Both oaths also took into account the shift in
devotion to the new state, though the later rendering was much less demanding than the
first. The binding commitment of “I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the
commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a free and independent state” transmogrified into a
two-part assertion that “Pennsylvania is, and of right ought to be, a free, sovereign, and
independent state” – an abstract impersonal acknowledgment – and an avowal that “I will
at all times maintain and support the freedom, sovereignty and independence thereof.”
Notably, the newer version jettisoned the word allegiance outright. To “maintain and
support” state sovereignty no longer required pure motives of fidelity.
Verb tenses in the two documents also reveal an accommodation with the political
shift. The June 1777 oath focused on future behavior, ensuring active participation in the
cause. Besides the “I will be faithful” avowal, it insisted that the pledger avoid anything
“prejudicial or injurious” to the state’s freedom and independence, while simultaneously
requiring the detection of antirevolutionary conspirators. On the other hand, the key
clauses in the December 1778 oath dealt with past behavior. Using the Declaration of
Independence as a fault line, the new oath-taker had to assert that he had never “aided,
assisted, abetted or in any wise countenanced the King of Great Britain, his generals,
fleets or armies, or their adherents,” while having “demeaned myself as a faithful citizen
and subject of this or some one of the United States.”93 It is especially striking that the
December 1778 further supplement reduced the number of penalties for refusal of the
oath to a mere four: inability to vote or be elected to office, serve on juries, and double
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taxation. Otherwise, “all other penalties, incapacities and disabilities imposed by any
former acts of assembly shall from henceforth cease and determine.”94 The new
conditions reveal radicals’ diminished hopes and a desire to simplify the political
panorama. Having discarded the illusion that all inhabitants would agreeably conform,
revolutionaries now assumed the presence of a core of disaffected or indifferent residents
who begrudgingly obeyed the law or would not swear loyalty to government. Howe’s
unhappy sojourn into Pennsylvania had slashed expectations.
The December act’s language inadvertently created confusion among patriot
officials as to whether or not they had to retake the test oath. Three months later, a further
supplement to the supplement for further security cleared up possible misunderstandings,
specifying that those who had already professed their allegiance did not have to do so
again. Responding to pockets of armed disaffection in southeast Pennsylvania, it also
reemphasized the need to disarm those “who shall have not taken the oath or affirmation
of allegiance” because “such person is suspected to be disaffected to the independence of
this state.” The measure gave a detailed inventory of the armaments, implying that those
to be neutralized had used weaponry types to challenge seizure of their firearms.95
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In October 1779, radicals stepped up the pressure on the disaffected once again as
speaker Bayard’s assembly took up test oaths for the final time during the war. “A
Further Supplement to the Test Laws of This State” reiterated prior penalties for refusing
the oath and added two new conditions: violators could not teach school except in private
homes, minimizing the influence of pacifist Quakers prohibited from taking the oath by
their sect’s discipline; and non-oathtakers “shall be forever excluded… and deprived of
the… benefits of a citizen or citizens who shall have complied with this act.” Through the
imposition of lifelong disenfranchisement, radicals sought to magnify the burden of
infidelity and permanently exclude the disaffected from participation in the polity.
Disparate parts of prior justifications for amending the test law came together
cohesively in this act and yield insight into the contemporary radical mindset. First,
republican government had a right to “exact a test.” Second, the failure of many to take
the oath was “reasonably apprehended [to be] from disaffection to our late glorious
revolution.” Next, it was “unjust, as well as impolitic” that “those who refuse to share in
common… the dangers of the present contest” enjoy the “blessings of independence.”
Furthermore, many “inimical to the liberties of the country” could be “induced to assume
the mask of friendship” even as they “endeavor to betray those whom they cannot
conquer.” Finally, test laws were useful “to make a proper and reasonable distinction
between those who step forward in the hour of trial, and those who would enjoy the
rewards of victory without having contributed towards it, and to guard against secret and
deceitful designs.” In other words, substantial numbers of people still contested the
propriety of tests, many refused to affirm allegiance despite repeated prompting, and
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patriots had to ferret out two-faced traitors before they took action. In the face of such
resistance, radicals encouraged greater severity.96
These premises underscore the patriot view that disaffection was alive and well in
Pennsylvania only fifteen months after the British evacuation, despite clear radical
supremacy.97 Meanwhile, strains in the relations between competing revolutionary
factions intensified. Three days after the October 1 passage of the test law supplement, a
radical militia mob incensed over the exorbitant prices of bare necessities began to round
up suspected “Tories.” Events quickly spiraled out of control and led to a shootout with
patriot moderates at the home of James Wilson. The incident came to be known as the
battle of Fort Wilson. Faced with bottom-up violence from his own followers, radical
council president Joseph Reed led a cavalry charge to reestablish order. He succeeded but
alienated supporters in the process.98 “A Further Supplement to the Test Laws” stabilized
the allegiance issue in the General Assembly for more than half a decade. No further test
law legislation came before the Pennsylvania House while the war lasted. When the issue
resurfaced during the Critical Period, concern was over reintegration and repeal, not
raising the stakes for the onetime disaffected.
In addition to actively combatting loyalism and disaffection, radicals at this time
finished the job of ousting the proprietary regime that had governed Pennsylvania since
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the colony’s formation in the seventeenth century. While the state Constitution of 1776
had wrested political power from the Penn proprietors, the family still owned large tracts
of undeveloped land in the province, territory granted to the Penn heirs in perpetuity by
the original royal charter. In effect, all land not yet purchased by others in Pennsylvania
legally belonged to the Penns. Arguing for incompatibility with republican rights,
radicals wanted those holdings turned over to the state for sale to citizen settlers or as
rewards for patriot soldiers. In November 1779, speaker John Bayard’s radicals in the
legislature – prodded by like-minded radical President Joseph Reed – struck a death blow
at the founder’s successors, approving a divestiture act that transferred the vast majority
of the remaining proprietary acreage to the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It was the
crowning achievement of radical rule.99
Despite these successes, Constitutionalist government proved brittle as economic,
political and social instability opened the door for moderates.100 Elections in the next few
years witnessed steady Republican/Anti-Constitutionalist gains. Conditions favoring
accommodation with the disaffected slowly matured as a by-product of these victories.
The Franco-American victory at Yorktown in October 1781 coincided with the moderate
upsurge and a corresponding decrease in radical support. On November 14, 1781, a more
moderate William Moore took his seat as President of Pennsylvania, elected by the new
assembly and council to replace radical Joseph Reed.101 Although radicals continued as a
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small majority in the assembly for a while longer, Anti-Constitutionalists took legislative
control in late 1783 and remained dominant into the early 1790s, except for a brief radical
rebound in the assembly in the mid-eighties. The moderate age had dawned.
REINTEGRATION & MODERATE ASCENDANCY (November 1781 – April 1794)
The rise to power of the moderate Anti-Constitutionalists or Republicans reversed
radical implacability against onetime opponents of the colonial insurgency and defined
the fourth and final stage of patriot reactions to disaffection. Moderates applied the law to
lessen restrictions and reinstate the rights of all Pennsylvanians regardless of previous
revolutionary commitments. The reintegration of nonjurors became part and parcel of a
moderate political program which eventually led to the legal reincorporation of the
formerly disaffected and the pardon of many of the attainted.
Unswerving allegiance was not a make-or-break proposition for moderates as it
was for radicals. As devoted patriots, Republicans did not permit open hostility against
the Revolution. In fact, it was moderate leadership that extinguished the remnants of
armed antirevolutionary opposition in Pennsylvania in the postwar era. Even so, patriot
moderates bore a greater tolerance for nuanced disaffection, neutrality or indifference to
the cause when driven by factors such as religious conviction, contradictory loyalties,
human frailty and fear, family ties, economic necessity and sometimes even opportunism.
As a result, they opposed test oaths, attainders and repressive rigor. Where radicals only
saw black-and-white, moderate Anti-Constitutionalists also pictured shades of gray. It is
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not surprising, then, that their response to less blatant infidelity, especially after the war,
was to forgive and forget. While radicals’ exclusionary formula legally ostracized the
disaffected, the moderates’ inclusionary vision sought their reinstatement as enfranchised
Pennsylvanians with all the rights of citizenship. This ideological divide framed factional
political battles over the status of former antagonists throughout the 1780s.102 As the
decade went forward, popular support for moderates in the state expanded in conjunction
with a national tendency towards the more centralized type of republican government
articulated in the Federal Constitution of 1787. By 1789, moderates held the levers of
power in both the General Assembly and Supreme Executive Council. That strength
allowed them, first, to push for a total repeal of all tests of allegiance and, a year later, to
successfully revoke and replace the radical Constitution of 1776. While state officials
continued to entertain pardons for attainted exiles well into the 1790s, the 1789 repeal of
the test acts restored formerly disaffected nonjurors to full citizenship and ended once
and for all the legal reintegration drama for Pennsylvania residents.
When not using more pejorative terms such as tory, inimical or obnoxious,
patriots referred to resident antirevolutionaries as loyalists or the disaffected during the
war. This terminology mutated with the achievement of independence, for loyalism
disappeared as a viable option when George III renounced all claims over the thirteen
rebellious colonies in 1783.103 From that point forward, those who stayed in Pennsylvania
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and would not or could not swear allegiance to the patriot government metamorphosed
into nonjurors – people who had never sworn the oath of allegiance. The exception was
those who actively took up arms against republican government. Scattered guerrilla bands
such as the Doans who had earlier aided or fought with the British continued their
depredations through the war and after the peace. Patriots never accorded these “banditti”
nonjuror status. In response to the latent existential crisis the gangs posed, moderatedominant government allied with the radical minority to destroy all armed resistance.
Along with a sustained martial effort under the direction of the Supreme Executive
Council, the assembly passed a series of legislative measures branding the culprits as
outlaws or extending the reach and flexibility of the law which contributed significantly
to dismembering these gangs.104
But it was the lasting consequences of the battle over citizenship and reintegration
of the onetime disaffected which defined the 1780s. Militia, treason, confiscation and
attainder laws and procedures affecting nonjurors all played second fiddle to the factional
controversy over repeal of the Test Act. Concerns over noncompliance with militia
service diminished as the decade wore on. Late-decade moderate legislators led by
B. Morris, The Peace-Makers: The Great Powers & American Independence (New York: Harper & Row,
1965), 461-465. Article 1st quote on 462; and in “British American Diplomacy, The Paris Peace Treaty of
September 3, 1783,” Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/paris.asp
last accessed March 26, 2017.
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speakers Thomas Mifflin and Richard Peters focused more on preventing abuse in the
collection of fines and recruiting soldiers to defend northwestern frontiers than punishing
those who neglected to serve. The war’s conclusion surely had something to do with this
redirection but the influx of Anti-Constitutionalist moderates into state government also
contributed meaningfully to the transformation.105 A 1788 militia act reducing fines and
taking “conscientious scruples” into consideration for “very burthensome” service
illustrates this change towards lenience.106
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The subject of treason followed a similar legislative trajectory, resurfacing in the
legislature only twice during the 1780s, even as the arrival of peace and independence in
1783 reignited public debate about what to do with the loyal and disaffected who chose to
stay or wished to return. The loyalist articles in the Definitive Treaty of Peace of 1783
magnified the controversy.107 Sporadic extralegal committees resolved the stay-or-leave
decision for some disaffected residents in favor of the latter option.108 The legislature’s
first intervention on the treason front, however, had nothing to do with disaffection
stemming from the war with England. Instead, the assembly under speaker Frederick
Augustus Muhlenberg denounced a rumored conspiracy to foment “the most criminal
design” of creating a new state within the commonwealth’s borders. Legislators made
clear that such actions were high treason, underscoring the “suffer death” and forfeiture
penalties, and authorizing the Supreme Executive Council under moderate president John
Dickinson to call out the militia to “prevent and suppress” threats to the state’s integrity.
The warnings worked and put a stop to western settlers’ machinations.109 A subsequent
1785 law checked procedural flaws leading to incarceration in treason cases. If the state
did not adjudicate in a timely manner, judges had to free prisoners on bail or discharge
them. It was incumbent on the state to adhere to its own procedures and eliminate
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arbitrariness. Nonjurors now received the benefit of the doubt, a significant reversal of
the earlier mentality that had guided radical policy on high treason. As Henry Young has
remarked on the prevailing attitude of Pennsylvania officials, “the tendency therefore was
to find some excuse for clemency.” Conditions continued to evolve towards greater
indulgence, favoring successful reintegration.110
Moderate views on sedition triumphed definitively in 1794 when legislative
action overturned the capital penalty under the 1777 treason law, ordering that “no crime
whatsoever, hereafter committed (except murder in the first degree) shall be punished
with death in the state of Pennsylvania.” The statute eased punishment for high treason
from death to “confinement in the gaol and penitentiary house of Philadelphia, for a
period not less than six and no more than twelve years, …at hard labor, or in solitude,”
while making similar adjustments for arson, counterfeiting, involuntary manslaughter,
and rape.111 It should be noted that legislators passed this act amid rising internal tensions
that crested three months later in the Whiskey Rebellion. Because of a potential for
repercussions at the ballot box, lawmakers did not want to face an autochthonous
republican rebellion with the same zeal and severity applied during the Revolution.112
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Removal of the death penalty closed the circle on the legal journey from radical
harshness to moderate clemency in matters of treason. But this belated action had little
impact on the disaffected. By then, legal reintegration had been achieved. The 1794
revision lived on till 1860 when its repeal became part of a major overhaul of the state’s
penal laws.113
Confiscatory policy initiatives and sales of forfeited property likewise slowed late
in the war and throughout the eighties under moderate political gains. The focus turned
instead to unresolved or contested individual cases. For example, the four patriot sons of
attainted loyalist Nathaniel Vernon sought to recuperate whatever forfeited property the
state had not yet sold, arguing “that they may not be reduced to indigence on account of
their father’s transgressions.” Two of the brothers were officers in the Pennsylvania
regiment of the Continental Army. Similarly, the assembly allowed John Abraham De
Normandie more time to settle his estate prior to returning to Geneva, Switzerland, his
native land. In the cases of merchants Matthias Aspen and Daniel Rundle, legislators
extended the deadline for surrendering for trial because they were in Europe and unable
to respond when attainted. Albertson Walton also received an attainder extension because
he had been “in the power of the enemy, and that though he endeavored, yet he was not
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able to escape from them.”114 After the war, issues of property relief, restoration,
restitution or compensation sometimes rose to the forefront when officials violated
seizure procedures or public opinion thought the punishment too rigorous or unjust in
retrospect. Most often, though, legal concerns over confiscated property revolved around
the rights of heirs, spouses or extended family. Some family members even managed to
recover portions of seized estates. The confiscation regime deeply affected reintegration.
For those who had lost significant property and fled, reintegration was not a viable option
without recovery of at least a portion of their assets to launch life anew.
The attainder as a weapon to combat revolutionary nonconformity equally faded
into oblivion under the Anti-Constitutionalists. Council moderates did not emit any
attainder proclamations after the decisive patriot victory over Cornwallis at Yorktown in
October 1781. The waning radical majority in the assembly passed the final attainder in
January 1783, a single-person act levelled at Harry Gordon of Chester County. This law’s
intent was less to condemn Gordon than to clarify his disputed legal status and that of his
seized property in Bedford County. The loyalist was attainted under the name of Henry
Gordon on March 20, 1781 as “now or late a military officer in the British service.” After
state agents confiscated and sold his estate, questions arose about a possible “misnomer,”
throwing the legality of the sale and deed into question. The new attainder gave Harry
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a.k.a. Henry until July 24, 1783, to surrender for trial or prior actions would take effect
“as if he had been legally and rightly named.”115 In total, the radical Supreme Executive
Council issued ten proclamations between the initial attainder law of 1778 and this final
bill. Having originated the use of attainders as a repressive mechanism with legislation,
the assembly closed the loop with the Gordon act.
Much more than militia, treason, confiscation, and attainder issues, however, it
was the factional struggle over repeal of the Test Act which characterized the postwar
decade for both the bloc of nonjurors who refused to take the oath and competing patriot
factions. Pointedly, the test oath battle was far less between the onetime disaffected and
victorious revolutionaries than between these partisan coalitions. Radicals once again
demanded exclusion of opponents from the benefits of republican citizenship, while
moderates insisted on their inclusion and reincorporation. The lack of civic participation
of a sizeable proportion of the populace and the legal nexus between voting rights and
wartime allegiance drew attention to a larger issue: to resolve the test oath controversy
was also to resolve the broader reintegration question.
After a hiatus of almost six years, radical legislators – yet again under John
Bayard’s speakership – resurrected allegiance tests during their brief mid-decade
resurgence as an assembly majority. On September 13, 1785, Constitutionalists folded the
issue into a lengthy electoral law entitled “An Act to Regulate the General Elections of
This Commonwealth and to Prevent Frauds Therein.” The test oath portions of the act
spoke to the renewed public debate triggered a year earlier by moderate Benjamin Rush
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with the publication of his influential pamphlet Considerations upon the Present TestLaw of Pennsylvania. Rush condemned “the exploded doctrine and practice of tests” and
pointed out that it was inconsistent “to employ the pitiful invention of tyrants to support
the freedom of republics.” Viewing nonjurors as “industrious, frugal, [and] temperate”
who were “for the most part genuine republicans in dress and manners,” Rush argued for
repeal. “If they have erred – nay more, if they have sinned during the late war, we shall
consult the freedom and prosperity of the state by forgiving them,” he wrote, expressing
the views of most moderates.”116
The twenty-seven page electoral bill passed only ten days before the Ninth
General Assembly adjourned for good. That autumn’s elections quickly reestablished a
Republican majority and, unbeknownst to Pennsylvanians of all political stripes,
conclusively expelled the radicals as an assembly majority when moderate victories
persisted into the 1790s. The election law contained thirty-two sections. The bulk dealt
with county-by-county voter qualifications and procedures not relevant to this analysis.
Four sections, however, discussed the ambiguous status of some nonjurors. The statute
acknowledged that “doubts have arisen whether young men of this state, who… were
under the age of eighteen years,” when the further supplement to the test laws became
law in October 1779, “can be admitted to vote at elections.” Minors during the
revolutionary years had come of age. Many were from patriot families. Lawmakers
proposed allowing these nonjurors to vote “upon taking and subscribing the oath or
affirmation of allegiance.” Simple enough. Yet radicals had no intention of discarding
suffrage hurdles erected against the ex-disaffected absorbed into the nonjuror class and
116
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thus reasserted that “it is requisite that the test laws heretofore passed in this state should
be carefully regarded in all elections under this act.”117
The new legislation reiterated that no white male residents eighteen years of age
or older at the time of the test supplement of October 1, 1779 could vote without taking
the oath of allegiance. Either the original June 13, 1777 oath or the rewritten December 5,
1778 pledge sufficed to remedy this defect. Moreover, the act settled ambiguities for
Pennsylvanians on military assignment who had not been able to take earlier oaths,
people who had moved to the province from another state, and citizens affected by the
border dispute with Virginia resolved in Pennsylvania’s favor in 1780.118 The new
election law resurrected the debate over tests in the assembly by reasserting the viability
of oaths, thrusting the larger reintegration issue into the limelight once again.
The test law dispute forged ahead on a three-step track which ended with full
legal reintegration. Six months after the new election law, a restored moderate majority in
the assembly returned to the question of loyalty tests. Though the designation insinuated
a new slant on the issue, there was really nothing new in “An Act for Securing to This
Commonwealth the Fidelity and Allegiance of the Inhabitants Thereof and for Admitting
Certain Persons to the Rights of Citizenship” beyond a single key word and yet another
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opportunity to take the oath. Upon taking the new oath, those “omitted or neglected… or
debarred of any of the rights citizenship” would “be and hereby [are] declared to be a free
citizen of this commonwealth and entitled to all the every rights [sic] and privileges
thereof.” Staples from prior oath adaptations reappeared: abjuration of George III,
promises to “be faithful and bear true allegiance” to Pennsylvania and do nothing “that
will be prejudicial or injurious to the freedom and independence thereof,” along with an
assertion that the oath-taker had never “voluntarily joined, aided, assisted or abetted” the
king’s forces. The single novelty was the insertion of the word “voluntarily” in the latter
claim. The new law thus drew a distinction between those who had helped the British of
their own accord and those who argued they had been compelled to do so against their
will. Of parallel import, the act did not extend “to any person or persons who have been
attainted of high treason.” Confirmed traitors remained traitors. The new wording showed
a tendency towards greater indulgence in both content and the opportunity afforded.119
The 1786 revamped test law was a failure. A year later, the moderate assembly
under speaker Thomas Mifflin returned with still another version. This 1787 act reduced
the elements of the oath to being faithful and bearing true allegiance to Pennsylvania and
doing nothing “willfully and knowingly” prejudicial or injurious to the same. It went to
great lengths to explain why the British monarch and “a retrospective clause of uncertain
and indefinite meaning” had been eliminated from the fealty equation, a reference to
aiding the British during the Revolution, voluntarily or not. The new act admitted that the
prior effort had flopped, mentioning complaints of “divers persons coming within the
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description of persons intended to be relieved by the act [who] have represented to this
house their scruples of taking the oath or affirmation, the meaning whereof is not plain
and certain upon the face of it.” The term “scruples” indicates a renewed attempt to
accommodate Quaker nonjurors.
Moderates now astutely couched their reasons in terms of patriot self-interest
rather than benefits to nonjurors. Disenfranchisement hurt the state because nonjuror
residents did not pull their weight in the republican order. “Whereas many useful citizens
are disqualified from service to this commonwealth in several stations by reason of their
scruples against taking the oath or affirmation,” they argued it was “highly impolitic to
deprive the community of their allegiance” and “their assistance in the various offices of
burden as well as of trust and profit which are necessary to be executed for the support of
government.” Besides, times had changed to such a degree “as to render all fears of
disaffection thereto groundless,” for ex-loyalists and disaffected residents were no longer
a threat. Requiring abjuration of the king therefore “is wholly useless as all allegiance
from the inhabitants of these United States has been formally and explicitly renounced by
the said king and no political connection exists between the said king and the inhabitants
of this state.”120 Even this highly concessionary legislation proved insufficient, however.
For many holdouts, conscience reigned supreme. The self-imposed religious prohibition
on taking oaths meant just that – no oaths. Few took advantage of the new opportunity.
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Momentum for repeal grew as national issues meshed with the local. Two months
after this “act to alter,” the Constitutional Convention of 1787 met – in Philadelphia no
less – to restructure the frame of confederated government for the thirteen states. Their
task concluded in September. Extensive debate followed throughout the young nation. On
December 7, Pennsylvania ratified the novel arrangement. Pro-Constitution Federalists
defeated the opposition of antifederalists in heated debates across the nation. By mid1788, enough states had consented to the proposed charter to make it the law of the land.
March 4, 1789 was set as the day for the new instrument of government to officially take
effect. The Federalist victory boosted moderate interpretations of the Revolution and its
consequences in Pennsylvania.
At long last, the door opened for redemption. Nine days after the new federal
government took office, moderate legislators rode the momentum and passed “An Act to
Repeal All the Laws of This Commonwealth Requiring Any Oath or Affirmation of
Allegiance from the Habitants Thereof.” This revocation drew a clear distinction between
times of war and peace, positing that “however proper and expedient they might be
during the late war when it was necessary for individuals to testify their attachment to
one or the other of the contending parties,” loyalty tests “have become unnecessary…
since the restoration of peace and the establishment of government.” Hence, all acts
which “require any oath or affirmation of allegiance or fidelity to this commonwealth…
shall be and they are hereby repealed.” As a result, people excluded from the privileges
of citizenship earlier for failing to swear allegiance “shall be and they are hereby restored
to and placed upon the same footing as to such privileges and burdens and in all other
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respects with the other citizens of this state.” The repeal ignored those attainted for
treason. For them, existing exclusions endured.121
Repeal of the test laws closed the bitter contest over legal reintegration. The
intractability of earlier allegiance requirements disappeared. Inclusionary tolerance and
compassion had won the day. In the process, Pennsylvania had come full circle. The test
act repeal legally rehabilitated those citizens of the commonwealth ostracized when the
Tory Act ignited the allegiance controversy in January 1776. The following decades
would assimilate their talents and contributions well. Yet for Anti-Constitutionalist
Republicans, the test oath repeal reintegrating nonjurors was only a step towards the
greater goal of revoking the 1776 state constitution. In the following months, moderates
rode the pro-federal wave to victory and realized their long-awaited ambition with
passage of the new Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. But that is another story.
CONCLUSION
For the disaffected, the repressive package of disarmament, treason laws, test
oaths, attainders, confiscations and militia service penalties during the war amounted to a
full-scale discriminatory attack on their inherent rights as English colonials. Committed
loyalists considered their decision to remain faithful to the king as perfectly natural. As
Claude Halstead Van Tyne has noted, “loyalty was the normal condition, the state that
had existed, and did exist; and it was the Whigs – the Patriots, as they called themselves,
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– who must do the converting.”122 Other disaffected citizens for whom the monarchy was
not necessarily their prime concern based distaste for the incoming regime on perceptions
of abusive patriot governance, religious persecution or social disorder. They repudiated
rebel conduct as “unconstitutional” because, in practice, it did not protect their rights. Of
course, it was the British constitution they had in mind, not the new state charter.
Through their non-threatening postwar behavior and acceptance of republican authority,
the disaffected-turned-nonjurors helped clear a path to successful reintegration. The
coming chapters will explore that path in depth through the lives of the protagonists.
Yet in the final analysis, it was up to the Pennsylvania Revolution’s victors to
allow or disallow the reintegration of those who had once opposed them. The factional
struggle between Anti-Constitutionalist Republican moderates and Constitutionalist Whig
radicals ultimately decided that question. Both were revolutionaries. Both were patriots.
Yet the two political blocs entertained diametrically opposite views on how to approach
the issue of disloyalty to their cause. Moderates favored reattachment and forgiveness.
Radicals supported segregation and damnation. The ballot box and the republican legal
order provided the terrain for battle. While each faction deployed the law in favor of its
proposed objectives, popular sovereignty had the final say. Electoral triumphs in the
1780s awarded moderates the right to resolve the problem according to their vision.
Between 1775 and 1794, moderate Republicans refrained from actively sponsoring
attainders, slackened the confiscatory regime, abolished capital punishment for treason,
and repealed the test oaths permitting the full reintegration of nonjurors. They used the
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law to restore the inherent rights of all Pennsylvanians regardless of revolutionary
ideology. As a result, the legal structure which had once chastened and ostracized
loyalists and the disaffected became the very tool that facilitated the reassimilation of the
once chastened and ostracized to the benefits of a full republican life.
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CHAPTER 2
REINTEGRATION & DEPARTURE OF THE ELITE LOYALIST MILITANTS
Factionalism contributed significantly to the downfall of the Ancien Régime in
Pennsylvania. The asperity between competing colonial blocs first laid the groundwork
for revolutionary change and then erupted along a loyalist-patriot axis with fatal effects
for proprietary rule. The seeds of disharmony were planted well in advance of rebellion,
as contending elites vied for provincial control for almost a century. On one side, the
successors of proprietor William Penn and their allies formed a loose coalition. Their
authority resided in the original charter of 1681 whereby King Charles II granted Penn
and his heirs ownership of all lands in Pennsylvania, to be disposed of as they saw fit,
and the power to institute “good Government” in keeping with the founder’s vision.1 In
practice, the Penn family sold substantial tracts to colonizers who settled chiefly in the
provincial capital at Philadelphia and the surrounding southeast counties near the
Delaware River. William Penn was a pacifist Quaker and accordingly designed his “Holy
Experiment” as a haven for persecuted religious minorities, especially members of his
own sect who had suffered greatly during the English civil wars of the seventeenth
century. Quakers thus comprised a majority of the early colonists. The founder set up a
political structure with a governor, a provincial council to advise the governor, and a
unicameral representative assembly elected by freeholders, as well as a pledge to deal
fairly with the diverse native peoples residing within their royally allotted jurisdiction.
The arrangement provided an incentive for settlement, as freemen were to share power
with the royal grantees and live in peace with their indigenous neighbors. For most of the
1
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next eighty years or so, the Penns ruled from England as absentee proprietors, appointing
governors and provincial councilors from afar, and providing their officers with specific
instructions on policy. Along the way, the proprietary family drifted from its Quaker
roots. Principal proprietor Thomas Penn’s 1751 Church of England marriage to the
daughter of the first Earl of Pomfret, Lady Juliana Fermor, finalized the conversion to
Anglicanism. At the same time, the Quaker-dominated provincial assembly, whose freely
elected members all lived in the colony, sought to configure Pennsylvania according to
their own image. Not surprisingly, proprietary and Quaker factions in Pennsylvania were
at odds with each other for much of the colonial era.2
Following the 1763 English victory in the French and Indian War, Thomas Penn
decided that the family needed a more hands-on approach in provincial affairs and
appointed his nephew, John Penn Sr., governor of Pennsylvania.3 From that point until
the end of proprietary rule in 1776, a Penn successor served as the colony’s chief
executive. John held the post through 1771 and again from 1773 to 1776. His younger
brother Richard replaced him for a two-year interval from 1771 to 1773 when their father
died and John returned temporarily to England. The Penns used patronage as a
formidable political tool and by the mid-1760s had built a strong network of supporters
with Chief Justice William Allen Sr. as its informal head. In the parlance of the day,
2
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Pennsylvanians recognized this network as the “Proprietary party.” Meanwhile, a
majority in the assembly gathered around the leadership of House speaker Joseph
Galloway and his ally Benjamin Franklin. That faction became known as the “Quaker
party.”4 Two divisive issues framed the contest between these blocs. First, the Proprietary
party strongly opposed assembly efforts to tax fallow, unimproved, and unsold Penn
lands. Second, because of their pacifist views, the Quaker party generally resisted efforts
to organize a militia for armed colonial defense even in the face of Indian and French
depredations on the frontier at the height of the war. The factional clash culminated in a
Quaker party campaign to have a young King George III replace proprietary rule with
direct royal government in the mid-1760s, for which the assembly majority dispatched
Franklin as emissary to London.5
Over the next decade, a new political faction consisting mainly of Scots-Irish
Presbyterian urban artisans, journeymen, laborers and frontier farmers emerged. In time,
these lower and middling sorts became the vanguard of provincial rebellion, challenging
both dominant parties. As a result, while Joseph Galloway and the Allen clan sat on
diametrically opposite poles of colonial contests as the Stamp Act of 1765 launched the
revolutionary period, a little more than a decade later they fled Pennsylvania, joining
forces with Sir William Howe at New York and assisting British efforts to squelch the
insurgency. Given later imperial strategy and the war’s results, the portentous decision to
4
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depart appreciably advanced the collapse of colonial Pennsylvania’s power structure in
two stages. Initially, the 1776 winter flight of elite loyalist militants such as Galloway
and the Allen brothers following the introduction of radical constitutional government
deprived the Penn proprietors of key allies at a critical moment in their struggle either to
preserve the existing regime or to mold the new order in accordance with their interests. 6
After returning with the imperial conquerors in September 1777, their second departure at
the British evacuation of June 1778 definitively decapitated the colonial leadership that
had ruled the province from Philadelphia for nearly a century and sealed the Penns’ doom
once and for all. The exile of loyal Philadelphia elites like the Allens and Galloway
constitutes a crucial feature of Pennsylvania reintegration for two reasons. First, their
exodus had beneficial effects for disaffected residents who chose to stay in Pennsylvania,
laying the groundwork for a lessening of internal political tensions and eventually paving
the way for a smoother process of reintegration. On a second and more personal level, the
Galloway and Allen sagas show how loyalist militancy during the war obstructed the
later path to reintegration. After an extended expatriation, Andrew Allen came back to
America and experimented with the possibility of reintegration but ultimately chose to
remain a British subject. Joseph Galloway guardedly pursued the same prospect but
found former rebel rivals unwilling to grant his wishes. No evidence suggests William
Allen Jr. contemplated a return, but there is no doubt that he would have remained in
Pennsylvania had events dealt him a more favorable hand. Consequently, these militants
are considered examples of failed reintegration.
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ELITE ANTECEDENTS & THE RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN (to 1765)
A devotion to king and empire underscored the fierce battles between the Allen
family and Joseph Galloway over the form, control and direction of colonial government.
Neither the Proprietary nor the Quaker factions ever questioned the legitimacy of
imperial rule, even after the Allens took up arms to defend colonial rights in the early
days of the Revolution. As key elements of a provincial elite clustered in and around
Philadelphia, each saw themselves as an indispensable vehicle for a properly functioning
colony under the British Constitution, the legal instrument that protected their inherent
rights as Englishmen. To defend the royal constitutional order was to defend those rights
and to accord their homeland its rightful place in the imperial universe. Hence,
Pennsylvania’s destiny seemed to be inextricably tied to theirs.
By the time the war opened in 1775, John, Andrew and William Allen the
younger were in the prime of life or about to enter it – 36, 34, and 24 years of age
respectively.7 The family had deep roots in Pennsylvania. Their father William was the
son of one the earliest Scots-Irish emigrants to the province who at one time had resided
at Dunganon, Ireland.8 Born August 5, 1704 and baptized twelve days later in the First or
Old Side Presbyterian Church, William Allen Sr. spent his youth in Philadelphia. At the
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age of sixteen, he crossed the ocean for the first time to study law at London’s esteemed
Middle Temple. In addition to his maturation in the legal profession from attorney to
judge to Pennsylvania Chief Justice from 1751 to 1774, he succeeded as an affluent
merchant, an entrepreneur in the iron industry, an investor in over 75,000 acres of land,
and a political leader holding public offices such as councilman, mayor of Philadelphia,
assemblyman, and city recorder during a multifaceted career. In the colonial era, he
emerged as a vital ally and confidant of the Penn family and the proprietary faction
perennially engaged in political tussles with the Quaker-dominant assembly. William
Allen Sr. derived much of his power from the ability to dispense patronage under the
Penns’ authority. Theodore Thayer argues that “after about 1740, almost all appointments
made by the Proprietors were at the suggestion of William Allen.” Similarly, Stephen
Brobeck has called the Proprietary party “a political faction controlled by the non-Quaker
gentry… dominated by William Allen from the early 1740s to the early 1770s and later
by his sons.” This interpretation is confirmed in a 1764 letter from Governor John Penn
to proprietor Thomas Penn, wherein “particular regard was always paid to… Allen’s
recommendation to every office that fell vacant.” Through talent, connections and the
trust of the Penn family, William Allen Sr. accrued great wealth and prestige.9
The Pennsylvania-born Allen boys followed in their father’s elite footsteps,
establishing early in life the trans-imperial linkages common to many affluent colonials
of the age. John, the eldest, enrolled at the College of Philadelphia in May of 1755 but
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did not graduate or attend after 1759.10 In 1760, he accompanied Joseph Shippen III on a
visit to England, mixing an exploration of business opportunities with learning. An added
excursion to Italy beyond the bounds of empire provoked the mocking curiosity of family
friend Colonel John Alford of Massachusetts, who wondered in a letter to Shippen’s
father why they had “traveled so far just for the honor of kissing the Pope’s great toe.”11
Having clerked with Tench Francis Sr. in Pennsylvania, John continued his legal studies
at the Temple in London like his progenitor but may have veered from this career track
and entered commerce instead.12 Second son Andrew did graduate in 1759 from the
College of Philadelphia, apprenticed locally under then Attorney General Benjamin
Chew, and in 1761 similarly crossed the ocean to pursue an English legal education at the
Temple. Less is known about fourth son William Jr.’s education and early development.
The original attainder law of March 6, 1778, designated him as “Esquire,” like his
brothers John and Andrew, while the 1774 provincial tax tables describe William Jr. as a
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“gentleman.”13 All of the siblings maintained ties with the Presbyterian Old Side
congregation. John joined the church’s Presbyterian Committee of Correspondence in
1764 to foment unity among the faithful in other counties. Around the same time,
Andrew contributed to the building fund for the new Third Presbyterian Church on Pine
Street which later rebelled against its First Church donors in a dispute that echoed
opposing revolutionary viewpoints.14
The third son of William Sr., James, was likewise an integral component of this
band of brothers in the early years of the Revolution. He traveled with Andrew in 1761 to
study law at the Temple and later fared prominently in colonial affairs, at times leading
organized resistance to parliamentary encroachment during the imperial crisis. Like his
brethren, James too became disaffected with the Revolution when resistance for a redress
of colonial grievances turned into separation from England. But he refused to take up the
sword against his fellow Pennsylvanians and disagreed with his brothers’ decision to join
the British army.15 His diary is a critical source for the period. Nonetheless, the analysis
here is largely limited to the three militants who enlisted with the British.
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Socially, all four brothers enjoyed the perks available to elite Philadelphians. In
the 1770s, John and Andrew were active members of the exclusive Philadelphia Dancing
Assembly that arranged galas and balls for those of high public standing. They joined
many of the local institutions of prominence such as the St. Regale Fishing Company, the
Jockey Club, and the American Philosophical Society. In addition, they were trustees of
the College of Philadelphia and common councilors or aldermen of the Philadelphia city
corporation.16 In his late twenties, Andrew married Sarah “Sally” Coxe, sister of Tench
Coxe, during the spring of 1768. Seven years later, John tied the knot in his mid-thirties,
wedding Mary Johnston from a prominent New York family in the spring of 1775.17
Unlike his brothers, William Jr. remained a bachelor all his life.
Some of the Chief Justice’s early reflections on his sons have survived. He
considered the oldest, John, to be “honest and worthy,” lacking vice and not extravagant,
but with “a taste for English manners and customs” and “more indolent than I could
wish” which made him “not as fit… to battle in the world” as he would have liked. As for
number two, Andrew, he too was honest, “of rather more vivacity and higher spirits” than
John, but with a “temper [which] seems rather too quick, of which I have frequently
cautioned him.”18 The elder William’s plans in 1762 to build a town from scratch in
Northampton County, north of Philadelphia, demonstrates the Allens’ high standing in
the colonial order. He named the municipality Allentown and dubbed the streets John,
16
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Andrew, James, William, Anne, and Margaret for his surviving children, while
christening the main thoroughfare Allen in remembrance of the full family. Clearly, the
Allens laid claim to an exalted social position as the imperial crisis opened.19
Joseph Galloway was also a son of privilege. Born in Anne Arundel County,
Maryland in 1730 or 1731, Galloway descended from an English great-grandfather who
received a land grant from Lord Baltimore in 1662. As a child, his family moved to Kent,
Delaware, a province also under the Penn proprietorship. Private tutors provided his early
education. After studying law for five years with Quaker attorney John Kinsey in
Philadelphia, he set up his own successful practice. Young Joseph rose through the social
ranks quickly. At eighteen, he became a member of the prestigious social club, the
Schuylkill Fishing Company. Two years later he tutored Benjamin Franklin’s son,
William, in the law. His friendship with William Franklin proved to be life-long, as both
later swore fidelity to their king in the throes of revolution.20 In 1749, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court bar authorized Galloway to practice in that highest of provincial courts.
By the mid-1750s, he was “easily leader of that bar.” Although raised a Quaker,
19
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Galloway converted to Anglicanism and married Grace Growden at Philadelphia’s Christ
Church in 1753. Grace was the daughter of Lawrence Growden, longtime speaker of the
colonial assembly and one of the wealthiest men in Pennsylvania. With matrimony came
a large house in Philadelphia proper and five country estates. Of these, Trevose in Bucks
County became Joseph’s refuge during the trials of the early Revolution. The Galloway
estate was once valued at £40,000. After her mother’s death, daughter Elizabeth testified
to the Royal Claims Commission that her father “was entitled in the right of his wife to
an estate worth £20,000.” The up and coming attorney thus tied his family fortune to a
larger one and played the gentleman farmer when not engaged in legal affairs.21
Galloway entered politics upon his election to the provincial assembly in 1756 for
Philadelphia County, following the resignation of six pacifist Quakers in the wake of the
colony’s war with indigenous nations, a conflict which in turn stemmed from the BritishFrench struggle for imperial control of North America. Over time, Galloway ascended to
co-leadership of the Quaker party in the assembly alongside Benjamin Franklin. With the
exception of a one-year setback in 1764, he served in the colonial legislature for eighteen
years. Although Galloway later testified before the Royal Claims Commission that he had
21
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been “Speaker of that Assembly for 13 or14 years,” legislative records show the true
figure was eight. Notwithstanding this overstatement, he had a gift for public speaking.
Admirers touted him as the “Demosthenes of Pennsylvania.”22
The Quaker party’s bid in the mid-1760s to supplant the Penns’ charter with
direct royal control of the colony epitomized their adversarial relationship with the
proprietorship and typified Galloway’s pre-revolutionary political career. While Ben
Franklin struggled to shape parliamentary opinion in England, Galloway carried the
campaign’s standard at home. The battle further alienated Thomas Penn, the absentee
proprietor residing in London, and his provincial allies across the sea – most notably
Penn’s nephews John and Richard, the Allen family, Benjamin Chew, and John
Dickinson. Although the royal government effort failed – in large part because of
unforeseen entanglements linked to the imperial crisis – the deep personal animosity
between opposing factions endured.23
During the colonial period, the Galloway star continued to climb. He became a
trustee of the Germantown Academy in 1760, trustee of the State House and other public
buildings two years later, and received an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the
College of New Jersey – later Princeton University – in 1769. Upon the death of fatherin-law Growden that year, he inherited a sizable interest in the Durham Iron Mines and
Iron Works in Bucks County. Galloway also speculated in western lands. With ten others,
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he founded the Illinois Company, presided over the Indiana Company for a time, and
bought land between the Ohio and Tennessee rivers. Meanwhile, he continued to practice
law. Lutheran minister Henry Melchior Muhlenberg noted Galloway’s participation in a
lawsuit involving church land deeds in March of 1763. Yet interest in his profession
waned as politics absorbed more and more of his attention and “he began to decline the
practice of the Law in 1769 & finally quitted it in 1771.” Galloway played a key role on
behalf of the colonial assembly in land negotiations with the Indians in 1758 and
interceded with the tempestuous Paxton Boys when they menaced Philadelphia from the
western frontier in 1764. That spring he “harangued a crowd in the State House Yard”
and later in the year suffered his only major electoral loss to John Dickinson and the
Proprietary party by a mere eight votes out of 3800.24 While the Allen brothers and
Joseph Galloway chose contrary sides of the colonial political landscape, both came from
entitled strands of elite stock centered in the provincial capital. They expected to rule.
COLONIAL RESISTANCE, LOYALIST MILITANCY & INDEPENDENCE (1765-76)
The Revolution reconfigured the colonial era’s loosely organized, tripartite
Quaker-Proprietary-Presbyterian competitive political alignments into a much more rigid
and demanding loyalist-patriot divide. During the insurgency, loyalist militancy came to
mean an unabashed devotion to royal rule. For the Allens early on, royal rule signified
government under a proprietorship headed by the Penns and subservient to the king. For
24
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Galloway, the preference was for a more straightforward connection to the monarchy,
omitting the proprietors. In either case, there was no need to express one’s “loyalism”
prior to 1765. The concept did not exist. In America, colonials everywhere intuitively
breathed the air of loyalty to the mother country. It was a given. There was no need to
affirm it. The rebellion shattered that common denominator once the crucial issue of
allegiance surfaced. Even before formal independence in 1776, those opposed to
resistance increasingly defined themselves as “loyal.” As imperial bonds dissolved, the
more militant among the loyal picked up arms to defend the kingdom or formed an
integral part of organized efforts to restore royal authority. Noteworthy among the
militarily committed foes of independence were John, Andrew, and William Allen Jr. On
the civil side of the conflict, Joseph Galloway arguably became the most conspicuous of
all loyalists, not just among Pennsylvanians. The journey into loyalism of these onetime
adversaries mapped the rocky political and ideological terrain that all provincials
encountered in the early insurrection and illustrates the challenge that independence and
later reintegration presented. The Allen brothers’ fateful decision to take up arms against
the patriot movement and Galloway’s concurrence in serving as Sir William Howe’s
chief civil officer during the British occupation led to their abrupt evacuation from
Philadelphia in mid-summer 1778. These departures became symbols of a larger exodus
of elite loyalists, resulted in a vacuum the rebels immediately filled, and converted
militants like themselves into enemy pariahs, severely circumscribing their options for
reintegration later on.
Passage of the Stamp Act in 1765 triggered acute discontent in the colony and
inadvertently launched the imperial crisis that led to rebellion. The British Parliament
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approved the stamp legislation in the midst of Benjamin Franklin’s mission to London
and caught the Quaker party off guard. The push for royal government was the brainchild
of Franklin and Joseph Galloway. It failed on two fronts. Not only was Franklin unable to
garner sufficient support in England for the proposal, but proprietary interests at home
ably conflated prospective royal rule with parliamentary overreach and the demise of the
rights and liberties granted under the original Penn charter.25 The sons of William Allen
Sr. actively defended the proprietary order. Andrew joined 156 chiefly Presbyterian
Philadelphians in a petition condemning the royal government campaign. John, Andrew
and James helped organize active resistance to the Stamp Act, thus countering Quaker
party strategy. The siblings rallied mob sentiment against John Hughes, nominated as
royal stamp distributor for Pennsylvania through Franklin’s intercession. As Franklin’s
wife Deborah wrote to her husband, “Jemey Allin was att the Staite house a Sperriting up
the mobe and inraigeing of them to porsiste in the affair thay had meet a bought [sic].”26
William Jr. was then only about fourteen-years-old and likely did not participate. The
Allen brothers’ not-so-veiled activism posed a direct challenge to the Quaker party.
Joseph Galloway’s stance on the Stamp Act was a prelude to his position on the
later uprising. In fact, unlike some of his contemporaries, Galloway showed a remarkable
consistency throughout the entire Revolution. Above all, he wished America to retain its
25
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ties to the king, the British Constitution, and empire. He conceded “the reasonableness of
our being Taxed” by Parliament and accepted the logic of parliamentary supremacy so
odious to American patriots. As a pragmatic politician, though, he considered such a
course counterproductive and ill-advised. Galloway especially abhorred the mob violence
that public passions often generated. Writing as “Americanus,” he published a piece in
the Pennsylvania Journal recommending that colonial legislatures make voluntary tax
donations for defense of the colonies, thereby cutting Parliament out of the equation.
Moreover, Galloway advocated the creation of an American legislature to solidify the
imperial relationship and resolve matters of mutual interest. He accurately gauged current
and later revolutionary ardor, commenting that, insofar as the Stamp Act was concerned,
“one Half of the Americans will die rather than submit to it.” His attempt to straddle the
imperial divide had a price, however. Backlash forced him to print a handbill denying he
had intended to embarrass the anti-stamp bloc.27 In September, rumors spread that a mob
would attack the homes of Franklin and stamp distributor Hughes. On the preset night,
Galloway rounded up eight hundred of Franklin’s working-class supporters – known as
the White Oaks – who patrolled the streets and frustrated the opposition’s plans. His
decisiveness paid off. Two months later, he regained his seat in the assembly, defeating
John Dickinson and overturning the sole electoral defeat of his career.28
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As the imperial crisis played out from 1765 to 1775, the ascendancy of both the
Allen brothers and Joseph Galloway grew. Andrew Allen developed steadily in the legal
profession. Like his Quaker party rival, the provincial Supreme Court admitted him to
practice in 1765. The Penns named Andrew a Common Councilman of Philadelphia in
1768. Benjamin Chew appointed him Pennsylvania Attorney General the year after. In
December 1770, brother-in-law governor John Penn named him to the Provincial
Council, where he participated in negotiations in 1774 with Lord Dunmore concerning
the jurisdictional dispute between Virginia and Pennsylvania over the Fort Pitt frontier.
John Allen, too, gained in prestige. Governor Penn appointed him intermediary to a
conference with native nations on the western frontier upset over “the late Murder… on
some of their Brethren” by white settlers. Like Andrew, John became a Common
Councilman for the city and then a Justice of the Peace. At the 1771 death of Richard
Penn Sr., Johnny Allen accompanied his sister Anne and her governor husband to
England, returning with them in August of 1773 when the latter came “to assume the
Government & to supersede his Brother [Richard]” who had exercised the governorship
in the interim.29
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The Allens continued as leaders of provincial resistance against parliamentary
intrusion throughout the imperial crisis. In September 1770, Andrew joined a committee
challenging the breakdown among merchants of yet another nonimportation crusade.
After Lexington, the assembly appointed him one of twenty-five members of the
Committee of Safety “for providing for the Defence of this Province against insurrection
and Invasion.” His involvement in provincial security matters from that summer through
his last council appearance on June 18, 1776 was substantial.30 John participated in
virtually every committee tackling a redress of colonial grievances from 1773 to early
1776. In mid-1774, he favored calling a congress to foster resistance and colonial
cooperation. Fellow activists assigned him to “take a sense of the people” on a choice of
potential delegates to that congress. Now of age, William Jr. participated in the June 1774
debates over the closure of Boston harbor alongside Andrew. As the threat of armed
conflict appeared on the horizon, William helped organize the First Troop of City
Cavalry that December, assuming the rank of First Lieutenant. The brothers’ growth in
public stature contrasted with their seventy-year-old patriarch’s calculated decline. An
aging William Allen Sr. willingly passed the chief justiceship baton to Benjamin Chew
on April 29, 1774 at a meeting of the Provincial Council with Andrew present.31
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In contrast, Galloway’s unshakeable insistence that Pennsylvania conserve ties to
Great Britain gradually eroded the popular support he had once enjoyed over the course
of the decade. His worldview failed to accommodate increasing public dissatisfaction
with the direction of imperial relations. For instance, Galloway saw no inherent danger in
Parliament’s imposition of the Townsend duties in 1767. “I don’t well see how the public
weal of the Province can be affected by it,” he wrote to Franklin in London.32 In late
1766 he partnered with Quaker merchant Thomas Wharton Sr. and newspaper editor
William Goddard to launch the Pennsylvania Chronicle in hopes that the medium would
become the semi-official voice of the Quaker party. When Goddard published an article
by rival John Dickinson condemning the Townsend Acts, Galloway withdrew funding
and resigned. The polemic further situated him among foes of the resistance. By 1769, he
no longer counted on the artisan class that had once formed a core component of his
political base. He kept his place in the assembly, however, through a safe and “rotten
borough seat” from Bucks County. Even so, he retained the respect of his fellow
assemblymen who chose him speaker every year through 1773.33
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From 1770 onwards, Galloway spent most of his time at his Trevose estate,
traveling to Philadelphia only when the legislature was in session or for essential
business. He felt mounting unease with both radical mobs and the “conduct of the
assembly.” As imperial tensions escalated, he considered permanently retiring from
politics. From London, Benjamin Franklin urged him to reconsider: “I must, however,
beg you not to retire from public business. You are yet a young man, and may still be
greatly serviceable to your country.”34 Parliament’s Intolerable Acts brought the crisis to
a head. In the summer of 1774, mass meetings in Philadelphia backed the call for a
congress to consolidate a joint colonial response to the closure of Boston harbor and other
parliamentary infringements. A battle ensued over the proper mode of electing delegates
to the proposed congress. Radicals convened a provincial convention and nominated John
Dickinson and his allies to represent Pennsylvania but a revivified Galloway played an
instrumental role in assuring that the legally constituted and more conservative assembly
had the final say. That body eventually named him to lead the provincial delegation – as
he later put it, “at the earnest solicitation of the Assembly of Pennsylvania.”35
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The First Continental Congress proved to be Joseph Galloway’s sole hurrah as
arbiter of colonial destinies. Despite apprehensions over increased radicalization, the
Pennsylvania House speaker viewed the September 1774 convocation in Philadelphia
with optimism, an opportunity to tackle the imperial rift head-on and re-anchor the
overseas dominions to England. Two days before Congress opened, Galloway gathered a
sense of those present while awaiting arrival of the delegates in transit. “I think they will
behave with Temper and Moderation,” he conjectured.36 Not unlike the most extreme of
provincials at the time, he conceded that the colonies had interests, rights, and safety
concerns which “from their local circumstances, cannot be represented in the Parliament
of Great Britain.” As a remedy for this accident of history, he argued that the colonies
“hold in abhorrence the idea of being considered independent communities… and most
ardently desire the establishment of a Political Union, not only among themselves, but
with the Mother State, upon those principles of safety and freedom which are essential in
the constitution of all free governments.” His most far-reaching proposal was a “British
and American legislature, for regulating the administration of the general affairs of
America.” This Plan of Union outlined measures for rebuilding fractured imperial
relations. A legislative Grand Council would convene annually in America and include
“all the said colonies,” each to “retain its present constitution, and powers of regulating
and governing its own internal police, in all cases whatever.” A President General
appointed by the king would administer the government and have veto power over all
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laws passed by the Grand Council whose representatives were to be elected by the
provincial assemblies of each colony. A critical clause ensured that all acts approved by
the Grand Council and the President General, “shall be valid and passed into a law,
without the assent of the British Parliament.”37
In retrospect, Galloway’s plan appears reasonable, visionary and quite possibly
capable of resolving contemporary political differences between America and Great
Britain. But such a supposition assumes a modicum of political foresight, even tempers
and judicious minds willing to compromise, and the corresponding acquiescence not only
of the thirteen colonies soon to rebel but also that of King George III, his ministers and
Parliament. The Plan of Union is an outstanding illustration of the critical role timing
plays in historical processes. It came too late for many colonists who deeply resented
Britain’s coercive measures against New England and too early for the English who still
believed they could bend the unruly provincials to their indomitable will. In fact, given
increasing obduracy on the royal side, the success of Galloway’s proposal was less
probable in Great Britain than among congressional delegates at Philadelphia. Some
historians have concluded that the Plan of Union failed in Congress as much from
Galloway’s “disabling vanity,” self-importance, and personal liabilities in his relations
with other delegates as from the timing or contents of the plan itself. Perhaps. The
wording of his later Candid Examination surely provides fodder for such a hypothesis.
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His closing remarks grandiloquently announced that “I have… deduced your rights… and
explained your duties… [and] pointed out the mode… you ought to pursue.”38 Little
humility informs such a pronouncement and it is not difficult to imagine that freethinking delegates would consider his disposition haughty or condescending.
In the end, it did not matter. Despite a home-court advantage, Galloway’s rivals
outmaneuvered him politically and procedurally. He did not propose his plan until the
First Continental Congress had heard and ratified the Suffolk Resolves’ recommendation
“to withhold all commercial intercourse with Great-Britain, Ireland, and the West-Indies”
– in effect a new round of nonimportation which proved to be more thorough and better
organized than earlier attempts. Nevertheless, Galloway’s blueprint succumbed only by a
narrow vote of six colonies to five – though radicals later rubbed salt in the wound by
expunging the Plan of Union debate from the congressional record. At first glance, it
seems puzzling that Joseph Galloway’s signature adorns the Continental Association
which Congress established to enforce the trade restrictions inspired by the Suffolk
Resolves.39 His later justifications, however, paint a vivid picture of an agitated political
climate at this crucial juncture. Although he confessed in private to Samuel Verplanck in
New York that “I totally disagree with them [Congress] in all,” Galloway signed because
“he was told by his friends out of Doors that it would not be safe to refuse to sign it.”
Similarly, he disagreed with Congress’ first petition to the king because it “contain’d
many grievances which in his Opinion did not exist,” yet added his endorsement
38
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“because it was signed by all the other delegates.” Galloway’s attitude is indicative of the
gulf between patriot and loyalist levels of commitment, not only in Pennsylvania but in
most other states. More often than not, revolutionaries dedicated themselves and their
resources wholeheartedly to the cause. Conversely, loyalists often declined to stand alone
when lacking overt British support. In another contemporary example following the
Pennsylvania legislature’s approval of Congress’ resolves, Galloway noted that assembly
consent “has given great uneasiness to many,” yet in his estimation the “men of Property
[who] begin to think & speak their Sentiments” would not take the lead in opposition
“until the measures of Parliament are known, and they can hope to be protected in their
upright conduct.” The disparity in commitment and the operational initiative which
naturally ensues reveal the importance of political will in deciding the Revolution.40
At the close of the First Continental Congress, an anxious Joseph Galloway
withdrew briefly from the public arena. In November, he expressed his true feelings to
the husband of his wife’s sister in London. “Nothing has been wanting on my Part to
moderate the Violent Temper of the Warm & indiscreet People here, and bring about a
Reconciliation between the two Countries upon Principles of Liberty and Government,”
he wrote. “But what can one or a few Men do in so Arduous a Task.”41 Though
“unanimously elected” as Pennsylvania House speaker after Congress adjourned, “he
declined it thinking he could be of more use upon the floor.” In the meantime, he traveled
40
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to New York City. Violating the delegates’ code of secrecy, he reported results of the
First Congress to royal Governors Cadwallader Colden of New York and William
Franklin of New Jersey. Returning to Trevose on December 6, he did not attend the
provincial assembly until the 13th, three days after John Dickinson successfully rallied
unanimous support for approval of Congress’ resolves.42 Whether Galloway’s presence
could have turned the tide or redirected events is open to question, but his absence most
assuredly paved the way for pro-congressional unanimity.
For a brief interlude, Galloway appeared optimistic. In February, he confided to
his friend Verplanck that “it is with great pleasure I assure you that Moderation is taking
place of the violence in this Province, in a more rapid Progress than my most sanguine
expectations ever suggested,” countering his observation two months earlier that “in these
perilous Times… no news perhaps would be most agreeable.” Two weeks later, he
expressed a similar buoyancy to William Franklin: “I hope, with some Trouble, all
Violence will soon cease, & Peace & Order take place of Licentiousness & Sedition.”43
But the outbreak of hostilities at Lexington green on April 19, 1775 dramatically raised
the stakes and transformed the political panorama. As armed conflict entered the picture,
both Galloway and the Allens remained true to the original resistance goal of redressing
colonial grievances within existing constitutional bounds. Their approaches to the
revolutionary crisis differed, however.
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Joseph Galloway became more and more disheartened. Still a representative in the
Pennsylvania assembly, he proposed motions that the House censure and withdraw from
Congress as well as endorse the British House of Commons peace proposals of February
1775. His efforts flopped. Though the assembly no doubt leaned conservative, they did
not dare to openly defy the bottom-up fervor which had already erupted prior to the onset
of armed conflict. He summarized the reigning legislative climate in March, noting that a
procedural measure “was opposed by my Friends but they had not Brass enough to insist
upon.”44 Upon publication of his Candid Examination in 1775 charging Congress with
intent to secure that “ill-shapen, diminutive brat, INDEPENDENCY,” Galloway received
“a Box with an halter in it & persons open’d a Policy of insurance to insure his Life for
ten Days.” The messengers enclosed a note saying that “they desired him to hang himself
or they would do it for him.” In April, Galloway joined Thomas Wharton Sr. in funding
the Pennsylvania Mercury as a new weekly under the direction of Enoch Story and
Daniel Humphreys. Opponents quickly categorized the newspaper as a “Tory” enterprise.
That same month, Galloway finally felt “Obliged to quit the Town of Philadelphia &
retire to his Country Seat.”45
During his absence, the colonial assembly appointed him a delegate to the Second
Continental Congress scheduled to convene in Philadelphia in May but he “absolutely
refused to go.” Requesting withdrawal of his name, “I very explicitly told them, that I
entirely disapproved of them.” During his self-confinement at Trevose, Galloway
44

“Joseph Galloway,” Legislators in Pennsylvania, vol. 3, 610-611.

45

“Memorial of Joseph Galloway,” Egerton, The Royal Commission, 84; Joseph Galloway, A Candid
Examination, 31; Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 185. The halter incident came up again during
Galloway’s testimony before Parliament in 1779. See The Examination of Joseph Galloway, 53-54;
“Joseph Galloway,” Legislators in Pennsylvania, vol. 3, 612-613.

123

received death threats and – as he later testified – local patriots “called on me for my
arms.” That May he wrote a public letter at the behest of the patriot Committee of Safety
in which he denied that he was “inimical” to the cause of America. Benjamin Franklin,
who had returned from London thoroughly persuaded of English corruption and
malevolent intentions, visited Galloway at Trevose at least three times, trying to secure
his friend’s support for the rebellion, all to no avail. By summer, Galloway’s transient
optimism had vanished, conceding instead that “we are on the brink of a Precipice ‘big
with the fate of America.’” He appears to have lost the will to battle, confiding first that
“I have I hope retired in Time from the distressing and ungrateful Drudgery of Public
Life,” and then limiting his efforts to a search for “the place of most Safety for a Family,”
concluding that “none [was] more safe than the country I live in.” In October 1775, the
frustrated ex-speaker resigned his post in the assembly and retired from all politics.46
Two months later, his investment in the Pennsylvania Mercury came to an abrupt end
when unidentified vandals – in all likelihood politically motivated – put the torch to the
“obnoxious” weekly’s printing press.47
Despite their own growing doubts, the Allens tried to stay in the partisan game
and lead from within. John Allen played a political and organizational role. In May of
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1775, he became a member of the patriot Committee of Inspection and Observation for
Philadelphia and the Northern Liberties and, that summer, joined a committee of six to
supervise the production of saltpeter, an essential ingredient in the manufacture of
gunpowder. Patriots held John in high esteem at this juncture. From the siege of Boston
in the early winter of 1775, rebel Colonel William Thompson assured him that “I shall
think myself happy in having it in my Power, in any part of my Life, to serve either you
or your Friends.”48 William Jr. made an even more robust commitment, taking up arms in
defense of aggrieved colonial liberty. After the battle of Lexington, he enlisted in the
militia as Ensign of the Second Battalion. Congress soon commissioned him as one of the
first Pennsylvania officers. In June, the assembly entrusted William Jr. as one of twelve
signers for an issue of £35,000 in bills of credit to bolster the local economy. Captain
William Allen Jr. endured the bitterly cold and abortive Quebec campaign of December
1775 under the pooled forces of Benedict Arnold and Richard Montgomery. Serving
laudably under Colonel Arthur St. Clair, he rose in rank to Lieutenant Colonel. Of the
eight patriots the Committee of Safety recommended to Congress for that distinction,
William Jr. tied for the second highest total of votes received.49 Meanwhile, Andrew
bestrode the political and military spheres. In 1775, he mustered with a troop of horse
48
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assigned in the summer to escort recently appointed Commander-in-Chief George
Washington from Philadelphia to Brunswick on the initial leg of his journey to take
charge of the patriot army in Boston. The colonial assembly named him to the Committee
of Safety in June and in August he helped design new rules for the “association” which
later metamorphosed into the state militia. The assembly also appointed him one of nine
delegates to the Second Continental Congress for Pennsylvania in November.50 Though
troubled, the family held steady on resistance.
The extraordinary events of 1776 definitively split Pennsylvania provincials into
loyalist and patriot camps and forced Galloway and the Allens to choose their destiny. In
January, Thomas Paine set off a firestorm with the publication of Common Sense in
which he proposed full-scale independence. Public opinion in the capital city rallied
around his radicalized views. As Congress and local popular sentiment edged towards a
definitive separation from the mother country, an ever more isolated Joseph Galloway
clung to the seclusion of Trevose. The Allen clan continued to engage, although more
hesitantly than before. Outwardly, they manifested a pro-patriot posture and fulfilled their
political and military duties. As a delegate to Congress, Andrew participated in a secret
initiative with Thomas Lundin, Lord Drummond, to develop a plan for peace acceptable
to both the revolutionaries and the British. But secrecy brought the opposition of George
Washington who reported the business to Congress, while Samuel Adams and John
Adams opposed the scheme on political grounds. In March, the plan fizzled away in
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dithering debate.51 Meanwhile, New Jersey elected John Allen a delegate to its Provincial
Congress. On February 26, the Philadelphia Committee of Inspection recruited John for
one of eight district subcommittees to supervise the landing of merchandise by ship or
ferry. After the retreat from Canada, the Continental Army assigned Lieutenant Colonel
William Allen Jr. to Fort Ticonderoga. Andrew continued in Congress, ran for a seat in
the assembly “by-election” of May 1, 1776 on a ticket “favoring reconciliation with
Britain” and won, tying for the second highest vote count in a slate of eight candidates.
He also continued to serve on the Committee of Safety. Although his attendance there
became more sporadic as time passed, minutes show Andrew present as late as June 18,
1776 – two weeks before independence – among a quorum of twelve others.52
Inwardly, however, the Allens had grave doubts about the course of the resistance
movement. Independence – a step they considered ominous – loomed ever larger. Caught
between conflicting impulses, the brothers opted to check the impetus towards a divorce
from Great Britain rather than advance the popular cause. As Andrew’s by-election to the
provincial assembly clearly demonstrated, the Allens were not alone in their sentiments.
The conservative ticket had won three of the four seats in question, the more radical
Whigs only one. Yet the extremely tight race revealed a bifurcation of popular attitudes
along a more or less equal distribution.53 Almost everyone agreed on defying
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parliamentary interference. But about half of the population wanted to persevere in
addressing colonial grievances within the legal bounds prescribed by the British
Constitution, while the other half wanted to sever ties with the monarchy once and for all.
It was at this critical juncture that Congress decisively called for the states to discard all
forms of royal authority and forge entirely new governments, opening the door for the
July 4th Declaration of Independence.54
The turmoil exposed the inadequacy of the idea of resistance upon which the
Allens based their antiparliamentary stance. The moment demanded greater zeal. James
noted forlornly in his diary that “My Brother John having been elected a member of the
Provincial Congress of New Jersey, finding all opposition [to independence] vain, soon
left it & never returned.” Upon hearing of the Declaration of Independence, William the
younger rode to Philadelphia from Fort Ticonderoga and submitted a letter to the
Continental Congress “praying leave to resign his commission,” a request duly granted
on July 24. As the most visible of the three, Andrew’s by-election campaign actively
endorsing reconciliation with Great Britain gained particular notoriety. By this point, the
Proprietary and Quaker parties had tacitly converged, conscious that political lines had
been redrawn and colonial factions no longer mattered. The entire existing order was
53
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under siege. Radical Christopher Marshall described the moment thusly: “I think it may
be said with propriety that the Quakers, Papists, Church, Allen family, with all the
Proprietary party, were never seemingly so happily united as at this election,
notwithstanding Friends’ former protestation and declaration of never joining with that
party since the club or knockdown Election.”55 Erstwhile enemies, Galloway and the
Allen brothers now stood arm in arm with the opponents of independence.
Joseph Galloway belonged to a strain of nonconformity with Parliament that
wished to remedy violations of colonial rights respectfully and only via proper channels.
For Americans like him, retention of the imperial connection reigned supreme. Open
defiance – which endangered that crucial linkage – was not an option. Alternatively, the
Allen brothers’ road from active to reticent resistance was more typical of colonials who
resisted parliamentary intrusion but could not cross the Rubicon of independence. While
wrestling with the question of allegiance and the prospect of a fall from the provincial
summit, it appears they overestimated the degree of influence they still retained. Patriot
officer Alexander Graydon noted that William Jr. had “called at our camp on his way to
Philadelphia [to resign], where he appeared somewhat surprised and mortified, that his
example had no followers.” Some saw William’s resignation as an act grounded on selfinterest and pride, not principle. A patriot newspaper adduced that “he resigned – not
because he was totally unfit for it, but because the Continental Congress presumed to
55
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declare the American States Free and Independent, without first asking the consent, and
obtaining the approbation of himself and wise family.”56
Andrew clearly saw himself as a necessary brake on the radicals in the lead-up to
independence. His testimony and that of witnesses before the Royal Claims Commission
in the 1780s sought to justify his actions on the patriot front in terms of strict loyalty to
the king. Witness Phineas Bond claimed Andrew was “uniformly zealous to maintain the
constitutional dependence of North America upon Great Britain,” though “constantly
adverse to the exercise of unrestrained taxations by this country [England] over the
colonies.” Bond added that a wish to be “the voice of the Moderate party” and “restrain
the measures of violence then in agitation” while opposing “the alarming efforts then
making to bring about” independence motivated the colonial assembly’s decision to
appoint Andrew to Congress as well as his acceptance.57
In his own testimony, Andrew Allen noted that radicals nicknamed his Troop of
Horse the “Tory Association.” He swore he had only joined the patriot Committee of
Inspection and Observation which rounded up suspected loyalists “to save these people
from the Fury of the Mob, who he feared would proceed to extremities against them.” In
the same vein, he asserted that “during the time he sat in Congress he did everything in
his power to prevent the separation of the two countries – and publicly in the Congress
and within closed doors delivered his sentiments against every measure which should
bring on a Rupture between the two countries.” Andrew took his views beyond Congress,
56
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adding that “being appointed a Trustee of the College of Philadelphia, he publicly took
the Oaths to the King in the month of April of 1776, for which he was attacked in
Congress by one of the Delegates from Virginia” a month later. Historian Henry Young
ascribes such importance to this incident that he believed it “probable” that Andrew’s
public oath to the king “helped precipitate the all-important resolution which Congress
passed” in May instigating the colonies to set up new governments.58 The episode reveals
the Allens’ importance as bastions of colonial continuity and as safeguards on separatist
impulses barely two months before independence. In order to go forward with their
agenda, radicals had to either smash the Allens’ opposition or convince them to join the
independence movement. Although patriots no doubt preferred the latter option, an
outcome like Galloway’s self-confinement was also perfectly admissible.
Contemporaries sensed the Allens’ allegiance struggles. Looking back from his
patriot vantage point, Graydon judged that John “was an acknowledged disapprover of
our proceedings” but recalled Andrew as “more ardent, and considered also to be more
sincere.” He concluded that the family’s “early whiggism had perhaps as much disgusted
the Tories, as its final defection had exasperated the Whigs,” suggesting their loyalism
was not a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, exile Daniel Coxe described Andrew
to the claims commission as a “steady zealous Loyalist” who “very sincerely repented of
the part he had taken.” Of Andrew, Sabine said a half century later “he, at first, was
found among the leading Whigs.” Of William, he said more succinctly “he was a Whig,”
whereas John, “unlike his brother, was an avowed Loyalist from the first.”59
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While Joseph Galloway remained out of the public eye, the Allens’ tightrope act
began to unravel shortly before the Declaration of Independence. Unable to halt the
momentum towards a permanent breach, the brothers voluntarily threw in the towel.
After John’s withdrawal from New Jersey’s provincial congress, he moved with his
family to an Allen residence at the Union Ironworks in Hunterdon in that state. Andrew
resigned from the Troop of Horse in April 1776 and did not venture back to the Council
of Safety after June 18 nor to the Continental Congress after June 14, a huge political
error since Pennsylvania’s delegation to Congress voted in favor of independence by a
margin of only one. Benjamin Franklin, James Wilson, and John Morton voted for
separation. Thomas Willing and Charles Humphreys voted against independence. Edward
Biddle died during the session, while John Dickinson and Robert Morris abstained. There
are conflicting accounts regarding the latter’s roles – some historians say they were
present but did not vote; others claim they purposely did not show up that day at all.
Because the final tally was 3-2 out of a potential eight-man delegation minus Biddle,
Andrew’s anti-independence vote could have brought about a tie and conceivably
precipitated a political crisis.60
Instead, Andrew Allen purchased a farm at Neshaminy, fifteen miles outside of
Philadelphia, and retired like Galloway to wait out events. Said diarist James, “a few
weeks before this unhappy declaration my Brother Andrew, with Mr. Willing and Mr.
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Humphries left the Congress.” Phineas Bond later elaborated that Andrew “withdrew
himself from Congress mainly because he perceived it to be impossible to defeat the
schemes of those who were bent on overturning the established Forms of Government.”
Andrew himself believed delegates to Congress “were plunging America into Ruin.”
Unlike his brothers, William stayed in Philadelphia that summer. No longer a continental
officer, he got into an altercation on September 3. Disowned Quaker and radical Whig
Christopher Marshall noted that “yesterday, high words passed at Coffee House, William
Allen, Jr., declaring he would shed his blood in opposition to Independency, and Col.
John Bayard, in the support of Independency.”61 This was the same John Bayard who
became speaker of the radical assembly.
Retirement from the public sphere did not bring tranquility. From July to
November 1776, Howe drove Washington and his continentals out of New York.
Speculation on his next move ran rampant. James Allen noted in his diary the rumors
then circulating that “General Howe was expected in Philadelphia.” Patriot fears ignited
“a persecution of Tories,” a definition applied haphazardly to “every one disinclined to
Independance [sic] tho’ ever so warm a friend to constitutional liberty and the old
cause.”62 Earlier devotion to resistance now provided little protection. Any doubts about
stronger measures against Great Britain made one a target. Joseph Galloway considered
himself in grave danger during his reclusion, and “to a Degree imprisoned in his own
house.” Three mobs “excited against him” in the autumn of 1776, some threatening to
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tar-and-feather or hang him. The last group consisted of “thirteen intoxicated Dutchmen,”
allegedly instigated by Massachusetts congressman Samuel Adams. The contradictions
wrought by revolution permeate the Galloway saga. Opposed to the country’s direction
and bullied with violent retaliation, the former House speaker nonetheless managed to
present medals to a patriot militia regiment and entertain four hundred troops on his
estate. On the eve of Benjamin Franklin’s departure for his diplomatic mission to France
that October, this onetime political ally – now a consummate revolutionary – stored his
personal papers at Trevose and left his last will and testament in Galloway’s care.63
The threats continued. By late November Galloway had had enough. While his
daughter Elizabeth hid at a friend’s house, he escaped by night. Wife Grace stayed behind
to safeguard the original Growden estate “under an expectation, from some words in the
law,” said her husband, “that she might retain her own estate even during my life, and at
least after my death.” Galloway found his way to the British at New Brunswick, New
Jersey, and surrendered to General Vaughn. It is possible he responded to the Howe
amnesty proclamations for those willing to embrace the royal standard.64 The patriot
Freeman’s Journal noted Galloway’s exit with poetic sting in early 1777:
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Gall’way has fled, and join’d the venal Howe,
To prove his baseness, see him cringe and bow,
A traitor to his country, and its laws,
A friend to tyrants, and their cursed cause…
Fit materials for such Tory blood,
Who wrong their country, and deny their God…65
Meanwhile, the Allens received the chilling news that “a list of 200 disaffected
persons [was] made out, who were to be seized, imprisoned & sent off to North Carolina;
in which list, it was said, our whole family was set down.” According to Graydon, lawyer
Christian Huck “had assured them, that measures were in agitation for their immediate
arrest and confinement.” William and Andrew fled “under this dreadful apprehension,”
seeking momentary refuge with brother John at Hunterdon. James met them there soon
after. The ensuing exchange among the four brothers resulted in the momentous decision
of three to quit Pennsylvania altogether. James’ entry of January 25, 1777 about a month
later, declared that “against my Judgmt, they all went to Trenton & claimed protection
from General Howe’s army. From thence they went to N. York where they now are.” The
Allens’ getaway garnered the attention of Congress. Virginia delegate Thomas Nelson Jr.
informed Thomas Jefferson that “your friends John, Andrew and William Allen are now
with General Howe,” adding that they “have hamm’d themselves finely, for when they
went to Howe, there was very little doubt, but he would shortly have been in possession
of Philadelphia, as indeed he might, had he play’d his Cards well.”66 The reference is to
the British advance southward through New Jersey which Washington repulsed with his
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victories at Trenton and Princeton. Howe himself later confirmed that Andrew had joined
the army at Trenton in 1776. Some historians believe the Allens may have likewise made
this decision in response to British pardons. Former patriot partners viewed the move as
basely self-interested. Robert Morris wrote of Andrew and John Dickinson that they
“have given mortal stabs to their own Characters” and that “the defection of these men
was supposed to have originated in a desire to preserve their Estates.”67 The decision split
John, Andrew and William Jr. from their father and James who opted to stay behind.
IN THE SERVICE OF THE KING (1776-1783)
The Galloway and Allen defections left Governor John Penn and the proprietary
government on their own at a crucial moment when the fate of the old order still hung in
the balance. In the absence of established leadership opposing the revolutionary surge,
radical patriots seized the opportunity to shape republican government according to their
design. They did so with gusto.68 Meanwhile, Galloway and the Allens quickly gained the
confidence of the British high command at New York. Andrew Allen took an oath of
allegiance to King George III and renounced fidelity to Congress. Joining other highly
regarded colonials who had fled, the group coalesced as an unofficial loyalist lobby,
peppering Howe with reports of strong pro-British feeling in Philadelphia and pushing for
an attack on the capital. Circumstantial evidence suggests an effective lobby, as the
commander abruptly modified his plans in the last months of 1776 from an attack on
67
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New England via Newport to an assault on Philadelphia. In later preparations for the
invasion, Howe appointed Andrew as Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania to stand in
for then captive Governor John Penn Sr. who remained under rebel arrest in New Jersey
through May 1778.69 Confidence levels for the Philadelphia offensive were apparently
high. Patriot officer Alexander Graydon’s mother, in British-occupied New York that
June seeking to find her recently captured son, received a visit from fellow Philadelphian
John Allen in which “he advised her not to be scrupulous as to the terms of my
[Graydon’s] release, since the business would soon be over.”70
Joseph Galloway felt much the same way. In March 1777, he optimistically hailed
British efforts and a weakening rebellion. Expecting a decisive imperial victory, he wrote
to Richard Jackson in London that the British were about to undertake the “Reduction of
America.” In preparation for such an inevitability, Galloway met with fellow Anglicans
in New York to discuss the establishment of a bishopric for the Church of England in
America. General Howe assigned Galloway to set up an intelligence network of loyalist
informants, recruit pilots and guides, secure provisions, and marshal horses for the assault
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on Pennsylvania.71 Sir William Howe landed his army at Head of Elk on Chesapeake Bay
on August 25, marched towards Philadelphia, and beat back Washington at Brandywine
on September 11. On September 26, Robert Morton celebrated in his diary that “about 11
o’clock A.M. Lord Cornwallis with his division of the British and Auxiliary Troops
amount’g to about 3000, marched into this city, accompanied by Enoch Story, Jos.
Galloway, Andw. Allen, William Allen, and others, inhabitants of this city, to the great
relief of the inhabitants who have too long suffered a yoke of arbitrary Power; and who
testified their approbation of the arrival of the troops by the loudest acclamations of
joy.”72 Loyalist fortunes were on the rise. The future was theirs.
The British takeover of Philadelphia finalized the transformation of the AllenGalloway relationship. Once acrimonious enemies along the Proprietary and Quaker
party rift, the Revolution purged those distinctions. They now stood shoulder to shoulder
on the same team. For most observers, the occupation appeared decisive and permanent,
especially after Howe’s forces held off the continentals again in a major engagement at
Germantown on October 4 and the imperial navy dislodged the patriots’ ingenious
maritime defenses on the Delaware River to open resupply routes before winter ice froze
access to the sea. But on November 4 news arrived that General John Burgoyne had
surrendered his entire army to the rebels at Saratoga in mid-October. Some of the earlier
buoyancy evaporated.73 Still, loyal Pennsylvanians seemed secure in their position.
71

“Joseph Galloway,” Legislators in Pennsylvania, vol. 3, 614; Chopra, Unnatural Rebellion, 83; James B.
Bell, A War of Religion: Dissenters, Anglicans and the American Revolution (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),
192-193.
72

“The Diary of Robert Morton,” PMHB, vol. 1, no. 1, 7-8. Other accounts reveal a more subdued
reception for Cornwallis and company. See editor’s footnote in Morton’s diary for entry of September 26.
73

“Diary of Robert Morton,” PMHB, 26-27. For the river battle, Taaffe, Philadelphia Campaign, 108-144.

138

Joseph Galloway and the Allen brothers promptly went to work to restore royal
rule. General Howe named Galloway Superintendent General of the Police in the City
and its Environs & Superintendent of Imports and Exports to & from Philadelphia, the
highest ranking civil officer of the occupation. Radical Christopher Marshall held a less
complementary view, noting that Galloway “was proclaimed in Philada. Governor of this
Province, by the knot of Tories there.” The designation put him in charge of civil
administration and trade, including the night watch, disarmament of suspected rebels,
control of access to the city, and regulation of markets, the port, and taverns. He also
organized round-ups of suspected Whigs who remained in the city and a campaign to
administer the royal oath of allegiance to residents. Elizabeth Drinker noted in late
September that “a Number of the [Citysans] taken up, and imprison’d.”74
The Allens followed a similar path. As the nominal Lieutenant Governor, Andrew
Allen first served in a civil capacity. In the fall of 1777, he and Galloway added their
signatures to that of more than six hundred Philadelphians who petitioned General Howe
to allow the use of colonial currency as legal tender.75 Meanwhile, William Jr. “was by
Sir William Howe appointed Lieut. Col. Commandant of a Regiment, which he raised at
that place called the Pennsylvania Loyalists.” The youngest Allen circulated a broadside
addressed to “All Intrepid Able-Bodied Heroes Who are willing to serve His Majesty
King George the Third, in Defence of their Country, Laws and Constitution against the
arbitrary Usurpations of a tyrannical Congress.” His notice offered recruits fifty acres of
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land at war’s end, as well as a five-dollar bounty, arms, clothing and provisions. With
authorization to enlist up to 456 men, William Allen Jr.’s regiment numbered 132
soldiers when the unit evacuated Philadelphia in 1778. Among those joining was John
Young, nephew of Elizabeth Graeme Ferguson, given the rank of Lieutenant. To
opponents, the Allens’ resurgence under royal colors appeared ominous. A letter from
occupied Philadelphia published in a patriot newspaper beyond the city described the
brothers as “insolent and cowardly.” That Joseph Galloway and the Allens found
themselves on the same side did not necessarily mean that they had become friends. In
later testimony before Parliament, Galloway attributed the failure of loyalist enlistments
to Howe’s selection of “the most unpopular men to recruit,” among whom he included
William Jr.76
Despite the setback at Saratoga, loyalist fortunes still appeared robust as late as
January 1778. Galloway faithfully tended to his duties, assembling a series of detailed
reports on colonial conditions for royal authorities, such as “An Account of the General
Property of the Thirteen United States of America” calculating “the whole value of the
real and personal property & taxables in the thirteen United Colonies.” In a demographic
analysis entitled “The Present State of America,” he surmised that 450,000 out of
1,800,000 whites and 200,000 of 800,000 blacks were capable of bearing arms on either
side of the conflict. Galloway favored arming the enslaved to fight for the royal cause,
arguing that “the Negroes may be all seemed so many Intestine Enemies [of the patriots],
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being all Slaves and desirous of Freedom, and wou’d, was an opportunity offer’d them,
take up Arms against their Masters.” He also completed a study on comparative prices for
essential goods, contrasting the colonial era with the current situation. In February,
British troops escorted wife Grace and daughter Elizabeth to a family reunification in the
capital. Then in March, his intelligence network supplied data on Washington’s nearby
encampment and confidently reported that 1134 soldiers and 354 sailors had deserted the
rebels, seeking refuge in occupied Philadelphia and taking an oath to the king.77
Meanwhile, the Allens were guests at the January 14 wedding of Tench Coxe and
Catherine McCall, a high point of occupied Philadelphia’s social season. That same
month, the three siblings reunited with absentee brother James when the latter finagled a
pass from General Washington permitting a reunion dinner on the perimeter of the city.
Describing his “inexpressible” joy at seeing them for the first time in over a year, the
state of their affairs impressed James: “the accounts my brothers gave of the military
events that had happened & the situation of things in Philadelphia gave me a new set of
Ideas; & made me ardently wish to be there.”78 But his optimism was short-lived. Worst
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of all, John Allen succumbed to “a putrid fever, insensible during an illness of 16 days,”
and died in the provincial capital on February 2. Diarist James recalled him as “the most
affectionate of brothers & best of men.” From his confinement in New Jersey with
Governor Penn, Benjamin Chew described the family’s grief to James Hamilton three
days later, observing that “the tender feelings of nature in hopes of this kind are for some
time deaf to the calls of reason and religion.” British officer John Peebles’ verses on
John’s demise reveal admiration for him in imperial circles:
Let death attack us in the bed or field
All Ranks & ages to his force must yield
Happy the Man Who meets the foe unafraid
For death or his Enemy never unprepar’d79
The winter optimism did not last and the loyalist cosmos soon entered a tailspin.
On March 6, the Pennsylvania Assembly at Lancaster passed the first attainder law. The
text accused Joseph Galloway and Andrew Allen, “late members of the Congress of the
thirteen United Colonies,” John Allen, “late member of the committee of inspection and
observation for the city and liberties of Philadelphia,” and William Allen, the younger,
“some time a captain and afterwards a lieutenant-colonel of a regiment or battalion of
foot in the service of the said United Colonies, now states of America” of high treason.
Not coincidentally, Galloway and Andrew Allen headed the list of the thirteen most
notorious loyalists in the province. The act gave the attainted until April 20 to report for
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trial in order to avoid an automatic verdict of guilt. Only the timing of John’s earlier
death preserved him from prosecution, an event which later benefited his heirs.80
In the late spring of 1778, loyalist fortunes plummeted further. Rumors swirled of
Howe’s resignation, a Franco-American treaty, a peace commission soon to arrive from
London, and a new British strategy that mandated the evacuation of Philadelphia. Morale
sank. Andrew Allen pushed hard against any withdrawal. Ambrose Serle, secretary to
William Howe, penned this entry in his journal as the evacuation neared: “Had some
Conversation with Mr. Andw Allen. His most material Remark was, that from the
Persuasion, that five Sixths of the Province were against the Rebels, our Army had only
to drive off Washington & to put arms into the Hands of the well-affected, and the Chain
of Rebellion would be broken.”81 Official news of the French alliance signed in February
arrived on May 2. Six days later Sir Henry Clinton disembarked to replace Howe. Sir
William sailed away on May 24 after a lavish tribute organized by his officers and elite
loyalists known as the Meschianza. Joseph Galloway received verification of the coming
evacuation on May 21. Serle noted the next day that “It filled my poor Friend, as might
be expected with Horror & melancholy on the View of his deplorable Situation; exposed
to the Rage of his bitter Enemies, deprived of a fortune of about £70,000, and now left to
wander like Cain upon the Earth without Home, & without property.”82
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Galloway refused to serenely accept the inevitable. Aboard his evacuation vessel,
he penned reports to the Earl of Dartmouth arguing against the withdrawal and proposing
new strategies for the British army to regain control of colonial territory. He argued that
Washington’s army was ineffective, “composed of many Boys old and Infirm Men…
without Discipline,” and in echoes of later accusations against the ineptitude of the Howe
command, that “10,000 Men would have been raised… had the British Army operated in
this Quarter.” He held Philadelphia as “the most important place to either contending
Party who shall possess it, of all in America,” enumerating benefits such as the city’s
ability to supply the British army with provisions, its central location as a nexus between
the other colonial capitals, support from Indians and loyalists on the frontier, and the
strength of the present British army which “is at least of four times the Force of the rebel
Army.” Most importantly, he noted “the evident good effects wich [sic] followed the
taking of this city” and the subsequent “extraordinary Revolution [that] has taken place in
the minds of the People in the middle colonies” against the rebellion, all of which would
be pointlessly reversed, as “by a Repossession of the city the Rebels will be restored to
their former Resources of Men and Provisions.” Instead of retreat, Galloway claimed that
he was in contact with “Men of the first Weight and Influence,” disposed “to raise the
well-affected and Loyal in their several Districts and form them into a Militia.” These
“Three Hundred Gentlemen of Weight and Influence are now ready to engage and will
immediately do so.” They only needed to be supplied with weapons and authority “to
disarm and secure those few Men who now oppress them” and to follow the lead of
“some Person, whose Attachment to Government is indisputable” who could “be
appointed as Brigadier or General Commander of the Provincial Troops.” With his lack

144

of military experience, it is doubtful Galloway foresaw himself as that leader – but then
again, given his personality, it is not beyond the realm of possibility.83 This last-ditch
effort on the Delaware came to naught. On June 18, the final British army contingents
abandoned Philadelphia. William Allen Jr. went with them. Galloway and Andrew Allen
sailed with the loyalist evacuees for New York. By the time the Earl of Dartmouth
received Galloway’s desperate pleas from “your Lordships most obliged & obedient
servant,” the withdrawal was a long-gone fait accompli.84
Along with reinstatement of the radical constitution that had wrested political
power from the proprietors, the departure of Joseph Galloway and the Allens effectively
put an end to historic elite leadership and certified the demise of the colonial regime. In
retrospect, their decision is perfectly understandable given the collective weight of the
patriot radicals’ program: the “suffer death” clause in the February 1777 treason law, the
June 1777 Test Act and multiple militia service requirements entailing a betrayal of their
declared allegiance to the king, the March 1778 attainder act specifically targeting them
by name, and the property confiscation measures projected in that statute which were in
fact later carried out. The decision of the pre-war Quaker and Proprietary leadership to
remain loyal to the Crown merged the interests and destiny of these Philadelphia elites
with the fate of Great Britain and, given the war’s trajectory, sealed their downfall.
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Eventual patriot victory proved to be not only the triumph of revolution over monarchy
but also of a new provincial faction over the two parties that had governed Pennsylvania
for nearly a century. For the disaffected who stayed, however, the exodus of militant
loyalists like Galloway and the Allens lessened internal loyalist-patriot frictions through
the postwar era, opening the door for a smoother process of reintegration by helping to
divert political animosity toward the radical-moderate dynamic of Constitutionalists vs.
Anti-Constitutionalists/Republicans.
Anticipating the upcoming withdrawal before his return to England, General
William Howe advised Pennsylvania loyalists “to make... Peace with the States, who, he
supposed, would not treat them harshly.” Some among the less compromised took his
advice. But committed militants who had stuck their necks out for the king distrusted the
radicals who then led the Revolution. Neither Joseph Galloway nor Andrew and William
Allen Jr. considered reporting for trial by April 20, as per their attainder instructions. In
Galloway’s later testimony before Parliament, he underscored that “I came away from
Philadelphia, knowing that my life would be taken if I stayed.” Given the subsequent
executions of Abraham Carlisle and John Roberts, they judged wisely.85 It was therefore
fear of rebel retribution that drove loyalist militants to reject their first opportunity to
reintegrate into provincial society in the summer of 1778. From that moment forward,
reintegration for committed militants meant nothing short of British military victory and
wholesale subjugation of the rebellion. Galloway and the Allens responded accordingly.
The Allens revitalized their militancy. While William Allen Jr. continued as
Lieutenant Colonel of the Pennsylvania Loyalists, Andrew received a commission as
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Ensign in the Queen’s Rangers on August 24 and a subsequent promotion to Lieutenant.86
During the retreat from Philadelphia, General Clinton assigned William’s Pennsylvania
Loyalists to cover the right flank of the army’s lengthy baggage train as it crossed New
Jersey during the tedious march to New York. On June 28, the rebel army attacked at the
battle of Monmouth but the unit managed to satisfactorily defend its stores. A muster roll
of two companies on July 11 had William Jr. commanding his loyalist troops at Camp
Yellow Hook.87 In the early autumn, the expatriate siblings received the regrettable news
that James had died in the capital on September 19 at the age of thirty-seven from a selfdescribed “disorder [that] appears to be a collection of wind in the upper part of the
Chest, – accompanyed [sic] with a shortness of breath, & a weariness & relaxation.”88
Two of the four brothers were now deceased.
In November 1778, the royal army reassigned the youngest Allen brother and his
loyalist corps to garrison Pensacola in West Florida, “where they remained until it was
taken by the Spaniards” in May 1781. The regiment endured not only Spanish onslaughts
but the ravages of smallpox. In late 1779, their depleted corps temporarily merged with
the Maryland Loyalists, also stationed there, despite opposition from Clinton back at
headquarters, who did not wish William Jr. to be placed above James Chalmers, the
Maryland unit’s commanding officer, because of seniority concerns. Both regiments
returned to an autonomous status in December 1780. Meanwhile, William’s forfeited
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estate in Pennsylvania was “to be speedily sold by Public Auction or Vendue, to the best
and highest bidders.” Sabine says of William at this time, “he was noted for wit, for
good-humor, and for affable and gentlemanly manners” but Sabine also recounts the
severe whipping of a deserter during the Spanish siege. Since William had been on
extended leave at one point, it is unclear whether he was the officer then in charge. The
British disbanded the Pennsylvania Loyalists at New Brunswick on the St. John River on
October 10, 1783. William Allen Jr. received a grant of Canadian land from a grateful
Crown. Thus closed the military adventures of the onetime Lieutenant Colonel of the
Second Pennsylvania Battalion who began the conflict on the rebel side with an invasion
of Canada, a province of the monarchy, and ended it accepting a donation of the same
territory he had invaded from the very king he had attacked.89
Andrew Allen’s war tour turned out to be less risky. At the June evacuation, he
sailed for Manhattan, leaving wife Sarah and his younger children behind. Rebels began
selling his seized assets only three months later.90 After his military promotions, he sailed
from New York for England in November, arriving on January 1, 1779 in the company of
the Carlisle Commissioners.91 An ocean now separated him from his family. Back in
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Philadelphia, his wife suffered a severe long-term disorder “connected with a variety of
nervous Symptoms.” These health problems had an upside, however, permitting her to
remain in the city even after the radical Supreme Executive Council under President
Joseph Reed issued a decree forcing the wives of loyalist exiles to leave within ten days
for security reasons.92 As a newly arrived American in Britain, Andrew Allen found the
going a bit tough. The rebellion had severed his sources of income. By the summer of
1779, he realized the need for official support. William Jr. noted in a letter on behalf of
his brother that “ this Gentleman has hitherto declined applying to Government for any
sort of assistance, which has been dispensed with equal Justice & Wisdom to many of His
Majesty’s Subjects who are under a temporary distress on account of their Loyalty.” He
added: “I now hope that Mr. Allen will overcome a Reluctance which under such
circumstances is certainly ill founded.” Apparently the reluctance had already been
overcome because Andrew sent a letter to Lord Germain on the same day asserting that
because of his loyalty he had been “deprived of every Resource of Subsistence” and was
therefore “constrained to look to Government for some Provision… making the present
application and requesting your Lordship’s Assistance.” The petition was successful and
Andrew received an annual pension of £400 sterling. In 1783, the British government
undertook an investigation headed by John Eardley-Wilmot which modified some of the
315 Treasury pensions then in effect. Andrew was among the ninety recipients judged to
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be receiving “more than their relative situation and circumstances required.” Officials
reduced his per annum to £300 sterling. This decision naturally provoked displeasure,
leading the victim to censure “the Insinimuation [sic]… of some Demerit in point of
Pretensions or Conduct, which I am by no means conscious of.”93
Andrew Allen correctly understood his economic circumstances. The choice of
fidelity, subsequent exile, and the expropriation proviso of the March 1778 attainder
devastated his earnings and holdings. Patriot authorities confiscated and sold vast
extensions of his property in Bucks, Berks, Northampton, and Philadelphia counties
valued between £16,000 and £18,000, mostly between 1779 and 1781. The inheritance of
his father’s substantial assets, income derived from colonial duties such as provincial
Attorney General and Recorder of the City of Philadelphia, and the earnings from his
private practice as legal counsel also ceased.94 His choice to remain loyal had ruined him.
Joseph Galloway’s New York sojourn was also brief. While there, he learned that
stockholders of the still active Indiana Company, speculators in western lands, had named
David Franks to replace him as president. Exile spurred Galloway’s resentment towards
his fellow Americans. While making arrangements to travel to England with daughter
Elizabeth who had evacuated Philadelphia with him, he wrote a revelatory note to his
sister. “I call this country ungrateful,” he confessed, “because I have attempted to save it
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from the distress it at present feels, and because it has not only rejected my endeavors,
but returned me evil for good.”95 In October, the Galloways left New York, arriving in
London in December. Wife Grace stayed behind in Pennsylvania. Adding insult to injury,
the radical assembly passed an act designating his confiscated property on the corner of
Sixth and Market streets in Philadelphia as the official residence of none other than the
President of the Supreme Executive Council. Auction of his other seized properties began
in earnest in the spring of 1779 and continued into the next decade. According to radical
Charles Willson Peale, patriots made a conscious decision to begin sales of forfeited
estates with loyalists “who were of most consideration among those named in the
Proclamation,” inaugurating the process with Galloway and Samuel Shoemaker.96
The British received Galloway favorably. Officials granted him an annual pension
of £500, one of the highest sums the Treasury awarded during the war. In the spring of
1779, he became a member of the Loyalist Association, a non-governmental organization
composed of prominent expatriates from all thirteen colonies.97 That year, the House of
Commons opened its inquiry into the failed conduct of the war at the behest of the Howe
brothers who felt their reputation had been sullied. Frustrated exiles readily joined in
condemnation. Lord Germain’s ministry recruited Galloway as a star witness to lead the
anti-Howe charge. Benjamin Thompson, an assistant to Germain, bluntly acknowledged
that “we should scarcely know what to do without you.”98 British officials also asked
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Andrew Allen to prepare testimony. Back in Philadelphia, Galloway’s wife Grace heard
from visitors that Andrew “Made a Most Eloquent speech & was greatly applauded” and
“had done himself Great credit,” though she herself had an unfavorable opinion of him.99
The Howes argued before British legislators that the American Revolution had
widespread support, loyalists were a minority, and as commanders they had operated to
the best of their ability under the circumstances. Galloway and the ministry’s acolytes
rebutted their contentions, blaming the Howes for feeble prosecution of the war and
failure to mobilize loyal followers. Galloway even went so far as to assert that four out of
five Americans were faithful to Britain. In hindsight, the pro-Howe position resembled
facts on the ground more closely than Galloway’s. While true that the Howes had often
been lax in engaging the enemy and could have done more to integrate provincials into
British forces, their assessment of rebel sentiment was accurate, while Galloway’s
inflated appraisals of loyalist support were nowhere within the realm of reality. The probe
resolved nothing, neither proving nor disproving negligence on the part of the general and
the admiral. But a series of pamphlet exchanges with the Howes thrust Galloway into the
spotlight as unofficial spokesperson for the loyalist cause.100
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Joseph Galloway’s most prolific labors followed that inquest. From 1779 to 1783,
he authored twelve essays on the war, America, and colonial relations with England
before turning his attention to the plight of the loyalist exiles once it became obvious that
the rebels had achieved independence. Since the goal of these wartime tracts was to
influence imperial policy, Galloway directed the gist of his message at British public
opinion, not Americans back home. In essence, he argued that the loss of the thirteen
colonies was detrimental to Britain; the poor conduct of the war was disastrous if not
treasonous; the British should resort to sterner measures to subdue the rebellion; and the
monarchy should institute major reforms in its relations with the colonies.101 Several core
assumptions succinctly captured in a letter to Lord North’s Secretary of War, Charles
Jenkinson, nurtured Galloway’s views on the war and its conduct. First, he blamed “the
Prevalence of the Aristocratical as well as Democratical Principles of the Proprietary and
Charter Governments in America” as “the great source from whence the present
Rebellion has sprung,” seeds planted in the original formation of the colonies. Second, he
Connected and Complete History of the Real Causes, Rise, Progress and Present State of the American
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believed the Crown had “illegally, inadvertently and improperly, granted away” to the
colonies power “necessary to its authority” and which “it ought to possess.” Third, it was
foolish to equate the rebels with the sentiment of most colonials. “We must not take the
wishes of the people of America from the Congress,” he argued. “They are not the
Representatives of America, but Usurpers” who generate “Tyranny and Licentiousness.”
Lastly, he was absolutely certain “the great bulk of the People of America… dread a
separation in polity from this Country [England], and are distressed at the prospect of
independence.” In fact, he held that Britain’s misappropriated powers could be “regained
without murmur and with the assent of nine tenths of the people to whom they have been
granted.” Although he may have been correct regarding the Revolution’s root causes,
Galloway erred consistently when gauging levels of popular support for either side.102
Galloway’s writings circulated in tandem with the rise and fall of British fortunes
as the ministry played out its southern military campaign in America. His Majesty’s
forces took Savannah in late December 1778 but abandoned occupied Newport, Rhode
Island, in October of the following year. Charleston fell to the British in May 1780.
Wilmington, North Carolina followed suit in January 1781. Cornwallis pursued his
Carolina victories with a march into the southern backcountry. Some loyalists in that
region did in fact come out in support of the king. There was a ferocious patriot-loyalist
engagement at King’s Mountain and loyalists accompanied British regulars at the battles
of Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse. But their numbers did not meet expectations or
needs, nor ensure success. Cornwallis eventually staggered north until his trapped army
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succumbed at Yorktown in October 1781. The collapse of Lord North’s ministry in
March 1782 signaled that British will for continued prosecution of the war had expired.
Evacuations of occupied southern cities followed. Later that year peace negotiations
began with the Continental Congress.103
In the later stages of the war, William Temple Franklin wrote to loyalist Galloway
in London from Passy near Paris on behalf of his patriot grandfather, Benjamin, as to the
whereabouts of Franklin’s last will and testament left at Trevose in October of 1776. The
epistle divulged that, not only had Franklin entrusted Galloway with his will, but he had
named him as “one of the Executiors [sic].” Daughter Elizabeth responded for Galloway,
informing the Franklins that “your Grandfathers will committed to his care when in
America, remains in the Cover with the seal unbroken, in a trunk with his own private
papers, at N. York.” About two-and-half years later, Galloway himself sent the will to
William Temple after “having lately received from New York a few Papers saved when
my House and property was destroyed.” His letter also refers to a missing note from
Elizabeth notifying the Franklins that the will had been “destroyed among other papers of
his and mine at my Country Seat by a Mob.”104 Presumably this clarification was sent
sometime during the interlude. The episode shows that, even in revolution, personal
relations could surmount political differences. William Temple dispatched his opening
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note after Galloway had publicly condemned the Howe brothers before the House of
Commons but five months before the patriot victory at Yorktown, while Galloway sent
his concluding missive a month after the formal signing of the Definitive Treaty of Peace
had finalized his fate. Judging from Franklin’s voluminous collected papers, the October
1783 letter was the last communication between these former allies. Sadly for Galloway,
personal tragedy further magnified British defeat. His spouse Grace died in Philadelphia
in February 1782. She willed the Growden inheritance to absentee daughter Elizabeth.
When the heralds of independence arrived the following year, all hope for a favorable
resolution to perpetual exile dissipated.
THE CHALLENGE OF POSTWAR REINTEGRATION (1783-1838)
Like the decisive 1778 evacuation, the war’s termination granted the likes of
Joseph Galloway and the Allen brothers another opportunity to reintegrate. Yet once
again, the vast majority of exiles declined the chance to return to their former homeland
and seek reconciliation. Galloway and the Allens were no exception. Although moderate
Anti-Constitutionalist Republicans were gradually gaining control of state government by
1783 and the Continental Congress had an avowed interest in compliance with the peace
treaty’s recommended leniency towards loyalists, Pennsylvania still based its disaffection
policy on radical Constitutionalist treason, test, attainder, confiscation, and militia laws.
And there was also the extralegal issue of popular anger. The prospects were not good.
For the disaffected who remained, however, the prolonged departure of the Philadelphia
elites was a blessing, as the stain of overt loyalism could only exacerbate tensions in the
wake of the treaty’s articles suggesting a restoration of “tory” property. Andrew Allen
wrote to James Hamilton in Pennsylvania for the first time in half-a-dozen years in
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February 1783, acknowledging that the end of “the unhappy Contest… gives me little
Prospect of ever returning.” He realized that his part in the conflict “must render me too
obnoxious to those whom I have opposed” but defended his stance. “What I have done
has flowed from Principles which what I have suffered has neither changed nor shaken,”
he avowed.105
Instead of reintegration, Andrew and brother William chose a diametrically
opposite approach. In May, Sarah Coxe Allen overcame an earlier hesitancy and set off
for England with daughter Margaret and son Andrew Jr. to reunite with her husband,
leaving daughters Anne and Elizabeth in the temporary care of Sarah’s parents and
Andrew’s sister Anne Penn and her ex-governor husband John.106 Brother Tench Coxe
took on the role of agent in defense of the economic and property interests Andrew and
John Allen’s families still retained as a result of William Allen Sr.’s astute inheritance
transfer to his grandchildren, bypassing his attainted sons and avoiding confiscation of
some assets in the succession following his death.107 Coxe handled taxes and rents on
Allen properties, as well as disbursing funds for Sarah, Andrew’s children, and John’s
wife Mary residing in New York. Matters did not always flow smoothly. For nearly a
year beginning in the autumn of 1785, contact between Coxe in Philadelphia and the
Allens in London ceased because of a mix-up in the mail with an English merchant firm.
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The mishap led to recriminations until batches of misplaced letters finally found their
destination, leading Sarah to “most sincerely ask your pardon for any thing we have
said.” Then again, prior to ratification of the new federal constitution, Coxe confessed
that legal matters involving the Allen children could be “affairs of difficult nature, in a
country whose business is much deranged.”108 Property issues frequently surfaced. In
1785 Andrew’s children brought suit in Pennsylvania to eject occupants from a plot of
land in Reading known as the Big Spring Tract as a prelude to its recovery. In 1786,
issues arose over the “Ralston and Wolfs Deeds” for a Northampton County tract these
individuals purchased from William Sr. “in his lifetime,” while in 1789 Andrew’s former
one-quarter share of a strip of 36,000 acres on the northeast branch of the Susquehanna
came under legal scrutiny. Like his older brother, William Jr. also set his sights eastward.
Despite the compensatory land grant in Canada for his military service, he too crossed the
Atlantic.109 The family had decided to embrace Great Britain in full.
Realizing the futility of their situation at the peace, loyalists in England turned
their attention to the British government in search of reparations for losses incurred as a
result of their fidelity. Working alongside exiled colleagues, Joseph Galloway contributed
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to two essays arguing that the British government had surrendered loyalist property in
America as part of the price of peace. By doing so, loyalists had given more than their
fair share to the common good. Those both affected by the capitulation and faithful to the
monarchy were thus entitled to recompense. Fortunately, sympathy for the loyalists ran
deep in Britain. Parliament lost no time in setting up a commission to bestow equity and
restitution.110 Later in the year, Galloway added to the conversation with publication of
his views on how the terms of the Treaty of Peace impacted loyalists.111 His published
works fell off sharply thereafter, although he wrote a comprehensive and lucidly reasoned
justification for the compensation of loyal Americans as the Royal Claims Commission
finalized its investigation in 1788. He based arguments on historical precedents, the right
of loyalists to indemnification under the British Constitution, their contributions to the
suppression of rebellion, and benefits the British nation derived from their sacrifice.112
Galloway’s personal postwar travails overlapped with his public persona. As early
as 1784, Rebecca Shoemaker noted from Philadelphia that the ex-assembly speaker tried
to hire Owen Jones and Dr. De Normandie “to make a formal application to Government
here for the restoration of his estate.” Although this was the inaugural period of moderate
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rule in Pennsylvania, Galloway’s über-loyalist stance remained noxious. Jones rejected
the offer outright. The doctor asked attorney William Rawle and “B.S.” to join him on the
pro-Galloway team but both refused and the effort evaporated.113 Royal government then
became the focus of the ex-champion of royal government. In 1785, perhaps as a way to
gain proximity to his homeland, Galloway pursued an imperial appointment as chief
justice of Nova Scotia. Andrew Allen also threw his hat into that ring but the nomination
went elsewhere. Yet even before his effort to secure a royal sinecure, Galloway’s primary
focus turned to the recently constituted Royal Claims Commission.
In early February 1784, Joseph Galloway submitted an extensively documented
request for £42,657 in compensation to Parliament’s commissioners. Describing himself
as “always a friend to Monarchy," a who’s who of supporters backed his application.
General Vaughn “found him a sensible zealous & steady man” who had been “very
useful in Philadelphia.” General Gage believed that Galloway, while colonial assembly
speaker, had done all he could to organize the possible quartering of British troops in
Philadelphia just before the war. Lord Cornwallis considered him “well affected” and “a
very zealous Loyalist” who “took the side of the British Gov’t from Principle.” Colonel
Montresor, on whose ship the loyalist had sailed from New York at the invasion of
Pennsylvania, declared that Galloway had procured “very material” intelligence and
“always endeavor’d to promote the Success of the British arms & Meant to render
Service to Gov’t.” New Jersey Governor William Franklin argued that Galloway was
“uniformly loyal” and “has given the most unequivocal proofs of it,” having “join’d the
King’s Troops from Principle only” – a point of added merit because “Mr. Galloway
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could have made his peace at any time with the Rebels.” Franklin’s testimony also
provides insight into his friend’s political evolution, conceding that “Dr. [Benjamin]
Franklyn accused his Son of having poison’d Mr. Galloway’s sentiments.”114
Two witnesses stand out in Galloway’s claims. Although radical patriot Daniel
Roberdeau did not venture to pass judgment on Galloway’s choice of allegiance, he did
present a declaration certifying the value of the latter’s Sepicken estate upon which his
own adjoined. Roberdeau’s testimony once again shows how personal relations often
superseded revolutionary ideology and allegiance. The most remarkable of Galloway’s
witnesses, however, was former rival and ministerial scapegoat Sir William Howe. The
general affirmed Galloway had been “zealous in the Cause of Gov’t” and “discharged
very well” his duties as civil administrator during the occupation. Moreover, from his
subordinate’s actions he had “no Doubt about his Loyalty or his wishes to promote the
King’s service.” But Howe apparently still harbored some bitterness for his onetime foe’s
testimony before Parliament because he downplayed the value of Galloway’s intelligence
operations, judged that the cavalry regiment this right-hand man had raised “was found to
consist chiefly of Deserters,” and cast doubt on the Pennsylvanian’s loyalty by
concluding that, although an effective activist, he “does not believe his [Galloway’s]
Heart was materially concern’d in it.” Galloway minimized the less complimentary parts
of this statement by furnishing a letter from Howe dated one month before the British
evacuation of Philadelphia “speaking of him in the highest possible terms” and probably
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netted a positive score from the general’s intercession. The claims commissioners
ultimately awarded Galloway £19,242 plus a pension of £40.115
The Allens’ attention likewise switched from events in America to the postwar
realities of life in England. Daughter Anne made the transatlantic journey to rejoin her
parents in 1784. Elizabeth would follow in 1788. Three more children were born to
Andrew and Sarah while in Britain: John Penn, Thomas Dawson and Maria. From their
residence in Southampton, Hampshire, the Allens moved to London by March 1785 so
that Andrew could lobby on behalf of his request before the Royal Claims Commission
for £14,335 in reparations. From Philadelphia, Tench Coxe provided documentation to
substantiate Andrew’s claim, while empathizing that “your Situation has been a very hard
one” and hoping that “it will be justly and liberally considered in your Compensation.”
Andrew eventually received £9,986 sterling, a high percentage in comparison to most
claimants. William too presented a claim but its adjudication is not clear. On one hand,
“his Estate has been confiscated… in Consequence of his Loyalty to his Majesty and
Attachment to the British Government.” But as of March 15, 1783, he had “not been able
to obtain an account of the Losses that he has sustained” from America. William also
used his influence as an ex-loyalist officer to back the claims of comrades in arms such as
Colonel John Hamilton and Nathaniel Wilson who had fought in the Georgia and South
Carolina expeditions.116
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In the end, the surviving brothers tackled the question of reintegration differently,
albeit with analogous results. The little evidence available for the latter part of his life
shows William Jr. adapting to life in England for the long haul and never seriously
considering a pardon or a homecoming, though he charged his brother with the task of
interceding on his behalf regarding inheritance property issues back in Pennsylvania upon
the latter’s return. William Allen Jr. died in London on July 2, 1838, at the ripe old age of
eighty-seven, unmarried and without descendants.117 As for Andrew, his views fluctuated
over time. Ongoing correspondence with brother-in-law Tench Coxe during the 1780s
reveals both an underlying resentment and a distancing from his former homeland. As
late as 1785, the Revolution still represented “all the Injustice I have met with,” while
America was “a country which I once sincerely loved but now thoroughly detest &
despise.”118 On American commerce, he opined that it did “not to me wear that bright
aspect as to hold certainly flattering encouragement” and “must decline from their having
lost the only market for their Ships by declaring Themselves Aliens to the British
Empire,” which in turn had determined “to exclude Aliens of all denominations from a
participation of the commercial Advantages reserved to British Subjects.” It was his
estimation that “for many years to come the trade of the American states must be more
and more contracted.” Andrew would not concede that independence could eventually
bring prosperity but rather regarded the new nation as irretrievably laden with “mischiefs
and Distresses,” especially because the confederated government then in existence
presented “Obstacles to a Commercial Treaty… arising… from the want of proper
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Authority being invested in the Congress.” In sum, independence had generated a
debilitating internal fragmentation which imperial rule had earlier solved. Even more
illuminating was the language he used to describe his ex-compatriots. Beyond seeing
himself as a British subject, Andrew’s remarks referred to “their character,” “they,” and
“themselves” as if Americans were a foreign people to whom he had never belonged.
Despite the subliminal repudiation, the Allens became core affiliates of a social cluster of
conspicuously American exiles in England which included Anglican clergymen Jacob
Duché, Samuel Seabury, and Charles Inglis, as well as Philadelphians like ex-governor
John Penn Sr., Samuel Shoemaker and Joseph Swift Jr.119
In the face of revolutionary turmoil and loss, Andrew Allen adapted well to his
resurrected condition in England. Reunited with his family, amply compensated for his
loyalty, and managing the clan’s assets in Pennsylvania from afar through his agent, he
let go of worldly pretensions and accepted domestic contentment as his lot. Letters from
Sarah Coxe Allen to her brother Tench reveal genuine happiness. In 1788, she professed
“to be thankful for my situation here, for though Mr Allen has lost an Affluent fortune,
things have turned out so much better than we expected, that we cannot be too grateful
for it.” In early 1790, Andrew told her that “he had just been settling his affairs and he
found himself now freed from every anxious thought about his circumstances.” For
Sarah, “this best of Men” had dedicated himself “to promote the happiness of his Family”
119
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and achieved “a comfortable and Independant [sic] situation… without anxiety” in the
midst of “kind and affectionate Friends.”120 England had been good to them.
Concerning America, ratification of the federal constitution in 1788 mellowed
Andrew Allen’s animosity somewhat. He liked that the new governmental structure
provided “Unity to the different & otherwise discordant Interests of the States” from
which might flow “Law & Justice” and “a greater Respect & Veneration for Authority”
to offset “the narrow & partial Schemes of factious Demagogues.”121 In the early 1790s,
he contemplated a return visit. By then, Pennsylvania’s political climate had changed
considerably. Moderates had ascended to power, repealed the test acts in 1789, and for
the most part dispelled lingering anti-loyalist sentiment. Yet the test act repeal did not
contemplate forgiveness for the attainted. Officially designated a traitor under the first
attainder act of 1778, Andrew sought to recover his good standing and requested a formal
pardon from the state government in 1792. Authorities granted his appeal that year,
opening the door for a homecoming. Loyalist militancy had been forgiven.
Crossing the ocean again with his full entourage of seven children, sister Anne,
and her husband John Penn Sr., Andrew Allen disembarked at Philadelphia on September
15. Missing was wife Sarah, who had either died or endured deteriorating health since her
upbeat missives to her brother two years before. Andrew rented a house in the city but
also purchased a 155-acre homestead in Bucks County as lodgings for his large family.
He dedicated himself to “secure his children’s interests” in Pennsylvania, to try to recover
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some of his own forfeited losses from the Revolution, and to act on behalf of his brother
William Jr. on inheritance property issues. Not all of his efforts succeeded. For example,
Governor Mifflin refused to suspend the sale of one of Andrew Allen’s seized properties,
despite his entreaties to the contrary. Nevertheless, he speculated profitably in real estate
while in Pennsylvania. Most significantly, daughter Margaret wed George Hammond, the
king’s first minister to the United States, at Philadelphia’s Anglican Christ Church in
1793. Although he “remained a few years” and was still in Philadelphia in March 1796,
he did not stay. The America he encountered was not the America he had known.122
Joseph Galloway also sought a pardon. Unlike Andrew Allen and other exiles,
however, his notoriety as Pennsylvania’s tory par excellence significantly complicated
the appeal despite a moderate majority in state government. In May 1790, the Supreme
Executive Council read his plea for absolution a second time but council members only
resolved that Galloway’s attorney Thomas Clifford “have leave to withdraw the said
petition,” presumably an elegant way to avoid an outright rejection.123 Indignation for his
role during the war persisted even at this late date. When Alexander Hamilton appointed
ex-loyalist Tench Coxe to the federal Treasury Department that year, a Philadelphia
newspaper satirically predicted the beginnings of a future American monarchy with
Joseph Galloway as secretary of state and Benedict Arnold as secretary of war. Later that
year, the moderate council presided by Thomas Mifflin entertained the possibility of “a
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general pardon of persons who have been attainted of high treason” but postponed the
discussion. Historian Wilbur Siebert argues that Galloway was still so significant that his
inclusion probably prevented approval of the general amnesty.124 Back in England,
Galloway later heard about the pardon debate and objections raised against him. In
response, he penned a letter to Chief Justice Thomas McKean explaining that mob attacks
had driven him into the arms of the British. Although there is little doubt that Galloway’s
actions prove he was indeed a true loyalist, he sometimes circumscribed the language of
allegiance to the audience and the occasion. For Parliament’s commissioners, he was
“always a friend to Monarchy.” But when soliciting forgiveness from revolutionary
authorities, he blamed patriot mobs for plunging him into disaffection. Expediently, it
was not really his decision.125 This ideological elasticity – fairly common among postwar
loyalists – once again suggests meaningful distinctions between patriot and loyalist
commitment during the Revolution. If we accept agency as a historical determinant or at
least as a critical factor in historical outcomes, it is not hard to see why patriots won.
Pardon or no pardon, it is possible that Joseph Galloway never intended to return
to Pennsylvania. What is certain is that his efforts for a reversal of his attainder for high
treason had much to do with daughter Elizabeth’s inheritance via the Growden lineage. In
1791, Galloway wrote to a colleague that he hoped to have the attainder erased in order to
collect as “Surviving Executor… Monies due to L. Growden’s Estate.” Notwithstanding
the intent, his legal exertions failed. In a judgment reminiscent of Sir William Blackstone,
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the Pennsylvania courts ruled that his attainder made him “civilites mortuus, and as dead
in consideration of Law.” Galloway persisted, however, and in 1795 he finally realized
his ambition, receiving an official pardon from Governor Thomas Mifflin. Litigation over
the Growden estate continued. Sabine states that “a considerable portion of it was
restored finally to his daughter.”126
Although officially forgiven for his betrayal, Galloway never ventured back to
Pennsylvania. In England, he arranged for Elizabeth to marry William Roberts, a London
aristocrat. The union produced daughter Grace but the couple’s relationship deteriorated,
obliging Galloway to make inheritance arrangements alienating the husband in his will.127
The aging loyalist turned from the temporal to the spiritual in his twilight years. In 1802,
over 950 subscribers from New Jersey and Pennsylvania sponsored publication of his last
major work. Last names such as Carlisle, Roberts, Tomlinson and Doan dot the list of
350 Pennsylvania subscribers, quite possibly extended family relations of loyalists
covered in this study. Most prominent is Samuel Shoemaker, whom Galloway named as
police magistrate during the Philadelphia occupation. Interestingly, no British subscribers
were listed as donating to the two-volume work, despite Galloway’s residency there.128
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The Brief Commentaries examined Christian revelation through the lens of “The
Seven Vials of the Wrath of God.” The contents of each vial reveal a worldview steeped
in Protestant eschatology. The targets reserved for divine fury included Rome and the
Pope, the King of France, papal Germany, the Turkish and Mohamedan apostasy,
“atheistical” France and the “atheistical and revolutionary republic” – the latter allusions
to the French Revolution and Napoleonic France. Galloway limited his views on the
American Revolution to a brief appendix. “Defended by one of the greatest nations in
Europe, and enjoying every blessing that reason could hope for, or heart ought to desire,”
the colonies had “ungratefully and wantonly” revolted. For this rebellion, he blamed “a
great, powerful, and traitorous faction rising up in the supreme councils of a great nation”
that had incited and supported the rebels and, in 1781, compelled “the parent state to
grant them independence, at the moment they were at her feet.” Colonial self-government
had come about “through the treason of that faction… from motives of ambition, and a
thirst for riches and power.” Judging from the text’s almost exclusive focus on Europe,
the treasonous faction consisted of those in Parliament opposed to king and war, not
America’s homegrown rebels. His insistence that the Revolution was at England’s “feet”
at that date – presumably after Cornwallis’ defeat at Yorktown – shows a monumental
misreading of military realities akin to his earlier misreading of loyalist support.129
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Joseph Galloway died the next year at Watford, Herts, England “in obscurity” but
he had no way of knowing that when the Brief Commentaries went to print. Hence, the
omission of America from the list of those awaiting God’s vengeance suggests he did not
wish to rile Pennsylvania officials or American public opinion. Elizabeth’s property
proceedings may have played a role in that decision. Or perhaps Galloway actually
harbored hopes to someday visit or return to his former home. The fact is he did neither.
In the end, his loyalism yielded permanent exile. A codicil to his will instructed executors
to bury the ex-chief civil administrator of the British occupation “without any pomp or
ceremony… in an oaken Coffin… to be carried to the place of Internment in watford
church yard by four poor men having families,” each paid £5 for their service. Only his
name and age were to be etched on “a Stone at the head” of the grave.130
By 1798, Andrew Allen had returned to England from his transatlantic sojourn but
he could not get America out of his system either. The next year he filed suit with the
Mixed Commission set up by Great Britain and the United States under the Sixth Article
of the 1795 Jay Treaty. The treaty tasked the commission with arbitrating the claims of
“divers British Merchants and others His Majesty’s Subjects” seeking to collect debts
“contracted before the Peace” due them from “Citizens or Inhabitants of the United
States.”131 The mixed commissioners found their task daunting and could not agree on
many complicated legal issues. Andrew’s initial effort thus failed. But in 1802 the
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Jefferson administration reached a settlement with the United Kingdom whereby the
United States would pay Great Britain £600,000 sterling to be used by the British
government to conclusively resolve all claims under this rubric. Andrew’s persistence
netted him a payment of £6,977.15.9.132 Allen lived out his remaining years in England,
residing initially in London and later in Middlesex County. In November 1815, Andrew
Jr. wrote confidently that “my father at 74 enjoys a vigour of mind & body equal to what
I can remember in his best days… He has not a complaint in the world.” In 1816, the
family embarked on a European tour and spent that winter in Paris.133
From the perspective of reintegration, what stands out is Andrew Allen’s legal
rationale several years after his return to Pennsylvania that he was a natural-born British
subject who had never relinquished allegiance to the king despite early support for the
rebellion and an attainder naming him a “late member of the Congress” and a “subject
and inhabitant of the state of Pennsylvania.”134 In less than fifteen years, Andrew had
overcome the stigma of loyalist militancy, received a pardon, and opened the door to the
possibility of a successful reincorporation into republican society. There is no evidence to
suggest that reintegration was ever the goal of his trip to Pennsylvania, however. Beyond
financial concerns, he probably pursued the voyage as a nostalgic visit to his old haunting
grounds and a reconnection with the extended family that had stayed behind. Perhaps on
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some unexpressed level he hoped to be pleasantly surprised and reassimilated on a more
enduring basis. But Andrew Allen encountered a dramatically altered Pennsylvania in
which the Allens no longer played a leading role. Rejecting the reintegrative option –
if it ever existed – he removed once and for all to England, affirming all the while that he
had always been a faithful Briton. Andrew died in England in March of 1825 in his mideighties. He consciously defined himself through the lens of loyalism, spurning America
according to the terms of his 1799 memorial to the Mixed Commission: “of London, in
the Kingdom of Great Britain… from his birth and ever… a British subject.”135
The final episode in the reintegration chronicle of the three loyal Allen brothers
involves John, the eldest, who died one month before he was charged with high treason in
the original attainder act of March 1778. His wife Mary Johnston Allen bore him two
sons on January 14, 1776, as the Revolution kicked into high gear. By a quirk of fate, his
“timely” death two years later allowed the surviving family to fully reintegrate. Though
attainted, radicals never confiscated John’s assets, corroborating that the intent of patriot
legal measures against loyalists was to contain the spread of disaffection, not to procure
vengeance or the spoils of war. In testimony supporting Andrew’s claim to the royal
commission, Daniel Coxe stated that “the children of Mr. Allens two Brothers who died
in America are in possession of their Parents prop[ert]y.” John, son of John, assimilated
well into post-revolutionary society – in 1802, he married Christina Livingston Jones,
granddaughter of manorial scion, prosperous merchant, and signer of the Declaration of
135
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Independence for New York, Philip Livingston. They lived comfortably in Dutchess
County in that state. Son William married Maria Cornelia Verplanck, another New York
notable, lived for a time in Hyde Park, also in Dutchess County, and eventually moved to
Ulster County. The original John Allen’s demise therefore saved his family from a
probable English exile like that of his siblings.136
CONCLUSION
The militant loyalism of Quaker and Proprietary party elites like Joseph Galloway
and John, Andrew and William Allen Jr. played an instrumental role in both the rebellion
and reintegration. Collapse of the Philadelphia-centered colonial leadership in the face of
insurgency occurred in large measure because of their overt commitment to loyalism.
Like many other provincial elites, their failed pro-British militancy and fear of radical
retribution engendered initial isolation and subsequent exile, disqualifying these once
dominant figures from steering the course of the Revolution or the formation of a postwar
republic. Loyalism thus unwittingly helped destroy the old colonial order and opened the
path to power for a third faction composed of revolutionary radicals and moderates.
After the British evacuation, the disappearance of elite militants led to a major
reduction of internal political tensions between patriots and the disaffected who stayed,
especially in the provincial capital, a factor which eased the process of reintegration over
time. That militancy, however, hindered the militant’s own reintegrative possibilities.
Andrew Allen’s case is exemplary. His active support for the king barred him from
remaining or returning to Pennsylvania at the critical junctures of evacuation in 1778 and
peace in 1783. Rightfully fearful for his life, Allen chose to not hazard the turbulent
136
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winds of reintegration in the land of his birth. Only after an extensive political and legal
transformation had taken place did he seek a pardon and tentatively test those waters.
That journey ultimately persuaded him to return to England, however. Rather than
bringing about a resumption of royal rule as intended, elite loyalist militancy in
Pennsylvania paradoxically enabled a more comprehensive and successful revolution and
facilitated a smoother reintegration process for the less disaffected whose commitment
did not match that of the militants.
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CHAPTER 3
REINTEGRATION & DEPARTURE OF THE ORDINARY LOYALIST MILITANTS
Commitment to an active military defense of royal authority was the clearest
marker of loyalist militancy. Many of the militarily loyal were not just dissatisfied with
patriot rule but manifestly pro-British. The Revolution encountered their opposition
throughout the province. The overwhelming majority of Pennsylvanians who brandished
arms in defense of the Crown did not belong to the elite class, however. For the most
part, they were “ordinary” loyalists from the middling and “inferior” sorts, sometimes
illiterate, consisting of farmers, artisans, mechanics, journeymen, and laborers. Lowerorder militants came from diverse religious, ethnic, and geographic backgrounds. They
were non-pacifist Quakers, Roman Catholics, Anglicans, German immigrants, British
subjects born outside of North America, frontiersmen, and city dwellers. These class,
regional, and in some cases ethnic and religious distinctions separated the great body of
Pennsylvania loyalists from the Philadelphia-centered elite militants like Galloway and
the Allens who evacuated with the British in 1778, even as their ideology, circumstances
and choices remained somewhat similar. Three populations based on geographic
dispersal emerge from the sources when exploring these largely non-elite militants. A
first set consisted mostly of artisans, laborers, and agrarians from the well populated
southeastern core of the colony encompassing the city of Philadelphia and the contiguous
rural corridor of Chester, Philadelphia and Bucks counties. Settled farmers and husbandmen along the intermediate agricultural belt of York, Lancaster, Berks and Northampton
counties between the provincial center and the periphery comprised the bulk of a second
group. Families trying to eke out a living on the “unimproved” and largely uninhabited
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frontier counties of Northumberland in the northeast and Cumberland, Bedford and
Westmoreland in the west represented a third contingent. While technically also farmers,
their hazardous existence involved much more than that term implies.1
In all three regions, pro-British militancy produced results akin to those of their
elite city counterparts. Whether casualties of failed conspiracies, martial defeat or
deliberate withdrawal, overt loyalism usually ended in departure and permanent exile.
Frontier militants picked up weapons, fought their battles for the monarch on the colony’s
outer fringes, lost, and generally fled, died, or were captured. Those in the inner counties
collaborated with Howe’s army as it passed on the road to Philadelphia, aided the escape
of British prisoners throughout the war, organized for a post-evacuation uprising directed
from Clinton’s headquarters at New York, and ran when thwarted or discovered. The
largest group – the mass of loyal militants in or near occupied Philadelphia who joined
Howe’s provincial regiments – departed for good at the evacuation under the orders of
their officers. These setbacks all but depleted loyalist strength in a province once
considered an obstacle to revolutionary progress.2
Despite analogous endings, however, the circumstances and events in each area
differed. On the frontier, pre-war territorial disputes with nearby colonies framed patriot1
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loyalist divisions and impacted outcomes. The middle ring of counties witnessed many of
the same tensions and conflicts that shaped the resistance-to-independence process for
elites in the provincial capital. In Philadelphia and its environs, lesser loyalists cast as
appendages of the British army responded to royal strategic priorities. The stories of John
Connolly in Cumberland County, the Pennamites of Northumberland County, the Rankin
brothers of York County, the middle-tier officers and the common soldiery of the
provincial corps recruited during the Philadelphia occupation who gathered around the
king’s cause reveal that military commitment was the most likely forecaster of departure,
exile, and the future failure to reintegrate. Moreover, the parting, capture, defeat or death
of ordinary loyalist militants contributed to the resolution of intracolonial clashes over
boundaries, shattered pro-British fervor among loyal sectors of the populace, and reduced
serious military threats to the rebellion in the state. Hence, the breakdown of loyalist
militancy among the common folk diminished internal tensions and strife, eased the
eventual reacceptance of the disaffected who stayed in Pennsylvania, but led to their own
failure to reintegrate as in the case of elite Philadelphia counterparts.3
JOHN CONNOLLY & MILITANCY ON PENNSYLVANIA’S WESTERN FRONTIER
In both the western and northeastern frontiers of the state, the Revolution injected
new fissures into standing colonial antagonisms. During the early 1770s, Pennsylvania
quarreled with Virginia for jurisdiction over the Fort Pitt region, leading to frequent
altercations between both officials and partisans from each band. An equally pugnacious
3
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conflict developed between Pennsylvania and Connecticut during the late colonial era
along the northern Susquehanna River, each provincial government citing their respective
royal charters as the basis for sovereignty over the area. The rebellion introduced the
dynamic of competing allegiances between America and Great Britain into an already
fluid and volatile environment, transforming intercolonial discord into loyalist-patriot
confrontation. As instigator of pre-war discord in the west on the side of royal Virginia,
the Pennsylvania-born John Connolly became a principal standard-bearer of the king on
the frontier in the early years of revolution. His arrest and imprisonment threw local
supporters of the Crown into disarray, appreciably weakened the king’s influence in the
region, and placed imperial fortunes largely in the hands of British-allied Indian nations
trying to defend their own civilization and territory. Thus, Connolly’s militancy
inadvertently helped rally white settlers in the west to the patriot banner as a means of
defending their lives and interests against indigenous threats. His steadfast loyalism
accordingly quashed any later chance of return or personal reintegration.
Born near Wright’s Ferry in Lancaster County between 1742 and 1744 as the only
child of an English surgeon, John Connolly was orphaned in 1753 with the passing of his
mother. His father had died six years earlier. The child was put under the care of James
Wright who apprenticed him in the medical field.4 Connolly’s own ambition, however,
was to become a military man. By 1762, he had fused the two tracks, becoming a
surgeon’s mate and serving in the Martinique expedition during the latter stages of the
French and Indian War. Two years later he joined the British army in two campaigns
4
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against indigenous nations on the western Pennsylvania frontier. “Animated by a strong
desire to make myself worthy to serve my King and country on future occasions, after
peace was established with the Indians,” Connolly dedicated the postwar period to an
extensive exploration of the western frontier, visiting with natives, traversing the wilds in
their company, and familiarizing himself with “their different manners and customs.”5
Sometime before 1767, he married Susannah Sample, daughter of a Pittsburgh tavern
keeper. Rather than fulfilling his desire for worthiness, Connolly got himself into debt at
Pittsburgh. In 1769, he plunged farther west into the Illinois country then under British
dominion, expanding his regional expertise while engaging in the Indian trade. Regional
expertise did not necessarily translate into business acumen, however, and he returned to
Pittsburgh in 1770 deeper in debt than before. In the process, he sold his patrimonial
estates to buy lands on territory claimed simultaneously by Virginia and Pennsylvania.
Thus was born the driving force of John Connolly’s royalist fidelity.6
As a wannabee landed magnate, John Connolly spent the five years leading up to
the outbreak of open revolution building the tight-knit relationships and personal interests
that bound him to the king’s cause while attempting to secure, preserve and defend title to
his property or sell it at a profit. Much of this contested “Virginia” terrain was located in
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present-day Pittsburgh.7 Along the way, he befriended or came in contact with some of
the main players on both sides of the future Revolution. In 1770, Connolly dined with
George Washington and other Virginia gentlemen exploring land investments in the area.
Impressed with the Pennsylvanian’s vast knowledge of the west, Washington called him
a “very sensible intelligent man.” Connolly’s most important contact came in the summer
of 1773 in the person of John Murray, Fourth Earl of Dunmore and royal governor of
Virginia, also on tour through the Ohio valley in search of investment acreage. Dunmore
was sufficiently impressed to make the Pennsylvanian-turned-Virginian his agent. That
December, John Connolly traveled to Williamsburg to attend a meeting with the royal
governor and Patrick Henry, among others, in which they devised a strategy to drive out
the Shawnee from the west, seize their land, and sell it. The campaign became known as
Dunmore’s War. The governor assured Connolly’s collaboration by granting him 4,000
acres at the Falls of Ohio, ignoring instructions from the British ministry not to issue new
land grants to avoid conflict with the Indians. A 1772 order from General Thomas Gage,
commander of British forces in North America, withdrawing the imperial army from Fort
Pitt opened the door for Dunmore’s ploy. The pullout created a local power vacuum
which triggered a three-sided tug of war among the original native residents, Virginia,
and Pennsylvania. While Penn’s colony filled the void by selling land to settlers under
the Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768 and in the process created the counties of Bedford in
1771 and Westmoreland in 1773 from swaths of the original Cumberland County, Lord
Dunmore claimed the territory as part of Virginia. In addition, the Mingo, Shawnee and
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Delaware nations disputed the Fort Stanwix agreement itself – an accord that had
received Iroquois assent but never theirs.8
Into this quagmire of power politics and shady legalities stepped John Connolly
on the side of Virginia. By this time, he had sold four hundred half-acre town lots in
Fincastle County, Virginia, for four Spanish dollars at a dollar a year quitrent. Buyers
under contract pledged to clear another seven acres each, slated to revert to Connolly in
seven years. Between four and five hundred families settled in the area under these terms.
William Preston, royal surveyor of Fincastle County, thought Dunmore had exceeded his
authority. Confiding to George Washington that he had signed the certificates granting
these lands to Connolly “with some Reluctance,” the surveyor noted the transaction had
“made a great deal of noise” publicly and “many good Judges” believed “the Patents are
altogether illegal.” Connolly returned to Fort Pitt to assert Virginia’s jurisdiction over the
contested territory. The entire viability of his speculative land project – his future
prosperity – rested on two factors: the successful claims of the royal colony of Virginia
over the disputed territory and confirmation of the grants Lord Dunmore had awarded
him. Pennsylvania and the native inhabitants stood in his way.9
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On January 6, 1774, Connolly proclaimed himself Captain Commandant of the
Militia of Pittsburgh and its Dependencies and on the 25th ordered the Virginia militia to
muster. Filling the militia rolls with ease, he took control of Fort Pitt by month’s end.
Pennsylvania responded through Westmoreland County magistrate Arthur St. Clair, who
detained Connolly on orders from an indignant Governor John Penn. The controversy
resulted in his release on February 2.10 Chaos ensued as contrarian colonial governments
each arrested supporters from the opposing band. Meanwhile, Virginia settlers used the
turmoil as an excuse to attack the Shawnee and Mingo peoples in the area, predictably
producing retaliation. Virginians exploited a circular letter from Connolly that April as
justification for hostilities, leading to the brutal massacre of the family of Mingo chief
Logan. Lord Dunmore subsequently used Logan’s reprisals as a pretext for Virginia
counterattacks. While fighting the governor’s war, John Connolly and his business
partner John Campbell continued to advertise lots for sale, asserting that their area “will,
in short time, be equalled [sic] by few inland places on the American continent.”11 In
September of 1774, the same month the First Continental Congress met in Philadelphia,
Lord Dunmore visited Fort Pitt and mounted a successful military operation that forced
the Shawnee to seek peace. Virginia officials claimed Pennsylvania land grants were
invalid and harassed Pennsylvania settlers. St. Clair thought Virginia’s attacks were all
part of a well-designed “Connolly plan” to subdue the region, an indication of his
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growing influence. Into this cauldron of discord and distrust, the news arrived in
Pittsburgh on May 1, 1775 that the British army had engaged the Massachusetts militia
on the fields of Lexington two weeks earlier.12
Events quickly escalated. Virginia and Pennsylvania settlers unexpectedly set
aside their differences, established a patriot Committee of Correspondence, mobilized
militia, and declared their intent to seek peace with local natives. Westmoreland County
residents nominally under the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania met at Hannastown and
declared their support for the patriot cause. Although John Connolly was still technically
militia commander of Augusta County, Virginia, these actions put him in a precarious
position, for events had made his patron Lord Dunmore persona non grata. Passing
through the frontier in July 1775, British traveler Nicholas Cresswell noted the political
climate: “the people here are Liberty mad nothing but War is thought of.” Throughout the
turmoil, Connolly confidentially retained his fidelity to kingly authority, adducing later
that “my loyalty to my Prince, and respect for the established form of government, were
too confirmed to admit of the least doubt which party I should espouse; I decided
instantly, and resolved to exert every faculty in the defence [sic] of the royal cause.”13
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Whether his defense of “the royal cause” was attributable to an ideologically
principled commitment or simply a vehicle for private aggrandizement is open for debate.
His later testimonies seeking parliamentary compensation naturally affirmed the former.
He was “conscious of having acted with good intentions, and from principles which he
believed were descriptive of a loyal subject, an honest man, and a man of honour.” He
was “taught from my earliest infancy to serve my King and my country.” He had been
“the first person of influence, who had attempted to support the Royal cause, by raising
troops in America.” He “still had the consolation to reflect, I had done every thing
possible in the discharge of my duty.” His “greatest faults” were “my sufferings, my zeal,
and loyalty… taken in the execution of my duty as a faithful servant of the Crown.” And
he thought himself exceptional, even among the loyal, for “Congress… resolved to detain
me… in an extraordinary manner, and quite distinct from any other Loyalist, during the
whole contest.”14 Yet despite such avowals of fealty, his actions before, during, and after
the Revolution almost invariably responded to projects defending his own interests. That
he sided with Dunmore and Virginia though raised a Pennsylvanian is especially telling.15
Covertly committed to the king, John Connolly conspired with Lord Dunmore
through 1775 while publicly trying to wear a patriot face. He played his dual role well.
From a refuge aboard an English warship on Virginia’s York River, Dunmore authorized
the converted Virginian to raise a loyalist regiment and secure an alliance with the Ohio
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Indians in support of Britain. Western patriots also sought an Indian alliance or at the
very least their neutrality, so Connolly convened a June conference with natives in the
region while feigning allegiance to the rebel movement. As the convocation approached,
Pennsylvania officials arrested Connolly as a suspected tory. Virginians saw this as no
more than a ruse in the continuing border dispute and countered with the arrest of three
Pennsylvania magistrates. The maneuver worked: Arthur St. Clair ordered the release of
Connolly, whereupon the latter dutifully joined the conference in progress and performed
his tightrope act ably enough to receive the compliments of Virginia’s patriot delegation.
Connolly later claimed he had stealthily achieved his goal of bringing local Indians into
the British fold while there. After the gathering, Connolly used three Shawnee chiefs as
cover and headed eastward towards Williamsburg with associate Alan Cameron to meet
Lord Dunmore face-to-face at his offshore sanctuary and plan strategy for a loyalist
uprising on the frontier. The Earl sent him to Boston to discuss operations with General
Thomas Gage, British commander for North America, who gave Connolly his blessing
and instructed him to coordinate with Sir Guy Carleton in Canada and Guy Johnson in
New York’s Mohawk Valley. On November 5, 1775, Connolly received a commission as
Lieutenant Colonel Commandant in anticipation of the upcoming expedition, with
Dunmore “reposing especial trust in your loyalty, courage, and good conduct.” At a time
when Britain’s Privy Council canceled the western land grants of patriots like George
Washington, Patrick Henry, and Thomas Jefferson, it is noteworthy that the same
officials left Connolly’s royal claims unscathed.16
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Lord Dunmore’s instructions to Connolly proved fateful. Writing on August 9
from Portsmouth, Virginia, to former friend John Gibson in the Fort Pitt area, Connolly
referred to “the infatuated people” and “their folly” while asking for his cooperation. “Be
prevailed upon to shun the popular error,” he advised, “act as a good subject, and expect
the rewards due to your services.”17 Unbeknownst to the loyalist conspirator, Gibson
turned the letter over to the patriot county committee. Connolly set out from eastern
Virginia on November 13 in the company of Alan Cameron and Dr. John Smyth, bound
for Detroit to execute the opening round of Dunmore’s stratagem.18 On the 19th, he
unexpectedly ran into a private once under his command, who disclosed Connolly’s
militant past to locals at Hagerstown, Maryland. That night patriots arrested the travelers
and uncovered Dunmore’s instructions. Upon receiving the news, Congress ordered the
group to Philadelphia. En route through York in Pennsylvania on January 1, 1776, escorts
paraded the trio before the populace to the tune of the infamous Rogue’s March. Among
the witnesses to the spectacle was his saddened half-brother and radical patriot, James
Ewing. Two days later the party arrived in the capital. Congress turned the cohort over to
the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety. Andrew Allen was present when the sixteenmember committee followed Congress’ recommendations and cast the group in jail,

Egerton, ed., The Royal Commission, 67; Robert M. Calhoon, “Civil, Revolutionary, or Partisan: The
Loyalists and the Nature of the War for Independence,” Tory Insurgents, 206; John, Earl of Dunmore… to
John Connolly, Esq., November 5, 1775, Peter Force, ed., American Archives, 4th Series (Washington, DC:
1840), vol. 4, 617.
17

John Connolly to John Gibson, August 9, 1775, Force, ed., American Archives, 4th Series, vol. 3, 72;
Connolly, “Narrative,” PMHB, vol. 12, no. 4 (January 1889), 408-09.
18

Detroit was then under British control, not a part of the United States.

186

inaugurating Connolly’s half-decade incarceration, among the lengthiest of any loyalist
during the Revolution.19
John Connolly’s detention and captivity left the few adherents to the Crown in the
west leaderless and temporarily disbanded loyalist efforts there. Although admonitions
the next year from William Lyon – radical member of the Supreme Executive Council for
Cumberland County – on “the growing party of disaffected persons, which unhappily
exist at this time” called for recruitment of five hundred men from the county for new
militia battalions and frontier battles against Indians aligned with the British, loyalist
militants in the vicinity conducted few armed enterprises on their own beyond Connolly’s
efforts. In one such case, Henry Magee helped recruit 431 men for an uprising around
Chamberstown in 1777. The movement disintegrated when one of the conspirators
betrayed the group to patriots.20 In the spring of 1778, seven men under the direction of
Captain Alexander McKee, the king’s deputy agent for Indian affairs in the area for over
a dozen years, then under house arrest for suspected communications with the enemy,
broke from confinement at Fort Pitt and made a successful dash for the British garrison at
Detroit. The fugitives left behind a clandestine “band of tories” among the Virginia
patriots stationed at Fort Pitt who plotted to blow up the installation and flee by watercraft in the dark. The scheme failed and some of the plotters fell prisoner. Patriot officials
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shot two of the leaders, hanged one, and publicly whipped another pair with one hundred
lashes. McKee later received a commission in the His Majesty’s armed forces and played
an instrumental role in securing the collaboration of the region’s natives on the side of the
British in the continuing conflicts which plagued the frontier for the remainder of the war
and into the postwar era.21
That April, patriots frustrated another loyalist conspiracy of about thirty men in
the upper Juniata valley under the leadership of John Weston. Known as the tories of
Sinking Valley, they intended to join indigenous allies in an attack on patriot positions.
The venture failed when the conspirators who had taken an oath of allegiance to King
George III accidentally clashed with a large band of Iroquois not part of the intrigue. The
Iroquois killed Weston and forced the loyalist frontiersmen to disperse into the
wilderness. In an initiative more typical of the imperial approach to the frontier war,
British Captain Henry Bird and Simon Girty – who fled to Detroit with McKee the
previous year – led two hundred Miami and Mingo natives on an assault on Fort Laurens
in February 1779. The besieged patriot garrison withstood near starvation and bitter
weather until a relief force saved the day on March 23.22 As these incidents illustrate,
regional loyalism did not die altogether with John Connolly’s departure. From the
original Attainder Act of March 1778 onward, twenty-eight individuals from Cumberland
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County were attainted for high treason, out of a state total of 488.23 Of these, at least eight
can be considered as militants who bore arms against the Revolution, including Simon
Girty, his brother James, and Matthew Elliott, all of whom took flight with Alexander
McKee to Detroit. Yet loyalist militancy in the west as a contribution to the British war
effort on its own without Indian cooperation never regained the vigor Dunmore’s agent
initially instilled in the cause.
John Connolly’s protracted imprisonment is a tale of unremitting petitions and
laments over his treatment and corresponding denials of improper handling by patriot
officials.24 On January 26, 1776, he was only one of six loyalists housed in a facility with
over a hundred prisoners jailed for a variety of crimes. Because he was an alleged traitor,
officials restricted his freedom of movement until his health began to suffer. Patriot
doctors confirmed his physical deterioration, at which point he was allowed to walk the
prison yard. In March, he planned an escape after the visit of his father-in-law Samuel
Sample. Authorities uncovered the plot, preventing its execution.25 In May, his wife
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Susannah visited him over five days, leading to a denial of her request to depart for fear
she would carry intelligence to the enemy. She continued there into the summer, despite
several petitions to Congress. In July, Pennsylvania’s Council of Safety decided to grant
her a retroactive weekly allowance of thirty shillings, followed by twenty-five shillings
thereafter. Growing desperate, she told Congress that her husband was planning an
escape, whereupon he began to “mistreat her” after learning of the accusation. Eventually
concluding that Susannah Connolly posed no threat, Congress resolved that she “may be
enlarged with Safety to these States, and suffered to go to her family in Cumberland
County.”26 When General Howe’s army made incursions into New Jersey in December
1776 after capturing Manhattan, Congress fled momentarily to Baltimore. John Connolly
remained in Philadelphia, where half-brother James Ewing took command of
revolutionary forces. A month later, Ewing arranged to swap jail for house arrest on a
farm near Wrightsville but shortly thereafter patriots ordered Connolly back to prison.
Detention kept the prisoner from meeting his financial obligations at this time and
creditors appropriated much of his lands. In April 1777, Ewing posted a £4,000 bond for
Connolly’s good behavior and obtained the latter’s transfer to one of his farms. Howe’s
August invasion of Pennsylvania upset the arrangement. Radicals moved Connolly to jail
at York under the watchful of a relocated Congress. He remained there until two months
after Clinton’s evacuation when, in early August 1778, he returned to confinement at
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Philadelphia. The vicissitudes of captivity thus kept Connolly from ever consciously
choosing or rejecting the option to reintegrate at the first fault line of evacuation.27
Although the radical Pennsylvania government had decreed five sweeping
attainders by the end of 1778, revolutionaries never attainted John Connolly for high
treason. Already jailed, he had no need to surrender for trial. During his incarceration, he
dedicated himself to two tasks: seeking an upgrade in prison conditions and petitioning
for exchange as an officer of His Majesty’s service. Congress tasked a team with
investigating Connolly’s mistreatment. This committee not only concluded that his
allegations were “scandalous and groundless” but upped the ante, accusing him of being a
spy rather than a commissioned royal officer. The charge posed a grave peril: spies were
subject to a different set of wartime rules, including execution. A surprised Connolly
fought the novel imputation, triggering yet another congressional probe that decided on
July 14, 1779 that he was indeed an officer, not a spy. Finally, in July 1780 patriot
authorities granted Connolly a parole and exchanged him three months later at New York
for Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel Ramsey, a hero of the battle of Monmouth. As part of
the deal, Connolly promised to do nothing in the future that would harm the United States
– terms he instantly violated.28
Promptly rejoining the British army, John Connolly drew up plans for a new
attack on the west that would restore British hegemony on the frontier – and title to his
27
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lands. Although Sir Henry Clinton approved the plan, Washington received news of the
affair in March 1781. Patriots punctually fortified Fort Pitt and the expedition never took
place. Instead, Clinton dispatched Connolly south as Lieutenant Colonel Commandant of
the Queen’s Loyal Foresters to assist Cornwallis in his push through Virginia. Connolly
soon fell ill and received permission to leave British lines to recuperate, leading to his
recapture in the countryside on September 21 while en route to his refuge. Had he
remained with Cornwallis, he would likely have fallen prisoner at Yorktown on October
19 anyway. Patriot officials shipped Connolly back to Philadelphia in December, where
he was brought before the Supreme Executive Council and jailed again. The following
March Washington ordered his release on condition that he go to British-occupied New
York and proceed onward to England. With the post-Yorktown royal cause in tatters, he
complied. Officials in London kept Connolly on the military payroll.29
Connolly did not consider postwar reintegration in Pennsylvania or Virginia a
viable option while adrift in exile, especially after sweeping changes on the frontier. The
competing states had settled their longstanding boundary clash on September 23, 1780,
agreeing to locate Fort Pitt and the surrounding area within Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction as
long as settlers could retain title to lands acquired under Virginia’s earlier authority.30
The Definitive Treaty of Peace in 1783 dashed Connolly’s last hopes. The area he had
claimed as the source of prospective riches no longer fell under the dominion of either
29
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Virginia or Great Britain. Lord Dunmore’s word – the cornerstone of Connolly’s claims –
was worthless. After breaking faith with his Pennsylvania origins in the colonial border
dispute with Virginia and the struggle for independence, Connolly’s dreams of landed
wealth lay in ruins.
Like many loyalist militants, Connolly turned his postwar attention to reparations
for his fidelity. In 1783, he published his narrative to bolster a claim to Parliament for
£6,849, a solicitation grounded in large measure on the 4,000 acres Lord Dunmore had
assigned him prior to the war. Joseph Galloway was among those who backed Connolly’s
land claim, declaring that it was “better than the title of those persons employed by him,”
while Dunmore himself affirmed that his former officer “would certainly have received it
[the land] if it had not been for the rebellion.”31 Unfortunately, the parliamentary
commissioners had removed uncultivated lands from the ledger of viable claims. As a
result, Connolly only received £793 in compensation.
John Connolly’s land dreams did not die with exile, however. In the winter of
1787, he moved to Quebec. The next year the British dispatched him to Detroit as
Lieutenant Governor. From there, he again tried to recover his Ohio properties, a
maneuver quashed by the Virginia Assembly in response to petitions from local settlers.
In September 1788, the ever-enterprising Connolly set out for Kentucky to reunite with
his onetime partner John Campbell, to whom he proposed an expedition to seize New
Orleans from Spain. He promised locals royal arms, ammunition, and men to secure the
Mississippi River for Great Britain all the way down to the Gulf of Mexico. Campbell
found Connolly “obnubilated” by alcohol and dismissed him as any sort of threat to
31

“Memorial of John Connolly,” Egerton, ed., The Royal Commission, 67-69; Palmer, Biographical
Sketches, 171.

193

Spanish sovereignty over the region. Kentuckians for their part rejected his offer, forcing
him to flee once again.32 By 1798, he was in Montreal, warning his patriot half-brother
James Ewing by letter that Europe’s conflicts would inevitably cross the Atlantic and
involve the United States in war with Spain. His earlier ardor against “the tyranny and
insolence of republican faction” and the “madness” of those who “overlook his duty to
the present [British] constitution” had evidently dissipated, for he offered his assistance
to the United States should such an event occur.33 Connolly suffered one final setback as
the eighteenth century drew to a close. Appointed royal Superintendent of Indian Affairs
at Detroit in December 1799 on the Duke of Kent’s recommendation, he discovered that
the long arm of imperial patronage had already offered the post to someone else. The
British ministry canceled the assignment by July 1800. Connolly died in Montreal on
January 30, 1813. According to his last wife, Margaret, he spent the later part of his life
lamenting his multiple failures.34
Of modest borderland origins, John Connolly was the most militant of western
Pennsylvania’s loyalists. Like Galloway and the Allens in southeastern Pennsylvania, his
departure from Cumberland County left loyalists without direction, mitigated local
revolutionary tensions, and paved the way there for a more harmonious reintegration
process. His efforts to resurrect the land issue in Kentucky in the late 1780s provide
ample proof that his presence, if allowed, would have substantially muddied the republic-
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building process on the western frontier. Connolly rode pre-war colonial factionalism into
the rebellion. His failed militancy had two significant consequences: it drew the issue of
allegiance to the king out of the Pennsylvania-Virginia boundary dispute, leaving rebels
to resolve the matter in 1780, and unintentionally placed the brunt of England’s fortunes
in the region on the shoulders of allied Indian nations, thereby pushing the white settlers
who bore their attacks away from the royal cause.
On a personal level, Connolly’s belligerence generated prison and exile, while
crippling any chance at reintegration. From the perspective of Pennsylvania patriots, he
had the dubious distinction of betraying his birthplace not once but twice: initially on the
side of the royal colony of Virginia over the proprietary colony of Pennsylvania and later
as a devotee of monarchy against revolution. Though he consistently ascribed his actions
to selfless aims, the historical Connolly seems less a loyalist militant than a militant
Connollyist, inspired and driven by what he perceived would bring the greatest personal
advancement. While steady in his fidelity, his personal stake in western land speculation
– in all endeavors at all junctures – strongly suggests that self-interest was the sine qua
non of his allegiance.
PENNAMITES & LOYALIST MILITANCY ON THE NORTHEASTERN FRONTIER
The infusion of colonial factionalism played an even more significant role in the
revolutionary struggle on Pennsylvania’s northeast frontier in Northumberland County
and upper Northampton County. As in the dispute with Virginia westward, competing
pre-war settlers from Connecticut and Pennsylvania coveted the largely unpopulated
lands along the northern Susquehanna River, in what was known as the Wyoming
country near present-day Wilkes-Barre. Both colonies claimed their respective royal
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charters granted them legal title over the area. The New Englanders argued that, since
their 1662 charter gave Connecticut the right of sea-to-sea colonization “from the said
Narraganset-Bay on the East, to the South Sea on the West Part” two decades before
William Penn’s grant, their jurisdiction skipped over the existing province of New York
and extended to the west.35 Yankee settlement began in earnest in 1753 with formation of
the Susquehannah Company of Connecticut. As Pennsylvanian “Pennamites” also put
down roots in the region, the conflict escalated, especially after the Fort Stanwix Treaty
with the Six Nations of the Iroquois in 1768. Pennsylvania governors John and Richard
Penn fervently disputed the outsiders’ claims. Yet by the early 1770s, it was clear that the
colony of Connecticut was doing a better job backing its settlers than Pennsylvania’s
“weak and disorganized” efforts.36
When the Revolution entered the picture, colonial factions divided along a much
more precise and evenly split loyalist-patriot axis than in the west. Connecticut frontier
farmers quickly placed themselves under the radical patriot standard, impugning their
Pennsylvania adversaries with the taint of loyalism and treason. Although divergences
centered around the geographic locus of governmental authority, an ethno-cultural
element also exacerbated tensions. For example, almost forty percent of the loyalist
militants in the Susquehanna valley documented for this study were either German
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immigrants or of Germanic ancestry.37 The violent struggle which ensued along the
Susquehanna River proved to be far more rancorous, chaotic and definitive than its
western counterpart. Outmaneuvered, the Pennamites turned to the British for validation
of their land claims. Actively embracing loyalist militancy, they were routed by local proConnecticut revolutionaries who forced them to abandon their homesteads and flee in the
dead of winter. With the exception of a number of particularly brutal return raids bent on
vengeance, the departure of these Pennsylvania militants not only reduced but virtually
eliminated loyalist support in the region and essentially canceled the need for a postwar
process of reintegration altogether. Moreover, their flight furthered resolution of the
intracolonial clash over boundaries by taking the imperial question out of the equation,
allowing Congress and patriots in each state to decide the matter. In terms of the destiny
of the exiles, the ferocity of the internecine conflict combined with British defeat and the
coming of independence to keep Susquehanna loyalist militants from ever returning to
Pennsylvania.
The Connecticut-Pennsylvania disagreement became untenable when both
colonies created competing governments in the region. Connecticut set up a town named
Westmoreland in 1774 as part of the existing Connecticut county of Litchfield and about
two-and-a-half years later, with the Revolution in full swing, restructured Westmoreland
into its own county. But two years before this event, Pennsylvania had established the
county of Northumberland covering more or less the same geographic expanse. In each
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case, local officials behaved like extensions of their respective provincial governments.38
Yankees thus vied with Pennamites to reclaim what was viewed as an unpopulated
wilderness. As can be expected whenever governmental authority is ambiguous, the
struggle turned violent. When the Revolution came to the frontier, the Yankees moved
swiftly to side with the rebels while Pennsylvanians hesitated to declare allegiance either
way. Focused more on the intercolonial dispute rather than the spreading rebellion
against the empire, Governor John Penn Sr. asked justice of the peace William Plunkett
to reassert Pennsylvania’s authority on the northeastern frontier in November 1775,
declaring “I do most chearfully [sic] order you to use your utmost Diligence and Activity,
in putting the Laws of this Province in Execution throughout the County of
Northumberland.”39 Plunkett’s military expedition ended in defeat and permitted the
clearly pro-patriot Yankees to position the Susquehanna Pennsylvanians as “tories” in the
eyes of outsiders. Thereafter, Connecticut authorities accused even avowed patriots on
the Pennsylvania side – like Adonijah Stanburrough – of tory tendencies and compelled
them to appear before their accusers. After his audience with the local patriot committee,
mill owner Stanburrough promptly disposed of his property and left the area.40
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By early 1777, the Yankee-Pennamite schism had reached a crescendo. In the
midst of winter, harassment against Pennsylvanians forced many to forsake their farms
and undertake the arduous journey to Niagara, where Lieutenant Colonel John Butler – in
charge of local Indian affairs for the British – welcomed the refugees. The Revolution
had transformed the colonial land conflict: Connecticut’s Yankees were now patriots and
Northumberland’s Pennamites loyalists.41 In December 1777, the British authorized
Butler to organize the newly arrived émigrés into companies which became known as
Butler’s Rangers. While the Niagara-based rangers were not technically a Pennsylvania
loyalist unit like the others analyzed here, Pennamite frontier farmers heavily manned
these units. Whole families’ worth of able-bodied males joined en masse – people like
Thomas Millard, son Thomas, and his two brothers; Daniel, George, and Gilbert Field;
Casper, Henry, and Jacob Hover; James, John, and Peter Secord; and Frederick and
William Vanderlip, father and son, all farmers.42 Strategically, the rangers usually
operated in conjunction with the allied Indian nations Butler had helped to salvage for the
imperial cause. Militarily, the blend proved highly effective. Most of these Pennamites
believed they were regrouping at Niagara to take back their lands but events would prove
that they had embarked on the first leg of a long exile.
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Pennamite-Indian vengeance culminated in a fabled raid known as the Wyoming
Massacre on July 3, 1778, a little over two weeks after the British had withdrawn from
Philadelphia. Colonel Butler reported the taking of 227 scalps from about 400 Yankee
militia defenders. Furthermore, over 1,000 farms were plundered and torched, crops
destroyed, and more than a thousand head of cattle butchered.43 The violence devastated
the region. The Pennamites did not resettle, however, retreating once again to Niagara. In
response to the loyalist militants’ scorched earth policy, patriot retribution raids began in
September and extended well into the war. The lack of security nearly depopulated the
northeast frontier of white settlement. The clash had an ironic ending. Congress resolved
the Pennsylvania-Connecticut territorial dispute in Pennsylvania’s favor in 1782, even
though the Yankees were the ones who had originally supported the patriot cause.44 By
June 1784, Pennsylvania had reestablished jurisdiction over the area by using two militia
companies to clear out the Connecticut settlers for their own newcomers, which of course
did not include the Pennamites who had gone over to the British. Resurgent hostility,
though, netted the opprobrium of the Pennsylvania state government under moderate
council president John Dickinson. Yankees were subsequently permitted to return. The
quarrel over competing title claims persisted for more than two decades, obligating the
43
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legislature to pass acts in 1787, 1799 and 1808 that tried to placate litigants. Generally
speaking, Pennsylvania under moderate rule honored the land rights of Yankee farmers
while granting fellow Pennsylvanians compensation with lands elsewhere in the state.45
For the Pennamites of the northern Susquehanna who joined Butler, departure
begot perpetuity. Their experiences are best summarized in three prototypical cases.
Philip Buck lived in Northumberland County “at the beginning of the late unhappy
disturbances in America, in possession of a good Farm with Building erected thereon,
Live Stock, Household Furniture, Farming Utensils, etc. valued at the time at £275 in
New York currency.” Buck was a native of Germany who had arrived in America as an
infant. “He made his escape to the British Army in the year 1777 – from which period to
the close of the War he served the King in Col. Butler’s Rangers.” He ascribed the loss of
grain and twenty hogs to “the rebels when he went away in 1777” and “to the Indians”
the loss of his cattle a year later, in addition to the property and goods he left behind.
Buck was captured and sent to New York in a 1778 prisoner exchange, rejoining Butler
for the war’s duration. In 1786, he was at Niagara, then a part of the British province of
Quebec. Like many of his Northumberland compatriots, Buck was illiterate, signing his
claim for compensation with an “X.” Apparently the commissioners converted the £275
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in New York currency into a British equivalent of £154.13.9, for that amount turned out
to be his official claim. Of this sum, he was awarded £62.46
Philip Bender told a similar tale. Also a native of Germany and residing in
Northumberland, he “left his home in the Spring 1777” because he “could not stay
without taking part with the Rebels.” Bender was clearly part of a Pennamite mass
migration, stating that he “came with the Loyalists off his settlement… to join Butler.”
He served with the Rangers as a private until his discharge in 1782 as the war neared its
conclusion. For compensation, Bender claimed a 320-acre farm and specified that “the
Rebels got some” of his stock of 200 bushels of corn and wheat, while a cow was “killed
by Indians” and five sheep “by Indians and Rangers.” Before leaving the area, he had
taken the precaution of moving his furniture to a fort for safekeeping but this transfer
“was found out by the Rebels” and the fixtures “taken by them.” By 1783, Bender was
residing at Niagara. He made his formal compensation claim in April 1786 to Colonel
Thomas Dundas and Jeremy Pemberton, members of the Royal Claims Commission sent
to Canada to substantiate and clarify loyalist petitions.47 Like Buck, Bender signed his
affidavit with an “X,” as did his witnesses John Depue and Charles Depue. The lower
sorts predominated in the Susquehanna settlements. Bender’s original claim for £246.10
in New York funds was acknowledged as £130.13.1 British currency, of which the
modest sum of £53 was granted.48
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The most telling of these Susquehanna cases was that of Frederick Anger, whose
account contained many similarities to Buck, Bender, and other Northumberland settlers.
He, too, was a native of Germany, arriving in America at the relatively advanced age of
thirty. He, too, owned a farm, furniture, farming utensils, cattle, horses, hogs, sheep,
grain, and the like seized or plundered by rebels or Indians. He, too, “made his escape to
the British army” in 1778 and then “served the King in Colonel Butler’s Rangers” – in his
case for seven years as a private. He, too, signed his claim with an “X” and wound up at
Niagara in the 1780s. And like other refugees from the region, he also had two sons who
served with him in the same regiment. But in seeking reparations for his loyalty, Anger
was one of the few who openly discussed the land dispute between Pennsylvania and
Connecticut in his claim and thus provides a unique gaze into the conflict’s evolution.49
Anger filed documents with the claims commissioners on at least three occasions.
On April 13, 1786, and August 27, 1787, he judged himself a Susquehanna River settler
of Pennsylvania’s Northumberland County. But his claim of November 14, 1783 – eleven
days before the British evacuated New York City – referred to himself as “late of
Susquehanna in the province of Conecticut [sic]” and “late of Waomen [Wyoming] in
Westmoreland County in the Province of Conettucut [sic].”50 This initial testimony came
less than two years after Congress granted the area to Pennsylvania. His willingness to
identify himself as a Yankee even after Congress’ adjudication shows that those who
49
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lived there earlier recognized that Connecticut had the upper hand in the territorial clash
throughout the war, regardless of partisanship. His stance was not contradictory, for he
was among those Pennamites who had originally recognized the claims of Connecticut
but later wound up fighting for Pennsylvania and the king.51
The New Englanders’ victory all but obliterated loyalist support in the northeast,
leaving control in the hands of radical revolutionaries who fought off joint British-Indianloyalist incursions through the war.52 Their dominance added a pre-war colonial twist to
the prospect of Pennamite reintegration, for the perception that Yankee rage still reigned
supreme in the northern river country eliminated this option after the British withdrew
from the state in 1778. Besides, had Frederick Anger believed reintegration viable at the
war’s closure, he would by his own admission have returned to Connecticut rather than
Pennsylvania, as his first compensation petition makes clear. The evidence thus suggests
that militarily active Pennamites like Anger had far greater reason to reject reintegration
than Pennsylvanians elsewhere. In fact, the Northumberland Pennamites were the least
likely to return among all exiles. Of sixty-three loyalists from the region known to be
militarily active, none came back. Only Henry Windecker even so much as visited a part
of newly independent America in the aftermath of war. Colonial antecedents elevated
local antagonisms beyond a straightforward patriot-loyalist enmity. Not surprisingly,
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Pennamites who bore arms for the king stayed away. No need for a process of loyalist
reintegration developed in the Susquehanna valley.53 The “reintegration” that did occur
concerned the removal, restoration, relocation or compensation of Connecticut and
Pennsylvania patriots once Congress granted Pennsylvania control of the area.
MILITANT LOYALIST LEADERSHIP IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: THE RANKINS
Loyalist militancy in the band of agricultural counties between the southeastern
core around Philadelphia and the frontier bore a greater resemblance to the center than
the periphery. The territory comprising York, Lancaster and Berks counties, as well as
the more settled southern part of Northampton County, was a land of established and
productive farms, with the towns of York, Lancaster, Reading and Easton acting as hubs
of each jurisdiction. This middle sector witnessed many of the same revolutionary strains
that shaped the resistance-to-independence process for elites in the provincial capital,
with a rural variant. The Rankin brothers of York County – James, William and John –
illustrate this pattern. In local terms, the Rankins could plausibly be classified as elites,
for they were among the more prosperous citizens in their district by the Revolution. But
contrasted with Philadelphia’s gentlemanly elites, these sons of an early frontier pioneer
were quite “ordinary.”54 Despite regional and class differences, the Rankins’ commitment
to the royal cause exhibited characteristics much like Joseph Galloway and the Allens.
Their militancy developed gradually in conjunction with the increasing radicalism of
events. They too tied success to a dependence on direct British support, hesitated to
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operate autonomously, and had to flee when failure became manifest. Their departure
likewise attenuated internal political tensions and smoothed passage towards successful
reintegration locally, including the reassimilation of some of their own descendants who
elected to remain in Pennsylvania.
James and William Rankin entered the revolutionary conflict as key movers and
shakers of York County. James settled in Newberry Township sometime after 1754. He
married Quaker Rebecca Bennett in 1756 but it appears he was not active in the faith. His
contrite wife told the Warrington Monthly Meeting that year that “for want of keeping to
the principles of truth in my own heart,” she “gave way so far as to get married by a
Licence [sic] and to a man not Joined to our Society.” The Quakers would launch strict
reforms that decade which stipulated disownment of those who married outside the
discipline, but they allowed Rebecca to remain within the congregation until her death in
in 1773, when the York County leadership authorized her internment in the Quaker burial
ground. The couple had at least two sons and two daughters over seventeen years. James
wed second wife Ann a year after Rebecca’s death. That union engendered two more
Rankins. Which of the wives gave birth to another pair of offspring is unclear, but James
had a total of eight children with his two spouses. Although engaged in agriculture, James
Rankin had entrepreneurial ambitions, preferring to run business operations and speculate
in land rather than rely exclusively on farming, as did most of his neighbors. Early on, he
added a tavern and store to a residence on his original 222-acre property and set up an
orchard harvesting apples for cider. For a decade from 1767 onward, he procured more
than 3600 acres, two islands on the Susquehanna River, a ferry operation, a shelling mill,
a grist mill, and a merchant mill that ground wheat for export instead of local use. To set
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up the neglected mills, he invested over £3000 and hired more than 150 workers. James
was not particularly interested in public affairs before the Revolution, limiting his
involvement to serving on local juries.55
Like his brother, William Rankin also became a large landholder. In his claim to
Parliament, he asked to be compensated for sixteen confiscated properties totaling 2,426
acres. William was not averse to public service, however, and in 1771 he began a six-year
stretch as a York County justice of the peace in the Court of Common Pleas and Quarter
Sessions.56 John was a man of more modest means and lived on one of James’
plantations. He owned 190 acres in York, as well as a lot adjoining James’ Newbury
property. Of the three brothers, he is the only one identified clearly as a Quaker, which
suggests that all three had antecedents in that sect but only John was religiously active.57
Like the Allens, the Rankins voluntarily signed on to the resistance against
Parliament’s onerous infringements. But unlike their Philadelphia counterparts, they did
not participate during the decade of the imperial crisis and came to the fray after the shots
at Lexington. William joined York’s patriot Committee of Observation and Inspection
and became “a Colonel of a regiment of Militia” in the county in 1775. As noted in his
later testimony, “when the Declaration of Parliament to Tax and in all cases to bind the
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people in America was made known,” William Rankin was “free to own, that conceiving
the Exercise of such Power oppressive he was opposed to that Measure.” James Rankin,
too, was an early member of the county’s conservative antiparliamentary faction. Six
months after hostilities broke out, Governor John Penn Sr. professed to be “pleased to
Commissionate” James as a Sheriff and Coroner for York County. In the crucial
Pennsylvania colonial assembly by-election of May 1, 1776, he was overwhelmingly
elected for York when “the Majority of that Assembly were friends to this country
[England].” He did not play a significant role as a member of that body, receiving only
two minor committee assignments during the early summer as the established colonial
assembly faded into oblivion.58
As with many other conservatives, the road to independence set the bounds of
proper allegiance for the Rankins. James’ path to open disaffection against the rebellion
was the most rapid of the three. At a meeting of Whigs to discuss the local response to
Congress’ appeal for a new state government less than a month after his election, radicals
accused James of violating “the trust reposed in him by the good people of this county.”
In propagating an anti-independence stance, he opposed the call for a provincial
conference to summon a constitutional convention and circulated “seven letters and a
bundle of remonstrances” for no other alleged purpose than “to draw this Province off
from the present union with the other Colonies, or to divide the people so as to fall an
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easy prey to our inveterate enemies.”59 A publicity battle ensued after radical Whig
investigators published their findings in a June edition of the Pennsylvania Gazette.
James defended himself publicly, asserting that he had only circulated the papers in
question to inform his constituents because the resolution of Congress left it to each
province to decide whether to establish a new government or not. In short, he was doing
his duty as an assemblyman.
His efforts proved to be in vain. When the day arrived for York citizens to select
delegates to the state constitutional convention, James led supporters to the polls in a
failed effort to scatter voters in defense of the existing assembly, even as the electorate
chose brother William as a representative. Perhaps swayed by his sibling’s participation,
James caved with a recantation in the Gazette in which he admitted to injuring the
county’s patriot committee via “sundry public misrepresentations, as well as by personal
insults.” Upon reflection, he was now “convinced of the bad tendency of my past
conduct.” “I do thus publicly ask forgiveness,” he added, “and do promise… that I will in
future pay due regard to the rules and regulations of the Honourable Continental
Congress, and behave, in all respects, as becomes a good citizen of the United States of
America.” The radical patriot committee accredited his penance, resolving he should be
“restored to his liberty, and the confidence of his countrymen.”60
William Rankin also had doubts about the political path on which radicals had
embarked. As events evolved towards an imperial divorce and “the liberal offers of Great
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Britain were rejected,” William “determined at every risque [sic] to prevent a Separation
between the two Countries… from a sense of Duty to his Sovereign and love to his
Country.” In pursuit of this objective, he decided to retain his spot within revolutionary
circles. York voters had elected him as one of nine county delegates to the Provincial
Conference which met at Carpenter’s Hall in Philadelphia from June 18 to June 25, 1776.
Conference minutes did not take attendance nor single him out for any specific reason,
but the fact that voters elected him again as part of the nine-man delegation to the state
constitutional convention at Philadelphia beginning July 15 suggests he fulfilled his duty
at the provincial conference.61 William also complied with responsibilities as a patriot
militia officer. In June, the Committee of Safety reimbursed him for £200 “towards the
payment of Firelocks purchasing by him in York County on account of Congress” and a
month later the Council of Safety ordered delivery to “Col. Rankin, of York County, 8
Muskets, for the use of his Battalion” and “30 stand of Arms.” William led his troops
through the capital three weeks after independence. Radical Christopher Marshall duly
noted on July 26 that “this afternoon, came to town and passed by our door to the
barracks, two companies of clever fellows, one from [the] back parts of Lancaster, the
other from York County, [under] Col. William Rankin.”62
On September 3, the convention appointed him one of seventeen state justices of
the peace for York County, the only direct mention of his activities while there. When
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time came to officially indorse the final rendering of the new constitution on September
28, however, William was missing in action. He was not alone. Only two of York’s nine
delegates signed, by far the lowest count of the twelve county delegations. Whether that
denoted more discontent in York than elsewhere in the state or simply reflected the
delegates’ other obligations is uncertain. Around this time, York County’s committee
ordered the militia colonel to lead his men and “lay waste the Estates and seize the
Persons of a Number of Loyalists.” But William’s doubts on allegiance had gelled as
loyalist conviction by then. As a result, he “obeyed the orders in appearance, but in the
Execution of them pursued such Measures as to prevent the intended effect,” in essence
becoming a double agent for the British.63
Sir William Howe’s landing at Head of Elk, Maryland, in August of 1777 recast
the political panorama in York County as elsewhere in the province. As the invasion
advanced, informants William Beckworth and Adam Laughlin gave patriot officials a
sworn deposition on September 6, 1777 that, while lodging at the tavern of John Rankin,
they had learned that bands of loyalists were organizing to join the British. Heavily
pledged in this venture was James Rankin who “had one or two thousand bushels of
Wheat and Rye laid in his mill for Hows [sic] Army, could raise 500 men and he belived
[sic] he would be one of the Chief Commanders.” On the 15th, the Supreme Executive
Council learned “of divers treasonable & dangerous intentions and designs of levying
men & destroying the Public Stores at York, Lancaster & Carlisle & elsewhere” likewise
implicating James. Apparently his public retraction a year earlier was not heartfelt. Key
arrests dismembered the plot. Marshall recorded on September 17 that James Rankin
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stood “accused of forming a scheme to destroy all our magazines, arms, tents, baggage,
provisions, &c… was taken about sixteen miles from our enemies’ camp, and secured,
but where I could not learn.” The reason he did not learn was that the revitalized loyalist
had scampered. “Obliged to flee for his Life,” James found his way to the British fleet on
the Chesapeake and joined the army after the capture of Philadelphia. From the occupied
city, James often rode out to gather intelligence from as far away as York to aid British
war efforts. On one occasion, he led five accomplices on a visit to George Washington’s
camp at Valley Forge to gauge the ragged state of continental troops. That his was a high
profile case is evident in the Attainder Act of March 1778, when “yeoman” James Rankin
earned notoriety as one of the original thirteen attainted under the new law.
John was less precipitous but, by helping British prisoners of war to escape, he
was later “obliged to flee to Philadelphia” where he joined the British army in March
1778. Two months later, he too was attainted in the first of the Supreme Executive
Council’s eight proclamations. The brothers left for Manhattan with Clinton in June
1778. Like other loyalist militants, James and John rejected the first opportunity to
reintegrate by exiting at the evacuation.64 The exiled duo settled in royally controlled
Long Island for the war’s duration. Lorenzo Sabine has James involved in loyalist politics
at New York as chairman of the loyalist Board of refugees in 1781. Three months after
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James’ departure, the Supreme Executive Council granted his wife Ann a pass to join him
at New York. John’s wife Abigail also reunited with her husband in late 1780.65 Between
the journeys of the two wives, the radical council under President Joseph Reed gave
notice that the seized estates of James and John Rankin, along with a host of other
departed loyalists, were to be sold at public auction. The notification set in motion a
decade of property transactions and issues that dot council records primarily because
James had left behind substantial debts and creditors made claims on his seized estates.66
William Rankin’s life took a different twist. He may have been involved in the
Carlisle plot also but, if so, he did not take credit for this episode in his later claim. That
he was not attainted at this point, yet continued to reside in York County, demonstrates
that the militia colonel was not under the same suspicion as his brothers. Nonetheless,
according to his own testimony, in 1778 he began to form “Associations among the
Loyalists and engaged some thousands of them to take up Arms in His Majesty’s favor
whenever the opportunity should offer.” Most recruits were “reputable farmers.” The
mobilization included an oath “abjuring the Congress and the Rebel States, of Secrecy in
regard to the Association of Fidelity and Allegiance to His Majesty, and of Enlistment
under their respective Officers,” in effect enforcement of the patriot test act in reverse.
His links to the clandestine association lasted about three years beyond the imperial
retreat from Philadelphia. At least two major operations were contemplated during this

65

Sabine, Biographical Sketches, vol. 2, 210; Council Minutes, September 19, 1778, Colonial Records, vol.
11, 562; Council Minutes, October 2, 1780, ibid., vol. 12, 494; Council Minutes, April 12, 1779, ibid., vol.
11, 745; “James Rankin,” Legislators in Pennsylvania, vol. 3, 1152 & 1155 fn15.
66

Council Minutes, April 12, 1779, Colonial Records, vol. 11, 745. For property issues, see Council
Minutes, Colonial Records, vol. 12, 174, 218-219, 560, 577, 680; ibid., vol. 13, 98, 273, 385; and ibid., vol.
15, 468. For John and William’s properties, see Colonial Records, vol. 13, 384 & vol. 15, 425.

213

time. In the first half of 1778, Rankin was in veiled communication with General Howe
in occupied Philadelphia through chief civil administrator Joseph Galloway, to whom he
proposed seizing the delegates of the lightly defended Continental Congress assembled at
York in a nighttime raid of six hundred loyalists then purportedly under his command.
But in a typical demonstration of Howe’s restraint, William received no answer. The
evacuation and Congress’ return to the capital ended the scheme. Rankin persisted in his
organizational efforts and established contact in New York with Howe’s replacement, Sir
Henry Clinton, offering the new commander the services of his loyal adherents. Clinton
accepted the proposition in principle and Rankin resurrected a reworked version of the
plot to attack the Carlisle arsenal. But once again, the order never came. William’s
continued militancy reveals that he held fast to the hope of reintegration after 1778 – but
his version of reintegration was built entirely on a British victory over rebels.67
In the meantime, William Rankin operated – at least nominally – as head of a
loosely knit and unofficially sanctioned guerrilla corps in southeastern Pennsylvania that
probably included the Doan brothers, and the Schockey-Nugent gangs. These rural bands
wreaked havoc on patriots in the area, committing robberies and conducting counterfeit
schemes to devalue continental and state currency.68 Four conspirators were captured and
hanged in 1779. While operating surreptitiously as a loyalist militant, William engaged

67

“Memorial of William Rankin,” AO12/42/206, DLAR; Coldham, ed., American Migrations, 481;
Palmer, ed., Biographical Sketches, 715; “Memorial of Joseph Galloway,” Egerton, ed., Royal Claims
Commission, 85. As late as April 5, 1778 – only ten weeks before the British evacuation – William was still
listed as a colonel in the muster roll of the Second Battalion of the Pennsylvania Militia. See “Muster Rolls
and Papers relating to Associators and Militia of the County of York,” Egle, ed., Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd
Series, vol. 14, 488.
68

Counterfeiting became such a problem in Pennsylvania during the war that it was legislated as a capital
crime. See for example Section VI of the Assembly’s act emitting bills of credit, March 20, 1777, Statutes
At Large of Pennsylvania, vol. 9, Chapter 752, 100, where counterfeiters of these bills “shall suffer death.”

214

the patriot legal system as an ordinary patriot citizen, obtaining a ruling in his favor from
the state on lands once owned by exiled brother James. In November 1779, the Supreme
Executive Council paid James Smith £74.9.6, “the amount of the claim of William
Rankin on the Estate of James Rankin, decreed him by the Supreme Court.”69 His loyalist
cover did not withstand the war. In March of 1781, informants apprised General George
Washington of Rankin’s subversion, whereupon the veiled loyalist “was immediately
seized on and committed to the Gaol of York Town, from whence he found means to
Escape and with great Risque [sic] and Difficulty got safe to New York.” The British
Army engaged his services there with a £200 per annum salary. Duties included renewed
efforts to “encourage the Associators to continue firm in their Allegiance and to be ready
to render those services” as needed. In the midst of the British military campaign in the
southern states, Rankin submitted a plan to Sir Henry Clinton to attack portions of
Maryland, southeastern Pennsylvania, and Delaware, areas still thought to contain strong
loyalist contingents. Clinton and Lord Cornwallis, who would have had to implement
such a strategy in the field and were by then fed up with overpromises of loyalist support,
had other ideas. The project came to naught.70
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William Rankin’s hurried flight from York brought the wrath of patriot legal
justice upon him. On April 27, 1781, the Supreme Executive Council rewarded William
with an attainder all his own, one of only three such single-person attainders during the
entire conflict in Pennsylvania. Acknowledging that William “did lately break the said
prison and make his escape from justice,” the loyalist militant was ordered to “render
himself” for trial by June 14 or “suffer such pains and penalties and undergo all such
forfeitures” customary for those charged with high treason. In a corollary, the state
offered an incentive of fifty pounds in Pennsylvania currency to anyone who could
“apprehend” and “deliver” the fugitive to state officials.71 After Rankin failed to report
for prosecution by the prescribed date, state agents seized his property.72
The peace of 1783 presented the three brothers a second chance to reconcile with
Pennsylvania and seek reintegration. But once again they would have none of it. At the
evacuation of New York, William crossed the Atlantic for English shores. There the
British Treasury awarded him a living pension of £120 per annum. John and James
headed northwards instead. Still in British-occupied New York in the summer of 1783,
John was appointed, along with fellow Quakers Joshua Knight and Samuel Fairlamb, as
agent for a mission to Canada to inspect locations for a future settlement of Friends. His
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appointment to such a delicate assignment shows the trust of his coreligionists. Their
inquiry gave birth to the colony of Pennfield at Beaver Harbor in New Brunswick, where
John received a grant of land after a stay in Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia. In 1784, he
filed his compensation claim to Parliament from Nova Scotia through a London proxy.73
Exile for James at the peace likewise took him from the New York evacuation to
Nova Scotia. In August of 1784, however, he concluded that his presence in England was
“absolutely necessary” to the successful execution of his quite substantial claim. Leaving
his wife and three children behind in Canada, he joined William in England. Like his
brother, he applied for and received a pension from the Treasury – in his case £140 per
annum, £20 more than William. As part of a growing community of loyalist exiles in the
mother country, James provided testimony to Parliament on the fidelity of his American
compatriots. In a typical example beyond support for his siblings, James spoke highly of
Abel Evans, confiding that “he has no Doubt of his being a very good Loyalist & speaks
very strongly of his Attachment to the Cause of Great Britain.” The two Rankin brothers
in Britain eventually received ample compensation for their losses from the Royal Claims
Commission. William applied for £8,209 in recompense, based on the loss of 2,426 acres
from his sixteen seized properties. The claim was backed by Joseph Galloway and former
commander-in-chief Sir Henry Clinton, among others. The commissioners awarded him
£3,806. James pressed for the huge sum of £44,387 sterling for his vast land holdings. He
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received £10,801 sterling. The less affluent John sought only £915 sterling in his claim,
for which he was granted £327 sterling.74
Unlike most other petitions, the Rankin claims faced several challenges, which
suggests they exaggerated their losses. Witness Daniel Batwell, a diehard loyalist and
Anglican minister who collaborated with James Rankin in planning the aborted Carlisle
munitions expedition, refused to pinpoint a value on James’ alleged £44,387 in holdings,
feigning ignorance of such matters. When commissioners told witness Andrew Allen that
James estimated a yearly income of £3000 from his confiscated properties, Allen wryly
countered that “there was no body in the province who possessed so large a property.”
Then in 1789, the claims commission received a letter from Pennsylvania signed by “A
Loyalist” with “a heart that’s pure” who had not filed his own claim but had “suffered
considerable loss of property.” The writer explained that rumors then circulated in the
province that James and William were asking for £40,000 in compensation, which was
true. The self-described loyalist cast doubt on the Rankins’ wealth, stressing that if the
rumor was correct “they are the basest men who have made their appearance before you”
because “they were never worth fifteen thousand pounds Pennsylvania Currency.”75 The
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observations had no impact on William’s application but may have hurt James who
received only 24.3% of his claim when the average award was for 39.9% after the typical
adjustments made by commissioners.76
Despite exile, the Rankins did not forget Pennsylvania. While William disappears
from loyalist accounts in England, John and James reengaged the reintegration route. In
late 1785, as moderate Republicans took definitive control of state government, John
returned to his York home, ostensibly to trade but one cannot rule out that his real intent
may have been to explore relocation. He did not remain long, however, hurrying back to
Canada to give first-hand testimony to the claims commission representatives assigned to
interview loyalists in the royal provinces there.77 John’s Pennfield community went
through some tough times in the late 1780s. As the following decade dawned, he decided
to seek redemption in Pennsylvania. With Thomas Mifflin presiding, fifteen members of
the moderate Supreme Executive Council heard a petition from John Rankin on March 9,
1790, “stating that he is desirous of returning to this State, and praying that Council
would be pleased to grant him a pardon that he may restored to the rights of a citizen of
this State.” The conclave “Resolved, that the said John Rankin be pardoned.” As for
Pennsylvania’s Anglican Loyalist Clergy in the American Revolution,” Pennsylvania’s Revolution, 111117.
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James, he first took tentative steps. In 1793, the moderate assembly restored a small
portion of his unsold estate to son Abraham and daughter Ann who had never left their
homes in Pennsylvania. Three years later James followed his brother’s example,
receiving an official pardon on February 2, 1796.78
James Rankin never returned to Pennsylvania. After receiving his compensation,
he settled in England at Mill Hill, Hendon Parish, Middlesex until his demise. He drafted
a will on January 11, 1803 in which he set aside an annual income of £150 for the rest of
wife Ann’s life, apportioned double shares of his remaining estate to his five sons and
single shares to his three daughters, and appointed Ann, son William then a resident of
Grenada, and local friend Sir John William Anderson as executors. In addition, he made
provision for possible recuperation of additional portions of his Pennsylvania holdings,
naming offspring Abraham and Ann executors of any such windfall. Nine months after
the January version, James supplemented his will with a codicil placing his son Richard’s
share in trust for “not having conducted himself with that prudence and discretion which I
could wish.” James Rankin’s will was executed in London on January 29, 1804 with wife
Ann and associate Anderson awarded administration of finances. Ann lived at Mill Hill
another twenty-six years.79
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Analysis of the brothers’ revolutionary account requires acknowledgement that a
number of Rankins from York County and the surrounding area supported the patriot
cause during the war. Council records disclose several instances of reimbursement from
patriot officials for services in the years after the conflict. David Rankin, Robert Rankin,
Thomas Rankin, a second William Rankin and Elizabeth Rankin furnished provisions to
the state militia, with Elizabeth’s supplies dating from 1776 and also including the
Continental Army. It is not likely this William was James’ son of the same name alluded
to in the prior paragraph because that William had clearly decided to reside within British
dominions. Robert was a militia lieutenant and Thomas a militia captain of Washington
County who served on the frontier in 1781.80 The radical Supreme Executive Council
commissioned another John Rankin – in all probability James’ son – as justice of the
peace for Newberry Township in York County in 1780. The previous year he had
petitioned the Supreme Executive Council for assistance in resolving a claim on “a part
of the confiscated Estate of James Rankin… under certain articles and covenants” which
was “of such a nature as cannot be settled in the usual mode before the Justices of the
Supreme Court.” In 1789, this same John Rankin requested that fines imposed by the
Court of Oyer and Terminer on himself and eleven others for instigating a riot in
Washington County be remitted. Officials granted the rioters’ wishes.81
The Rankin clan carried forward the banner of reintegration further than anyone
in the history of Pennsylvania. In 1846-1847, heirs claimed restitution of all funds
80
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collected by the state during the Revolution from the forfeiture sales of family property.
Attorney Charles Penrose argued in representation that, since James Rankin had always
been a British subject and not a citizen of the United States, he could not have committed
treason as per his attainder and all of his property should have been restored according to
the 1783 Treaty of Peace.82 The senate postponed the decision at the time but the case
resurfaced in 1879 when James’ descendants managed to have the lower house of the
state legislature adopt a bill declaring that their ancestor had been attainted illegally. Not
privy to their ancestor’s testimony in England before the Royal Claims Commission, they
refuted any notion that he had been a loyalist. The senate had other ideas, however. There
the “Act for the Relief of the Heirs of James Rankin, Deceased,” was first turned over to
the senate finance committee on April 15, officially read for the first time on May 19, a
second time on May 26, and “determined in the negative” by a vote of 31-12 on June 5.
With that verdict, the legal legacy of James Rankin was finally laid to rest. As subsequent
historical scholarship would show, the senate was correct. James had in fact been a
loyalist – and quite the militant one at that.83
The Rankin saga reaffirms several key points about loyalist militancy in
Pennsylvania. Like other regional kingpins beyond Philadelphia engaged in activities

82

Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Commenced at Harrisburg, On Tuesday,
the seventh Day of January, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty-Six. And of
the Commonwealth the Seventieth. (Harrisburg: J. M. G. Lescure, 1846), vol. 1, January 30, 1846, 120;
Argument of Charles B. Penrose, Esq., Before the Judicial Committee of the Senate, Relative to the
Restitution of Confiscated Property of James Rankin (Philadelphia: William Y. Owen, 1851); “James
Rankin,” Legislators in Pennsylvania, vol. 3, 1154; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, vol. 2, 210. Sabine
gives the year as 1852.
83

For the case in the lower house, see Pennsylvania Legislative Record, 1879 footnotes in Young, “The
Treatment of the Loyalists in Pennsylvania,” 318. For the senate decision, Journal of the Senate of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the Session Begun at Harrisburg, on the 7 th Day of January, 1879
(Harrisburg: Lane S. Hart, 1879), 627, 933, 1154, 1180-81.

222

such as farming, milling and land development, they were more ordinary than elite. The
brothers’ repudiation of parliamentary interference initially tempered their view of royal
aims and led instead to resistance. As William’s militia service reveals, that resistance
could even involve armed opposition. Their attitude changed slowly as the Revolution
radicalized. When forced to choose allegiance to king and empire or self-rule, the
threesome tied their fortunes to the mother country. The way the brothers interpreted the
imperial linkage inextricably tied their success to a dependence on British support,
ratified by the fact that James took no action until Howe’s army had disembarked on the
Chesapeake Bay. William was similarly unwilling to follow through on his military
intrigues without British collaboration and reinforcements. That self-imposed reliance
inhibited their ability to operate effectually in a fluid environment. When failure became
manifest, they fled.
The departure of militant loyalists like the Rankins in the middle corridor reduced
the numbers of those willing to fight for the colonial order during the war, but paved the
way for a smoother reintegration process. The absence of these former leading lights of
York County and their like-minded compatriots during the critical postwar years allowed
for development in the region of a more tolerant view of former “tories” that contributed
to the repeal of the test acts, precisely because their militancy no longer posed a threat.
By the 1790s, loyalism and disaffection had become an after-thought under the stability
conferred by the moderate-led state and national institutions that arose from the federal
constitution of 1787 and the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 rescinding the radical
Constitution of 1776. Despite a transformation of the political climate, the Rankin
brothers did not return or personally reintegrate, although John may have reconnoitered
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that possibility during his visit in the mid-eighties. Yet their descendants reassimilated to
such a degree that they erased the specter of loyalism from family lore a century later and
solicited damages from the state legislature for Pennsylvania’s alleged mistreatment of
their forefathers. Ironically, then, Rankin reintegration succeeded without the presence of
the protagonists who originated the need for reintegration in the first place.
LOYALIST MILITANCY IN AND AROUND PHILADELPHIA
Any variation of Great Britain’s strategy for putting down the colonial rebellion
recognized the need to defeat or disarticulate the Continental Army under the leadership
of General George Washington and his subordinates. The insurrection would continue as
long as Americans demonstrated the capability to organize militarily and put armed men
in the field.84 After 1778, the army and navy of Catholic France joined the Americans in
the battle, as did Spain the next year in a less straightforward manner. The intervention of
France in particular proved pivotal.85 Still, the Continental Army, funded via Congress,
was the key. The prime counter to Washington’s forces was the British army. In addition
to the fabled redcoats, Hessian conscripts formed an integral part of the imperial war
effort. Indigenous allies likewise made important contributions on behalf of the king,
especially along the frontier. America’s loyalists comprised the final link in the British
chain of suppressive deterrents. Of all the departures in different regions and at varying
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junctures during the war in Pennsylvania, the June 1778 exodus of the ordinary loyalist
militants who filled the ranks of the provincial regiments recruited at Philadelphia during
the British occupation was without doubt the most devastating to Great Britain’s chances
for victory. Their definitive retreat removed from the Pennsylvania theater of war the
overwhelming majority of those colonials willing to bear arms for the king in actual
practice as opposed to the hypothetical or botched intrigues of William Rankin and John
Connolly. Though its impact was not entirely clear at the moment, their withdrawal
doomed loyalism in the state as English commanders dispatched recruits to fight
elsewhere. Then again, the departure of these armed loyalist militants greatly lessened
any possibility of an uprising on behalf of the monarchy afterwards, by definition
opening the door for a smoother passage towards reintegration in Pennsylvania. The fact
that few of these militants later returned or visited also contributed to the less threatening
political environment which ultimately resulted in the full legal reintegration of the
disaffected.
Loyalist militants joined provincial regiments in almost all the colonies, fighting
in over 150 units raised by the British over eight-plus years of war.86 In Pennsylvania, the
main military engagements of the Revolution occurred in September 1777 at Brandywine
and in October at Germantown, where redcoats and Hessians faced off against the
Continental army. Loyalists formed only a minor contingent of British forces in these
engagements, just as state militias comprised marginal slices of Washington’s assets on
the opposing side. Most notable were the Queen’s American Rangers, the most adept
partisan regiment accompanying the royal army during the campaign for Philadelphia
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that autumn which included some Pennsylvanians.87 Once Howe occupied the provincial
capital, however, the British launched an energetic appeal to enroll locals to the king’s
cause. Recruitment led to the formation of William Allen Jr.’s Pennsylvania Loyalists
and Alfred Clifton’s Roman Catholic Volunteers in October of 1777, the Philadelphia
Light Dragoons commissioned in November, and the Bucks County Volunteers and
Bucks County Light Dragoons authorized in the spring of 1778.88
Pennsylvania’s collective impact on loyalist strength was greater than that,
however. While occupying Philadelphia, the British raised regiments bearing the names
of other colonies which incorporated many Pennsylvanians. Most prominent among these
were the Maryland Loyalists in November 1777 and the West Jersey Volunteers recruited
in January 1778. The New Hampshire Volunteers drew from recruitment pools from both
Philadelphia and New York in 1777, and the Caledonian Volunteers also pulled from
those two sources in 1778. Pennsylvanians likewise fed the ranks of regiments such as
the Guides and Pioneers, the Maryland Royal Retaliators, and the First and Second
Battalions of the Royal Highland Emigrants. In addition, prominent loyalists with ties to
Pennsylvania played roles of varying significance with other regiments. Captain James
Forrest formed the Loyal Irish Volunteers in Boston in December of 1775 when the city
was still under the control of General Thomas Gage. He was captured at sea in 1776, after
the British evacuation there, and underwent protracted incarceration at Philadelphia.89 On
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the frontier, we have seen how John Connolly recruited the royally faithful in both
Cumberland County in 1775 and Virginia in 1781 and how Northumberland County
loyalist refugees filled the ranks of Butler’s Rangers at Niagara.90
Despite Joseph Galloway’s later protestations before Parliament that the British
bungled loyalist enlistments at Philadelphia by assigning the task to “the most unpopular
men to recruit” like William Allen Jr., Sir William Howe made loyalist deployment a
priority during the occupation. Between November 1777 and January 1778, Richard
Hovenden of Bucks County and Jacob James of Chester County marshaled militants
under Howe’s direction for the Philadelphia Light Dragoons.91 Each was captain of his
own independent troop of cavalry, conducting repeated incursions into patriot territory
beyond Philadelphia to secure supplies and open roads for local farmers who wished to
bring their products to market in the city. That substantial numbers of agrarians preferred
to sell to British occupiers in specie rather than to Americans for continental or provincial
paper reveals not only self-interest, but the depth of indifference or antirevolutionary
sentiment in southeastern Pennsylvania at the time.92 Hovenden was especially renowned
for collecting large quantities of clothing for the army, while James garnered a reputation
for “kidnapping Whigs of note in the Philadelphia vicinity” and stealing horses for
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Howe’s army. George Washington wrote to Pennsylvania President Thomas Wharton Jr.
from Valley Forge in the winter of 1778, stressing that “the insolence of the disaffected in
Philadelphia and Bucks Counties had arisen to a very alarming Height. They have seized
and carried off a number of respectable inhabitants of those Counties, and such officers
of the Army as fell in their way.” Days before the British evacuation, General John Lacey
– charged with defending the patriot perimeter around the occupied city and preventing
supplies from reaching the capital – wrote from Bucks County to state vice-president
George Bryan, informing him that “this Country is left intirely [sic] open to the insults
and ravages of the Tories and Vagabonds from the Enemy… Parties of these Malignant
Villains Comes into Makefield, Newtown & Northampton Townships, and Steals [sic] all
the good Horses they Can find and takes them to Philadelphia.”93
Like many other loyalists, Jacob James at least tacitly aided the patriot cause early
on. As an innkeeper in 1776, the Pennsylvania Council of Safety ordered repayment to
“Jacob James [of] £2 9 6, for dieting Capt. Allbright’s Company of Col. Miles’ Batt’n.”
But James later turned his back on the revolutionaries and “Tho Oath was twice tendered
to him but he refused to take it.”94 He joined General Howe the day after the battle of
Brandywine and served as a guide and recruiter of guides for the British army. The Light
Dragoons participated in the notorious battle of Crooked Billet on May 4, 1778 earning
the wrath of contemporaries and historians alike as “refugee scoundrels” for bayoneting
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patriot prisoners. Both Hovenden and James were attainted four days later in the first
Supreme Executive Council attainder proclamation after the initial March 6th act of the
General Assembly.95
The pair evacuated to New York with Clinton’s army in June of 1778 and two
months later their units were integrated into the British Legion. The British command
reassigned Jacob James with his unit to the southern campaign, where North Carolina
patriots took him prisoner in April, 1780. Upon receiving word of James’ capture, Joseph
Reed, radical president of the Supreme Executive Council, asked the North Carolina
governor that the “distinguished Partizan” not be exchanged as a prisoner but rather held
until he could be extradited back to Pennsylvania to stand trial and “suffer the
Punishment his many Villainies & offences so justly deserve.” Apparently the request
was not fulfilled, for James was eventually released on parole. Then in January of 1781, a
patriot privateer captured James, eleven of his men, and their horses on a sea voyage
from New York to Savannah. The rebels slit the horses’ throats, paroled his men, kept
James as prisoner, and let the sloop transporting them continue the journey. Presumably
James was exchanged, for he later surrendered at Yorktown with Cornwallis on October
19, 1781. After the war, he went to Canada. James makes no mention of the above
incidents in his 1783 claim for compensation, declaring instead that he “continued to
serve until 24th Oct. 1783 when he with his Corps disbanded.” The exiled ex-innkeeper
left a wife and five children behind in Pennsylvania and his property was seized. By
1785, his wife was dead and the children were “living among his Enemies without care or
education, or taught only to execrate their Father’s name as a Traytor [sic] to his Country
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and a deserter of his kindred.” His military commitment earned him a higher percentage
of compensation than most loyalists, receiving £300 sterling out of the £471 claimed. For
his part, Richard Hovenden accompanied the infamous British Lieutenant Colonel
Banastre Tarleton in the cruel Carolina countryside civil war during the southern
campaign which followed the Philadelphia evacuation. He was “laid up with fever and
ague” on December 4, 1780, was at the battle of Cowpens on January 17, 1781, and
surrendered at Yorktown in October of 1781. By December of that year, he had relocated
to Ireland. Curiously, despite his exile in the United Kingdom where word of the Royal
Claims Commission was commonplace, there is no record that he filed a claim for
compensation.96
In addition to William Allen Jr.’s Pennsylvania Loyalists and the Philadelphia
Light Dragoons, other notable loyalist regiments included the Bucks County Volunteers,
the Bucks County Light Dragoons, and the Roman Catholic Volunteers, led respectively
by Captain William Thomas, Captain Thomas Sandford, and Lieutenant Colonel Alfred
Clifton. A farmer from Northampton County, rebels arrested William Thomas and six
others “suspected of being Tories,” confining them at the Reading jail months before the
British invasion. Thomas must have escaped or obtained his release because he fled to the
British lines at Philadelphia and assembled a true volunteer company without pay or
official uniforms in the spring of 1778. By the June evacuation, his unit consisted of
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eighty men. Thomas was attainted on May 8, 1778 and his personal and real property
later confiscated and sold. At the peace, he settled in Digby, Nova Scotia. One of his
claim witnesses believed Thomas was illiterate, even though he had achieved the rank of
captain. In Arthur Mekeel’s study on the Quakers, there is a William Thomas that was
disowned by the Philadelphia Monthly Meeting, quite possibly the Bucks County
Volunteer captain.97
Thomas Sandford recruited his dragoons in the fall of 1777 but fell captive
afterwards. Scharf and Westcott place his capture in a mid-June 1778 action as the
patriots retook Philadelphia, but a muster of his loyalist unit covering December 1777 to
April 1778 already listed him as “Prisoner with the Rebbels [sic],” his troops under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel Watson. Given no overlap in dates, it is possible both
incidents occurred. From mid-June 1778 until his parole in November, Sandford
remained a prisoner in the patriot jail at Easton, Pennsylvania. After his release, he was
paroled to patriot-reoccupied Philadelphia where, on November 10, he visited Grace
Growden Galloway in the company of the latter’s friends, Mrs. Craig and Pegg Johns,
after her husband and daughter had evacuated with the British army that June. Of Captain
“Sansford,” she found that “the rebels Used him very cruelly” and that he was “a clever
young Man.” Sandford returned six days later to “Tea in ye evening,” this time in the
company of Benjamin, Sally and Peggy Chew. A Bucks County Light Dragoons muster
roll still listed him as a prisoner on parole as of June 25, 1779. He must have been
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exchanged shortly thereafter because in January of 1780 Sandford was captured at sea
while en route to Savannah from New York, like Jacob James a year earlier. Transferred
to a prison in Massachusetts, he escaped from Concord jail on September 3 with two
companions. Finding his way back into service, Sandford was ordered to take charge of
the rank and file remnants of the British Legion at Charleston from June 25, 1781 to
February 23, 1782. Despite his military track record and imprisonment, Thomas Sandford
was never attainted. Like Richard Hovenden, he did not make a compensation claim.98
The British Empire discriminated against Roman Catholics for historical and
religious reasons dating back to Henry VIII, the Spanish Armada of 1588, the Glorious
Revolution in the seventeenth century, and the longstanding religious conflict over
Ireland. As Reverend Thomas Phelan has noted about pre-revolutionary conditions in
North America, “Catholics were deprived of civil and religious rights in all the colonies
except Pennsylvania.”99 Contemporary English law prohibited Catholics from holding a
military commission. Hence, Protestant officers normally led imperial units containing
large contingents of Catholics. In America, however, this restriction was not always
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applied.100 Alfred Clifton’s Roman Catholic Volunteers therefore offer a glimpse not only
into loyalist militancy but also social conditions in colonial Pennsylvania.
Clifton was a leading member of Philadelphia’s two Catholic parishes, St.
Joseph’s and St. Mary’s. His name appeared on the St. Joseph registry in 1773 and he
was a frequent witness at marriages and baptisms prior to the war. Father Ferdinand
Farmer described Clifton as an “English gentleman of an Irish mother.” His prestige
among his religious peers exceeded his wealth. As one historian has noted, “he does not
appear to be a man of property as no evidence thereof has been found in the Recorder’s
Office.” Nonetheless, when Howe decided to expand his provincial forces during the
occupation, he turned to this “chief” among those of “Roman Catholic persuasion of
whom there were said to be many in Philadelphia, as well as in the Rebel army serving
against their inclinations.” Given the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Clifton was authorized
to “receive and form for service all the well affected that could be obtained.” Catholic
otherness is evident in that the unit was to “consist of Roman Catholicks only [,] on a
presumption that they will prefer serving under an officer to whom they are naturally
attached.”101
Alfred Clifton’s recruitment effort was highly successful, managing to raise about
three hundred officers and men. Militarily, however, they were a bust. Unlike other loyal
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regiments, the unit never participated in a major engagement during the occupation and
was continually plagued by disciplinary problems, including a notable clash between
officers on parade. Clifton led his troops out of Philadelphia at the June 1778 evacuation
and they did fight at the battle of Monmouth under General Knyphausen. More typically,
however, Captain Martin McEvoy of the Roman Catholic Volunteers was court martialed
in September of 1778 for “behaving indecently on the Parade” and “plundering the
Jerseys in taking a Horse, and Cow.” In the former instance, two officers witnessed
McEvoy kick a fellow officer, a charge the accused not only acknowledged but justified
as “being provoked by some abusive language of Captain McKinnon.” The Roman
Catholic Volunteers did not last much beyond this incident. Clifton himself retired from
military service in British-occupied New York on October 25, 1778, and his unit was
amalgamated into the Volunteers of Ireland. Alfred Clifton never returned to
Philadelphia, expiring in Manhattan on June 16, 1780, at “age 75 years, a Stranger,
buried in Trinity Church yard, died of decay.”102
Richard Hovenden, Jacob James, William Thomas, Thomas Sandford, and Alfred
Clifton personify the middle echelons of loyalist armed militancy. They came from the
southeast core of Bucks, Chester, Northampton and Philadelphia counties, exercised
commonplace occupations such as farmer and innkeeper, and belonged to faiths as
dissimilar as Quakerism and Catholicism. At least one was probably illiterate. Though
commissioned as officers, they were quite ordinary in the social sense of the term. Even
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Clifton, reputed to be a “gentleman,” lacked the financial wherewithal to fulfill that
lifestyle. Two factors indelibly bound these men together. They all fought proactively for
the king and they all abandoned their homes in Pennsylvania, never to return. As integral
components of British arms in America, reintegration did not prove to be a viable option
for any of them either at the evacuation or the peace.
Leaders need followers. The mass of militants who joined loyal provincial
regiments to engage the rebels were unexceptional everyday men from the middling and
lower sorts with no claim to superior status, connections or landed wealth. A glance at
muster rolls of some of these units gives an indication of their hierarchical composition.
The muster roll of William Allen Jr.’s Pennsylvania Loyalists on July 11, 1778, shows
that Captain Kearney’s company had nine officers, including the surgeon and chaplain,
six non-commissioned officers with the grade of sergeant or corporal, and 36 men among
the rank and file. On the same day and place, Captain Stephens’ company – also under
Allen – had three officers of rank, five non-commissioned officers, and 31 soldiers. The
muster of Richard Hovenden’s dragoons in the occupied capital on January 10, 1778
counted four officers, five non-commissioned and 35 soldiers from the lower orders. In
February 1778, Jacob James’ unit mustered at Philadelphia three full officers and a like
number of three non-commissioned officers, along with 41 privates.103 A composite of
the four units shows that conventional soldiers comprised about four-fifths of their
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overall strength. Though plentiful, militantly loyal commoners populate the sources
almost as fleeting postscripts when contrasted with provincial notables.
For example, John Howell of Solsbury in Bucks County acted as a guide for both
the British army and loyalist regiments. The Supreme Executive Council attainted him on
June 15, 1778, classifying him as a common laborer, though he later described himself as
a farmer. Howell left with the British army for New York three days after his attainder. In
1783, he repeated the exodus, conveying his wife and children from New York City to
England. His travels were not over, however. His compensation claim to Parliament’s
commission requested funds to travel and start anew in Nova Scotia. Reintegration in
Pennsylvania was never on his itinerary, although no legal prohibition prevented him
from using royal compensation to return to his former home.104
Laborer Jacob Holder of Linton in Northampton County was attainted on May 8,
1778. The twenty-year-old had sought British protection in Philadelphia during the
occupation and enlisted in the Bucks County Volunteers despite being raised by pacifist
Moravian parents of German descent. After Holder’s evacuation to New York, the British
high command assimilated his unit into the Queen’s Rangers. Franco-American forces
later captured Jacob Holder at the battle of Yorktown in 1781. At the peace, he settled in
Canada. The royal compensation commissioners rejected his claim, but Canadian
officials granted him land lot number 566 at Parrtown, now St. John, to provide him with
a new beginning. Holder eventually moved to Kingston, New Brunswick. In 1789, he
married Mary Sharp, daughter of a New Jersey loyalist farmer. They had nine children,

104

“A Proclamation: By the Supreme Executive Council of the Common Wealth of Pennsylvania,” June
15, 1778, Colonial Records, vol. 11, 514; Coldham, American Migrations, 466; Palmer, Biographical
Sketches, 406; Sabine, Biographical Sketches, vol. 2, 533.

236

all of whom lived into adulthood. Holder prospered and adapted well to life in New
Brunswick, in the process joining the Anglican faith. He purchased an additional lot of
land in 1795 and during his life “he was able to develop the lot into a productive farm”
which remained in possession of future generations of the family. He died on June 29,
1828, two months before his seventy-first birthday. His success shows how a new life in
exile was often a better option for departed militants of the lower sort than the unknown
challenge of reintegration.105
Artisans and especially farmers made up the lion’s share of the soldiery. Joseph
Paxton was a carpenter from Middletown in Bucks County. Though a minor, he joined
the British when Howe took Philadelphia and served for six years in the army, first in
wagon transport and then in the engineering department. He presumably withdrew with
the army to New York, for he evacuated from there again in 1783. Paxton was attainted
in the last Supreme Executive Council group proclamation of March 20, 1781 and
patriots seized his inherited estate. In the spring of 1782, patriots decided to allocate his
property to the University of Pennsylvania and sent appraisers to value the land. By the
mid-1780s, he was exiled at Halifax, Nova Scotia.106 Similarly, Christopher Curtis was a
Philadelphia cooper who served as a guide for Colonel Robert Rogers and recruited
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soldiers, first for the Queen’s Rangers and then the Bucks County Light Dragoons. He
abandoned his native city for exile in Sorel, Quebec, from where he filed his
compensation claim in 1786.107
Tallow chandler Thomas Badge of Philadelphia used his trade as an excuse to
gather intelligence for the British. Because he offered needed supplies for sale to the
rebel army, he was able to penetrate their encampment and conduct in situ surveillance
for Howe.108 Badge was born in England and raised in Ireland, emigrating to America in
1767. Initially, his allegiance was ambivalent, as evidenced in his three-month service
with the rebels. He bluntly declared in his later compensation claim that he sided with the
royalists because “he thought the British Army would conquer.” Badge served as a guide
for the British invaders on their march from Head of Elk to Philadelphia in the fall of
1777 and was severely wounded by a musket ball in the right arm, rendering further
military service ineffective. He was attainted on May 21, 1778. While seeking exile in
England, his ship was apprehended by a privateer and taken to the French port of Brest
where all his personal property was seized. He eventually found his way to London,
where he filed his loyalty claims. Badge is typical of those born outside of the thirteen
colonies who emigrated to Pennsylvania before the war and never renounced their
allegiance to king and empire.109
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Although militant mechanics were numerous, farmers proliferated far more than
most among militarily committed loyalists. They were often smalltime cultivators like
Samuel Custard Jr., Hugh Pugh and Henry Steininger who owned family-sized farms.
These three were all residents of Northampton County and combatants with William
Thomas’ Bucks County Volunteers. Custard was a typical yeoman with a 200 acre
farmstead, a horse and a cow. Son of a loyal Quaker, patriot intimidation forced him to
abandon his farm and flee early in the Revolution, relegating his impoverished wife and
large family to the care of friends. After his stint with the Volunteers, Custard joined the
Queen’s Rangers and eventually wound up exiled in Sunbury County, New Brunswick.
Parliament’s commissioners rejected his claim.110 Hugh Pugh likewise sought refuge with
the British army in occupied Philadelphia and joined the Bucks County Volunteers for
two years without pay, as customary for that unit. He was classified as a husbandman in
his attainder of May 8, 1778. His 1786 claim stressed the loss of cattle. Like many men of
modest means who served in royal regiments, Pugh sought a mere £88 in compensation
from the claims commissioners. He settled after the war at Digby, Nova Scotia, in close
proximity to his wartime commander, Captain William Thomas.111 The tale repeats itself
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in the case of farmer Henry Steininger, likely of German origin or ancestry, who bolted to
the British at Philadelphia in early 1778 and joined the Bucks County Volunteers, serving
three years. Steininger had the dubious distinction of being attainted twice, one of only
six such individuals in Pennsylvania. His two attainders came in 1779 and 1780, quite
late after the evacuation for a militant. Although the patriot government did not explain
why Steininger was twice attainted, duplication and delay suggest legal uncertainties in
the confiscation of his property. Radical patriots seized his lands and sold them in 1782
and 1784 as per attainder penalties. Steininger too eventually put down postwar roots in
Digby, Nova Scotia.112
Enlistment in the king’s provincial regiments was surely a promising prospect
when Howe’s call for “All Intrepid Able-Bodied Heroes Who are willing to serve His
Majesty King George the Third” first went out in the early winter of 1777 from occupied
Philadelphia. Despite a recent setback at Saratoga, the likelihood of British victory
seemed irrefutable. For many of the lower sorts who had little or nothing, then, the
enticement of a five-dollar bounty, arms, clothing, provisions and fifty acres of land at
war’s end made perfect sense. John Howell and Joseph Paxton came in from Bucks
County. Jacob Holder made the trek from Northampton County. Local Philadelphian
Christopher Curtis followed suit.113 Other factors prompted the likes of Thomas Badge,
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Samuel Custard Jr. and Hugh Pugh who owned some assets. For Badge the Briton, it
seems to have been national origin and opportunism. Custard and Pugh responded to
rebel persecution, suggesting political provocation. Nevertheless, the trajectories of the
lesser loyalists depicted here demonstrate that official enrollment in the king’s army
initially led to a post-evacuation military deployment away from home, followed by
permanent exile. Most ordinary loyalists who took up arms against the Revolution never
saw their native soil again after the fighting stopped. Their dispersion removed from the
Pennsylvania scene the overwhelming majority of those colonials actually willing to bear
arms for the king, as opposed to the illusory schemes of the likes of William Rankin or
John Connolly. Although not entirely clear at the time, their withdrawal doomed loyalism
in the state. Militant departures greatly reduced the possibility of armed uprisings on
behalf of monarchy and opened the door for a smoother passage towards reintegration in
Pennsylvania. The fact that few of them later returned or visited also contributed to the
less threatening political climate which ultimately resulted in the full legal reintegration
of the disaffected who stayed.
CONCLUSION
Revolutionary conflict offered many gradations for expressing a commitment to
Great Britain. One was clear-cut and unambiguous. From the standpoint of the victors,
bearing arms against those aligned with the cause of independence carried a stigma far
greater than any other anti-patriot activity. Most who bore arms for the king came from
the lower sorts. On the province’s outer fringes, pre-war territorial conflicts among lesser
agrarians fused into an especially vicious patriot-loyalist divide. Given the trajectory of
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the war, it is no surprise that many – if not most – of those ordinary folks who took to the
field under the loyalist banner on the frontier, in the countryside, and at Philadelphia and
its environs decided to abandon their homes and depart for the insecurity of exile. Few of
these ever returned. Yet active loyalism in Pennsylvania conceivably could have survived
the departure of both the royal army and Philadelphia’s elite colonial leadership, at least
provisionally, if the British high command had formulated plans to open a new battlefront
for those willing to stay and continue to bear arms beyond the reach of revolutionary
forces or if these combatants had organized on their own. But loyalist operational
independence never formed part of the strategic paradigm for either the British or the
great body of Pennsylvania loyalists themselves. As Joseph Galloway’s ongoing analyses
exposed, explicit British support was deemed a precondition for military or political
action, inadvertently ceding the initiative to the rebels.114
In practical terms, King George III’s renunciation of any and all claims to the
rebellious colonies in the Definitive Treaty of Peace left his surviving supporters in
America with two options: adapt to the new republican order or go elsewhere. In
Pennsylvania, His Majesty’s advocates had already faced this grueling choice at the
British evacuation of Philadelphia in 1778. Loyalist militants in particular did not weigh
their choices in a vacuum at either juncture. Wartime behavior was especially critical in
making the determination for or against reintegration. Militants juxtaposed their actions
114

Loyalist frustration with British inaction in the mid-Atlantic colonies reached a crescendo in occupied
New York in 1780 when William Franklin and nine other prominent loyalists formed the Board of
Associated Loyalists with Lord Germain’s formal approval from London. The British ministry hoped this
organization could operate autonomously within overall imperial objectives. Opposed to such a measure
but required to comply with the ministry’s orders, Commander-in-chief Henry Clinton placed them directly
under military command and made sure nothing was done without his permission, thereby frustrating the
operational independence the group sought. For the Board of Associated Loyalists, see Ruma Chopra,
Unnatural Rebellion, 170-174, 194-197.

242

to the prospects for redemption that triumphant rebels offered. Legal status played a
critical role, for patriots made a point of targeting those who bore arms against the
rebellion in the treason, attainder, and confiscation statutes. Loyalist militants also paid a
great deal of attention to the revolutionary faction exercising power. Fear of radical
retribution under the leadership of council vice-president George Bryan and assembly
speaker John Bayard at the 1778 evacuation motivated from three to five thousand
loyalists to flee with General Clinton’s forces.115
While no numbers are available for 1783 during the transition to moderate
political ascendancy under council president John Dickinson, the contemporary debate in
the newspapers – though vigorous – suggests no mass exodus and only isolated incidents
of rebel reprisal. The evidence analyzed in this and the preceding chapter thus reveals
that the evacuation of 1778 was the single most significant factor in nullifying loyalist
commitment in Pennsylvania. The sizeable number of militant departures put control of
the state in the hands of radical revolutionaries, leaving only a few willing to stick their
necks out to fight for the imperial order. The colossal decline in pro-imperial militancy
for the most part removed armed conflict as a menace from daily life in the settled areas
of the province. After the close of the revolutionary struggle in 1783, nowhere in the state
did threats from large numbers of “tories” brandishing weapons against republican rule
persist. This departure of the ordinary militants who formed the core of the king’s support
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reduced tensions and established a more tolerant political climate, permitting successful
reintegration of the ex-disaffected who did stay and try to adapt. To them we now turn.

244

CHAPTER 4
REFUSING THE OATH: REINTEGRATION & THE QUAKER PACIFISTS
While most loyalist militants chose to depart and face the prospect of a new life
elsewhere, a substantial number of those who did not bear arms against the movement for
independence but were nonetheless dissatisfied with patriot rule opted to remain through
the trials and tribulations of the early rebellion, the British occupation and evacuation, the
later war years, and the aftermath of the peace. These Pennsylvanians are best understood
as disaffected rather than loyalist. They included religious pacifists, neutralists, selfinterested opportunists, pragmatists convinced that England would emerge victorious,
doubters of the direction, righteousness or legality of independence, apolitical provincials
immersed in their own daily affairs, and people fearful of social disorder or terrified by
the savagery of war who wanted nothing else than to be left alone. Despite a diversity of
motives, revolutionaries viewed them all with suspicion, frequently with disdain, and
sometimes as outright traitors. In the radical Constitutionalist view that dominated the
patriot movement into the late 1770s, there was no room for the hesitant or the unsure.
Everyone not unambiguously for the insurgency was judged to be against it. Radicals
accordingly configured the law under the auspices of the state Constitution of 1776 to
reflect that interpretation.1
Many disaffected-only Pennsylvanians no doubt preferred an orderly colonial
government under the king to a more chaotic republican regime subject to popular rule.
The depth of their commitment to that preference, however, was at best subdued. Unlike
1
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the militantly loyal, the merely disaffected were tentative – often silent – in articulating
their position publicly in the face of radical opposition. Their disaffection was more about
reacting to the political, economic and social transformation taking place around them
than any proactive defense of monarchy – more against change than for preservation of
the old order. 2 Although motives varied, a series of core issues can be identified that
summarize the disaffection of most of the less militant. In general, they were against
popular sovereignty, warily considered the reign of “the rabble.” They opposed loyalty
tests, restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly, compulsory militia service,
war-related taxation and fines, appropriation of foodstuffs, animals or goods for military
defense, property confiscations, constraints on commerce, and the mandatory use of
continental currency as legal tender, all the while holding a profound distrust for the
revolutionary authorities who repeatedly fashioned, ordered and enforced these nefarious
measures. Significantly, most espoused a common sentiment that Pennsylvania was their
legitimate home – in many cases the only home they had ever known. Some also believed
in the inevitability of British victory. Since royal arms would one day win the war and
restore the prior regime, these disaffected residents only had to wait out events, thus
engendering a mentalité of patience and forbearance rather than activism in the face of
real or latent radical antagonism. And so they stayed.
The marginalized residents who chose to withstand rebel intransigence rather than
abandon their native soil constitute the heart and soul of the Pennsylvania reintegration
saga. Patriot anti-disaffection legal measures, especially the Test Act, played a central
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role in their experience. In the dozen or so years following the loyalist exodus of 1778,
the disaffected who stayed legally evolved into disenfranchised nonjurors – that is,
people denied their rights as citizens for refusing to swear allegiance to the revolutionary
state. Treatment of the disaffected/nonjurors drew deep political cleavages among patriot
factions, with radical Constitutionalists opposing and moderate Anti-Constitutionalists or
Republicans favoring their reincorporation into society. We have seen how these blocs
configured and applied the law to further their respective exclusionary or inclusionary
goals. Beyond patriot actions, however, the disaffected themselves furnished critical
pieces of the reintegration puzzle.
Among the disaffected non-militants who stayed in Pennsylvania, reform-minded
pacifist Quakers afford us the most comprehensive picture of the intricacies of
reintegration because of their principled dogmatism in the face of radical hostility. This
antipathy developed well before the colonial insurrection. Much like the Virginia and
Connecticut controversies on Pennsylvania’s frontier, the rivalries and societal visions of
pre-war Quaker and Presbyterian “parties” mutated into disaffected vs. radical discord
during the Revolution. The root of this revolutionary strife lay in the absolute refusal of
pacifist Quakers to aid the rebel war effort or submit to the test oath mandated by patriot
law. The need to support the war ended with the peace of 1783 but the requisite oath
endured. By spurning every opportunity to conform to the state’s demands on allegiance,
Quaker nonjurors played a decisive role in fostering the conditions that allowed
republican legislators to repeal the Test Act. Through their commitment to pacifism,
reformist Friends clearly established that they posed no threat to revolutionary rule,
unlike militant loyalists. After independence, Quakers signaled further that they were
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perfectly willing to embrace the nascent republican order. This non-threatening posture
and the readiness to accept republican sovereignty converged with moderate AntiConstitutionalist electoral triumphs, culminating in the Test Act repeal of 1789 and the
full legal reintegration of the formerly disaffected.
QUAKER PACIFISM, RELIGIOUS REFORM & THE PEMBERTON BROTHERS
The Quaker admixture of pacifism plus the determination to stay in Pennsylvania
was diametrically juxtaposed to loyalist militancy, with its predisposition to bear arms
and abandon the province when martial endeavors did not accomplish their ends. Since
most pacifist Friends chose to remain and face an uncertain future, they provide an ideal
model for an in-depth analysis of non-militant disaffection and reintegration.3 Pacifists
censured the struggle for independence not necessarily because they disagreed with the
goals of the Revolution – though most likely did – but because they believed violence
and war were inherently evil and contrary to the principles espoused in their particular
interpretations of Christianity.4 Beyond this passivity, however, three other issues
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nurtured a seemingly unavoidable clash between pacifism and revolution. The first
concerned willful rejection of the payment of taxes and fines levied for direct or indirect
promotion of the war. This conviction brought pacifists into conflict with the patriot
authorities responsible for collecting fines for refusal of militia service. A second
scriptural imperative prohibited the taking of oaths of any sort. Such a stance violated the
patriot Test Act obligating citizens to take an oath of allegiance to the state of
Pennsylvania.5 Finally, Quakers believed government was the work of divine revelation:
the jurisdiction of God, not humankind. In their view, established government had the
blessing of the Creator. Mere human beings had no right to meddle with what Providence
had designed, which naturally forbade partaking in any enterprise calculated to dissolve
existing authority.6 Together, these four tenets rendered adherents to pacifism antithetical
to the broader republican crusade, relegating them in patriot eyes to the ranks of the
tories, the inimical, and the obnoxious – all contemporary terms for disaffection.
Reformist Quakers were the most conspicuous of Pennsylvania’s pacifists. As the
revolutionary crisis opened in the mid-1760s, Quakers comprised about one-third of the
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colony.7 Members of the Society of Friends resided mainly in the city of Philadelphia
proper and the rural counties in the southeast which formed the backbone of European
settlement. The structure of colonial government responded to this demographic and
historical reality. William Penn and his Quaker followers had founded the colony under a
1681 charter from King Charles II, initially controlled all branches of government into
the early 1700s, and continuously dominated the provincial assembly for decades.8 By
any measure, they were a major political force with which to be reckoned. During the
Revolution, an unyielding commitment to pacifism forced reformist Quakers to wrestle
with a distinctive set of disaffection issues that greatly contributed to shaping the overall
process of reintegration.
Key figures among Pennsylvania’s Quaker leadership provide a template for a
comprehensive analysis of the disaffected who stayed. The sect’s internal dynamic played
an instrumental role in determining the composition of that leadership. Quakers in the
revolutionary era can be divided into at least four groups. First and foremost were those
who led and obeyed the precepts of the spiritual renewal that began in Pennsylvania prior
to the outbreak of the French and Indian War. These reformers claimed divine inspiration
and urged followers to return to the more steadfast and pious discipline of their English
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forefathers. Central to reform was an unconditional commitment to pacifism.9 More
worldly Quakers prone to material affluence and the continuation of Quaker political
dominance in the colony’s affairs, who otherwise tried to respect reform-sanctioned
religious and disciplinary ways, comprised a second group. The third cohort consisted of
disowned Quakers who maintained a cultural affiliation with the sect but did not abide by
the stricter religious and behavioral requirements of reformers. A fourth set considered
themselves patriots, rejected pacifism altogether, and actively supported the colonial
rebellion. They evolved into the Free Quakers.
In terms of religious and cultural identity, reformers stood at the center of the
faith as adjudicators of Quaker orthodoxy. In Pennsylvania, they controlled the Monthly,
Quarterly, and Yearly Meetings in the principal Quaker jurisdictions, the Meeting for
Sufferings which decided how to approach the persecution emanating from revolutionary
conflict, the Women’s Meetings, and the Yearly Meeting for Elders and Ministers of the
Yearly Meeting. Crucially, reformers had the final word on who was to be allowed to
remain within the congregation and who was to be disowned.10 Control of religious
institutions like the Society’s seasonal Meetings greatly elevated the standing of
reformers. Significantly, the overwhelming majority of those who identified as Friends
acknowledged the reformers as final arbiters of all things Quaker.
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The lines separating the other three groups blurred and sometimes overlapped. For
example, the critical disownment penalty could be equally applied to the materially and
politically prominent, as well as those culturally Quaker or the combative Free Quakers.
Distinctions lay in the reasons for disownment. Over the years, reformers gave Friends
who pursued political and economic power a great deal of leeway to allow them to arrive
at their own realization that their priorities were askew and needed rectification. In many
cases, this approach succeeded, integrating those worldly astray back into the fold –
although disownment could eventually apply in cases of continued noncompliance. Those
whose prime affiliation to the sect was cultural rather than religious often fell victim to
disownment for behavioral breaches such as marrying outside the faith, inattendance at
Meeting and breaking the Sabbath, or moral problems such as profanity, rowdiness,
inebriation, gambling, sexual misconduct or loose business ethics. Free Quakers came
into direct conflict with the denomination’s increased pacifism by contravening the core
call to nonviolence and reformers unabashedly disowned them for partaking in the war.
Individual Quakers’ positions were not stagnant: as followers of the Society
evolved in their devotions, their personal lives, or their response to the Revolution, they
could move from one group to another. Jack Marietta’s comprehensive study of the
eighteenth-century Quaker reform movement tabulated disownment cases in four major
delinquency categories: marriage, sectarian (which included violations of pacifist
conduct), sexual, and delinquency with victims.11 The overwhelming majority of
infractions had to do with behavioral norms. Only 539 of about 13,000 disownments
11
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during the age of reform concerned military activity or subscribing to the patriot oath of
allegiance, a rate of 4.1%. In another detailed study, Arthur Mekeel unearthed 906 warrelated disownments in Pennsylvania for military activism, assisting the war effort,
paying fines and taxes, taking the test oath, and holding public office.12 Whether warrelated or not, it was reformers who set the bar for Quaker propriety, decided
disownments, and controlled the faith’s pivotal institutions in Pennsylvania. For all
intents and purposes, the religion was theirs, a fact Quaker leadership in England fully
recognized.13
These internal nuances were not always evident to outsiders. Given the Society’s
insularity, patriots often conflated disowned Quakers or those in the public eye with the
reformers who emphasized withdrawal from all involvement in government and a strict
adherence to pacifism, leading to charges of hypocrisy. Typical examples are in Lutheran
minister Henry Melchior Muhlenberg’s journal, peppered with derisive anti-Quaker
remarks. In 1764, he criticized “these pious sheep, who had had such a tender conscience
during the long Spanish, French, and Indian War, and would have rather died than lift a
hand for defense against the most dangerous enemies.” As the patriot militia mobilized a
dozen years later, he scoffed at “the inhabitants who make a matter of conscience… and
12
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meanwhile raised the price of all necessities and amassed money for their tender
consciences.”14 The misconstruction of reformist ends came to a head as General Howe
and his invading redcoats marched towards Philadelphia in 1777. Radical revolutionaries
reacted to this existential threat with a series of arrests and banishment, targeting those
perceived as potential enemy collaborators. Renowned Philadelphia Friends headed the
list. These deportees became known as the Virginia exiles. Rebels allowed their return
about seven weeks before the British evacuated, whereupon most of the banished chose
to remain in Philadelphia rather than depart. Their ensuing decade-plus journey through
the political landscape presents a guide to the Quakers who stayed and successfully
reintegrated on the basis of non-threatening behavior and acceptance of the postwar
republican order.
Most conspicuous among the original reformers and later Virginia exiles were
Israel, James, and John Pemberton. By the time of the Revolution, Israel had earned the
nickname “King of the Quakers” because of “his extensive undertakings and influence,
and his vigorous, assertive manner.”15 As torchbearers of the Quaker community, the
brothers played a major role in the deportation drama that unfolded from the late summer
of 1777 through the spring of the following year. Their stature, commitment to pacifism
and reform, return from forced exile, and decision to stay in Philadelphia thrust them into
the unwelcome turmoil of revolutionary and postwar politics. Unlike the militant loyalists
who fled at the British evacuation of June 1778, all three Pembertons deliberately chose
14
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reintegration over departure. Philadelphia was their home, and their home it would
remain. Although the brothers’ reintegrative paths diverged over time – the design of
both choice and fate – their long-term commitment to pacifist principles and reform
contributed notably to alleviating political tensions in the postwar era and creating a
climate conducive to the legal reassimilation of nonjurors.
The siblings had deep roots in Pennsylvania. They were grandsons of Phineas
Pemberton, one of the original Quaker pioneers who embarked on William Penn’s Holy
Experiment. Their father, Israel Pemberton Sr., was among the first colonial offspring of
English Quaker stock, born in Bucks County on the outskirts of Philadelphia in 1684,
only two years after the settlement’s founding. Israel Sr. went on to a prosperous life as a
merchant, accruing land and wealth, serving in the colonial assembly, and exercising the
faith until his death in 1754. Along the way, he married Rachel Read, who gave birth to
ten children. Not all survived into adulthood like the three brothers. Israel Jr. arrived in
1715, James in 1723, and John in 1727. Mother Rachel died in February 1765, a month
before passage of the Stamp Act inaugurated the imperial crisis.16 By the time hostilities
broke out at Lexington and Concord in April 1775, the Pemberton brothers were at the
apex of their influence: Israel was 59, James 51, and John 47.
Raised in strict adherence to Quaker doctrines, the Pembertons received “a
careful, guarded education while young,” including instruction at the Friends’ school.17

16

Thayer, King of the Quakers, 3-5; “Brief Memoirs of the Life of John Pemberton, intended as an
Introduction to a Journal of some parts of his Life and Travels,” Friends Miscellany, vol. 8, no. 2 (First
Month, 1836), 49 (hereafter John Pemberton Journal); “Memoirs of James Pemberton,” Friends
Miscellany, vol. 7, no. 2 (First Month, 1835), 52 (hereafter Memoirs of James Pemberton).
17

John Pemberton Journal, 49; John F. Watson, Annals of Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, in the Olden
Time; Being a collection of Memoirs, Anecdote, and Incidents of the City and Inhabitants and of the

255

Israel was more aggressive than his even-tempered father but “kind and generous”
nonetheless. In 1737, he married Sarah Kirkbride. The union produced eight children.
Sarah died around the year 1747, at which point Israel married twice-widowed 43-yearold Mary Stanbury Hill Jordan, with whom he had one more child. Of the nine total
offspring, six lived to maturity.18 James was studious and “distinguished for diligence,
integrity, and benevolence” from his youth. His mother noted in him a “mildness of
temper and steadiness of conduct.” The editor of his memoirs considered him “humble.”
Because of the uncertain health conditions of the day, the second brother went through
three marriages, engendering seven offspring. In 1751, he married Hannah Lloyd. They
had four daughters and two sons. Hannah died in 1764 before the age of thirty. Four years
later, James married Sarah Smith, who died of childbirth complications in 1770. A half
decade later, he remarried, this time to the widow Phoebe Lewis Morton, who bore no
children.19 John too was noted for his compassion and generosity. Not overly concerned
with worldly matters, he did not marry until the age of thirty-nine. At his wedding to
Hannah Zane in 1766 at the Meeting House on High Street, he ordered provisions sent to
all prisoners then confined in the Philadelphia jail. Unlike his brothers, John never had
occasion to remarry and had no children with Hannah.20 Of this matrimonial collage,
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Mary (with Israel), Phoebe (with James), and Hannah (with John) survived to confront
the revolutionary challenge alongside their respective husbands.
As sons of a prosperous merchant, the brothers received training in commerce
from early on. Since London Quakers dominated North American markets during the
colonial period, it is not surprising that much of the Pemberton trade was tied to England,
where these Philadelphians likewise had deep religious roots. Correspondingly, all three
crossed the ocean to fortify their business connections and religious commitment. Israel
first did so in 1735, James followed in 1748, and John in 1750. These trips reinforced
bonds with the mother country. By the end of the 1740s, Israel Pemberton had made a
fortune as a merchant and transitioned much of his wealth into land, mortgages, notes,
and bonds. In addition, he and his brothers came into “one of the largest fortunes in
Pennsylvania” at their father’s death. Investments and inherited wealth produced a
financial stability that allowed Israel more time for civic affairs and philanthropy. He
toyed with politics briefly – voters elected him to succeed his father in the colonial
assembly in 1750 after the latter’s retirement. But he was surprisingly defeated the
following year and lost the taste for public office.21
Israel’s return to civic activity included membership in the Library Company, the
American Philosophical Society, the Union Fire Company, the establishment of Quaker
and private schools for children, charitable aid to the poor and needy, and coordination of
relief efforts for displaced French Acadian refugees shipped to Philadelphia in 1760. As
founder and manager of the Pennsylvania Hospital, he personally donated £100 for its
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construction. Israel is probably best known today as an early antislavery activist, playing
a leading role as clerk of the 1754 Quaker Yearly Meeting which first took up the issue of
coerced bondage and decreed internal reforms prohibiting Quaker ownership of slaves. In
1775, he helped found the Society for Relief of Free Negroes Unlawfully Held in
Bondage which later evolved into the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, the first
organization of its kind in America.22
James Pemberton was also successful in commerce, continuing steadily in the
merchant trade well into the revolutionary and postwar era. Like Israel, he too engaged in
religious and civic affairs, dedicating much of his life to the “distribution of religious and
instructive books among that class of the community who did not possess the advantages
of a liberal education.” Above all, he committed to service among his fellow Quakers. He
was clerk of the Philadelphia Monthly Meeting from 1756 to 1777, overseer from 1757 to
1760, and an elder from 1759 onward. James also received appointments to the Quarterly
Meeting eleven times between 1760 and 1795. Most importantly, he played a leading role
in the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting and the Yearly Meeting for Sufferings that confronted
revolutionary ire. Other activities included his election as manager of the Pennsylvania
Hospital in 1758, for which he remained a lifelong contributor. Later, he joined his older
brother as a founder of the abolition society. Well into the nineteenth century, James
maintained a reputation for being “devoted to deeds of charity and love.”23
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John Pemberton was smitten by a deep religious fervor during his voyage to
England in the company of Quaker minister John Churchman. On landing at Dover on
May 6, 1750, the “sober, well inclined young man” – as per Churchman – continued with
the preacher on his mission into the English countryside and all but disregarded the
economic aspect of his trip. In a letter to Israel two months later, John noted “how much
longer I shall stay with our said friend, I do not at present know; but have no satisfaction
when I think of leaving him, though I cannot account for the reason.” Not until
September 1753 did the two part ways. By then, John had decided to dedicate his life to
the propagation and consolidation of his deepening faith. This sacred vow never allowed
him to achieve the wealth of his brothers, although his share of the family inheritance
provided relative affluence. John expressed his religious sentiment through personal
contributions to the indigent, spiritual consolation, and application of Quaker disciplinary
norms. The youngest Pemberton often would “go to the shambles” on the spur of the
moment and disburse money to the poor. He also spent a great deal of time visiting the
aged, the afflicted, orphans and widows. John too was present at the 1754 Quaker Yearly
Meeting which first tackled the question of slavery among the faithful. Visibly devout, he
led efforts to uphold Quaker morality. In 1765, Friends charged him with delivering a
remonstrance to Governor John Penn opposing “vain amusements.” As clerk of the
Yearly Meeting three years later, he signed a letter to Quaker youth against “the
ensnaring diversions of the horse-races and stage-plays.” The brothers’ responses to the
Stamp Act in 1765 reflect the value each placed on the material and the spiritual. Israel
and James signed the antiparliamentary nonimportation agreement. John did not.24
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Beyond civic assistance, philanthropy, commerce and other secular activities, the
siblings increasingly devoted their efforts to the purification of Quakerism through the
reform movement. That commitment remained unshakable throughout their lives but
each stressed different aspects of devotion. John dedicated himself entirely to the divine
realm, becoming a renowned preacher and advocate of the Quaker testimony. James
became embroiled in provincial affairs of state during peacetime, responding to a belief
that politics held the key to the preservation of Quaker religious liberties. As the eldest
and wealthiest, Israel continued in the dual role of humanitarian and social activist. The
application of religious principles to local matters, however, often projected the King of
the Quaker’s activism into provincial politics, conflating the spiritual and temporal.
COLONIAL POLITICS, THE IMPERIAL CRISIS & THE EARLY REVOLUTION
The two decades preceding the opening hostilities at Lexington set the conditions,
context and tone for the subsequent Virginia exile, the persecution of pacifists during the
war, and the Quaker reintegration drama in the revolutionary aftermath. Central to this
dynamic was the complex interplay between Quaker religious reform, the Quaker party in
the assembly, the proprietor in England and his provincial supporters, and the arriviste
faction of Philadelphia mechanics and frontier farmers known initially as the Presbyterian
party. During this period, the Pembertons tried to bridge their denomination’s spiritual
reform/temporal politics divide, not always successfully. Given the brothers’ prominence
among Friends, outsiders came to regard them as the quintessential expression of official
Quaker positions and values. It is not possible to understand radicals’ bitter resentment
against Quakers at the dawn of the Revolution, their decision to arrest, banish and
24

John Pemberton to Israel Pemberton, July 30, 1750, The Life and Travels of John Pemberton, 4; ibid., 51;
John Pemberton Journal, 51-52; Scharf & Westcott, History of Philadelphia, 272-273.

260

marginalize pacifists during the war, and the later movement to permanently exclude
nonjuror Friends from participation in republican life without an appreciation of prerevolutionary politics in Pennsylvania. Quaker wartime mistreatment and postwar
reintegration was an extension of pre-war disputes with radicals.
The French and Indian War and the expansion of white settlement on the colony’s
western frontier destroyed the political paradigms which ruled Pennsylvania for about
eighty years, compelling Quakers to examine their pacifist doctrine. The alliance of
France and Indians in the west sought to turn back British-American incursions into
indigenous territory. Pennsylvania’s frontier settlements soon came under attack.25 With
the borderlands aflame, frontier calls for creation of a provincial militia followed. The
crisis created rifts between reform purists and key Quaker delegates in the assembly.
Confronted with the breakdown of colonial peace and a bottom-up clamor for martial
remedies throughout the province, reformers called for a Quaker withdrawal from public
life as the only viable alternative for preserving a true adherence to pacifist principles.
Yet prominent Quakers in the assembly shrank from voluntarily relinquishing power.
The contrasting views of House speaker Isaac Norris and James Pemberton help
explain the divisions within the reform-driven Society of Friends, the Quaker party in the
assembly, and the relationship between the two. Norris chose to adjust his faith to the
government’s need to provide for military defense. James did not.26 Richard Bauman has
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divided Quakers in this era into three categories: reformers, politicians, and politiques.
Reformers stressed obedience to the sect’s peace testimony and discipline. Politicians
were the worldly and often prosperous Quakers who refused to renounce political power.
Politiques tried to function in both worlds simultaneously. According to Bauman, John
Pemberton belonged to the first group, Isaac Norris the second, and both Israel and James
Pemberton the third. In addition, eminent political figures like Joseph Galloway and
Benjamin Franklin led the Quaker party in the assembly against the proprietary bloc but
were not religiously affiliated with the Society. Before the Revolution, these divisions
produced some curious situations among imagined allies. For example, James led a
minority faction within the Quaker party in the assembly against Franklin’s majority that
voted against any legislation violating “traditional Quaker pacifism.” Later in the mid1760s, Israel would publicly defend the proprietors, his historical enemies, in favor of
maintaining Penn’s original charter and opposing the royal government plan, while James
would side with Galloway and Franklin against his brother.27
These positions played out during the opening round of the war against France. In
November 1755, representative James Pemberton voted with six other Quakers against a
£60,000 military appropriation which passed despite their opposition. In March 1756, he
voted to defund the troops raised the year before. For James, the clash between religious
honesty and temporal accommodation revealed that many Friends had capitulated to
temptation. “[T]here is indeed a majority amongst us who show little regard to the
Principles of their Profession,” he wrote to a fellow Quaker in England. His desire to
promote pacifism as an assemblyman proved untenable. In June 1756, James resigned
27
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from the colonial assembly alongside five other conflicted Quaker representatives.28
Their resignation initiated what became a voluntary abdication of Quaker power in
succeeding years that, on the other hand, strengthened the reform movement among the
faithful with the inauguration of a parallel crusade for stricter enforcement of the
discipline’s behavioral norms. Like the mandate to retire from wartime politics, these
reforms met with internal resistance. When members chose not to conform, reformers
granted the disobedient a chance to reconsider their transgressions and make amends. But
failure to comply ultimately resulted in disownment.
The roots of revolutionary discontent with the Quakers can be traced directly to
the reformist rigor of the colonial period. Two interrelated issues drove the developing
antagonism: Quaker policy towards indigenous peoples and the longstanding historical
acrimony between Presbyterians and Friends. William Penn’s peaceful settlement of
Pennsylvania with the cooperation of resident natives was a core component of Quaker
identity. True to their appellation, the Society of Friends regarded Indians as friends. As
an exemplary colonial address signed by Israel Pemberton explained, “they received our
Ancestors with Gladness, relieved their Wants with open Hearts … and for a long Course
of Time gave constant and frequent Proofs of a cordial Friendship.” In contrast to North
American colonies like Massachusetts and Virginia, no major conflicts with indigenous
peoples erupted into war under Pennsylvania Quaker governance. Harmony with natives
was a point of pride among Friends who regarded its preservation as the fulfillment of the
sect’s “testimony” and the founder’s original vision. In a word, peace was sacred.29
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Intersecting this view was a profound Quaker fear of the Calvinists who had
persecuted the Society as far back as the English civil wars of the seventeenth century.
On the American side of the Atlantic, Calvinist Congregationalists in New England had
inflicted similar sufferings on local Quakers there, also in the seventeenth century. Over
time, Presbyterians became the dominant Calvinist sect in Pennsylvania. Although this
factor did not weigh much in the colony’s early history, Presbyterians made up the bulk
of a large Scots-Irish migration during the middle part of the eighteenth century and
changed conditions. Quakers viewed this influx with trepidation as the advent of
intolerance. Since sizeable portions of the newcomers chose to settle on the frontier,
indigenous and sectarian issues soon merged.
The Pembertons’ own observations leading up to the Revolution confirm Quaker
qualms over Presbyterian intentions. As the most politically immersed of the siblings,
James left an abundant trail of evidence. He first became aware of the divide between the
faiths in 1740, at the age of seventeen, when he noticed a mob of “fanatical Presbyterians,
with axes in their hands, going to destroy a Catholic chapel.” A dozen or so Quakers
“exhorted them” to stop and, in this instance, “they dispersed without effecting their
design.”30 In the aftermath of the French war, James drew upon historical antecedents in
communications with fellow Quakers in Britain, referring to “the old envious persecuting
spirit” of the seventeenth century and “the Insolence of Presbyterian Cabals.” By 1768,
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he was censuring “ye rashness of their conduct.” Israel held similar views. When some
colonial legislators asked the Pennsylvania governor to declare war on the Delaware
people in 1756 and approve a bounty for the taking of native scalps, a horrified Israel
blamed “blood-thirsty Presbyterians.”31 This Pembertonian imagery speaks volumes.
Fanatical, envious, rash, insolent, bloodthirsty, and cabals are not the stuff of a
dispassionate lexicon. Since Presbyterians came to dominate radical elements among
rebels in Pennsylvania much like Congregationalists in New England, the terms radical
and Presbyterian conflated idiomatically among Quakers during the revolutionary era.
As frontier and sectarian concerns converged in colonial Pennsylvania, QuakerPresbyterian rancor played out in the domain of Indian relations. Conforming to the
sanctity of their founding commitment, Quakers tried to preserve peace with native
peoples despite the disruptive challenges of imperial war with France. They viewed
Presbyterians as a major obstacle in this endeavor. Quite simply, Friends did not believe
Indians were the problem – Presbyterian frontier settlers were. All the natives needed for
a return to peace was better treatment from frontiersmen. Correspondingly, the three
brothers participated in numerous bids to restore colonial concord with local Indians.
Israel and James led the 1756 effort to create The Friendly Association for Regaining and
Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures – a designation which in itself
encapsulates Quaker views succinctly.32
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The period was rife with peace talks between Indian nations and the Pennsylvania
government. Official colonial delegations sometimes included Quakers, other times not.
In latter instances, unwanted Friends often inserted themselves into the negotiations as
independent advisors anyway, creating further friction with other provincials. The Easton
Treaty peace conference the next year was perhaps the most instructive of Quaker labors
in this regard. Israel, James and John led a delegation of twenty-four Quakers whose
intercession with the chief of the Delawares created the impression among non-Quakers
that the pacifists were acting against the colony’s best interests. Indian trader George
Croghan noted months later that “the Quakers Still Continue to Sett up Teadyuscung [sic]
Against ye Governor.”33 Quaker repute for deceitful engagement persisted through the
French and Indian War, so much so that, when the Paxton rioters amassed in 1764 on the
outskirts of Philadelphia in the wake of Pontiac’s War and penned their “Declaration of
the injured Frontier Inhabitants,” they explicitly condemned “Israel Pemberton (an
ancient leader of that Faction, which for so long a time have found means to enslave the
Province to Indians), together with others of the Friends” for giving the natives “a Rod to
scourge the White People that were settled on the purchased Lands.”34 Thus, frontier
conflict with the Indians exacerbated an already historically deep distrust between
Quakers and Presbyterians.
This mutual suspicion, later aggravated by class tensions and dubious imperial
policies, continued in the lead-up to revolutionary hostility, during the war, and in the
33
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reintegrative aftermath of the peace. Prior to the rebellion, control of the assembly had
guaranteed Quaker security. But by 1775, the provincial balance of power had shifted.
The Society of Friends’ reformist retreat from public life facilitated a Presbyterian-led
radical surge in local politics. When armed revolt against Great Britain finally arrived,
the perception that the Quaker faction had betrayed the interests of the state loomed large.
For their opponents, Friends had demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that they
could not be trusted. After the sect’s pronouncements in the early years of revolution, it
was but a short skip and a jump to presume that Quaker allegiance lay with the British.
The voluntary Quaker descent from power came in spasmodic contractions over
the peaks and valleys of the imperial crisis. The Pembertons led the way. As noted
earlier, Israel and James joined four hundred other merchants – many of whom were
Quakers – in signing the nonimportation agreement against the Stamp Act in October of
1765. From the British perspective, that association was an extralegal and, in effect,
illegal body. The brothers and their coreligionists thus began the crisis on the side of an
unlawful resistance.35 Their worries over imperial overreach were genuine, as Israel’s
later comments revealed. “How unreasonable it is to attempt to govern a people with
severity when gentle methods and constitutional laws would secure their affection &
allegiance in ye most effectual manner,” he wrote in the midst of the tea controversy.36
But disapproval of British colonial policy clashed with a greater fear of lawlessness,
anarchy, and radical supremacy. Crowd actions against the appointed Stamp distributor,

35

Thayer, King of the Quakers, 204; Scharf & Westcott, History of Philadelphia, 272-273; Marietta,
Reformation of American Quakerism, 207.
36

Israel Pemberton to Mildred, January 3, 1774, Cox/Parrish/Wharton Collection, XI in Thayer, King of the
Quakers, 207.

267

John Hughes, turned violent. As Hughes wrote to his associate Benjamin Franklin in
England, “it seems to me that a sort of Frenzy or Madness has got such hold of the People
of all Ranks.” Recognizing danger, he added that “perhaps when a Mob is on foot, my
Life and Interest may fall a Sacrifice to an infatuated Multitude.” James blamed radical
Presbyterians for the riots and threats against Hughes. In letters to Quaker colleagues in
London, he argued that the Calvinists feigned to be “actuated by a spirit of Liberty &
Patriotism” while in reality working towards the “very oppressive & dangerous” day
when they could take over the government. The agitations of the Allen brothers, affiliated
with the proprietor and the Old Light Presbyterians, buttressed his view.37
The ongoing tension between a redress of grievances through legal means and the
bottom-up pressures of illicit crowds and associations led by radicals continued through
the next decade. Along the way, Pennsylvanians witnessed Parliament’s passage and
repeal of the Townsend Acts, a Tea Act, and the Coercive Acts which closed Boston
harbor, united the colonies, and led to the First Continental Congress in 1774. Quaker
marginalization from the resistance, even on occasions when they agreed with the
movement’s goals, increased as dissent radicalized. After a ten-year hiatus from the
assembly on account of the conflicts posed by French and Indian War, James ran for a
seat in the House in 1765, targeting the incumbent, future radical vice-president George
Bryan, whom he considered “an Envious Pres[byteria]n.” The contest initially ended in a
tie. A special election followed in which Pemberton won handily when the Presbyterians
37
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failed to get out the German vote.38 After repeal of the Stamp Act, Pemberton reported to
John Fothergill in England that no Quakers had illuminated their windows in the
celebrations which followed, unlike other sectors of the population. The attempts of
political Quakers like James to partake in legal resistance activity while opposing illegal
means proved unsustainable. It was a stance tested not only by external pressures, but
also by the hardcore reformers who had recaptured the faith.
For a while, James Pemberton kept a foot in both camps. As an elected official, he
was a key cog in the assembly’s fourteen-man Quaker committee of June 1766 that
drafted an address of thanks to the king for the Stamp Act’s repeal while stressing the
colony’s continuing loyalty to the Crown. In 1768, he again helped draft an assembly
petition, this time for repeal of the Townsend Acts. In October that year, he was reelected
to the assembly on a platform opposing nonimportation and elected again on the same
issue in 1769. Even so, the nonimportation association resumed its activities.39 The
downward political spiral progressed as Quakers tried to stem the popular tide. When a
consignment of malt arrived from England on the Philadelphia docks in July 1769 and
challenged the merchants’ new nonimportation accord, Israel led opposition to the mass
meetings organized to impede unloading the cargo. The Quaker Meeting for Sufferings
drafted an epistle with the collaboration of Israel and James condemning “the dangerous
tendency of contributing to the support of such Associations” which they believed incited
upheaval. The vessel returned to England with its freight on board anyway, and radicals
38
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continued to meet. Fearful that events were drawing him to a “conduct inconsistent” with
“religious principles,” James decided to forego another run for the assembly in 1770 after
five consecutive years of service.40
The oscillations in imperial policy from colonial taxation to repeal and back again
continued to upset the political panorama. In response to the Tea Act, Philadelphians
forced the Polly, laden with tea, to return to England in 1773, an action that Quakers
generally opposed and James dubbed an arbitrary breach of law and justice. He noted
further that no Friend “of any Account” was seen among the seven hundred people who
met at the State House to organize that crowd action. A year later, James justified the
presence of Quakers at a public meeting against the Coercive Acts only on grounds of
preventing “the ill-timed and rash proceedings” of the citizenry. All the while, he warned
of “the most tyrannical disposition” of Presbyterians and radicals. The Quaker Meeting
for Sufferings concurred, admonishing extralegal committees for promoting “anarchy”
and above all threatening Quaker “Civil, & religious Liberties.” Philadelphia Quakers
made a financial donation for the relief of the citizens of Boston in January of 1774,
while simultaneously denouncing the dumping of tea into the city’s harbor. It was too
delicate a balancing act to sustain.41
The futility of the Quaker position came to a head that year. In June, the Society
of Friends decided to “keep from mixing with the people in their Public Consultations” –
in effect a directive to retreat from political life once and for all. At a public convocation
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only days later, citizens appointed James Pemberton one of twelve Quakers to a larger
Committee of Correspondence without his approbation. While other Quakers opted to
join, James refused to serve. The episode reveals that, despite reformist retreat, Quaker
influence was still considerable even at that late date. Their conformity with proceedings
was judged vital. The collision between Quaker reformist instructions to withdraw from
public life and the patriot committee’s growing militancy proved to be a turning point.
This was the last extralegal body in which Quaker moderates participated.42
The First Continental Congress which adjourned at Philadelphia in October of
1774 planted the seeds for full radical control of the resistance movement nationally and
locally. Congress rejected Joseph Galloway’s proposal for an American Parliament and
preservation of the imperial union, organizing instead a Continental Association to curtail
trade with Great Britain. Later rumors had James calling those who supported the
congressional measures “rebels,” at the time an incendiary and pejorative term. James’
language affords us an opportunity to trace evolving Quaker perceptions of colonial
antagonisms over the pre-war decade – the expanding opposition had gone from
Presbyterians to radicals to rebels. For Quakers, though, Presbyterians formed its core.43
Coinciding with the first congress, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting issued an
epistle of advice to Friends emphasizing that Quakers were beholden to the king for their
liberties in America, obligated to express their allegiance to him, and opposed to all
efforts “to excite disaffection or disrespect to him.” Alarmed by the course of events,
42
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Friends published two key clarifications of their position in early 1775 – one for in-house
instruction and the other as a public pronouncement. As clerk of the Meeting for
Sufferings, John Pemberton signed a new epistle to believers on January 5 condensing
Quaker views. The Meeting declaimed against “the present distracted proceedings of the
Colonies” which had approved “publick Resolves… evidently contrary to our religious
principles,” a stance they understood would produce “the most fatal consequences both to
themselves and the parent country.” As a remedy, reformers urged steadfast pacifism:
Friends were to “to act agreeable to the peaceable principles and testimony we profess.”
The missive targeted those Quakers who had participated in recent political proceedings,
urging them not to “deviate” from “the peaceable spirit and temper of the Gospel.”44
Later that same month, reformers issued a public address which James signed on
behalf of the congregation as “Clerk at this time.” Three thousand copies of a Testimony
of the people called Quakers were printed and distributed. The document became the
basis for Quaker pacifist orthodoxy during the Revolution. True to reformist precepts, the
piece argued in no uncertain terms that the established political regime was legitimate.
Thus, “peaceable subjects” should “discountenance and avoid every measure tending to
excite disaffection to the king, as supreme magistrate, or to the legal authority of his
government.” It went on to condemn the direction of colonial resistance. Referring to the
“late political writings,” these were deemed “contrary to the nature and precepts of the
gospel” and “destructive of the peace and harmony of civil society.” As such, Quakers
were “led by a sense of duty to declare our entire disapprobation of them.” The Meeting
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admitted that deep differences existed between the mother country and her colonies but
trusted that “decent and respectful addresses from those who are vested with legal
authority” – that is, the colonial assembly, governor or council – “would avail towards
obtaining relief” of grievances. The path Congress and its supporters had chosen was
likely to “produce violence and bloodshed, and threaten the subversion of constitutional
government, and of that liberty of conscience” which had induced their ancestors to seek
refuge in Pennsylvania in the first place. The Testimony ended by declaring “against
every usurpation of power and authority… and against all Combinations, Insurrections,
Conspiracies, and Illegal Assemblies… inconsistent with our religious principles” which
violated “the fidelity we owe to the king and his government, as by law established.”45
The address captured all of the key elements of Quaker doctrine. Established
authority must not be disturbed. Grievances existed but redress should be undertaken
only via legal means within the British Constitution. Order, stability, and imperial union
must be maintained. Congress, spontaneous assemblies, and crowd actions were illicit
and would generate violence, disarray, and an unwelcome change in regime. Pacifism
was morally righteous and pragmatically indispensable. The testimony is notable for its
foresight. Unauthorized assemblies and radical multitudes did generate violence, chaos,
and ultimately overthrew the existing government. An unspoken fear in the declaration
also proved accurate. Because of historical acrimony and their opposition to change,
Quakers would bear much of the brunt of that disorder.

45

The Testimony of the People called Quakers, given forth by a Meeting of the Representatives of said
People, in Pennsylvania and New-Jersey, held at Philadelphia the twenty-fourth Day of the first Month,
1775, (Philadelphia, 1775), Broadside, Evans 14052; Force, ed., American Archives, 4th Series, vol. 1,
1176-1177.

273

The hostility between radicals and Quaker pacifists escalated from 1775 to 1777
as open warfare with England erupted, the colonies declared independence, and rebels
deposed proprietary rule in Pennsylvania by enacting a new constitution and government.
Multiple Quaker efforts to stem the tide proved ineffectual. They petitioned the assembly
for immunity in military matters on the basis of Penn’s original charter. They opposed
Congress’ proclamations for national days of fasting. They insisted Quakers resign from
public office and not elect Friends to positions of power. They disowned those who
participated in the war. They refused test oaths and militia service, substitutions, and the
payment of fines. As independence approached, they issued an emphatic restatement of
their position in the Ancient Testimony.46 Although reformers left the acceptance of
continental bills of credit to individual conscience, many Quakers additionally refused to
receive the new paper currency because it was seen as a funding mechanism for the war.
In sum, pacifist reform-minded Quakers like the Pembertons who set appropriate conduct
for the sect opposed virtually every novelty the revolutionaries sought to put into effect.47
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Unsurprisingly, radicals viewed the antiwar stance of pacifist Quakers as
duplicitous. Moreover, patriot leadership often placed blame for Quaker disaffection on
the Pembertons. John Adams saw Israel Pemberton as “an artful Jesuit” and noted his
negative influence over patriot John Dickinson and other moderates in the Continental
Congress on the question of independence. Thomas Paine was more blunt – condemning
Quakers wholesale: “O! ye fallen, cringing, priest and Pemberton-ridden people!”48
Reprisals followed. A committee report for the Monthly Meeting of the Northern District
in Philadelphia a month before Howe’s invasion gives an excellent summary of
conditions. Quaker houses had been “stripped of the leaden weights used for the hanging
of windows.” Blankets had been “forcibly taken” for use of the army. The homes of
Friends had been “wantonly abused, and their windows broke and destroyed by a rude
rabble.” Quaker shops had suffered similar property damage. In an ironic reminder of the
earlier British quartering policies in Boston which incited revolution, Quaker families
“had soldiers forced into their houses and kept there for some time.” Rebels carrying
weapons had seized some Quakers on the street. Others were “taken from their dwellings
by an armed company of men, and with drum and music paraded through the streets for a
considerable time.” Still others were fined and their personal goods “distrained” for
declining to serve in the civil government. When this committee report was presented,
Quaker William Compton had been in prison for six weeks, though “nothing criminal in
the view of those who now exercise authority in this place, had upon examination been
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found against him.”49 The parading of victims, smashing of windows, and forced
detentions demonstrate the patriot government’s lack of control over bottom-up
effervescence and the resulting arbitrary and tumultuous nature of radical rule.
Presbyterian/Quaker hostility had found renewed vigor in the rebellion.
VIRGINIA EXILE & THE RETURN TO PHILADELPHIA
That antagonism detonated when word arrived in Philadelphia that Sir William
Howe had landed his army at Head of Elk on the Chesapeake Bay in August of 1777.
Events soon came to a climax. With Philadelphia targeted, the various manifestations of
patriot government scampered. Before leaving for York, Congress recommended that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council “apprehend and secure” key disaffected figures
deemed likely to collaborate with the advancing British. This congressional resolution
honed in on eleven individuals, all Quakers, including Israel, James, and John. By the
time the council gave the arrest order three days later, the list had ballooned to forty-two
people from multiple faiths.50
The Quakers and the Pembertons fought back. Israel and two others prepared a
written objection on September 4, telling the council that “your issuing that order is
arbitrary" and stressing the arrestees were “peaceable men & have never borne arms,” as
well as “good Citizens sollicitous [sic] to promote the real interest and welfare of our
Country.” The protest claimed “our undoubted rights as Freemen” and emphasized that
patriot authorities were violating their own recent constitution as “no opportunity is given
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them to be heard.” That same day another protest with twenty signatures, including the
three Pembertons, showed how Quakers perceived their homeland, “claiming to ourselves
the liberties and privileges to which we are entitled… by our birthright and inheritance.”
The later choice to stay and reintegrate was a natural derivative of this core attitude that
they were sons of a Pennsylvania that was theirs by right.51 The prisoners issued a similar
complaint to the Continental Congress the next day, once again underscoring their right
to a hearing, followed by publication of an “Address to the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania”
explaining the injustice of their situation.52 The Supreme Executive Council countered
that the matter could be laid to rest if the prisoners would “take and subscribe the oath or
affirmation required by law” or accept a modified, more generic version assuring fidelity
and “true allegiance” to the state. The imprisoned Quakers refused. The council reacted
by declaring that the captives had chosen to “consider themselves subjects of the King of
Great Britain” and “do hereby renounce all the privileges of citizenship.”53 The test oath
thus became the justification for permanent Quaker separation from the body politic.
The controversy mushroomed. One hundred and two petitioners appealed to the
President and Supreme Executive Council to grant a hearing to the prisoners. Their
petition went unheeded. Congress had likewise denied a hearing days earlier. On the 9th,
twenty-two captives signed a more extensive “Remonstrance and Protest of the Prisoners
51
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in Mason’s Lodge.” The detainees reiterated that they had not been heard, a violation of
due process rights; that “we utterly & solemnly deny” maintaining correspondence with
the enemy; that they had “steadily maintained our Religious Principles”; and in a defiant
reference to the test act approved the prior summer, that “the Tests you proposed we were
by no Law bound to subscribe.” The appeal concluded with echoes of earlier sectarian
enmities and fears: “that the Evil & destructive Spirit of Pride, Ambition & arbitrary
Power with which you have been actuated may cease & be no more.”54 For the victims, a
noxious Presbyterian presence lurked behind the entire affair.
Additional measures proved futile. The prisoners requested a writ of habeas
corpus to delay and possibly overturn the departure order. Revolutionary judge Thomas
McKean granted the request but patriot officers ignored it. Nameless intimidators forced
printers to cancel publication of a second public address, even though the type for that
text was cast. In the end, all efforts failed. The council assigned a troop of City Guards to
escort the captives on their way, pursuant to prior instructions that they be “treated in
such manner as shall be consistant [sic] with their respective Characters.” Adherence to
protocols of class and station persisted even under the duress of insurgency and invasion.
On September 11, the prisoners departed the city in wagons, “a spectacle to the people.”
Crowds of men, women, and children lined the streets, “their countenances sufficiently
though silently expressed the grief they felt on the occasion.” John Pemberton took
special solace in the sympathy of “many poor blacks” who came to say good-bye and
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“shook me by the hand, being affected with our hard treatment,” an acknowledgement of
the brothers’ earlier reform efforts across racial lines.55
Their journey first took them northwards to Pottsgrove, away from Howe’s
invading hordes, then on to a more menacing Reading, where “there appeared to be much
enmity among the people, and some stones were thrown at us.” From there it was on to
Lancaster, then across the Susquehanna to Carlisle. Turning south, they crossed the
Potomac on September 28, reaching Winchester, Virginia, two days later. The reception
there was chilly. About thirty armed men appeared at noon demanding their “immediate
removal.” Virginia officials convinced the protestors to disband, promising the prisoners
would remain in their lodgings until Congress could clarify their situation.56
It soon became clear that the pacifists posed no real threat as they adapted to life
in Virginia. Gradually, rebel jailors extended privileges. From house arrest, the prisoners
were first allowed to walk the garden, then to separate and arrange for more commodious
lodgings. On October 11, their common journal reported “our old guards went away, and
took leave of us in a very kind feeling and disposition.” Four days later, they petitioned
and received permission to ride anywhere within six miles of Winchester. Local Friends
soon received permission to join the religious services of the captives. Sometimes other
Virginians participated in silence, including officials and landlords. More often than not,
John Pemberton and fellow exile John Hunt preached before these gatherings, providing
spiritual instruction on their banishment. Turnout grew. On November 2, nearly seventy
people attended the meeting. In the interim, some prominent Virginians called to pay
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their respects. Most conspicuously, Colonel John Augustine Washington, brother of army
Commander-in-chief George, stopped in on October 19 for “some friendly conversation,”
taking the opportunity to relay the stunning news of Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga. In
the meantime, news from Philadelphia was slow to arrive. James noted in his memoirs as
late as November 9 that the exiles had received no word from family since departure.57
Several noteworthy incidents marked the exiles’ stay in Winchester. In early
October, the local militia forced a pacifist Quaker to stand guard over the prisoners,
though he refused to touch his assigned musket. The spectacle lasted two days. On the
24th of the month, Virginians paraded with drum and fife in celebration of the Saratoga
victory, then lit bonfires and illuminated their houses at night. “By way of insult,” rebels
smashed the windows of a Quaker neighbor who refused to participate. On December 8,
fellow prisoner Dr. William Drewitt Smith – granted special permission to roam freely
and treat local patients – escaped. As a result, officials again placed sentries at the exiles’
residences. Four days later, the Board of War accused captive Quaker Owen Jones Jr. of
conspiring to depreciate continental currency in faraway Lancaster while “exchanging
gold at a most extravagant premium for paper money.” Patriots ordered Jones removed to
a jail at Staunton, Virginia. In mid-February 1778, prisoner Thomas Pike absconded.
Notably, neither Smith nor Pike appear to have been Quakers. How exiled Friends
reacted to these getaways says much about their code of ethics. In the former case,
Quakers themselves informed Major Joseph Holmes that evening at dinner of “our
apprehensions that he [Smith] had gone to Philadelphia.” In the latter, a journal entry of
57
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February 16 remarked that “our company considered that Thomas Pike had acted
dishonourably [sic].”58
Yet all of these incidents paled in comparison to the deaths of fellow exiles
Thomas Gilpin and John Hunt, both of whom fell seriously ill in the late winter and never
recovered.59 Gilpin died at Winchester on March 1 after about a month with a violent
cold. Israel Pemberton recorded in his journal that “one of us is happily released from the
power of our oppressors,” along with the landlady’s observation that Gilpin had “died
like a Christian,” to which he added “which I believe may be truly said of him.” As for
Hunt, eleven days later the exiles received word that “a mortification had begun in his
leg.” Doctors recommended severing the limb as the only way to spare his life. The
operation took place on March 22. At first Hunt appeared to recover but he soon faded,
dying nine days after the amputation.60 As a result of these events, only sixteen of the
twenty original prisoners remained in custody by the spring of 1778.
During the entire experience, the exiles continued to lobby the Continental
Congress in York and the Supreme Executive Council in Lancaster for release. Frequent
visitors from Philadelphia and elsewhere aided these efforts, with Quakers conveying
information and petitions back and forth. The captives likewise appealed to the Virginia
governor and council. Virginians saw themselves solely as custodians of congressional
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resolves, however, so the problematic issue festered mainly as a dispute among the two
political entities located in Pennsylvania, neither of which wanted to accept responsibility
for the detainees. Direct appeals to patriot authorities from Quaker Meetings and the
exiles’ wives brought their plight into public scrutiny in the hope of ending the wrangling
over jurisdiction and the unwillingness to rule in the case. Finally, the Supreme Executive
Council responded on April 8 to a March 16 resolve of Congress, ordering that the
prisoners “be brought to Shippensburg, and there enlarged.” In the following days,
officials made the necessary logistical arrangements for the return home. On April 19 the
exiles left Virginia after “taking affectionate leave” of Friends at morning Meeting. 61
The homeward journey went as planned. On April 26 they reached Lancaster,
where the sixteen banished Quakers presented Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive
Council – still on their own exile from British-occupied Philadelphia – with a petition “to
be reinstated to the full Enjoyment of that Liberty, of which we have been so long
deprived.” The next day the council ordered the exiles sent to Pottsgrove and “there
discharged from confinement.” To facilitate passage through Continental Army lines,
they received copies of the discharge and certificates allowing them to travel
“unmolested” into Howe’s Philadelphia.62 Israel and James heeded the immediacy of the
directive, proceeding onwards. John tarried a bit because he “was not satisfied with the
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order of discharge,” claiming instead that “this was far short of what we demanded;
which was to be reinstated in our families in the manner in which we had been wrested
from them.” Responding for the patriot government, Timothy Matlack curtly informed
him that “the council would do no more.” Council minutes derisively note “Mr. John
Pemberton’s tender conscience being hurt by the words, ‘agreeable to the said order’” in
authorizing the journey through Philadelphia County, inserting instead the phrase “and he
is there to be considered as discharged” to his certificate of release. Heading home, James
noted the “devastation committed by parties of the English army in their excursions” and
duly recorded upon arrival that he had been absent for thirty-two weeks and six days. The
exile experience seemed to have the greatest effect on Israel. Upon his return, he found
his wife ill, his fortune in ruins, rampant inflation, and his various estates in the no-man’s
land around the city in dire straits after expropriation for the quartering of His Majesty’s
troops. John’s exile ended on April 30, concluding the final leg “without molestation or
difficulty” after an early breakfast on the city’s outskirts with the family of Quaker John
Roberts where he lodged. In a gesture indicative of his priorities, the next day he visited
the widows of Thomas Gilpin and John Hunt who had succumbed to illness in exile.63
It is noteworthy that, after months of separation from their homes and family for
alleged political perfidy, patriot authorities never brought charges of treason, misprision
of treason or otherwise against the captives they had once feared as British collaborators.
For the Quaker faithful, the conditions under which the state government restored the
prisoners vindicated their pacifist position. The first post-return Monthly Meeting of the
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Middle District in Philadelphia, to which the brothers belonged, recorded in the official
minutes that those sent to Virginia had “been permitted by their Persecutors to Return to
their Habitations without any Charge exhibited against them, or any Concessions or
Obligations on their Parts,” a fact “which sufficiently demonstrates their Innocency.”
This was a common sentiment among the exiles themselves, best expressed in Thomas
Wharton Sr.’s statement to his wife Rachel during the early stages of confinement: “I
have done No Wrong, & therefore My Conscience is Easy.”64
In the next six weeks of whirlwind activity and rumors, the Pemberton brothers
resumed their lives. General Howe was returning to England. Israel met with the imperial
commander and claimed compensation of several thousand pounds for British devastation
of his property. Howe rejected the claim. John attended a Meeting for Sufferings on May
14 which discussed the “dissipation” of the forthcoming Meschianza organized for the
outgoing general. The Meeting urged Quakers to refrain from attending the celebration.
Nine days later John noted that preparations for a purported evacuation had “put many
into great hurry and fears” but that he himself was calm and “preserved in much quiet.”
James faced an especially difficult season with the May 20th death of his grown son,
Phineas, best known as an accomplished amateur meteorologist, much respected for his
documentation of Pennsylvania’s weather patterns. As the month closed, the Philadelphia
Monthly Meeting officially noted the return of the Virginia exiles and reassigned John to
his ministerial duties by a way of a formal committee appointment.65
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Meanwhile, Israel Pemberton had a long conversation in early June with Ambrose
Serle, Secretary to Lord Howe, on the causes and nature of the American rebellion. The
talk provides an insightful look into Quaker views on the Revolution at the crossroads of
their homecoming. The eldest Pemberton argued that Parliament “had no constitutional
Right to tax America, but that he was equally averse to the violent Proceedings of the
People here and particularly to the atrocious Act of Independency.” Here again was the
locus of pacifist orthodoxy wedged between imperial and radical overreach. On June 6,
John recorded that the king’s Carlisle Commission had arrived from London to negotiate
peace with the Continental Congress but two days later noted that “the city continues in
commotion,” as the British army was “moving their baggage, cannon, etc.” and the
evacuation seemed to be proceeding without interruption. When that momentous event
finally arrived in mid-month, John expressed no emotion either way. He simply stated
that “early in the morning of the 18th, they [the British] marched to Gloucester Point, and
went over to New Jersey. Some of the American light-horse then entered the city, and
large numbers of soldiery and of the former inhabitants, came in by the 20th.”66
Unlike many of those displeased with patriot supremacy, Israel, James and John
Pemberton never considered abandoning Philadelphia at this first critical juncture of
reintegration. Their recent return from banishment and a matching desire to stabilize life
no doubt influenced that view. But the lack of any sort of introspection or discussion on
this issue in any of the Pembertons’ firsthand accounts is itself revealing and suggests
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that, as direct descendants of the colony’s founders, they understood Philadelphia to be
their one and only home and never contemplated any other option. Their attitude reflected
that of other disaffected Quakers for whom the choice of reintegration over departure was
not a choice at all. It was a given.
PACIFIST CONVICTION & REINTEGRATION DURING THE WAR
The non-threatening nature of the reformist Quaker presence in Pennsylvania
which the Pemberton brothers epitomized is abundantly clear in the period that followed
the British evacuation in the summer of 1778. True to their nonviolent worldview, the
Pembertons and their reform-minded coreligionists focused on peaceful activities within
the civic, social and religious spheres during the rest of the war and its aftermath. This
was a conscious decision, consonant with the reforms demanding withdrawal from
political life and their interpretation of Christianity. Quakers made sure to avoid patriot
factional squabbles while restricting their public encounters to deeply felt social causes or
situations directly affecting the Society or fellow Friends.
Following their return from Virginia in April 1778, the Pemberton brothers
renewed efforts to aid persecuted Quakers. After the evacuation, the Monthly Meeting
appointed Israel and James as representatives to the broader Meeting for Sufferings
responsible for monitoring and assisting mistreated Quakers. They quickly organized a
campaign for the release of Friends imprisoned for pacifism. In August, the brothers
contributed to the text of the Society’s representation to the General Assembly publicly
restating their position for the first time since the British evacuation. Because of “a steady
adherence to our peaceable principles, and testimony against wars and fightings,” they
called for a repeal of “those laws, which have a tendency to oppress tender consciences,”
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meaning those mandating the test oath and militia service. The duo then played a key role
in the Yearly Meeting of September 1778 which set official Quaker policy on the Test
Act question, reinforcing the sect’s refusal to take oaths as manifested at the beginning of
the exile controversy. A month later, Israel’s wife Mary died, never recovering from the
illness which preceded her husband’s exile. The eldest Pemberton was devastated.67
John Pemberton was especially active after the British withdrawal. In July, he
visited German Pietist Christopher Sower II, whom local radicals had “stripped naked,
and painted in different colours” for his pacifism and pro-British sympathies.68 In August,
he attended a series of Friends Meetings in Bucks County, extending his spiritual support
to fellow Quakers “who had been much stripped by foraging parties, and for fines, etc.”
Most he found in good spirits. In September, he joined Israel at the Philadelphia Yearly
Meeting. In October, he received a letter from Moses Brown, a leading Rhode Island
Quaker, who advised Pennsylvania Quakers to pay taxes to patriot authorities in order to
remain “quiet & peaceable Subjects under Every Government.” Brown’s interpretation of
proper Quaker conduct shows a lack of unanimity among Friends across colonies on the
payment of war fines and taxes. In fact, Pennsylvania Quakers proved to be the most
intractable among the sect in their rejection of all things construed as contributing to the
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war effort, a posture which generated controversy not only among colonial Friends but
with leading Quakers in Great Britain too.69
In November, John comforted condemned Quakers Abraham Carlisle and John
Roberts just two days before their execution, sadly noting afterwards they did not deserve
such treatment. Later that month, he responded to the inquiries of Maryland Quakers,
refuting rumors that Philadelphia’s faithful had taken the test oath. In December, he set
out on a religious tour of Delaware but a severe illness sidelined him for three months at
Wilmington. On his return to Philadelphia in March, he lamented a tragic shipwreck off
the coast of New Jersey in which an armed American privateer impeded rescue efforts of
an English transport, resulting in the death of over one hundred passengers, even as
defiant locals managed to save forty-two of them. For John, the incident exemplified the
cruelty and futility of war, which thwarted the exercise of basic Christian compassion.70
The trio of brothers came together for a final time in the spring of 1779. Israel
was gravely ill, never fully recovering from his wife’s death and the emotional and
physical distress of prolonged exile. On April 23, Grace Growden Galloway noted
forlornly in her diary that “poor Israel Pemberton died yesterday Morning.” The King of
the Quakers had tried to advise her on property seizures after husband Joseph’s departure.
A public funeral attended by “a great concourse” of all denominations followed three
days later. In a replay of the banishment drama of 1777, John made special mention that
“many coloured people” had come to say goodbye to the abolitionist they considered
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their friend and patron.71 Despite philanthropic inclinations, Israel left his entire fortune
of about £60,000-70,000 to his children. Nothing to charity. He was probably concerned
about son Joseph who had gone bankrupt in the West Indies trade before the Revolution
and exhibited a disturbing predilection for gambling. On one occasion, the father paid the
“worldly and spoiled” son’s massive debt of £10,000. Israel’s passing strengthened the
sincere bond among the brothers. “I have myself particular cause to mourn his absence,”
wrote John, “he having been to me a steady, sympathizing friend.”72 Despite tragedy, it
was the rapid return to the routine of daily life which characterized the critical year from
repatriation through Israel’s death. In the face of external political hurdles, an effortless
recovery took place inside the Quaker realm as the Pembertons quietly resumed their
earlier standing. Within the discipline’s insular horizons, nothing had changed.
The exterior universe was another matter. For Quakers, turbulence plagued this
first phase of reintegration under radical rule. At the height of Constitutionalist power in
1779, Mrs. Galloway confided to her diary that “a Mob is raised in ye Town & they are
taking Up Tories… we were much alarm’d.” While visiting her neighbor Smith that day,
she noted “he is very reserved but I find is Much frigthen’d… we are quite alone.” In the
summer a crowd attacked the home of Quaker merchant John Drinker for allegedly
violating radicals’ price-fixing imperatives. With Philadelphia in the midst of a cycle of
spiraling inflation, severe shortages of flour and other key staples, and a heated political
debate over the continuing presence of loyalist wives accused of conveying intelligence
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to their émigré husbands in New York, radical militiamen seized Drinker and three other
Quakers coming out of the Yearly Meeting in October. Patriot officials intervened and
put the captives in prison for their protection. The confrontation escalated into the armed
clash between patriot factions at Fort Wilson. Rebel officials released John Drinker and
his associates once the government regained control.73
In June of the following year, the Supreme Executive Council declared martial
law, called out the state militia, and targeted for seizure the horses of disaffected citizens.
James Pemberton lost two mounts, John one. In August, patriot newspapers republished
earlier Quaker antiwar epistles in a renewed campaign to stir up the populace, what John
called “fresh enmity against Friends.” Then on September 29, 1780 radicals carted
Benedict Arnold’s effigy through Philadelphia’s streets “with a great rabble following”
about a week after his treachery. When John Pemberton and Henry Drinker went out for a
walk later that evening, the mob cursed them.74 Radical antipathy prevented Quakers
from recovering any sense of normalcy as members of the larger community while the
war remained undecided. Friends lived in perpetual uncertainty, never knowing when
external forces might disrupt their insular world. The most Friends could hope for was
that rebels would allow them to go about their daily lives unmolested. Under radical
ascendancy, legal reintegration or a broader social reassimilation was unimaginable.
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Amid this climate of insecurity after their brother’s death, the surviving siblings
continued to champion reforms. John Pemberton placed special emphasis on matters of
the spirit, missions, and compliance with the Quaker peace testimony. Only two weeks
after Israel’s funeral, John made the rounds of Quaker Meetings in southern New Jersey.
Returning to Philadelphia, he witnessed the devastation of war in the countryside and
decried both this “disposition opposite to the spirit of Christ” and “the spirit in man
which delights in another’s overthrow.”75 Over the next few years, the youngest brother
joined a variety of missions in support of fellow Quakers. In late 1779, he visited the
Quaker master of a vessel who had been jailed for three weeks. In 1780 and 1781, he and
James traveled to Lancaster three times to encourage Moses Roberts and Job Hughes,
Quakers imprisoned for refusing militia service. Local officials released the pair after an
eleven month incarceration. In the summer of 1780, John participated in a failed effort to
convince radical authorities to allow Quakers to send a delegation to Canada to seek the
release of Benjamin Gilbert and his family, taken captive by Indians in alliance with the
British. John Pemberton found these obligations fulfilling. Discouragement surfaced only
when encountering laxness among Friends. In February 1780, he accompanied Isaac
Zane Sr. on a mission through Bucks County to admonish “such as had deviated from our
religious principles and testimonies in relation to war.” Making religious rounds a year
later, he wrote of “an exercising time” and “a season of much depression and suffering to
me” because Quakers at Deer Creek ignored pacifist principles, what he termed “a wrong
spirit prevalent in some.” John’s ubiquitous scruples carried into temporal matters. In
1780, he rented a tavern property inherited from his father and structured the agreement
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to counter the possibility that the facility might succumb to Quaker interpretations of
immorality. Pemberton’s contract stated that the lessee would “exert his endeavors as a
Christian to preserve decency and order in said house… that the house on the first day of
the week shall always be kept closed from public use… and that he will not allow or
suffer any person to use, play at, or divert themselves with cards, dice, back-gammon, or
any other unlawful game.”76
John and James Pemberton belonged to Quaker committees assigned to mediate
between the radical government and Samuel Rowland Fisher, imprisoned anew for
purportedly providing intelligence to the enemy in a letter to his exiled brother Jabez
Maud Fisher in New York. The formal charge was misprision of treason. Fisher was a
fellow Virginia exile well known to the Pembertons. His most recent arrest had put
Friends in a precarious political position, for the prisoner refused to acknowledge patriot
governmental authority in any way. Quaker officialdom coincided with Fisher on
virtually everything. They opposed military service, test oaths, war taxation, militia fines,
and what they perceived as the arbitrary laws of the revolutionary regime. But by this
time the Quaker hierarchy did not publicly question the legitimacy of the rebel state.
Fisher did. As part of five committee visits to the inmate from January to October of
1780, John Pemberton offered spiritual guidance while advising Fisher to present the
injustice of his case to the President and Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, an
implicit recognition of patriot governance. The prisoner had other ideas. He was only
76

The Life and Travels of John Pemberton, July 20, 1780, 98-99; Mekeel, The Relation of the Quakers,
198; John Pemberton Journal, February 16, 1780 to March 15, 1781, 89-90, 92-93; Watson, Annals of
Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, in the Olden Time, vol. 1, 394. The “first day” was Sunday. For tavern
disorderliness in Philadelphia/Pennsylvania and Quaker attitudes, see Peter Thompson, Rum Punch &
Revolution: Taverngoing & Public Life in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 1-2, 44, 92, 98, 102-105, 112-113, 122-125; Sharon V. Salinger, Taverns and
Drinking in Early America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 89, 115-118, 144-148.

292

willing to address authorities “by their names as Men & the Instruments of our suffering
only, & not as Body.”77 These visits produced no results. Fisher stoically lingered in jail.
Between April and June of the next year, three new Quaker committees called on
the detainee. James Pemberton replaced his younger brother. During the last visit on
behalf of the Meeting for Sufferings, Fisher noted that James “gave me to understand that
they expected me to make some concessions.” He did not budge, responding it was “out
of the Question,” suggesting instead that the Pine Street Meeting disown him if Quaker
leaders felt a need to ease their concerns. The brothers’ intercession in the Fisher case
reveals the willingness of reformist Friends to engage the Revolution when the Society
was at risk. Samuel Rowland Fisher’s denial of revolutionary authority jeopardized the
unofficial truce with radicals that permitted Quakers to live out their pacifist faith.78
Difficulties continued. In the summer of 1781, Philadelphia received shiploads of
patriot ex-prisoners from South Carolina, exchanged under a flag of truce. Many of their
families had arrived in the city the previous summer after the surrender of Charleston to
the British. Patriot moderate Robert Morris appealed to James and John Pemberton and
other prominent Quakers to raise a loan to the United States among their brethren to
alleviate the suffering of the exiles. The Society of Friends, however, turned down the
request, pleading poverty and an inability to raise funds because of measures imposed by
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the rebel government.79 Three months later, when “intelligence as surprizing [sic] as
vexatious” arrived of Cornwallis’ surrender at Yorktown, the displaced southerners took
their revenge, joining Philadelphia revolutionaries in castigating those like the Quakers
who did not illuminate their homes in celebration. Mobs roamed the streets freely on the
night of October 25, looting Quaker shops. The throng beat Friends John Drinker and the
wife of Benjamin Gibbs. Quaker diarist Anna Rawle wrote that “for two hours we had the
disagreeable noise of stones banging about, glass crashing, and the tumultuous voices of
a large body of men, as they were a long time at the different houses in the
neighborhood.” Alert and sympathetic acquaintances concocted a stratagem of lighting
candles in Friends’ windows ahead of the rowdy crowd, “which pacified the mob, and
after three huzzas they moved off.” For Anna, “it was the most alarming scene I ever
remember.” She noted the Walns and the Drinkers, Quaker families of note, “make heavy
complaints of the Carolinians in their neighborhood.” While conversing with frightened
neighbors the next day, Anna lamented the passing of an age: “it seems universally
agreed that Philadelphia will no longer be that happy asylum for the Quakers that it once
was.”80 Her reflection seemed prophetic.
As the war dragged on, John Pemberton began to feel the pull of a religious
mission to the mother country. For pacifists like himself, Great Britain was not the
enemy, but a spiritual field in need of cultivation. On January 26, 1781, the Quaker
Meeting formally authorized his trip, but it was not until the first half of 1782 that John

79

Scharf & Westcott, History of Philadelphia, 418. Morris proposed a loan at 6% interest.

80

“A Loyalist’s Account of Certain Occurrences in Philadelphia after Cornwallis’s Surrender at Yorktown,
Extracted from the Diary of Miss Anna Rawle,” October 22 to October 26, 1781, PMHB, vol. 16, no. 1
(April, 1892), 103-107.

294

decided to move forward.81 Pemberton put his affairs in order and assigned power of
attorney to his wife, Hannah, and Quakers John Field and John Wilson. For Field, he
prepared additional documentation delineating the state of his accounts and detailing the
penalties and articles patriots had seized for his adherence to pacifist principles.82
Anxious that his travels might be misinterpreted as loyalist defection to England,
John Pemberton paid a visit in May to boyhood companion William Moore, then the first
moderate president of Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council. Friend William
Matthews and brother James accompanied him. President Moore encouraged John to
write to the full council because state law forbade passage through British lines without a
passport on penalty of death and forfeiture. John’s letter eloquently discloses Quaker
attitudes towards politics. Adducing that his trip had “no sinister View or Worldly
concern to promote,” the missionary declared he did not need human consent to depart
but wanted to make his plans known to patriot authorities nonetheless. Some radicals on
the council pressed for application of the treason and confiscation penalties but the
council’s moderate majority made sure that effort came to naught. Patriot power
alignments once again determined treatment of the disaffected. On June 10, John finally
bid good-bye to his wife and set out for New Jersey. As a prelude to his European
ministry, he visited Quaker Meetings in the northern states over the next six months, zig-
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zagging his way to New York City in due course. From there, he embarked for England
on December 21.83 The youngest brother would be gone for seven years.
While John planned his trip, a heated political battle with the disowned Free
Quakers developed, further exposing the interplay between patriot factional disputes and
the handling of the disaffected. James Pemberton led the charge to vindicate Friends’
conduct. In December 1781, the Free Quakers – which included notable patriots like
Timothy Matlack, Samuel Wetherill, Christopher Marshall, Clement Biddle, and Betsy
Ross – petitioned the state assembly to assert their right over the Quaker property that
remained in the hands of the sect’s governing body. While demanding the use of meeting
houses, schools, burial grounds and the like, Free Quakers emphasized the disaffection of
reformist Quaker leaders and their own not insignificant contributions to the rebel cause
which had provoked their disownment. The distribution of radical-moderate power in
Pennsylvania was then beginning to tilt toward the Anti-Constitutionalists. Moderate
William Moore presided over the Supreme Executive Council and John Dickinson would
follow later that year. Constitutionalist radical influence was still sufficient to preserve a
political equilibrium, however. Unwilling to address the issue, the legislature tabled the
Free Quaker petition. Opponents hardened their positions. The spinoff group insisted on
drawing an ideological division, arguing that, as patriots and former members of the faith
in good standing, they had contributed to the acquisition and upkeep of Quaker property
and continued to have a vested right in its use. Reformers replied that church discipline
was an internal matter, not a state prerogative. Their constitution set the rules for
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membership. Since the Free Quakers had violated those rules, they no longer belonged.
Government had no business regulating the church’s conduct.84
James Pemberton believed the Free Quaker attack even graver than the Virginia
banishment because it “exceeds any we have before experienced, it being upon the whole
body.” He understood the move as an assault “directed in the same line as former
persecutions to misrepresent our conduct and bring in the laws of the land to their
assistance amusing the people that we are legally disenfranchised of our liberties and the
protection of government and have forfeited our inheritance.” James emphatically denied
that Quakers were traitors or aliens or that they had lost their birthright as citizens of
Pennsylvania. A dithering legislature played ping pong with the dispute, eventually
assigning it to a study committee in the fall of 1782. Two events saved the established
order. First, seventy-five disowned Friends with revolutionary credentials wrote an
address to the assembly stressing that, despite their disownment, they respected the
current denominational leadership and endorsed its right to enforce Quaker discipline as
they saw fit. Then in the October elections, moderate Republicans supplemented their
majority in the Supreme Executive Council with increased numbers in the assembly. The
House committee took no further action and faded into obscurity. “Blessed be the Lord
who hath not given us a prey to their teeth,” concluded James thankfully.85 The Free
Quaker affair offers another example of the decisive impact of Pennsylvania’s factions on
the fate of the disaffected. The moderate electoral surge had checked the radical assault.
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The inward-looking temper of spiritual reform held fast through the external
complications arising from cases like Samuel Rowland Fisher and the Free Quakers.
Quaker interpretations of the nature of suffering enhanced this inner strength, for pacifist
Friends saw the travails of war not only as hardships but also as a blessing and a vehicle
for saintly purification. For pacifists, the sacrifice of political hegemony, material wealth,
and greater security enjoyed during the colonial era only strengthened their resolve. The
Meeting for Sufferings articulated this view at war’s end, commending Friends who had
borne rebel fury and “measurably seen and felt the sufficiency of his protecting power,
and in the day of their humiliation have been permitted to sit under the cover of his
paternal care.”86 The view that devout suffering was a beneficial rather than detrimental
experience invigorated Quaker conviction, contributed to the postwar perception that they
posed no threat to the standing order, and became a pillar of successful reintegration.
Notwithstanding radical ire and reaction, Quaker pacifists never threatened
republican government in the post-evacuation era. Yes, foes often accused them of
manipulating prices, refusing continental paper currency, or harboring displeasure with
the course of events – and there was some truth to these allegations. But such “threats”
paled in comparison to William Allen Jr.’s regiment of Pennsylvania Loyalists, William
Rankin’s loyal cohorts in the southeastern counties, John Connolly’s frontier escapades,
or the Doan guerrillas beyond Philadelphia’s perimeter. That the British never tried to
make use of this untapped resource as part of a grand strategy, even as cogs within their
civil administration, speaks to the view that the king’s generals did not consider pacifists
a trustworthy or adequately loyal asset. Rebel rancor against Quakers thus seems wholly
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misplaced within the narrow context of the independence struggle. It is only when we add
pre-war Presbyterian and Quaker tensions to the equation that radical actions make sense
as a “rightful” correction of perceived political wrongs.
POSTWAR REINTEGRATION, NONJURORS & THE TEST ACT REPEAL
Non-threatening behavior did not necessarily spawn acceptance of the new order.
While restraint was a quality intrinsically consistent with pacifist doctrine, embracing
republicanism required no less than divine intervention. Since Friends believed God
ordained state authority, they could not consent to republican government unless King
George III renounced his rule over Pennsylvania. Recognition of the new order was
therefore circumscribed to the outcome of the war. The divine verdict arrived in 1783
with the Definitive Treaty of Peace, when the monarch relinquished “all claims to the
government, propriety, and territorial rights” of the rebellious colonies, Pennsylvania
included.87 While the severing of ties with England produced anxiety among many
Quakers, their consternation did not preclude acknowledgement that God had indeed
spoken. As Quaker banker David Barclay surmised from London, “the pleasing prospect
of peace affords ground for expectation that an intercourse may be established to the
comfort of many on both sides the Water.”88
For Friends, Barclay’s optimism was well founded, for independence resolved or
softened three of the sect’s four principal objections to the Revolution. The war’s end
eliminated demands for participation in military aggression against the British. The need
for active militia service on the frontier continued but declined considerably, reducing
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pressures to pay war taxes, fines or find a substitute. And God had resolved the dilemma
of established authority by divinely sanctioning patriot victory. Only resistance to the
taking of oaths endured. For the disaffected, however, the peace did not at first bring
peace. As details of the treaty recommending restitution of loyalist property swept
through public venues, the challenge of reintegration rose to the forefront as the single
most important issue facing the new republic. Contemporary press accounts reveal deep
apprehensions over loyalism, disaffection, and citizenship, with vociferous radicals
pushing for exclusion of those who had not contributed to the revolutionary cause in
Pennsylvania. A similar dynamic played out in the other twelve rebel states. Quakers who
opposed the war on pacifist principles found themselves woven into the drama.
In May 1783, Berks County residents formed a Whig association “calling to
remembrance the cowardly desertion and undermining arts of a set of men, unworthy of
the name Americans, who now come out of their hiding places.” The Berks associators
were willing to allow these turncoats to reside among them and “in silence peaceably
enjoy the common benefits flowing from a glorious revolution,” their tolerated presence
lauded as “monuments of the clemency of government.” But local Whigs were likewise
prepared to do everything in their power to “discountenance in this county, the voting at
elections for any man, whose principles in politicks [sic] have been inimical to the
independency of this country.” Freemen of the city of Philadelphia and the Liberties met
at the State House the following month and approved popular resolves for transmission to
the state assembly. In essence, these citizens argued that it was inconsistent with the
people’s dignity and interest that those who had “deserted their country in the hour of
danger and sacrifice” and had “voluntarily withdrawn” from the state or any other state in
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rebellion, or who had joined the enemy, been attainted or banished “should be suffered to
return to, or reside within the state of Pennsylvania.” They saw it as their duty to not only
prevent but “to expel, with infamy,” all such individuals. Naturally, they opposed “the
restoration of the estates forfeited by law,” a reference to treaty proposals. Their
instructions to the assembly forbade “the return of those degenerate and apostate sons of
America, who hold principles incompatible with a republican government.” Attitudes in
the city – where greater numbers of radicals had endured the British occupation – were
clearly more uncompromising than in Berks County, though both saw full citizenship as
an earned privilege of revolution, not a right of residency.89
In August, “independent electors” of Bucks County published and submitted to
their representatives in the state legislature a set of “instructions for the government of
your conduct” as the war drew to a close. They asked for a new law prohibiting the return
of loyalist exiles and targeted the disaffected who remained through “your strongest
efforts… to oppose repeal of the test laws,” insisting that “we will use every effort in our
power to exclude all descriptions of men, who have deserted their country and joined the
enemy of these United States… from residing among us.” Like Whigs in Berks and
Philadelphia, the Bucks County language supported an exclusionary citizenship based on
revolutionary credentials. A comparable sentiment prevailed in a letter published on
December 27 from a gentleman in Scotland whose son in Philadelphia had served as an
American officer. The writer blamed the war on “your American delinquents and
apostates, [who] by their nefarious misrepresentations, did inflame and abet our rulers
here,” a not-so-veiled reference to loyalist exiles in Great Britain like Joseph Galloway
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and Andrew Allen. On the issue of returnees, the gentleman questioned “with what grace,
in the name of wonder, can these miscreants and malevolent wretches supplicate to return
and live amongst a people they have so much prejudiced and injured?” He then called
upon “the friends of liberty” to “spurn at the idea of receiving again into their bosoms
those vipers who have sucked their blood already.”90 The battle over nonjurors thus
evolved into a battle over who was worthy to stay and to be allowed to hold republican
citizenship. To reintegrate was to become a fully enfranchised citizen.
In the short run, the peace treaty’s recommendations did more to resurrect the
antipathies of eight years of war than to restore local harmony. Fortunately for the
disaffected-turned-nonjurors, however, the outburst of anti-loyalist fervor proved
fleeting. Various factors contributed to the reinstatement of tranquility over the next few
years. On the one hand, radical patriots beyond official control on occasion achieved their
exclusionary ends, compelling the hurried flight of some suspected of royalist complicity.
Capt. Thomas Rawlings, Capt. Joseph Crathorne and Thomas Plunket “received
peremptory notice to depart in a specified time” from a citizens committee and five others
were “denounced to the committee and warned off.”91 The intermittent success of these
scare tactics and threats seems to have acted as a mollifier of radical anger at the local
and neighborhood level, satiating specific enmities or personal grudges. Once repelled,
the immediate adversary disappeared for good. The Pennsylvania government – like their
counterparts throughout America – lent a deaf ear to the Definitive Treaty of Peace’s
prompting that “Congress shall earnestly recommend” a restoration of loyalist property in
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the independent states. When it became clear that the treaty articles that had triggered the
commotion were not to be enforced, public passions subsided. But the remaining issue of
allegiance to the state did not. While postwar refusal to take the test no longer conveyed
the blot of treason, only men who swore allegiance to Pennsylvania were entitled to full
citizenship. For reformist Friends, God had sanctioned patriot government but oaths were
still forbidden. Thus, the test oath became the single most significant barrier to
enfranchisement for male Quaker nonjurors, drawing an ideological divide between
reintegration and legal citizenship.92
During the rest of the decade, patriot factions dueled over the status of nonjurors,
but the ultimate Test Act repeal of 1789 had little directly to do with the reform-minded
Quakers, who persisted in their pacifist withdrawal from the political arena. John
Pemberton encapsulated the need to assume a non-threatening public position while
remaining true to the sect’s beliefs in a wartime letter still valid after the peace. Asking
Henry Drinker to intercede with Abel Evans against a “menacing entanglement” that
could be misconstrued as a breach of Quaker neutrality, John cautioned that “we need to
be Wise as Serpents & Harmless as Doves.”93 At the height of the Test Act debates in the
mid-eighties, James Pemberton remarked that “there are great Contests among our
Politicians about Repeal of the Test Law.” He observed that some state representatives
“are very solicitous that friends should write in an application to the Assembly for
removal of the grievance & the restoration of our Just rights.” Yet James opposed Quaker
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involvement, reflecting that “hitherto we have been quiet, and I hope shall so Continue,
from a persuasion that our safety & union consist in avoiding to join in the Councils of
such unstable men.” James expressed similar sentiments amid a later climate of national
insecurity, writing to John in Europe that “a general discontent prevails among the people
in the Massachusetts and Rhode Island governments, which keeps up a great ferment &
agitation.” To this disorder he added a resurgence of war with the natives in the west –
placing the blame once again on the “avarice & imprudence of the Frontier Inhabitants,”
code for the Scots-Irish Presbyterians – and renewed troubles with the northeast’s
Connecticut settlers. His formula for handling the widespread chaos remained secession
from public life. After proudly declaring that “there is not in our Assembly any
acknowledged member of our Religious Society,” he extolled the benefits of strategic
isolation, advising that “our safety consists much in keeping free from having any
connection in their Councils or disputes.” The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of 1786
validated James’ sentiments, exhorting Friends to “beware of taking an active part in
government, either to elect or be elected” – in other words, refrain even from voting.94
This conscious self-reliant insularity among committed Friends made followers
almost impervious to outside influences and, in the long run, earned patriot respect and
acquiescence. Final Quaker reintegration correspondingly took place on the same two
fronts that had followed the British evacuation: the legal external sphere and the internal
self-structured domain. The first required patriot consent. Quaker readiness to embrace
republicanism after God’s ringing verdict on state authority greatly facilitated that path.

94

James Pemberton to John Pemberton, January 16, 1785, Pemberton Papers, Box 42, 165; James
Pemberton to John Pemberton, November 25, 1786, ibid., Box 47, folder 40, HSP; Mekeel, Relation of the
Quakers, 318. The “ferment and agitation” was Shay’s Rebellion then in full swing.

304

On the other hand, reformists built the interior world on an amalgam of family, faith,
community, business, and social concerns, none of which posed a threat to the nascent
republican regime. Illness and death shaped much of daily life. A typical missive had
James Pemberton remarking to John that their sickly sister was now “well and in good
spirits” but his own wife Phoebe “has met with a fresh affliction by the death of her
mother.” Three years later, James described his spouse’s “weak state of mind” and
reclusion in her bed chamber over a period of weeks after the death of a close friend, a
condition resolved by the timely intercession of Quakers Sarah Harrison and Elizabeth
Drinker who insisted Phoebe accompany them to a religious rendezvous in Shrewsbury
which spurred her recovery.95 John Pemberton kept an ongoing tally of acquaintances
who had died since his departure from Philadelphia in 1782, a list enumerating thirtythree such deaths, including merchant Joshua Fisher, physician Thomas Bond, noted
Quaker abolitionist and “my worthy Friend” Anthony Benezet, and extended family such
as cousin Elizabeth Pleasants and nephew Joseph Pemberton, Israel’s son.96
Traveler Jean Pierre Brissot de Warville, a future French revolutionary, witnessed
the candor of a Quaker funeral firsthand. Escorted by James Pemberton, the unidentified
Quaker preacher who delivered the eulogy made a vivid impression on the visitor. The
minister had “trembled in all his body, and his eyes were staring and wild,” and then “a
woman [who] threw herself on her knees, made a very short prayer.” Quaker sincerity of
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emotion made a deep impression on the foreigner. Later that year, Brissot conversed at
length with James a day after his daughter Hannah’s death. As the teary but serene father
reflected on his offspring’s demise, the guest concluded that Quakers “consider Heaven
as their country; and they cannot conceive why death, which conducts to it, should be a
misfortune.”97 Friends held the view that, after living in union with Christ, death led to
greener pastures, invigorating their capacity to endure mortifications such as persecution
and banishment.
The Quaker outlook on earthly suffering likewise subsumed personal needs to the
imperatives of heaven. The letters of John Pemberton’s wife, Hannah, to her husband
abroad exude this sentiment and provide a portrait of the postwar attitudes of the Quaker
faithful. “I wish my dear to be encouraged to fulfill every duty that thou art Called to
perform,” she wrote from Philadelphia three years after his departure. Although she
missed him dearly – “I Salute thee in the tenderest Love & Sympathy even more than I
can express for thou art often in my remembrance by day and by night” – Hannah
expressed solidarity with John’s mission, news of which had “awakened… every tender
feeling on thy account my Beloved Spouse, with whom all that is liveing [sic] within me
is made at times partaker with thee in thy deep Baptisms and unusual path, in which thou
has been led.” Emblematic of the Quaker devout, Hannah Pemberton did not believe John
had made a personal decision to cross the ocean. Instead, he was an instrument of divine
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guidance. A year later, she reaffirmed that “I often very often think of thee & feel myself
thy Companion Closely united in & through thy many trials & exercises which I believe
Infinite Wisdom has Allotted thee for the Promotion of his truth & Righteousness among
many that have been much of Strangers to the precious life & his Holy leadings.”98 In
short, their shared sacred duty was far more important than personal need or suffering.
Sacrifices had to be made for the Lord. It was the same blueprint that steered Quaker
pacifist conduct during the war.
The religious comings and goings of Friends offer further indication of the stature
of faith in the Quaker community during postwar reintegration. A typical trio of letters
from James to John Pemberton in 1784 mention the return from England of American
Friends Robert Valentine and Samuel Rowland Fisher after preaching there; the arrival of
Thomas Irwin with news of Quakers in Ireland; “the business transacted with such
harmony” by “the considerable number of friends now collected from various parts” such
as North Carolina and Virginia for the Yearly Meeting in Philadelphia; and the arrival in
town of Quaker preacher William Kersey. John received encouragement while in Great
Britain not only from wife Hannah, brother James, and other relations but also from the
extended Quaker community. A particularly eloquent letter at mid-decade from Ann
Emlen Jr. heartened the missionary to continue his efforts “to gather in the shieves [sic]
which shall be reaped, & which thou art now as foreman, made to help bind up in the
harvest field of the divine.”99 Ann’s poetic images show the depth of conviction pacifist
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Quakers felt in the quest to bring the world into rightful alignment with their view of the
Gospel. That view posed no threat to patriot authorities of either faction.
Quaker peaceful behavior and acceptance of republican rule is implicit in the
mundane personal, social and business interactions of both the post-evacuation and
postwar eras. The accounts of Thomas Wharton Sr. expose how believers’ focus on the
personal all but erased external politics from daily life in the midst of revolution. Bills
from his carpenter show work recommencing on a remodeling of his estate the summer
after his return from Virginia. In the fall he leased out a lot in the Southwark ward. The
next year he discharged a bond from the colonial era, then borrowed money in gold and
silver, and later rented out his property on the Delaware wharfs as a storefront. In one
instance, patriot moderate Benjamin Rush canceled a lease agreement with Wharton,
blaming “the unjust tender laws” in existence. Rush’s interaction shows that moderates
were willing to do business with those officially tainted with disaffection, while his
condemnation of monetary policy reveals yet another division between patriot radicals
and moderates.100 Life’s routines expunged politics from Wharton’s post-evacuation
communications. Although he had admitted that “great is my uneasiness” and received
assurances from his brother Isaac for “the severe pressure of unmerited captivity” during
“this Deeply afflicting Period” of exile in Virginia, Thomas’ decision afterwards to

100

John King Account Book with Thomas Wharton Sr., August 25, 1778; Memorandum of an Agreement,
Felix Fenner & Thomas Wharton Sr., November 13, 1778; John Baynton, Samuel Wharton & Thomas
Wharton’s Bond, dated 27th February 1767, discharged & delivered April 21, 1779; Borrowed an [sic]
Received of William Fisher Sr. £100 in Gold, February 21, 1780; Borrowed & Recd from Brother William
Wharton £100 in Silver, April 26, 1782; Agreement between Daniel Wier Commissary General & Co. and
Thomas Wharton Sr., August 4, 1782; Benjamin Rush to Madam, March 21, 1781, Wharton & Willing
Families Papers, Collection 2014, Box 3, HSP. It appears “Madam” was handling the rental for Wharton,
who Rush mentions directly in the letter.

308

jettison the revolutionary conflict from his daily record epitomized the Quaker tendency
towards insularity in the midst of rebellion.101
James Pemberton’s correspondence yields a similar air of the commonplace.
While conveying reports of itinerant Quaker preachers in his vicinity, friend Thomas
Colley took the opportunity to request that James send him a batch of good boots.
William Rodman wanted to know if James had received interest payments on a probate
matter implicating the forfeited properties of loyalists Gilbert Hicks and Thomas Smith.
If not, Rodman wanted to apply to the assembly for restitution of his share.102 A year
later, James mediated a debt between the estate of Benjamin Taylor, a deceased
American, and Thomas Wagstaffe, a Quaker merchant in London. The following year he
interceded with Friends in Rhode Island who had questions on an inheritance due to
Pennsylvania Quaker Susannah Fisher. These requests for James’ arbitration reveal his
prestige and standing in the Society of Friends. Social and family interactions dotted the
details of the daily, as if no war or banishment had ever taken place. James notified Dr.
Parke that “thy Company will be acceptable” to dine with Dr. Thornton and himself one
fine afternoon between one and two o’clock. Cousin Jacob Read felt the pinch of war
scarcities in New Jersey and asked for funds to purchase clothing.103 James and John
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arbitrated payment of long overdue debts that Israel’s son Joseph had inherited as part of
his father’s estate. Testy exchanges with their “Loving nephew” had the uncles insisting
Joseph “comply with his [claimant’s] equitable demands” as nephew alluded to a
supposed alacrity hampered by “great interruptions to trade.”104 Even brotherly
connections sometimes required Quaker intercession. John appealed to Henry Drinker to
plead on his behalf about an upcoming religious journey in the company of Thomas
Lightfoot. “If thou would join in giving my Bro[the]r a Hint of the necessity of his
helping me at this time, it would have much effect,” he proposed.105 It appears colleague
Henry had more influence with James than brother John himself did.
The resumption of ordinary life beyond the political is also evident in James
Pemberton’s continuing involvement in the merchant trade, an activity which afforded
him economic viability and more options in worldly affairs than his younger brother. In a
typical business note, London-based Quakers John and Robert Barclay informed James of
financial adjustments involving clients in Rotterdam and the British capital. St. Thomas
merchant Daniel Tyson blamed a missing shipment of silks on a probable capture at sea
because “B.” – his friend and intermediary – “is incapable of neglect.”106 James’
communications sometimes disclosed the larger economic tenor of the times. Referring to
visitations to the homes of neighbors. Such activity served as the backbone of community life. Jacob Read
to James Pemberton, September 21, 1781, ibid., Box 36, 9, HSP.
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an influx of Quakers “whose motives being of a temporal nature” had relocated from the
countryside to Philadelphia in the mid-eighties, James confided that “they will I expect
find their mistake” soon enough because of “the very great change of mercantile affairs,
which are almost daily growing worse, by frequent bankruptcies among the Traders.”
Two years later he again lamented that “our traders & mercantile people complain much
of the dullness of the times.” The economic stagnation reflected in James’ letters
contributed to the changes that spurred the triumph of moderates and resulted in the test
act repeal and state constitution of 1790.107
James and John Pemberton dedicated much of their postwar efforts to fortifying
Quaker institutions and reforms at home – in effect reintegrating the Society of Friends
back into the fabric of Pennsylvania society. The education of Quaker youth, the spiritual
purity of the discipline, and an ambitious project to write a history of Quakerism
incorporating the denomination’s expansion to America headed their agenda. In the first
case, James was named to a committee of Overseers to investigate the “State of our
schools,” specifically the number and quality of “Tutors” and “Schollars [sic].” John
zealously committed to reinforcing the Society’s disciplinary conventions before his
European trip. Though later published during his absence, the 1788 “Epistle of tender
Caution and Counsel Affectionately Addressed to the Members of our Religious Society
in Philadelphia” summarizes John’s earlier objectives and reformists’ anxiety that
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worldly success among the faithful had rendered a parallel loss of religious purity.
Embedded within the epistle’s language was the implicit success of the broader Quaker
reintegration a year before the repeal of the test laws.108 James in particular devoted his
time to gathering firsthand evidence from Meetings throughout the former colonies for
the edition which eventually became John Gough’s four-volume A History of the People
Called Quakers from their First Rise to the Present Time.109 Visitations, ministrations,
mediations, commerce, discipline and service went on as usual as the inner track of
Quaker reintegration bred a semblance of normalcy. Daily life in the postwar era
gradually came to resemble peacetime before the Revolution.
Although focused for the most part inwardly, reformists ventured into the public
arena on behalf of select social causes important for their heavenly aims. Antislavery and
the suppression of vice and immorality headed the list of Quaker advocacy in the 1780s.
While the Society braved some backlash from these external commitments, negative
tremors were subsidiary to recognition from the patriot moderates in power who reacted
to Quaker proposals as if petitioners were fully vested citizens rather than disenfranchised
nonjurors. By acting as “normal” citizens, Friends quietly advanced the notion that they
should be restored as citizens.
The Quaker push against slavery which predated the Revolution typified this
approach. Israel Pemberton and his brothers worked to prohibit slave ownership among
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Friends from mid-century forward, disowning those who refused to comply. Sanctions
continued against fellow Quakers who failed to abide by the sect’s manumission dictates
into the postwar period.110 Over time, reformers’ efforts expanded into relief assistance
and the establishment of schools for people of African descent.111 The logic of applying
antislavery tenets to one’s own members led reformist leaders to combat the immorality
beyond the bounds of the faith, lobbying government and the general population for an
end to the slave trade and the abolition of slavery itself. In their view, what was evil for
Quakers was naturally evil for the greater society. In 1780, the state assembly’s passage
of “An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery” crowned Friends’ antislavery efforts.112
Quaker opposition to slavery afterwards extended beyond the provincial borders of
Pennsylvania to the southern states, the Continental Congress headquartered in New
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York, and across the ocean to Parliament and the English public. Devoted reformer
Warner Mifflin asked John Pemberton to provide him with materials “particularly
respecting the Negroes” to take to Virginia and later again for an address to Parliament
while he was in England. Patriot printer Francis Bailey, who published the Freeman’s
Journal or the North American Intelligencer in Philadelphia from 1781 to 1792, informed
James Pemberton that he hoped to send to Charleston one hundred copies of “Mr. Day’s
letter” opposing the slave trade. He enclosed another two hundred copies for circulation
in Pennsylvania and offered a like number “if you have connections in the southern
states… for the purpose of circulating among them.”113 Like Benjamin Rush’s lease with
Thomas Wharton Sr., antislavery cooperation between Bailey and Pemberton less than a
year after the war’s termination suggests collaboration between nonjurors and patriots
was perfectly acceptable despite the former’s continued disenfranchisement.
In the mid-1780s, James Pemberton and fellow reformist leaders revved up their
campaign against the slave trade by taking the debate to the Continental Congress seated
at New York. In a letter to John, James referred to “an application… lately made to the
President of Congress” on the subject and distribution of a pamphlet on “the Case of the
Oppressed Africans, sufficient to deliver one to each member.” The drive continued over
the next few years. In 1786, key Philadelphia Quakers including James teamed with
coreligionists in New York and sent a delegation to Congress to advance the antislavery
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message. The delegation met with Foreign Minister John Jay, late President of Congress
Nathaniel Gorham, New York radical Melancthon Smith, and a bevy of congressional
delegates from South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, Maryland, and Massachusetts.
Significantly, radical Philadelphian Charles Thomson “gave us a list of divers of the
Members of the Southern Governments with his apprehensions of their Views in Relation
to the Matter under Care.”114 As long-time secretary to Congress, Presbyterian Thomson
had been an active proponent of the 1777 Quaker deportation to Virginia and opposed
pacifist rigidity throughout the revolutionary conflict. Still congressional secretary when
the delegation visited New York, Thomson’s willingness to lend a hand demonstrates an
increasing acceptance of ex-disaffected pacifists as legitimate constituents of the nation,
despite their legal marginalization at home.115
Reformists likewise viewed with alarm the population’s mounting postwar
preoccupation with earthly cares. In response, they mounted campaigns to suppress vice
and depravity. The Quaker hierarchy was especially wary of institutions that fostered
moral decay. In their view, the two most notorious were taverns, considered “ensnaring
Nurseries of Idleness, Drunkenness and Debauchery,” and “the Amusements of the
Stage” which promoted “the most pernicious Evils” contrary to the teachings of
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Christianity. While countering this declension in virtue, Quakers addressed the state
assembly as concerned inhabitants on multiple occasions.116 In 1786, Friends succeeded
in strengthening an anti-vice bill that had served as the revolutionary state’s morality
compass since 1779. Extended provisions targeted iniquities such as godless “worldly
business” and diversions on Sundays, profanity, intoxication, cockfighting, bulletplaying, billiards, gaming for money, betting, duels, theatrical productions, and the
number of taverns. Three years later, opposing petitioners succeeded in repealing the
sections applying to “dramatic entertainments,” the assembly declaring itself “desirous of
promoting the interests of genius and literature by permitting such theatrical exhibitions
as are capable of advancing morality and virtue and polishing the manners and habits of
society.”117
The postwar national battle over the inhumanity of slavery and the slave trade and
the local campaign over the impropriety of theatrical entertainments and distribution of
spirited liquors both failed. The Quaker push to have the first federal Congress end the
slave trade in 1789 rather than delaying its prohibition for twenty years as negotiated into
the federal Constitution did not succeed. Congress did pass a Slave Trade Act the next
decade barring U. S. ships from participation in that inhumane commerce under a penalty
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of forfeiture for vessels that violated federal law. And in 1808 Congress outlawed the
slave trade as per the earlier constitutional covenant, one year after passage of the Act
Prohibiting the Importation of Slaves.118 Quakers indisputably contributed to the public
sentiment encouraging these measures but the broader goal of national abolition proved
elusive. Similar results occurred on the local vice and virtue front. Taverns and theaters
not only survived but thrived in Pennsylvania in the ensuing years. The secular current
was simply too strong.
Nevertheless, efficacious public advocacy in the case of gradual abolition at the
state level suggests that Quaker reintegration began well before the war ended. It is
striking that pacifist reformers achieved passage of an abolition act through a historically
hostile radical-dominant assembly at the height of its power less than two years after the
public execution of two Quakers. Contemporary radical ideology is ascertainable in the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, that faction’s most distinctive pronouncement during
the Revolution. The issue of slavery appears only once in the document, an allusion in the
preamble to England’s use of “foreign mercenaries, savages and slaves, for the avowed
purpose of reducing them [Pennsylvanians] to a total and abject submission to the
despotic domination of the British parliament.” The topic does not appear in any of the
sixteen articles in the key section entitled “A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants
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of the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania.”119 In other words, slavery was not a
crucial concern for radicals in 1776. Yet they joined forces with Quaker rivals in 1780.
This achievement could not have occurred without the coalescence of various
factors. First, radicals had come to recognize a notable difference between armed loyalist
militants and the relatively innocuous character of religious pacifists like those banished
to Virginia. Second, the unfortunate executions of Quakers Abraham Carlisle and John
Roberts in 1778 satisfied the clamor for revenge against the sect among rebel officials.
Third, revolutionaries turned their wrath against the overt loyalists who departed rather
than the merely disaffected who stayed through the confiscation and sale of exiles’ assets.
These attitudinal changes allowed radical patriots to honor the entreaties of pacifist
Quakers at permissible junctures with the same attention and dignity given to full citizens
of the commonwealth, in a sense obscuring the legal status of the disaffected. The pattern
continued into the postwar era. Quaker reformers accordingly engaged authorities as if
they had an inherent right to participate in government. James Pemberton and eleven
other Quaker leaders said as much in their 1785 anti-vice address to the state assembly.
“Incited by an Apprehension of religious duty and a real concern for the prosperity of our
Country,” Friends implied they were already citizens of Pennsylvania despite their
nonjuror status.120
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Official postwar reactions to Quaker efforts at both the local and national levels
presupposed that Friends did not object to republican rule. Many members of Congress
received their antislavery delegations to New York with open arms – even southern
delegates met with them and listened. Meanwhile, Pennsylvania authorities did not deny
access to Quakers because of their legal condition. On the morality question, religious
leaders from other denominations joined in the campaign to ban stage plays and limit the
effects of taverns, further validating Quaker legitimacy. When the national government
moved from New York to Philadelphia, reformers widened their anti-vice campaign to
include federal authorities. President Washington’s response to a 1789 address of the
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting illustrates the sentiment of many patriots. “Your principles
and conduct are well known to me,” said the president, “and it is doing the People called
Quakers no more than Justice to say that (excepting their declining to share with others
the burthen of the common defense) there is no Denomination among us who are more
exemplary and useful Citizens.”121 Although this exchange took place several months
after the test act repeal had reestablished nonjurors as fully enfranchised Pennsylvania
citizens, the underlying tone of the president’s words suggests a long-standing attitude. In
the end, Quaker reengagement on social issues strengthened the view that they were
valuable citizens who posed no threat and willingly accepted a republican government
born of revolution.
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REINTEGRATION AFTER THE TEST ACT REPEAL
Legal reintegration for members in good standing of the Society of Friends came
full circle with the test act repeal. James Pemberton and a minority of his brethren who
still believed in the positive effects of political participation during peacetime reentered
public life immediately after reacquisition of their “just rights.” Two days before the
repeal, the Pennsylvania assembly passed an act incorporating the City of Philadelphia
and restructuring the government to include the election of fifteen aldermen and thirty
common councilmen. Polls opened about three weeks after the incorporation and repeal.
James Pemberton won a seat as a common councilman. With him, Quakers Miers Fisher,
Henry Drinker, and Edward Pennington also emerged victorious.122 Their election speaks
volumes on changing conditions and reintegrative success. The four had been banished to
Virginia in 1777. A dozen years after that tragedy, the freemen of the city had elected
those they once repudiated to rule over them. The election suggests Quaker reintegration
exceeded legal constructs to include a much fuller social reacceptance.
At the close of the eighties, a new era dawned in Pennsylvania. The local and the
national merged to make the state – and especially the capital city – the center of life in
the early republic. The confluence of the test act repeal and the new state constitution of
1790, on the one hand, and the federal constitution and the relocation of the seat of
national government to Philadelphia, on the other, exemplified the decisive victory of
patriot moderates. That triumph brought Quakers closer to a resumption of pre-war
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normalcy. John Pemberton finally returned from Europe in the fall of 1789. Arriving after
the repeal battle, John’s acceptance of the new order was barely an afterthought. His
reintegration was seamless. Disembarking at Wilmington, Delaware, on September 26,
John was pleased to find that former council president and patriot moderate “John
Dickinson sent his carriage with us to Chester.” Dickinson’s civility was yet another
manifestation that Quakers merited respect. Hannah was delighted to see her husband.
The youngest Pemberton brother resumed his duties at home with the same characteristic
fervor as earlier. He rejoined the Philadelphia Meeting. He again distributed personal
funds to the poor. He accompanied other ministers on religious outings to fellow Friends
in the surrounding countryside, like the three weeks he spent calling on Quaker families
in Bucks County with James Thornton in 1792. In community circles, John and Hannah
revived their close contacts with Philadelphia Quakers. Elizabeth Drinker noted that the
couple were often guests at her home in the early 1790s.123
Yet even seamless reintegration proved unsatisfactory for a John Pemberton
burdened by weightier concerns. His “return to his relatives and friends after a long
absence on his former European visit, was very gratifying,” James observed. But it soon
became apparent that “he came to us under an apprehension that his duty was not fully
performed; which occasioned so great distress and conflict, as sometimes to affect his
bodily health.” After nearly a half-decade at home, John reapplied to the Monthly and
Quarterly Meetings for a new certificate which would allow him to return to Europe as a
missionary. Prolonged introspection and debate followed. Eventually he received the
blessing “of the full unity of his brethren.” On May 27, 1794, he boarded the Adrian at
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Newcastle, Delaware, and set off for Amsterdam, the first leg of a voyage to the faithful
in Germany.124 John Pemberton would never see America again. During his first winter
abroad, he became ill and “reduced to a very weak state.” In the final entry of his diary,
the dedicated disciple counseled two errant congregants “not willing to be subject to the
discipline and good order, in wisdom established among Friends” and then recorded that
mail delivery had been interrupted because the armies of the French Revolution had
crossed into Holland. John died among his beloved people at Pyrmont, Germany, on
January 31, 1795 and was interred days later at the Friends burial ground there. Hannah
lived on till the age of seventy-seven, finally passing away in 1811. Her death signaled
the end of that branch of the family. The pair had no children.125
Israel Pemberton’s legacy after his 1779 death carried further. As the last male
heir of the King of the Quakers, worldly son Joseph lasted only a few more years, dying
in 1782 at the age of thirty-five soon after the terse exchanges with his uncles on the
payment of inherited debts. Joseph’s marriage to Ann Galloway of Maryland in 1767,
however, produced eight children – four boys and four girls – all of whom survived the
war. Four of the eight lived into the nineteenth century. Youngest son, John, born after
Joseph’s death, endured longest among those of his generation, breathing his last in 1847
– a year after Lorenzo Sabine resurrected loyalists in the first edition of his Biographical
Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution. Like Joseph, two of Israel’s daughters
– Mary and Sarah – also survived the revolutionary era. In 1762, Mary married future
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Virginia exile Samuel Pleasants. Their union produced ten children. Mary Pemberton
Pleasants died in 1821. Sarah married Samuel Rhoads in 1765, had three children, and
died in 1810. Despite the fact that these descendants did not carry forward the Pemberton
surname, Israel’s lineage nonetheless reaped the long-term benefits of reintegration,
leading productive lives into the antebellum period.126
Whereas fate had willed the death of his older brother and religious fervor had
taken away his younger sibling, it was James Pemberton who was left to fulfill the
promise of reintegration in Pennsylvania as the Age of Federalism dawned. James and
wife Phoebe continued in their roles as leaders of a community that still looked mainly
inward. In 1794 the couple were overseers at the wedding of Elizabeth and Henry
Drinker’s son. Two years later they consoled the Drinkers after daughter Molly chose to
marry outside the faith. During this time, James’ reputation grew within Quaker Meeting
circles. Brissot de Warville’s description shortly before the test act repeal extended into
the future. Referring to James’ station among his coreligionists, the Frenchman held that
he was “one of the most wealthy, and one whose virtues have placed him among the most
respectable of their chiefs.”127 Although postwar troubles affected Quaker legal rights,
citizenship, and social standing in the broader society, Brissot de Warville’s comment
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reveals that these effects did not extend into the economic arena. Quaker merchants
continued to prosper in the immediate postwar period.128
In the newly reopened public sphere, James refreshed his commitment to dearly
held social causes. He signed petitions to Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council on
behalf of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery in 1789. Six months later he was
elected President of the organization, replacing the revered and recently deceased
Benjamin Franklin. That a formerly banished pacifist Quaker replaced the most renowned
Pennsylvania patriot of the American Revolution at the head of an institution on the
cutting edge of social change ratifies the view that reformist Friends had regained the
broader society’s respect by 1790 and reintegrated well beyond the legal realm. Under
James’ tutelage, the Abolition Society’s hopes for abolishing the slave trade expanded
into the global arena through partnership with the Société des Amis des Noirs in France,
founded in 1788 with the collaboration of Brissot de Warville.129 James was reelected
annually as the society’s president until his advanced age in 1802 prompted a resignation.
During the Federalist era, Quakers also turned their attention again to Indian affairs but
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the Pembertons played a diminished role.130 A renewed Quaker call for pacifism went out
during the Quasi-War storm when an address to the federal Congress urging the United
States to refrain from war with France set off a public firestorm that caused James and
others to withdraw their names from the petition. The conflagration was the product of
the newly emergent Democratic-Republican/Federalist factionalism of the 1790s. In this
instance, William Cobbett’s notorious Porcupine’s Gazette led a pro-Federalist attack on
the pacifist petitioners, charging that James and his Quaker colleagues had aligned
themselves “with Democrats, with disorganizers and atheists” – meaning French
revolutionaries. The accusation implied that James supported war on the side of France, a
misunderstanding he resolutely wished to rectify.131
As the revolutionary century closed, James Pemberton entered life’s final stages.
In his last decade, the indefatigable reformer maintained an armchair devotion for his
favored causes, for example corresponding with President Thomas Jefferson on the
antislavery question. James passed away in Philadelphia on February 9, 1809 and was
buried in the city’s Quaker cemetery in the presence of “a very large concourse of his
fellow citizens.” He was eighty-five. His will divided substantial wealth in real estate
holdings and personal property not only among his wife, children and grandchildren but
also six friends and three domestic servants. Phoebe Lewis Morton Pemberton survived
her husband for another three years, dying in 1812 at the age of seventy-four. Two
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decades later Philadelphia historian John Watson painted a vivid sketch of the final
Pemberton of the revolutionary generation, describing James as “almost the last of the
race of the ‘cocked hats’ and certainly one of the very best pictorial illustrations of bygone times and primitive men.” In a later assessment, loyalist historian Lorenzo Sabine
remarked that James had died “universally respected.” Judging from the admiration and
esteem bestowed upon this Quaker icon in his waning days, there can be no doubt that
long-term reintegration was a success for pacifist Friends like him. Patriot Pennsylvania
had forgiven – or perhaps chosen to forget – the sins of suspected British collaborators
who had once spurned the noble ideal of self-government.132
CONCLUSION
Despite a preference for monarchy and the old order over republican rule, pacifist
and reform-driven Quakers like the Pemberton brothers were never pro-British militants.
They are better understood as disaffected Pennsylvanians rather than loyalists. Their main
objective was to preserve Pennsylvania as a sanctuary of peace, tolerance and prosperity
according to the vision of founder William Penn. Two wars challenged that promise.
During the French and Indian War, Quakers who dominated the provincial assembly
blamed Presbyterian settlers rather than natives for the savagery of frontier conflict, in the
process alienating many non-Quaker whites. That struggle accelerated an internal move
to purify Quakerism as reformers pressed for a wholesale retreat from public life in order
to preserve pacifist ethics. By the time the American Revolution reared its head, reformist
Friends were well on their way to dismantling the Quaker party in the assembly and
voluntarily abdicating power. Presbyterian-led radicals with anti-Quaker antecedents
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exacerbated by colonial tensions repudiated pacifist passivity in the wake of imperial
tyranny and filled the power vacuum. After Lexington, the rebel call to arms collided
head-on with Quaker pacifism and, in the eyes of radical insurgents, developed into a
loyalist vs. revolutionary divide. Friends’ belief that violence and war were inherently
evil and contrary to Christ’s teachings bound them to reject militia service and the
payment of taxes and fines linked to prosecution of the war. A scripturally inspired
Quaker prohibition against the taking of oaths further distanced Friends from rebels, as
did Quaker faith in the inviolability of established government.
The resentment and distrust between Quakers and radicals culminated in the arrest
of key Quaker leaders such as Israel, James, and John Pemberton suspected as British
collaborators when General William Howe invaded Pennsylvania in the fall of 1777. The
detainees refused to take the oath of allegiance to the state or sign paroles, resulting in
their banishment to Virginia without a hearing. Refusal of the test oath thus became the
engine for Quaker disenfranchisement. After much controversy, patriot authorities
permitted the return of the exiles to Philadelphia in late April 1778. The group was never
formally charged with a crime. When Clinton’s imperial army evacuated the city and the
revolutionary government returned in June, the Pembertons and their fellow Virginia
exiles chose to remain in Pennsylvania rather than depart with the British, launching their
reintegration journey.
The Pembertons and like-minded pacifists responded to the restoration of patriot
rule by assuming a non-threatening posture that avoided politics and focused on their
daily lives and businesses. Initially, their only public concern was a campaign to help
jailed antiwar Friends and their families affected by patriot retribution. Uplifted by the
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convictions that saintly duty superseded personal desire and suffering was an instrument
of God’s grace, disenfranchised Quakers channeled their energies into inward-looking
family, religious, community, business, and social activities beyond the scope of politics.
Friends only reentered the public arena to defend their faith, uphold divine virtue and
right social wrongs, mainly in campaigns against moral decay and the institution of
slavery. The antislavery effort led to the passage of the Gradual Abolition Act of 1780.
The patriot victory that ended the war allowed Quakers to accept republican rule
since Providence had ordained a new source of governmental authority. Ignoring their
protracted nonjuror status, postwar Quakers repeatedly assumed the role of enfranchised
citizens who had a right to petition government. In general, these efforts were received
agreeably in key patriot circles such as the Pennsylvania General Assembly and the
Continental Congress. Friends’ non-threatening pacifist posture and their readiness to
accept republican rule established favorable conditions for the legal reincorporation of
nonjurors. These factors coincided with the political triumph of patriot moderates at the
state level, leading to the 1789 repeal of the test acts – with little Quaker input. By
reinstating citizenship rights, the repeal closed the book on the legal reintegration process
for nonjurors.
That James Pemberton and other reformist Quakers ran for office immediately
following the test act revocation ratifies that Friends valued legal enfranchisement. Yet
citizenship played second fiddle to the precepts of their religious faith, especially the call
to pacifism. The electoral triumphs of James and three other pacifist candidates banished
in 1777 illustrates that Quakers had successfully reintegrated by 1790, a point further
evidenced in James’ election as president of the Abolition Society following the death of
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celebrated patriot Benjamin Franklin that year. Over the long haul, the inoffensive nature
and consistency of Quaker pacifist behavior – inspired and guided by reformers like the
Pembertons for nearly half a century – generated trust among former revolutionaries.
This trust aligned with the inclusionary views of patriot moderates and paved the way for
the legal reintegration of those once thought to be obnoxious and inimical.
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CHAPTER 5
LOYALIST DEFIANCE, THE RULE OF LAW & REINTEGRATION
In addition to the attitudes, behaviors and actions of the disaffected, the root
causes of reintegrative success must also take patriot contributions into account. For only
the victors could confer a full-scale reassimilation of onetime enemies. Taking over a
decade to crystallize, patriot consent for reintegration was the outgrowth of two
underlying premises. The first was ideological. Revolutionary theory touted the inherent
rights of English subjects – reborn as republican citizens – as moral justification for
rebellion. During the imperial crisis, violations of these rights emphasized issues like
taxation without representation in Parliament, local jury trials in cases with political
overtones rather than adjudicatory venues in England, colonists’ forcible quartering of a
British standing army in peacetime, and the ongoing authority of provincial assemblies to
pay the salaries of royal governors. The later push towards popular sovereignty added a
philosophical orientation to these rights that was more inclusionary, building on concepts
such as greater equality, extension of citizenship and the franchise to those willing to
swear allegiance, and expanded representation in democratically elected bodies.1 The
enforcement of these natural rights required an impartial system of justice based on the
rule of law equally applicable to all citizens, a universal ideal regulated by contemporary
views of citizenship among patriot radicals and moderates.
The second premise was pragmatic. For hard-fought revolutionary aspirations to
endure, Pennsylvania society had to achieve a degree of stability that would foster long-
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term political, economic and social development. As a class of residents legally removed
from public participation, nonjurors were an impediment to the postwar vision and reality
of a successful revolution with the potential to extend well into the protracted lifetimes of
the disaffected generation. Because radical Constitutionalists favored permanent
exclusion of nonjurors who had not taken the test oath, their political dominance meant
that the state would require two sets of rights and laws well into the future, one for fullfledged citizens and another for proscribed nonjurors, contradicting the inclusionary
tendency of inherent rights philosophy, and in practice prolonging the political insecurity
that defined much of the 1780s. On the other hand, a sectarian win for moderate AntiConstitutionalists heralded one set of rights and laws for all citizens and growing societal
stability, as per their more inclusive outlook. As the popular will increasingly backed
moderates in local elections after 1781, their triumphs laid the groundwork for a
reinstatement of the rights of large segments of the disenfranchised and the elaboration of
a single system of laws for all qualifying citizens, providing ideological consistency and
political stabilization.
While application of the law to defend the rights of citizens who pledged
allegiance was a foundational principle of the Revolution, defiance often generated a
hostile reaction. Quaker pacifists challenged the new order by publicly protesting military
violence and refusing to take the test oath. Despite a profound disdain for their antiwar
stance and an initial policy of banishment, revolutionaries concluded over time that
reformist Friends did not present a genuine danger to the budding republic. But there
were others, much more palpably loyalist, who engendered fiercer reactions from rebel
officials. Two examples stand out. Quakers Abraham Carlisle and John Roberts, who
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collaborated with General William Howe’s administration during the British occupation,
tried to resume life as usual after the evacuation only to find themselves the foils of
official and popular rage. After their conviction for high treason, the radical government
executed the pair in a very public display in November 1778. Meanwhile, the Doan
guerrillas personified the remnants of the loyalist militants who continued to fight for the
king in Pennsylvania after the British evacuation. Their actions jeopardized the security
and stability of the revolutionary government into the postwar period. Both radical
Constitutionalists and moderate Republicans interpreted the Doan gang’s activities as an
existential threat and successfully joined forces to eradicate the danger.
When juxtaposed with the treatment of Quaker pacifists, the Carlisle/Roberts and
Doan cases reveal the bounds of dissent that Pennsylvania’s revolutionary factions chose
to allow. As ongoing radical vs. moderate patriot factionalism disclosed, one could
dispute the nature of republicanism and popular sovereignty from within. Allegiance
permitted internal divisions. The nascent state was also willing to tolerate the continuing
presence of recalcitrant nonjurors such as the Quakers as long as they posed no threat.
Moreover, contrition was not only feasible but encouraged. Many attainted during the
war willingly surrendered, banking on the clemency of rebel authorities. Most judged
correctly. Patriot officials discharged the cases of prominent citizens like Provost William
Smith of the College of Philadelphia and merchant Tench Coxe, as well as those of lesser
sorts like artisans Ludwig Kercher and John Palmer, farmers Peter Robeson and Uriah
Hughes Jr., and laborers John Burnett and Henry Effinger. Artisan Joseph Bolton, pilot
John Poor, farmer James Hartnett, and merchant Samuel Garrigues Sr. surrendered and
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went to trial, only to be acquitted.2 Discharge or acquittal led to a restoration of
citizenship after the requisite oath of allegiance. Those attainted could also solicit official
forgiveness. The state exonerated a number of attainted Pennsylvanians between 1779
and 1802, with most pardons granted in the postwar era of moderate ascendancy.3 In
these ways, the revolutionary legal order bolstered republican rights and reintegration,
while legitimizing patriot authority and control. Yet the Carlisle/Roberts and Doan affairs
depict the reverse side of the coin, demonstrating that patriots denied consent for
reintegration when it was perceived that the disaffected did pose a threat to republican
rule. The nature of that threat was in the eye of the beholder, however. Whereas radicals
and moderates came together to exterminate the Doans’ armed insubordination, radicals
went at it alone in the case of Carlisle and Roberts, who by any measure no longer posed
a danger to the Revolution at the time of their arrest in late 1778. This punitive disparity
between revolutionary factions reaffirms that successful legal reintegration could only
have taken place under moderate rule.
THE EXECUTION OF QUAKERS ABRAHAM CARLISLE & JOHN ROBERTS
On November 4, 1778, revolutionaries executed Quakers Abraham Carlisle and
John Roberts in Philadelphia for high treason. The news pervaded local accounts. Noting
2

“List of Persons Against Whom Proclamations Were Issued by the Supreme Executive Council & Who
Surrendered Themselves to be Tried for High Treason,” June 28, 1779, from the Records of the Courts of
Oyer & Terminer & for the Several Counties of Philadelphia, Chester, Bucks, Lancaster & Northampton,
Pennsylvania Archives, Sixth Series, vol. 13, 475-477; Scharf & Westcott, History of Philadelphia, 395.
3

The difference between discharge/acquittal and forgiveness/pardon was mainly procedural. Most of those
found guilty through attainders did not voluntarily surrender for trial as required by law. Most who did
surrender were discharged or acquitted. See my footnote on Anne Ousterhout’s study of rebel prosecutions
for infidelity in the section entitled “Quelling Disaffection” in Chapter 1. Henry James Young’s list of 42
pardons shows that radical-dominant government granted six between April 1779 and 1781, three were the
product of the transitional stage of mixed radical-moderate rule between November 1781 and September
1783, while moderate-led governments granted 33 thereafter. Young, “The Treatment of the Loyalists in
Pennsylvania,” Appendix XI, “A List of Proclaimed Traitors Who Were Pardoned,” 400-401.
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the calamity, Grace Growden Galloway recorded in her dairy “all things are gloomy.”
Elizabeth Drinker also confided to her journal, “An awful Solemn day it has been.” That
evening she and husband Henry went to pay their respects at “Neigr. Carliles [sic]” where
“the Body is brought home, and laid out – looks placid & Serene.” Quaker preacher John
Pemberton, who had visited the prisoners in jail two days before the execution and
“found them in a thoughtful disposition, and tender,” noted that “they appeared resigned,
and died without a struggle,” their faces as if “in an easy deep sleep.”4 Moravian minister
John Ettwein was present at the morbid spectacle, “meditating with unusual fervor upon
our doctrinal text: ‘For none of us liveth to himself.’” Ettwein considered the death of
these “old and otherwise highly respected and beloved men” an injustice engineered by
the radical Presbyterian faction who “had contrived to prevent the House from
assembling before they had been hanged.” Given the city’s inflamed political tensions in
the wake of the British evacuation, he believed the execution was inevitable, for
“Quakers were to be and had to be hung.”5
Ettwein’s analysis accurately reflects the contemporary partisan dynamic between
patriot radicals and moderates. After Sir Henry Clinton’s army abandoned the provincial

4

“Diary of Grace Growden Galloway,” November 4, 1778, PMHB, vol. 55, no. 1, 56; Diary of Elizabeth
Drinker, November 4, 1778, 82; John Pemberton, Eleventh Month 2 nd (November 2, 1778) & Fourth day
(November 4, 1778), The Life and Travels of John Pemberton, 92-93. Although he does not say so
explicitly, Pemberton’s language strongly suggests he was present at the execution.
5

John Ettwein, Short Account of the Disturbances in America and of the Brethren’s Conduct and Suffering
in This Connection in Kenneth Gardiner Hamilton, John Ettwein and the Moravian Church during the
Revolutionary Period (Bethlehem, PA: Times Publishing Co., 1940), 222 (emphasis mine). The biblical
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capital in mid-June, returning revolutionaries found Philadelphia devastated.6 A popular
clamor for revenge arose. Historical antagonisms between Presbyterians from the lower
and artisan classes and the once dominant Quakers led to bottom-up pressures targeting
Friends, among others, who could be identified as loyal to King George III – a perilous
state of affairs with the potential to metastasize. Unfortunately for the vengeful, most
diehard followers of the king like Joseph Galloway and the loyalist Allens had departed
with the British. Aware that backlash could lead to anarchy, patriot moderates counseled
prudence. The resulting tug of war between rebel factions culminated in the arrest and
execution of Carlisle and Roberts as a means to satiate popular rancor while restraining
further bloodletting. Measured in those terms, it worked. Whether it was justified or not
is another matter.7 The episode was irrefutably the pinnacle of revolutionary events in
Pennsylvania in late 1778. Sundry aspects of the affair have been covered in the historical
scholarship over the years. David Maxey’s outstanding treatment of the John Roberts trial
is of particular note.8 Given the present study’s reintegrative focus, however, the concern
here is as much about the aftermath as the trial and execution itself. The hanging of
Abraham Carlisle and John Roberts shows that patriots were bent on eradicating what
they perceived as direct threats to their authority, although in this case only the radicals in
power envisaged the peril. The execution further reveals that reintegration could only

6

Jackson, With the British Army in Philadelphia, especially Chapter XVI, “A Devastated City,” 265-273.

7
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8
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occur on terms that legitimized and institutionalized republican rule and stability. Lastly,
it exposes that the law, when wielded under radical authority, could be a double-edged
sword for the disaffected and not necessarily a vehicle assuring successful reintegration,
as in later periods of moderate hegemony.
As rumors swirled that the British were going to voluntarily relinquish occupied
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council attainted Abraham Carlisle,
“House Carpenter” of the City of Philadelphia, and John Roberts, “late of the Township
of Lower Merion, Miller,” on May 8, 1778. This council attainder proclamation issued
from Lancaster following the original assembly attainder act of March 6 targeted fiftyseven presumed loyalists, placing the pair among the first seventy attainted provincials.9
Disregarding contrary cautions, the carpenter and the miller decided to stay and adapt to
the revolutionary regime rather than depart. Regarding Carlisle, Joseph Galloway said
that “I positively advised him to leave the city, because I knew he would not be safe.”
Similarly, Roberts’ cousin and future U. S. Senator Jonathan Roberts later wrote “my
father thought that his return within the power of the Whigs, was unwise, and advis’d
accordingly.”10 The Quakers’ confidence in revolutionary moderation was not wholly
unfounded. In April, the Continental Congress sitting at York had recommended “to the
legislatures of the several states to pass laws, or… issue proclamations, offering pardon,”

9

“A Proclamation,” May 8, 1778, Colonial Records, vol. 11, 481-485. The earlier assembly attainder act
named thirteen individuals. See Statutes At Large of Pennsylvania, vol. 9, “An Act for the Attainder of
Divers Traitors if They Render Not Themselves by a Certain Day, and for Vesting Their Estates in This
Commonwealth, and for More Effectually Discovering the Same and for Ascertaining and Satisfying the
Lawful Debts and Claims Thereupon,” March 6, 1778, Chapter 784, 201-202.
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The Examination of Joseph Galloway, Esq; Late Speaker of the House of Assembly of Pennsylvania,
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J. Wilkie, 1779), 76-77; Jonathan Roberts and Philip Shriver Klein, “Notes and Documents: Memoirs of a
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to those who surrendered while asking “good and faithful citizens... to receive such
returning penitents with compassion and mercy, and to forgive and bury in oblivion their
past failings and transgressions.” Even radical judge Thomas McKean expressed
optimism two weeks before the British evacuation for “a general Pardon” to exclude only
those who had earlier committed “an Overt-Act, such as bearing arms, or annexing his
person to the troops of the Enemy… or furnishing them with provisions or intelligence.”
At the very least, he believed those who willingly surrendered “ought to be bailed.”11
John Roberts took immediate action to remedy his situation. The day after the
British army left the city, he made a good faith visit to a patriot justice of the peace to
affirm his allegiance to Pennsylvania, thereby complying with the June 25th surrender
deadline of his attainder. In a written declaration, Justice Zebulon Potts confirmed that
Roberts had taken the test oath and commanded “all Sheriffs, Constables, &c., not to
detain nor keep in Custody the said John Roberts, on any Account, Cause, Action or
thing.” All seemed in good order. Besides, Roberts possessed favorable pre-war
resistance credentials, nominated as one of forty-three representatives for Philadelphia
city and county to “a large and respectable Committee… to correspond with the Sister
colonies” for the purpose of setting up a colonial Congress at the mass citizens’ meeting
that protested Parliament’s closure of the port of Boston on June 18, 1774.12
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Journals of the American Congress, vol. 2, April 23, 1778, 525; Thomas McKean to William Atlee, June
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But the popular outcry swelled. Indicative of growing resentment against the
“notoriously disaffected, and others of suspicious characters, [who] presuming upon the
indulgence and lenity of their virtuous and forbearing countrymen, have lately manifested
an unbecoming and insolent spirit,” nearly two hundred patriots signed a public pledge to
root out those guilty of “misdoings before and during the enemy’s possession of this city”
and “bring such offenders to proper trial.” A round-up of many of the attainted – and
unattainted – soon followed. Officials issued a warrant for Roberts’ arrest on July 27 and
he was taken into custody on August 10. Ten days later he faced a hearing with the
recently sanguine Judge McKean who now denied him bail.13 Abraham Carlisle was
arrested on August 1. After a grand jury recommended indictment, his jury trial began on
September 25. Patriots officially charged him with “1. Taking a commission, 2. Levying
war, and 3. Aiding & assisting the Enemies of this State” – legalese for having supervised
the administration of passes in and out of the city under Howe during the occupation, in
effect the British gatekeeper. The grand jury likewise indicted Roberts and his jury trial
followed on September 30. The state charged him on five counts: “In endeavoring to
procure a party of Light horse to rescue those banished to Virginia; Acting as a Guide;
Being at Offices under the King & causing People to be imprisoned as Rebels; That he
endeavored to persuade people to inlist [sic] under Captn James; That he lived in the
Country and joined the enemy in the city.” Of these, the most serious was the second: his

Thomas McKean, as well as future assembly speaker from October 1780 to September 1783 Frederick
Augustus Muhlenberg.
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The Pennsylvania Packet, July 25, 1778, DLAR. The first signature on the published list was that of
Joseph Reed, who was to prosecute John Roberts and Abraham Carlisle for the state. “Diary of Grace
Growden Galloway,” August 10, 1778, PMHB, vol. 55, no. 1, 48; Maxey, Treason on Trial, 28.
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role as a guide during a particularly destructive British army foraging expedition in
December 1777.14
During the period between arrest and trial, Philadelphia’s Quakers published a
reaffirmation of their pacifist principles and protested what they considered unwarranted
revolutionary persecution. Recognizing that “a number of our friends have been and are
imprisoned, some for refusing to pay the fines imputed in lieu of personal services in the
present war, and others for refusing to take the test prescribed by some laws lately made,”
Friends reiterated their “steady adherence to our peaceable principles, and testimony
against wars and fighting,” and appealed to the religious protections of the original Penn
charter, circuitously ignoring the rebel government’s legitimacy. In addition, they asked
for a repeal of those laws “which have a tendency to oppress tender consciences.” For
Friends Roberts and Carlisle, the timing could not have been worse. Radicals blamed
Quaker acquiescence under the British occupation for much of the city’s devastation. As
“Belisarius” noted in a typical reaction, the address “has excited the most general
resentment among all other orders of people that I have ever yet observed to follow any
publication.”15
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With tensions thus magnified, radical Joseph Reed prosecuted both treason cases
in the state Courts of Oyer & Terminer & General Gaol Delivery. Eleven witnesses
stepped forth to condemn Carlisle for his arbitrariness and malice as administrator of
passes, while seven censured Roberts, principally for his role as a guide in Howe’s
foraging excursion. The Roberts defense countered with twenty-nine witnesses, the
Carlisle defense with at least twelve. For the most part, both defenses did not contest the
facts but rather argued that the accused had acted in fear under British duress and
compulsion.16 Trial testimony exposed the irony that John Roberts had at times aided the
revolutionaries, cooperating with a neighbor to safely secure the papers of the
Continental Congress during the British invasion and informing General Washington so
that the documents could be successfully recovered. Later forfeiture evidence also shows
that he provided the patriot army with two horses “for the use of the quarterMasters [sic]
General Departmt” less than a month after the British captured Philadelphia. When all
was said and done, however, the trial juries found both prisoners guilty. In accordance
with due process, the court sentenced them to death as per the reigning treason statute.17

table.”; “To the Printer of the PENNSYLVANIA PACKET,” The Pennsylvania Packet, August 15, 1778.
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While the verdicts did not surprise many, the severity of the sentence set off a
firestorm of protest. Moderate patriot judge Jasper Yeates wrote that “the city is in the
greatest ferment.”18 A petition drive requesting clemency in favor of the condemned
followed. Official records show that, beginning on October 18, forty-seven people signed
four different memorials on behalf of both prisoners, 329 signed five memorials seeking
moderation for Abraham Carlisle, and 1,006 signed twenty memorials for John Roberts.
The signees comprised a cross section of the community, including at least thirty-seven
officers in the revolutionary armed forces, fifteen from the uneducated lower sorts who
signed with “X,” and eleven patriots imprisoned by the British during the foraging
expedition who Roberts attended with compassion. All twelve of the Carlisle jurors and
ten of the twelve Roberts jurors who had convicted the duo asked for mercy, as well as
judges Thomas McKean and John Evans who presided over the trials and sentenced the
traitors.19 Anti-Constitutionalist moderates like Benjamin Rush, Thomas Fitzsimmons
and Benjamin Wynkoop signed, as did some Constitutionalist militia on the radical
Committee of Privates. Conspicuously, neither the radical leadership nor the principal
Quaker reformers, foes on opposite ends of the local political spectrum, joined in the plea
for commiseration. The radical leaders favored execution; the Society of Friends wanted
to establish distance between their professed pacifist neutrality and the active pro-British
18

“Judge Yeates to Col. Burd,” October 10, 1778, Thomas Balch, ed., Letters and Papers Relating Chiefly
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stance Carlisle and Roberts had assumed.20 Imposition of the death penalty – or not –
rested with the Supreme Executive Council. Petitioners were hopeful. In spite of
discernible preparations for the fateful event, Elizabeth Drinker noted the day before the
execution that “I am still of the mind, that they will not be permitted, to carry this matter
to the last extremity.”21 The recalcitrant radical council thought otherwise. As Reverend
Ettwein had perceived, Quakers “had to be hung” to satiate popular pressures.
Word of the hangings spread quickly. Quaker pacifist Hannah Griffitts penned a
tribute to the victims the same day of the execution, blaming radical patriots “whose mad
ambition, Lawless grasp Of Proud Dominion, and oppressive power Have spread the
flames of war around the shores Where Peace once smiled & social union dwelt.”22 New
Jersey lawyer Isaac Ogden wrote to Joseph Galloway, exiled in England, that “Roberts’s
Wife with ten children went to Congress, threw themselves on their knees & supplicated
Mercy.” Although it is doubtful Roberts ever uttered the following words, Ogden stressed
Roberts’ commitment as a diehard loyalist who spoke courageously before the gallows
“for doing his Duty to his Sovereign” while reprimanding the patriots “That his Blood
would one day be demanded at their hands.” From his New York exile, printer James
Humphreys Jr. – who had published the loyalist Pennsylvania Ledger in Philadelphia
during Howe’s occupation – lamented to Galloway that the Quakers had been “cruelly
20
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and wantonly sacrificed” in a scene “with hardly any spectators.” Behaving “with the
utmost fortitude and composure,” the sickly Carlisle had said nothing but Roberts “spoke
for some time” from the gallows. Enormous crowds turned up for the funerals. John
Pemberton wrote that “the burials were very large.” Humphreys estimated that Carlisle’s
corpse was “attended by above four thousand people in procession.”23
Despite the horror, analysis of the trial leads to the undeniable conclusion that the
radical patriot government honored the rule of law and respected the procedural rights of
the prisoners throughout the entire judicial process. The accused chose their own counsel,
selecting attorneys with revolutionary credentials. James Wilson, George Ross and
William Lewis represented both prisoners. Procedurally, first a grand jury composed of
citizens of the Commonwealth had to indict. It did. The defendants then requested and
received a trial by a jury of peers, not a politically motivated judge who could guarantee a
specific outcome. The court provided a large pool of potential jurors and the defense had
ample opportunity to reject those they did not like.24 The indicted summoned their own
witnesses to counter the claims of the prosecution. Everyone was satisfactorily heard. The
judges’ sentence followed the letter of the law: “every person so offending and being
legally convicted by the evidence of two sufficient witnesses in any court of Oyer and
23
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Terminer shall be adjudged [guilty] of high treason and shall suffer death, and his or her
estate shall be and is hereby declared to be forfeited to the commonwealth.” As Carlton
Larson has observed, “these trials were conducted according to customary rules of
procedure even in the middle of a divisive civil war.”25 The post-trial/pre-execution
process was also fair. Official minutes disclose that the Supreme Executive Council
received, considered and duly noted all citizen memorials and petitions in the trial’s
aftermath. If there was an injustice in any of this, it lay in the implacability of the law and
the parameters for its enforcement, a responsibility of the radical legislature which had
earlier passed the treason statute and decreed proper punishment.
And yet the Carlisle and Roberts execution is striking for its near singularity. 26 In
order to understand why, context is crucial. Between September 1778 and April 1779, the
state grand jury looked into thirty-nine possible cases of treason and issued twenty-three
indictments prosecuted as such. Of the twenty-three, jurors convicted only four men. In
one conviction, authorities reprieved George Harding “after being forty minutes under the
gallows.” In another, Abijah Wright had charges changed from treason to burglary when
it was discovered he had tried to kidnap or murder Andrew Knox, Esq., for the British.
Wright was hanged but not under the treason statute.27 That leaves Carlisle and Roberts
as the only two individuals executed for treason in this volatile period.
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The explanation resides in the timing and evolution of the trials. Chronologically,
Abraham Carlisle was the first person tried and John Roberts the third of the twenty-three
purported traitors. As the petition campaign and later trials confirm, jurors were never
comfortable with the “suffer death” sanction in the treason statute, believing that to be
too severe a sentence. Over time, jury panel members opted to impose stark financial
burdens in lieu of a death sentence.28 But the Carlisle and Roberts verdicts came before
juries had witnessed the dramatic real-life consequences of their decisions. In addition,
the only surviving account of the jury deliberations suggests that two of the twelve
Roberts jurors who insisted he was guilty of treason convinced the other ten who leaned
towards acquittal to change their votes “by promising that a pardon would be granted and
by persuading the others of the necessity of a conspicuous example.”29 The prospect of
leniency allowed them to go forward with a guilty verdict. When the state-approved
killings proved otherwise, patriot citizens selected for subsequent juries transformed what
27
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Brissot who admired them.
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radical officials likely intended as the beginning of a pruning process into a unique event.
Popular sovereignty, in effect, halted a political purge – a result only possible when
application of the law is subject to the direct input of a more indulgent citizenry.30
The Carlisle-Roberts execution provides a window into the attitudes of both
patriots and the disaffected. On the revolutionary front, it ratifies that patriots refused to
tolerate direct challenges to republican authority. Beyond the wishes of radical
prosecutors like Joseph Reed, common citizens sitting on the jury likewise agreed that the
Carlisle-Roberts collaboration with the king was treason. And treason was quite simply
unacceptable. Second, the rule of law was supreme. Even presumed traitors deserved due
process. Third, the relative strength of patriot factions ultimately decided the fate of the
disaffected. Most exclusionary radicals championed the executions and most inclusionary
moderates opposed them. But in the immediacy of the British withdrawal, radicals were
ascendant and the executions went forward. Fourth, radicals pushed the law to its logical
conclusions. For them, “suffer death” meant “suffer death.” Radical justice afforded no
middle ground. Fifth, radical officials acquiesced to bottom-up pressures. Although
prosecutor Joseph Reed was then a firebrand exhorting execution over mercy, judge
Thomas McKean wavered, only to succumb to the popular clamor within his own faction
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Maxey stresses that the radical council was “especially attentive to their political base that demanded
retaliatory justice,” while prosecutor Joseph Reed feared that “the whole attainder apparatus [would]
collapse” if suspected tories went free, making Carlisle and Roberts “the prime targets for hanging” at that
critical juncture. See Maxey, Treason on Trial, 109-110. Larson takes an in-depth look at the composition
of both types of juries in later trials. He concludes that “defense counsel was able to shape the jury in ways
favorable to the defense” and that jurors as a whole were less radical and more lenient than the state’s
Constitutionalist leadership at the time. Thus, actual jurors – and not the radical political base or leadership
– were the “more indulgent.” For demographics on the grand jury, Larson, “ Revolutionary American
Jury,” SMU Law Review, 1457-1462; for trial jury demographics, 1467-1478. Above quote is on 1478.

346

when it finally came time to sentence.31 Sixth, reintegration of the disaffected could only
take place under republican terms which legitimized and invigorated republican
authority. The executions left no doubt that patriots were in charge and, at least initially,
served notice as to what was and was not acceptable behavior towards the Revolution.
Lastly, the Carlisle-Roberts episode once again echoed the historical bitterness between
Presbyterians and Quakers. As Reverend Ettwein noted, Quakers “had to be hung.” The
lawful killing shows that radicals valued practical politics over technical legalities. Both
Quaker prisoners followed the dictates of the attainder law and voluntarily surrendered on
time. Roberts affirmed allegiance to the republic the day after the British evacuated.32 But
his declaration of fidelity did not supersede the charge of treason or the popular demand
for loyalist atonement and the prosecution pressed onward.
From the loyalist perspective, the Carlisle-Roberts affair reveals that at least a
portion of the disaffected was predisposed to trust patriot goodwill. Obviously Abraham
Carlisle and John Roberts believed they could navigate the revolutionary tide or they
would have left with Galloway, the Allen brothers and the British. The decision to stay
also demonstrates a very strong preference for their Pennsylvania homeland over exile
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elsewhere within Britain’s presumably friendlier and more accommodating dominions.
As we saw with the Pembertons, such a predisposition was quite common among Quaker
descendants of the colony’s founders. The executions likewise lay bare the unremitting
dedication of reform-minded Friends to the sect’s peace testimony. Because Abraham
Carlisle and John Roberts had violated pacifist principles by aiding the British, Quaker
leaders were unwilling to actively intercede on their behalf. Instead, they let events take
their course and limited official Quaker involvement to comforting the condemned in
their final hours. Most significantly, their case shows the difference between moderate
and radical uses of the law to foster or deter successful reintegration when in control of
government. Moderates repealed the test acts and reestablished nonjuror rights in 1789.
But radicals dictated provincial politics in 1778. Rather than retract the sword of
Damocles, they made certain it fell.
THE DOAN GUERRILLA GANG
Whether openly loyal to the British or more dissatisfied with patriot ways, the
disaffected took various approaches to the prospect of reintegration. Some like John
Connolly, Joseph Galloway, or the Allens and Rankins spurned reintegration altogether,
choosing instead to depart a clearly hostile revolutionary Pennsylvania. Others such as
the Pembertons and like-minded Quaker pacifists stayed on as second-class nonjurors or
took the oath a la John Roberts and tried to remain under the radar. A small cadre of
loyalists and disaffected colonials in Pennsylvania, however, repudiated the notion of
reintegration while choosing to stay and carry on the war. These bands did not concede
republican rule, never gave a thought to swearing allegiance, and tested the security of
the new state.
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The Doan guerrillas are a prime illustration of this blueprint. Patriots were well
aware that armed defiance from sectors that did not subscribe to republican authority
imperiled the entire foundation of government by popular consent, much like opposition
from the king and his armies. Locally spawned subversive elements continued to plague
Pennsylvania after the British evacuation, despite a dramatic reduction in royal support.
The extermination of this threat became a matter of the highest priority. The Doan gang
was the most enduring, menacing and notorious of these scattered troupes, contesting
patriot legitimacy throughout the war and its aftermath. Revolutionaries declared its
members outlaws and offered rewards for their apprehension or death with growing
urgency. Consolidation of the Revolution in the state increasingly isolated the band,
spelling their inevitable doom. The Doan guerrilla challenge shows that continuing to
bear arms against the new republic served as a litmus test barring all possibility of
reintegration. Patriots passed legislation allowing greater flexibility in the capture and
prosecution of the “banditti,” while simultaneously fortifying republican government.
These methods succeeded in extinguishing the peril during the 1780s. While there is no
doubt that the Doans degenerated into mere outlaws by war’s end, it is also clear that
their support for royal aims well after the evacuation of Philadelphia was heartfelt, valued
by the British high command, and highly effective in actions such as procuring
intelligence and requisitioning horses from patriots for the imperial army.
The Doans had a long contrarian history. As a religious dissenter in England, the
original Americanized Doan, John, landed in Plymouth, Massachusetts, as a worthy
Puritan in 1629. His grandson Daniel Doan Jr., however, dissented from the dissenters,
abandoning his father’s faith to join the Quakers of Cape Cod. Consequently, Daniel Sr.
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severed his wayward son’s access to the family inheritance. Eventually Daniel Jr. and
wife Mehetabel moved to Bucks County, Pennsylvania to begin anew, setting down the
family’s roots in the province. Initially welcomed as a capable teacher of the Quaker
discipline, Daniel Jr. dabbled a bit too much in astrology. The sect disowned him in 1711.
Quakers also disowned his son Israel in 1725 for not following the discipline’s rules on
marriage. By the onset of the Revolution, the Doans had proliferated in rural Bucks, north
of the provincial capital at Philadelphia. Two of Israel’s progeny fathered the core of the
future guerrillas. Joseph Sr. and wife Hester Vickers begot Moses, Levi, Aaron, Mahlon,
Joseph Jr. and sole daughter Mary, while Israel II and Rachel Vickers – possibly Hester’s
sister – engendered Abraham, reputedly one of the most spiteful of the gang. Locally, the
boys were renowned for their athletic prowess, especially as outdoorsmen and hunters.33
The younger Doans, smitten like many contemporaries with the winds of rebellion raging
through the province, initially contemplated fighting against British tyranny. But their
Quaker elders, farmers Joseph Sr. and Israel II, refused to pay war taxes as a result of
their pacifist beliefs. When rebel authorities threatened to declare the family outlaws and
seize their farms, the sons joined the tory opposition.34
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At least forty-four additional people belonged to or collaborated with the original
six Doan guerrillas and their two fathers during the gang’s existence.35 Moses Doan was
the inspiration behind the gang’s organization and its recognized leader until his death in
1783. If oral accounts are to be taken at face value,36 the Doans played an important role
as loyalist allies of the British army during the war, serving mainly as scouts and spies.
The brothers – and especially Moses – interfaced directly with Major John Andre who
ran General Howe’s loyalist spy network and Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe,
commander of the Queen’s Rangers, an active and effective loyalist regiment.37 Moses
became a favorite of General William Howe, reconnoitered Continental Army positions
during the battle of Long Island, and is credited for guiding the British through “an
unguarded pass to the heights” in August of 1776 which enabled imperial forces to

individuals who, as children or young adults, had witnessed events or heard stories of the Doans from their
parents and relations. As the editors of The New Doane Book note, Rogers’ writing style “was florid and
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surprise and defeat Washington on the drive towards New York City.38 The Doans
surfaced again at the key battle of Trenton that December as the royal messengers who
delivered a warning on a wintry night to the Hessian commander regarding Washington’s
approach. Annoyed with interruption of his festive card game, Colonel Johann Gottlieb
Rahl refused to receive the emissary and put the latter’s handwritten note in his pocket
unread. It was found on his dead body the following morning after the Continentals’
surprise attack.39
As Abraham Doan’s robbery of farmer Gilbert Nugent around this time illustrates,
patriots recognized all too well the Doans’ predatory activities and alliance with the
British early in the revolutionary contest. Nugent encountered Doan at a tavern on the
road between Philadelphia and Bristol. Abraham expressed support for the rebel cause,
received Nugent’s approbation, and discovered the farmer was returning from market
after selling eggs and butter for a tidy profit. After a hearty round of drinks, Nugent
invited Doan to hitch his horse to his wagon and ride with him. “Made merry by the
liquor he had imbibed,” Nugent “became quite loquacious.” Asked if he had ever heard
of the Doans, the farmer affirmed “yes, d—n them, we seldom hear of anything else. The
villains keep the whole country in a state of alarm.” He then erupted into song recounting
the feats of Moses Doan, ending with a verse concerning the latter’s loyalty.
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“He is the Briton’s friend,
He is the freeman’s foe;
And may we pray God send
To him a quick death-blow.”
The long wagon ride eventually put the inebriated Gilbert Nugent to sleep, at
which point Abraham Doan stole his watch and money and rode off into the night
without a struggle.40 Thus, the Doans had already achieved a notorious reputation among
the general populace by late 1776.
Once the British occupied Philadelphia in September 1777, the Doans provided
intelligence to Howe on Washington’s vulnerable position at Whitemarsh and guided the
imperial army to that spot on December 4 only to find the Americans prepared for their
strike because an opposing spy had signaled the British advance. From the captured city,
the guerrillas roamed the adjacent counties of southeastern Pennsylvania, robbing horses
for Howe’s army and a tidy profit.41 There is even empirical evidence suggesting possible
Doan involvement in the Benedict Arnold treason conspiracy of August, 1780. A map
dated August 10th found at the cabin of John Tomlinson – a gang collaborator who used
the site as a Doan hideout and headquarters for tory and British spies in the area – shows
the “Line of Encampment and order of Battle” of Washington’s army in Bergen County,
New Jersey six weeks before Arnold’s treachery. 42 As these incidents denote, the Doans
were a valuable asset for the king’s cause. After Sir Henry Clinton abandoned the
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provincial capital in June 1778, local cooperation with the imperial high command
diminished. It is likely that Colonel William Rankin considered the Doan guerrillas a part
of his loyalist force of “thousands” awaiting instructions that never came for a postevacuation royal insurrection in southeastern Pennsylvania. In the interim, the Doans
gradually evolved from imperial military scouts and spies into semi-independent
guerrillas and later outlaws and banditti. Rogers ascribes the gangs’ original plans in
early 1776 as seeking British protection for the primary purpose of plundering their Whig
neighbors. Initial raids in this vein occurred before their formal attachment to Howe’s
forces.43 Even while embedded in royal army activities, the band exhibited a penchant for
pillage. For years, they raided Whigs seemingly at will, sending Bucks and Chester
County patriots into a panic. Long-held grudges against neighbors of yesteryear
sometimes inspired these mostly nighttime robberies that often led to cruelty. But
revolutionaries were not always the victims. On one occasion they robbed Quaker loyalist
Isaiah Hallowell for his money. On another occasion, a chivalrous Moses Doan was said
to have slain a British officer in defense of an ill-treated patriot damsel.44 The band
became exceptionally obnoxious to patriot authorities when they targeted Whig tax
collectors. The October 1781 robbery of Bucks County Treasurer John Hart at Newtown
was especially egregious because of the temerity exhibited and the considerable bounty
extracted. As the war drew to a close, patriot pursuit intensified, forcing the Doans to flee
to Pennsylvania’s outer counties where they invariably renewed their depredations.45
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All did not end well for the loyalists-turned-guerillas-turned-outlaws. Of the eight
surnamed Doans implicated in the gang’s activities, four perished as a result of their
actions. For starters, the war “unpacified” the formerly pacifist stance of Israel II and
Joseph Sr. whose religious refusal to pay war taxes had initially triggered Whig
antagonism. Israel II, Abraham’s father, died in prison after his arrest for harboring the
gang at the time of the Newtown robbery. A patriot posse shot and killed leader Moses
while attempting to arrest him. Officials publicly executed Moses’ brother Levi and
cousin Abraham. Four other Doans became exiles. The council proclamation of June 15,
1778 attainted Joseph Sr. – Israel II’s brother and father of five Doans. Officials seized
and sold his property.46 Apprehended later in Bedford County, the elder Joseph
eventually found his way to Canada. Two captured sons, Joseph Jr. and Aaron, also
eventually sought refuge northwards. Although patriots seized their brother Mahlon, he
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escaped and made his way to New York and then England.47 Also of note, sister Mary
Doan married gang member Isaac Vickers and moved to Canada. Despite the clan’s
tory/criminal proclivities, patriot authorities nonetheless allowed family members not tied
to gang activities to stay in Pennsylvania.48
ARMED HOSTILITY & THE LONG ARM OF REVOLUTIONARY LAW
By definition, republican government cannot function without the consent of the
governed. An indispensable ingredient of that consent under the aegis of republican
ideology is preservation of the public peace. The Doans directly threatened this paradigm.
As such, they provide a laboratory in which to dissect how revolutionary interpretations
of citizens’ rights and the rule of law intersected with reintegration. Specifically, the
pardon of Aaron Doan and the later execution of cousins Abraham and Levi Doan reveal
that, even in cases of armed defiance after the British withdrawal, republican authorities
granted rights of due process to disaffected transgressors and meticulously followed the
procedural demands of rebel law. In addition, the late-life return to Pennsylvania of
Joseph Jr. from Canadian exile and the claim put forth by similarly exiled Mary Doan
Vickers show that Pennsylvanians adhered to the dictates of the law irrespective of one’s
stance during the Revolution. Most importantly, the Doans’ disaffection compelled the
47
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patriot government to configure and enforce the law in a way that ensured the total
destruction of armed threats and the stabilization of revolutionary rule.
The Doans’ despoliations continued unabated well into the latter part of the war.
By 1782, the Supreme Executive Council was finally focusing on the banditti menace
with some success. Captured gang members Jesse and Solomon Vickers provided
detailed confessions implicating their fellow outlaws. Patriots then arrested John
Tomlinson, a key cog in the band’s network. Supreme Court Justices Thomas McKean
and George Bryan convicted and sentenced Tomlinson to death for felony on September
30, 1782. He was executed on October 17. In early 1783, officials jailed the elder Israel
Doan II for aiding his son and nephews, and then dismissed a petition for release from the
“languishing prisoner.” The “unwell’ Israel died in prison.49 Rather than stifling the
gang’s efforts, however, setbacks only seemed to redouble their determination. Operating
from secreted caves, old deserted houses and the dwellings of local collaborators, the
Doans stepped up their robberies of tax collectors and Whig locals, culminating on July
21, 1783 in a series of six attacks on a single night. Five days later the Supreme
Executive Council issued a proclamation offering a reward of £100 in specie for the
capture of Moses, Abraham, Levi or Malin Doan “and other persons unknown,” along
with a “free and full pardon to any one of the said robbers, their aiders, abettors, or
comforters, who shall discover, apprehend, and secure” them. This and similar
proclamations that summer constituted a watershed moment. Officials had previously
refrained from identifying the Doans by name, generically referring to “armed men”
49
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because of reservations that the gang targeted those who denounced them.50 Necessity
now transcended fear.
Galvanizing popular support proved successful. In late summer 1783, a posse in
pursuit of three of the band killed leader Moses Doan. Abraham and Levi escaped, while
one of their patriot pursuers, Major William Kennedy, also perished in the clash. Reward
payments followed.51 Learning from the incident, the Pennsylvania assembly appointed a
committee on August 27 to draft a bill for the quick capture of outlaws. In a testament to
both the urgency of the situation and patriot respect for legal procedure, the proposed
statute was read for the first time on August 30, a second time on September 1, debated
on the 4th and read for a third and final time on September 6.52 Two days later the
legislature passed a comprehensive law specifically targeting eighteen gang members,
including the five remaining younger Doans. The measure increased rewards for the
capture of each robber to £300, gave immunity plus the £300 prize to anyone who killed
a gang member while trying to apprehend him, and compensated law-abiding citizens for
damages earned in the endeavor – if wounded, £150; if killed, £300 to the victim’s
executors. In addition, legislators inserted a category of “discoverers” slated to receive a
payment of £50 for relaying information on offenders or stolen goods and offered gang
defectors a full pardon and their own £100 reward for turning in their comrades. The law
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was to remain in effect until January 1, 1785, giving officials over a year to fulfill their
mission.53
Conveniently considering the guerrillas a law enforcement rather than the longstanding military problem they had been, the state consciously decided to treat the Doans
as outlaws rather than militant loyalists in a systematic effort to crush the gang. Attainder
for outlawry rather than attainder for treason allowed authorities to target a much broader
range of offenses and expedite the persecution and prosecution of perpetrators, even as
existing law provided for forfeiture of property and penalties as severe as death in either
category.54 Timing was another reason for this legal predilection: the war’s conclusion
held the potential to complicate the prosecution of wartime sins in a new era of peace.
Uncertainty reigned, above all with the Peace Treaty’s proposals on loyalist property
restitution.55 Since the Doan threat could extend into a more problematical future, its
resolution required immediate attention.
From the passage of the September 8th act forward, patriot authorities waged a
vigorous campaign to bring the outlawed Doans and their cohorts to justice. Five days
later, the Supreme Executive Council issued a proclamation putting the state’s assets
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fully behind the new law, requiring “all Judges, Justices, Sheriffs, and Constables… and
all other persons, when called upon… to give their assistance for apprehending and
securing the aforesaid felons or offenders, their aiders, abettors, and comforters, and
every one of them.” They succeeded. Officials captured Mahlon and Joseph Doan Sr. in
Bedford County in September 1783 and Joseph Jr. in Bucks County around the same
time. Aaron faced a similar fate in August 1784.56 Moreover, state officials hanged gang
members Peter Brown, James Burke, George Crowder and Richard Williams at the
Philadelphia gallows on October 16, 1784.57 Although the Doan law expired and sporadic
banditry continued into the latter half of the postwar decade, energized revolutionaries
gradually accomplished their objectives, eradicating the band and all armed resistance,
containing outlawry, buttressing the rule of law, and ensuring republican stability.58
Paradoxically, the armed guerrilla threat reinforced rather than weakened the
Revolution’s commitment to the core principles of inherent rights and the rule of law. As
the cases of Aaron Doan and Levi/Abraham Doan reveal, patriots abided by the
constraints of due process even against their most implacable enemies. Hunted for
participation in the Newtown robbery three years earlier, Aaron Doan fell victim to
patriot pursuit in Baltimore on August 14, 1784. Conducted to Philadelphia by his
captors, he remained in prison for several years under a sentence of death as his case
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wound its way through Pennsylvania’s judicial and political system. During the process,
this Doan petitioned the Supreme Executive Council for mercy on at least two occasions
and even managed to generate support from loyalist exiles in Halifax, Nova Scotia.59
Patriot factions split over Aaron Doan’s destiny. No one questioned that he was
an outlaw but doubts arose as to his guilt on the specified charges. Frightened by too
arbitrary an application of the death penalty, moderate president John Dickinson and his
Supreme Executive Council majority, charged with executing the execution, threw their
support behind a pardon based on a series of seven legal “defects in the proceedings.”
They argued that “where life depends on proclamations, it seems scarcely possible to
adhere with too scrupulous an exactness to injunctions positively directed by law, for
giving them their destructive efficacy,” and counselled caution lest officials set a perilous
precedent in cases of capital punishment.60 Meanwhile, radical Supreme Court judges
George Bryan and Thomas McKean, upon reviewing the case at Dickinson’s request,
concluded that “we… have no doubt, that Aaron Doan, besides the forfeiture of his
estate, has forfeited his life.” They urged execution as just retribution for Doan’s crimes
and observed that “it is as much a breach of duty, to reverse a good, as it would be to
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affirm a bad outlawry.”61 The Supreme Executive Council voted on the issue in the
spring of 1785. By similar tallies of 7-3, Dickinson’s moderates first resolved to pardon
the prisoner and then declared that the council could not legally issue a warrant to put
Doan to death. The Pennsylvania General Assembly – fleetingly under a resurgent radical
majority – weighed in afterwards. A committee convened to assess the matter maintained
that the Supreme Executive Council had overstepped its mandate and “are not instructed
by the Constitution nor laws, to declare what the law is” or “whether this out-lawry [sic]
is legal or not.” The council only had power to “reprieve or pardon, or to issue a warrant
for the execution.” The legislature thus agreed with the court that “the laws in being
should have their course.”62 All three branches of government had spoken.
The Supreme Executive Council stalled for over two years. At last, a moderatemajority council revisited the case in 1787. Overlooking the Supreme Court judgment
and General Assembly findings, the council used its recognized powers to produce their
preferred result anyway. They decreed that convicted felon Aaron Doan “be pardoned, on
condition that he transport himself beyond the seas, not to return to the United States.”
The freed prisoner only partially complied with these conditions on his liberty. On July
29, 1788, New Jersey authorities reprieved Aaron Doan at the gallows in Newark after a
conviction for breaking into the house of Hassel Patterson at Acquackanonk. He had left
Pennsylvania and not returned, but he was still in the United States. This Doan brother
eventually reached exile in Canada and later fought against the Americans in the War of
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1812.63 The process leading to his pardon and the pardon itself support the view that
officials on both sides of the factional divide in Pennsylvania placed enormous value on
the rights of individuals and the rule of law, especially since Aaron Doan the outlaw
technically had no rights – that is, he was living outside the law. Nonetheless, honoring
rights and the law did not necessarily translate into successful reintegration. Postwar
belligerent behavior against the republic meant banishment at best and execution at
worst. State officials afforded Aaron the first option. A cousin and one of his brothers
would face the second.
Authorities captured Abraham and Levi Doan in Chester County on May 15,
1787, only two days before Aaron’s pardon. “Broken in spirit and worn down by
continued anxiety,” the pair did not resist their captors. After a judicial process that lasted
sixteen months, they were convicted of outlawry and sentenced to death. As in the case of
Aaron, the duo petitioned for clemency and the Supreme Executive Council sent the
matter to the Supreme Court for review. Again, judges Bryan and McKean heard the
arguments and found “nothing favorable concerning them or either of them” meriting a
change of verdict.64 The council ordered the execution to go forward in early August but
two weeks later declared a four-week “respite.” In the interim, “free negro” Benjamin
Hall, a cellmate of the outlaws, “undertook to execute the Doans” on his own. The failed
attempt made him a target of Doan vengeance and placed his life in danger. As a result,
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the council decided that Hall’s fine and prison punishment of hard labor “be remitted.”
On September 16, the council finally decided to issue a warrant “for executing the
sentence of the Court upon them” on September 24. The moderate General Assembly
then interceded the day before the fateful event, this time on the side of the prisoners, and
appointed a committee to request a six-day stay of execution. The legislature’s three-man
committee attended the Supreme Executive Council meeting of the 24th, expressed their
concerns and then withdrew, leaving the twelve council members in attendance to
conclude the affair. A motion “to respite… until Tuesday next... was negatived,” as was
another motion “to reconsider the vote respecting Abraham Doan and Levi Doan.”65
Patriot law had the final say. Sheriff Joseph Copperthwait executed the outlaws as
scheduled at Smith’s Island “in the presence of an immense concourse of spectators.”
Years later, John Pugh Rogers interviewed an unnamed Philadelphia gentleman who
visited the condemned prisoners two days before the end. According to the eyewitness,
Abraham spoke openly and admitted that their conviction was just but a “moody and
sullen” Levi only expressed a desire for revenge against those who had testified against
him. Not unexpectedly, the local Quaker Meeting decided to deny the Doan family
permission to bury the outlaws in their graveyard.66
Official sources do not explain why Aaron Doan received a pardon while Levi
and Abraham did not. The courts ruled for execution in both instances but the Supreme
Executive Council and the General Assembly saw their roles reversed. In Aaron’s case,
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the assembly took the side of execution while the council elected to pardon. With Levi
and Abraham, the opposite held true – the assembly pushed for a stay and the council
ordered the execution. The court judges were Constitutionalist radicals, which explains
their consistency. Radicals also promulgated the first assembly recommendation in 1785
upholding Aaron’s execution, while Anti-Constitutionalist moderates held a majority in
the 1788 debate – which explains that body’s inconsistency. Moderates dominated the
council at both junctures, however, which does not explain their inconsistency. Perhaps
personal leadership influenced the decision. John Dickinson presided over the council in
1785 and Thomas Mifflin headed that body in 1788. While Dickinson personally led the
charge for a stay of Aaron’s execution during his tenure, Mifflin was absent the day of
the final vote on Abraham and Levi.67 Or maybe news had recently arrived of Aaron
Doan’s noncompliance with the mandate to leave the United States, persuading the
council to choose a less lenient course. But it is more likely that past crimes had a major
stake in the council’s final resolve. Abraham and Levi were reputedly the cruelest of the
guerrillas. A drunken Abraham had killed Mrs. Caldwell, the wife of a pastor, in New
Jersey during the war. Levi shot and killed Major William Kennedy during the raid which
resulted in the death of guerrilla leader Moses Doan.68 Those incidents likely affected the
vote. Regardless, patriots respected due process for Levi and Abraham Doan, while
making a conscious and thorough effort to obey the dictates of contemporary justice.

67

Compare the Council Minutes of March 28, 1785 with those of September 24, 1788, Colonial Records,
vol. 14, 387 & vol. 15, 544 respectively. Membership in the Supreme Executive Council changed 100%
during these three years. No council member who voted in 1785 was present on the council in 1788.
68

Abraham Doan’s murder of Mrs. Caldwell occurred on September 7, 1780. Levi Doan killed Major
Kennedy on September 1, 1783. Both incidents are in Rogers, The Doan Outlaws in The New Doane Book,
293-294 & 329-332 respectively; and also in Brooke, Annals of the Revolution, 58-59 & 75-77.

365

In retrospect, it is difficult to explain why Abraham and Levi still resided in
Pennsylvania in 1787. They were legally outlaws with a price on their heads, devoid of
rights. Most of their relations were either dead or exiled. They must have known that no
possibility for accommodation existed and yet they did not leave, choosing instead to
“reintegrate” in their own way as outlaws under a perennial cloak of concealment. Maybe
as descendants of Quakers with historic roots in the province, on some level they too
preserved a deep sense of belonging to the Pennsylvania homeland – like the Pembertons
– and could not fathom life elsewhere. And yet they continued to openly defy the new
order. In the final analysis, the ostracism and failure of Abraham and Levi Doan shows
that loyalists could not prescribe the terms of reintegration. That prospect could only
occur with republican consent – and consent would never be tendered in cases of
sustained armed aggression.
A parting Doan incident suggests that over time, not only patriot government but
broader republican society in general, came to accept as definitive the inclusionary model
of moderates in relation to the onetime disaffected. An aging Joseph Doan Jr. visited
Bucks County from his Canadian exile sometime in 1820. There he sought the legal
services of Josiah Shaw in hopes of recovering a legacy of £40. Shaw had received a
flogging or two from Joseph Jr. in colonial days when the latter had been a strict schoolteacher in Plumstead and the former his pupil. The attorney was also the son of patriot
John Shaw, whose farm Joseph and his brothers raided during the war. In fact, the boy
Josiah had been dispatched on a dark midnight to warn neighbors of the Doans’ attack in
the area. After a cold reception, Shaw accepted the visitor’s commission, arranged a
meeting of the parties in question, and succeeded in recuperating the legacy for Joseph Jr.

366

Equally exiled sister Mary Doan Vickers and her gang member husband, Isaac, later
enlisted Shaw’s assistance in a similar instance.69 The episodes again demonstrate that
Pennsylvania patriots willingly recognized the claims of onetime adversaries, when just,
within a republican construct of the rule of law.
POSTWAR REINTEGRATION & THE CARLISLE/ROBERTS LEGACY
Despite the blot of treason and execution, the families of Abraham Carlisle and
John Roberts declined to leave Pennsylvania. Their persistence presupposes a hope, if not
a belief, that the treacherous behavior attributed to the patriarchs was not transmittable
and they would be able to lead tolerable lives thereafter. The hope was not misplaced, for
Pennsylvania had inherited the British legal tradition which prohibited “corruption of
blood” – the transmission of a crime to heirs or familial relations. Sir William Blackstone
observed in his study of Britannic law that “after the decease of the late pretender, no
attainder for treason should extend to the disinheriting of any heir, nor to the prejudice of
any person, other than the traitor himself.”70 Pennsylvania law reflected this view. For
example, a 1770 anti-crime statute “Provided, that no attainder for any of the offenses
made felony by virtue of this act shall make or work any corruption of blood, loss of
dower, or forfeiture of lands or tenements, goods or chattels.” Similar clauses reappeared
in postwar penal legislation.71 In addition, the state’s 1777 treason law allowed judges to
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“order and appropriate” portions of a convicted traitor’s forfeited property “to the support
of such traitor’s children or wife and children (if any) as to them may appear sufficient.”
The original 1778 attainder statute contained a similar clause.72
From the onset, both families proceeded on the assumption that they had an
inherent right to stay but approached that prospect differently. The Roberts clan pursued a
proactive path to reintegration that harnessed the state’s legal edifice and the law itself in
their favor, engaging the General Assembly, the Supreme Executive Council, and the
Supreme Court as necessary. The Carlisles opted for a more reactive approach. For both,
however, reintegration came in two phases. Survival and adaptation characterized the
initial phase from the executions until the war’s end. Reestablishing the family’s social
and financial position then shaped the early republic stage which followed. Since seizure
of real and personal property accompanied imposition of the death penalty for treason,
primary reintegration concerns often revolved around property and goods. For almost two
decades, the heirs engaged state authorities. Their struggle assumes faith in the republican
legal system for family members and corroborates a patriot adherence to the rule of law,
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this time increasingly coupled with a sentiment of remorse among authorities that over
time helped to ameliorate the sufferings inflicted by the executions.
The state confiscated John Roberts’ assets on October 3, two weeks before actual
sentencing.73 Given the pain and pace of events, it is remarkable how quickly his family
responded to the crisis. Less than three weeks after the execution, the General Assembly
received two petitions, the first “to restore to our afflicted Mother the Dower she was by
law entitled to, and to grant to us her Children the Inheritance we had a Right to expect,
and which no act of ours has contributed to forfeit.” When the legislature took no action,
Jane Roberts and her children asked for a temporary stoppage of all forfeited property
sales until the assembly could decide on their petition, as auctions were scheduled to take
place before that entity reconvened. Consciously or not, the Roberts family initially
avoided contact with the Supreme Executive Council and the courts, the institutions
responsible for the execution. Instead, they appealed to the assembly, “fully persuaded
that the House as Guardians of the Rights of every Individual, will not reject the second
Reading of a Petition which asks for an act of Clemency towards Persons against whom
no Crime is alledged [sic].”74 The radical guardians of their rights took no action.
The Roberts family then turned to the Supreme Court and found in the judges
unexpected – and perhaps contrite – allies. Four days after the petition to the assembly,
the court ordered officials in charge of the forfeited assets to “stay their proceedings…

73

See “Inventory of the Movable Effects Belonging to John Roberts – Lower Merion Township Philada.
County Seized in Behalf of the State of Pennsylvania October 3d 1778,” Pennsylvania Archives, Sixth
Series, vol. 12, 710-715.
74

Reference to a November 23rd petition is in “Memorial of Widow, &c, of John Roberts,” Pennsylvania
Archives, First Series, vol. 7, 122-123. Most of the “children” were adults at this point. The two oldest were
the only sons, Thomas and Jehu, 35 and 27 respectively. All told, seven were twenty years of age or older.
Only fifteen-year-old Elizabeth and ten-year-old Ann were clearly minors.

369

untill [sic] the decision of the said Court upon the said Claims” and assigned to widow
Jane the “Plantation with the Edifices Mills and Appurtenances… and the Goods and
Chattles [sic] in the foregoing Inventory” until April 1 of the next year for support of her
underage children. Either the court transmitted the November 27th stay order to the agents
too late or their decision did not include all of John Roberts’ property, for second son
Jehu successfully bid on and repurchased a portion of his father’s personal assets on
December 1. Of the 158 items sold at auction that day, Jehu bought 87 of them. Others
with the last name of Roberts bought additional items. Five months later, Justices
Thomas McKean and William Atlee formally ruled in favor of the claimants, granting the
children the seized goods and Jane Roberts “the several Articles & Things mentioned in
the above Inventory & Interlocutory Decree… for her Support and Maintenance and that
of her three youngest Children.”75 Remorse is especially evident in the court’s decision of
May 1779 granting widow Jane Roberts a compensatory annuity of £75 per year, the
disbursement of which fell upon the radical-controlled Supreme Executive Council
headed by President Joseph Reed – he of prosecutorial fame propelled to the summit of
provincial politics thereafter, in no small measure for his inflexibility during the trials and
executions. It comes as no surprise, then, that Jane Roberts did not receive her annuity
anytime during Reed’s presidential tenure through 1781. New president John Dickinson
and the executive council eventually authorized three initial annuity payments in August
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of 1783 after moderates took political control.76 There is no record that Ann Carlisle
sought a similar state pension.
Strategically, it appears that the family decided to proceed on two tracks in their
efforts to retain the John Roberts legacy. Widow Jane Downing Roberts, second son Jehu
and the married and unmarried daughters formed a single collective front, while eldest
son Thomas proceeded along a parallel but separate path. Sometime after the execution,
Thomas Roberts convinced the Supreme Court that his father had transferred to him a
sizeable portion of a seized three-hundred acre tract on the Schuylkill River before the
crucial cut-off date of July 4, 1776. That legal acknowledgement kept the property
beyond the purview of the forfeiture statute. In the interim, Jane Roberts and her minor
children continued to live on the principal family estate while the issue of her husband’s
holdings remained in flux. State agents sold one hundred acres of the Roberts estate to
Daniel Clymer in August 1779. Clymer had tepidly supported John Roberts as a defense
witness during the trial.77 In November, Jehu Roberts petitioned the assembly to suspend
further land sales. As of December 16 that year, state agent Thomas Hale noted that three
seized Roberts properties consisting of 678 acres in toto were still unsold. When the
legislature failed to respond to the November request, Jehu redirected his attention to
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Reed’s Supreme Executive Council the following summer. Needless to say, that body
rejected the appeal.78
Failure to defer or reverse the process resulted in the sale of the two largest
Roberts tracts less than three weeks later. For the sum of £271,600, Bucks County miller
Edward Milner purchased the tract of three-hundred acres which harbored the main
Roberts residence and the site’s mills in Bucks County, along with an adjoining plot of
seventy-eight acres. President Reed signed the deed in December. Despite the sale, Jane
Roberts and her children did not leave, for Thomas Roberts managed to lease back the
property from the buyer, including the mills. Subsequent mill production generated an
income flow which allowed his mother to close out the war on the property.79
Less evidence is available for Abraham Carlisle’s widow and only son but what
exists suggests that they were less fortunate, at least initially. Like Jane Roberts, Ann
Brooks Carlisle continued to reside at the family home on Front Street in Philadelphia
after her husband’s execution. And like the Roberts family, she lived in uncertainty while
the state decided how to dispose of the property. For example, the “Secretary & keeper of
the Register for forfeited Estates” published notices in April of 1779 that her residence
“will be speedily sold by Public Auction or Vendue, to the best & highest bidders.” That
July the state also settled accounts with Philadelphia Sheriff James Claypoole, disbursing
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a payment of £79.3.11 for “the amount of his Bill of Costs in the case of Abraham
Carlisle.”80 The widow’s wait ended the next summer. In June 1780, forfeiture agents
sold the Carlisle property to Captain Robert Bethel for the sum of £20,000 in continental
funds. President Reed reviewed and signed a deed dated September 20, 1780 in April of
the following year. George A. Baker acquired rights to the property from Bethel sometime in the next three months and soon encountered an intractable Ann Carlisle. Baker
turned to Reed’s Supreme Executive Council in mid-July because “the widow of the said
Abraham Carlisle is in possession of the premises, and refuses to deliver them up.” The
council accordingly applied the law and ordered the sheriff to “give possession of the said
premises to him [Baker].”81 Despite the directive, Ann remained in Philadelphia through
the war’s conclusion.
When independence finally arrived in 1783, the two widows and their offspring
stayed in Pennsylvania – a final de facto acceptance of republican rule. Two years later,
the Philadelphia Meeting for Sufferings revived the Carlisle-Roberts controversy while
compiling documents for English Quaker John Gough’s forthcoming history of the sect.
The 1785 official Quaker version of events reiterated most of what Friends affirmed in a
1779 report signed by James Pemberton in the immediate aftermath of the executions.
The Society held that Carlisle and Roberts were among those “divers making profession
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of the Truth with us [who] have been misled & become entangled in the confusions
prevailing.” They had been “inattentive to the Divine principle” and “manifested open &
active deviations from our antient peaceable testimony.” “Overtaken & ensnared,” the
duo had disobeyed and “involved themselves in difficulties, and distress, [and] become
obnoxious to party resentment… which is lamentably the case of the members now under
our consideration.” Official Quakerdom had not intervened at the time because of “their
[the prisoners] inadvertence to the principle of Divine Grace, and overlooking repeated
advice… they were suffered to fall into such error, & deviation [which]… affected the
reputation of Truth.” Consequently, “this meeting or any other was restrained from
interposing in their favour or vindication.” The report alluded to visits with the prisoners
prior to the executions and the latter’s admission of religious impropriety. Roberts
acknowledged that “he had gone beyond the line, & seen his deviation” from Quaker
orthodoxy. Carlisle “saw the Station he had filled, & acted in, in a different light, and that
he had been under a cloud when he thought he was doing right.” Although the report
often reads like a justification of Quaker inaction while the fate of the captives hung in
the balance, there is no reason to doubt the veracity or sincerity of the testimonies as the
detainees approached their final hours. For the widows, the Quaker account officially
appended religious error to their husbands’ costly political error, but did not affect their
membership in good standing within the faith in the postwar era.82
As the decade of the eighties worn on, the Carlisle and Roberts survivors turned
their attention to Parliament’s Royal Claims Commission across the sea as a source of
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possible compensation. In 1784, exile Samuel Shoemaker filed a memorial in London on
behalf of Ann Carlisle. Abraham Carlisle Jr.’s deposition from Philadelphia also found its
way to the commissioners. The twenty-four-year-old silversmith and only son verified
that his father had a house and lot in the provincial capital and had “served in the police
during the British administration.” References to “police” and “administration” spoke a
modified language that accommodated royal rule. During Abraham Sr.’s trial, the
prisoner had only granted passes, not joined the police, while Philadelphia had suffered
an occupation, not an administration. Parliament took the Carlisles’ plight to heart,
awarding the family their entire £600 claim, one of the few to receive one-hundred
percent compensation.83
The Roberts family followed a similar track. In 1783, Jane Roberts petitioned
Parliament for compensation as a result of her husband’s death, submitting an appraisal
of forfeiture losses. Another report followed in February 1786 from Cape Breton,
Canada, where parliamentary appointees Colonel Thomas Dundas and Jeremy Pemberton
had traveled from London to gather first hand evidence from loyalist exiles. That same
year eldest son Thomas decided to venture to England to plead the family’s claim for
£5,780 sterling in person. Among the exiles who bore witness to the family’s torments
was Colonel William Rankin. In their assessment of the case, the British commissioners
explained that John Roberts had been “condemned, & executed, and his Property was
confiscated… on account of his active Exertions on behalf of the British Government.”
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They also recognized “the Widow & Children” as “having taken no Part whatever in the
Dispute.”84 Parliament awarded the widow £3,931 sterling or 68% of her claim.
Jane Roberts’ saga reveals how the changing political climate in Pennsylvania
affected application of the rule of law while popular support for moderates intensified. As
Thomas Roberts prepared for his transoceanic trip in 1786, he solicited the aid of wellknown Quaker merchant Abel James. James in turn directed attention to the Supreme
Executive Council, requesting that the patriot government certify the events leading to
the Roberts execution and the consequences thereof in order to facilitate the family’s
claim before the British Parliament. With Thomas Mifflin as assembly speaker and
Benjamin Franklin as council president, moderates at the time controlled both the
executive and legislative branches of government. In addition, James had established a
personal relationship with Franklin after encouraging the latter to complete his
autobiography in 1782.85
For patriots, however, there was a potentially ominous side to this sketch. Abel
James had been on the August 1777 council list of those “who have in their General
conduct & conversation evidenced a disposition inimical to the Cause of America.” In
fact, he was one of eleven Quakers that radicals “particularly” sought to apprehend as
Howe’s army approached Philadelphia. James was initially slated for banishment to
Virginia, but revolutionaries allowed him to remain under virtual house arrest on his
84
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Frankford plantation after receiving his promise to avoid cooperation with the oncoming
British invaders. Once Philadelphia fell, James joined the British in the greater safety of
the capital, for his country estate outside the city was located in no-man’s land. The
radical Supreme Executive Council attainted “Abel James, Merchant,” on May 21, 1778,
a month before the British evacuation. His name headed the seventy-five suspected
loyalists appearing on that third attainder. James surrendered according to attainder
guidelines and authorities discharged his case. Resuming his pursuits in the merchant
trade, council secretary Timothy Matlack wrote to James the following year about the
delivery of a seized shipment of salt as if nothing had ever happened. In addition to
James’ track record of suspected disaffection, Jane Roberts’ memorial to the Royal
Claims Commission in 1786 explicitly condemned “the inflamed temper of Persons
active in the Execution of those [revolutionary] Laws” who had killed her spouse simply
for “continuing to manifest a respectful Attention to the British Government.”86 These
factors did not upend Abel James’ request for a certification of events under the more
tolerant moderates. The Supreme Executive Council complied, outfitting Thomas Roberts
for his mission.
This sequence is truly extraordinary. It exposes that, by 1786, an inimical Quaker
once targeted for banishment, placed on house arrest, and attainted could intercede with
the approbation of the revolutionary regime on behalf of the family of another obnoxious
Quaker who had actually been executed, for the purpose of facilitating financial redress
86
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from none other than the tyrannical institution most patriots of all stripes considered the
chief culprit for the abrogation of colonial rights which had led to armed insurrection in
the first place: the British Parliament. Clearly, a dramatic change had taken place. The
elimination of internal armed opposition and external military peril, the non-threatening
behavior of nonjurors and their willingness to accept republican government teamed with
the rise of the moderate faction, allowing patriot government institutions and the new
legal order to side with the ex-disaffected.
The two widows spent their last days in republican Pennsylvania in comparative
peace. On September 15, 1788, Quaker Hannah Callender Sansom chronicled in her diary
“Ann Carlisle is dead, thus has she finished a course of affliction, heavy both before and
after the decease of her husband, Abram Carlisle, he being one of the unhappy sufferers
in the late commotion.” Ann was in her mid-sixties and never really derived satisfaction
from the compensatory valuation the Crown had placed on her husband’s loyalty. Jane
Roberts continued to faithfully submit her yearly requests to the Supreme Executive
Council for the £75 annuity a remorseful court awarded her in 1779. Although payment
may not have been forthcoming without her solicitations, she encountered no further
obstacles in its collection under continued moderate government. Added to the sizable
compensation award from the Royal Claims Commission, she and her numerous family
could lead a comfortable existence. In 1791, the Roberts clan – including Jane, daughters,
and Jehu – abandoned the memories of Lower Merion Township in Bucks County for
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West Whiteland Township in Chester County where Jane was born. The Merion Meeting
provided the family with a certificate authorizing a move to the Uwchlan Meeting.87
The following year the Carlisles and Roberts joined forces in a final gesture of
solidarity. Matriarch Jane Roberts and sole survivor Abraham Carlisle Jr. successfully
lobbied the Pennsylvania legislature for a return of properties still in state hands “as hath
not heretofore been seized, sold, aliened or otherwise disposed of.” Moderate lawmakers
passed a special bill for the express purpose of effectuating this reacquisition.88 That
same year Thomas Roberts sold the property procured from his father and moved to
Philadelphia. He spent much of his time there with a Quaker drinking companion and
coffin maker named Joseph Price whose diary provides insight into the minutiae of daily
life in the early republic and further confirms the family’s return to normalcy. In 1796,
Thomas abruptly wed Polly Cochran. The Radnor Meeting subsequently disowned him
“for his irregular marriage.” The eldest Roberts male only lived a few more years, aptly
saying good-bye to God’s green earth in 1799 in a coffin his drinking buddy fabricated
for the occasion. In the intervening time, Jane Roberts had succumbed in 1795 at the age
of seventy-three and second son Jehu had married Elizabeth Jones in 1792. Remaining
active in the Quaker faith, Jehu became an overseer of the Uwchlan Meeting soon after
and lived until 1818. He and Elizabeth had two children, one a male. Despite the tragedy
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of the Revolution, it appears that the couple was proud of their family history. They
named their son John Roberts. This sentiment appears to have endured. “I remember to
have seen, & had been taught, to revere, this respectable kinsman,” declared cousin and
U.S. Senator Jonathan Roberts years later. As if pronouncing final judgment on his
extended relations’ reintegration experience, he added that “his fate had no effect, on
lowering the standing of his numerous family.”89
The post-execution and early republic experience of the Carlisle and Roberts
families confirms that reintegrative success or failure was intimately linked to the
struggle between patriot factions. The law was the law, but radical and moderate
revolutionary “parties” often configured or applied that law according to their respective
aims. After the Carlisle-Roberts executions, radicals speedily pressed for seizure of the
victims’ estates in 1778. Fourteen years later, moderates passed a statute giving back the
unsold portions of those same estates. When radical judges approved an annual pension
for an executed traitor’s wife in 1779, the radical executive branch did not disburse the
funds. It took a surge in moderate political fortunes to endow a grieving widow with what
was legally due her. The moderate council furnished Thomas Roberts with an official
certification of the circumstances leading to his father’s death sentence for presentation to
an enemy inquiry despite testimony that put the Revolution in a bad light. It is doubtful
radical cooperation would have been forthcoming if the tables had been turned.
In retrospect, much of this radical relentlessness seems overly rigid and
unnecessary. While scrutiny of the Doan despoliations often leads the investigator to root
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for their victimized patriot rivals, the opposite holds true for Abraham Carlisle and John
Roberts. For unlike the Doans, these elderly Quakers and their heirs were never really
much of a threat to the revolutionary cause. Perhaps justification for the executions can
be made in lieu of rebel fear and rage following the British evacuation. Granted. But it is
much more difficult to defend carrying that attitude forward to the guilty parties’ wives
and children who committed no offense against the Revolution. The Carlisle-Roberts
affair paints an added dimension onto the exclusionary/inclusionary divide between
patriot radicals and moderates during the war. Simply put: moderates were willing to
forgive, radicals were not. How each gauged absolution determined what was or was not
perceived as a threat. Corresponding applications of the law obeyed these contending
visions.
CONCLUSION
The cornerstone of Pennsylvania republicanism, as elsewhere in the rebellious
colonies, was a belief in the inherent rights of citizens and the rule of law. The new
political and legal order applied the law principally to defend the rights of those who
demonstrated their fidelity. How to apply that law to the disaffected who failed to prove
their allegiance presented patriot authorities with a dilemma. In cases like the Quaker
pacifists who posed no real threat, revolutionaries developed a reticent tolerance that led
to creation of the exclusionary legal category of nonjurors in the postwar era. Nonjurors
were tolerated as residents but not enfranchised as citizens. Direct threats to revolutionary
authority, however, struck a different chord. For example, British military aggression had
to be repulsed by force. There was no middle ground. The same held true for threats to
republican rule from within. Patriot radicals and moderates often diverged, however, on

381

how to interpret what constituted a true threat. While both factions considered armed
opposition like the Doan guerrillas an inexcusable affront requiring extermination,
officials in each coalition differed on how to treat lesser loyalist transgressions like
collaboration with British occupiers. This divergence collided in the treason cases of
Quakers Abraham Carlisle and John Roberts. Two factors drove competing factional
responses: historical animosity between pacifist Quakers and radical Presbyterians, and
the contrasting views of patriot radicals and moderates on forgiveness. Constitutionalist
radicals preferred fire and brimstone justice as per the movement’s underlying Calvinist
worldview, while Anti-Constitutionalist Republican moderates took a more lenient stand.
Since radicals held the reins of power in November 1778, their vision prevailed and the
prisoners were executed. Once again, “party” decided the fate of the disaffected.
On a broader scale, the law served to legitimize patriot authority and control in
both the Doan and Carlisle-Roberts cases, while helping to pave the way for a smoother
reintegration process. The unified factional response to Doan guerrilla depredations
eliminated the last armed threat to the Revolution on Pennsylvania soil and steadied the
public’s faith in republican authority. In turn, the Carlisle-Roberts executions satiated the
desire for anti-Quaker retribution among radical leaders, most of whom ceased to insist
on application of the “suffer death” sentence in cases of high treason and looked instead
to forfeiture penalties thereafter. The executions thus contributed to reducing internal
tensions. Authorities even permitted the families of the deceased or banished who had not
contravened revolutionary law to remain in Pennsylvania, so that Doan, Carlisle and
Roberts survivors retained their rights as citizens and assimilated. For a society no longer
faced with real or perceived threats from within, the resultant increase in political and
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social stability fostered a climate of forbearance that consolidated moderate power in the
1780s, contributing to the repeal of the Test Act that restored nonjurors to the rights of
citizenship and reintegrated them into the republican fold.
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CHAPTER 6
THE PENNS, REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION & REINTEGRATION
We have traced how revolutionary factions used the rule of law to promote and
consolidate their visions of the brave new republican world. Patriot radicals demanded an
untainted republic that limited citizenship, even residency, to those who had earned their
stripes through selfless devotion to the Revolution. Less strident but no less devoted
patriot moderates exhibited a willingness to accommodate a diversity of viewpoints as
long as skeptics or the inimical posed no threat to the new order. We have likewise
considered the impact competing patriot ambitions had on disaffected Pennsylvanians
who refused to accept or endorse the innovations wrought by rebellion. A majority of the
loyally militant willing to bear arms and fight the king’s fight departed or were defeated.
Most never saw Pennsylvania again. Quaker pacifists stayed but declined to swear
allegiance, serve in the militia, or contribute in any way to the war effort. They were
ostracized as nonjurors well into the postwar period but eventually reintegrated. Others
who supported the British also stayed after the evacuation of 1778. Guerrilla bands
remained defiant and carried on the military struggle. They were crushed. Radicals made
a devastating example of two Quakers who violated the pacifist tenets of their faith,
found them guilty of high treason, and executed them as enemy collaborators. We turn
now to the descendants of William Penn, the most prominent provincials of the era who
witnessed, participated, and bore the brunt of much revolutionary turmoil. In
transformative phases defined by reverence for monarchy, political resistance, armed
rebellion, and legal reintegration, their singular experience wove a common thread
through the last third of the eighteenth century in Pennsylvania.
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Under the hands-on leadership of John Penn Sr., the proprietorship tried to walk a
fine line between republican and royal governance during the war. Placed in an almost
impossible predicament, the family approached the unwelcome conflict on two fronts:
their personal status as citizens of Pennsylvania and their privileged status as proprietors
under William Penn’s founding charter. The Penns successfully navigated the first set of
obstacles, adapting to long-term republican rule after a series of unsettling misfortunes.
But their efforts failed entirely in the second case, resulting initially in a loss of political
power and later in the expropriation of most of their vast land holdings. The fate of the
Penn family proprietorship unearths three important aspects of the American Revolution
and its aftermath in Pennsylvania. First, the colonial order as structured locally was
inherently incompatible with the new republican configuration based on popular
sovereignty and egalitarianism. This irreconcilability led to both its inevitable overthrow
and an expansion of the rights of those citizens committed to revolt. Second, absent the
encumbrance of earlier colonial antagonisms such as Presbyterian-Quaker distrust or
Yankee-Pennamite hostility, revolutionary justice was relatively benign, even at the
height of radical supremacy. A core respect for the rights of citizens and the rule of law
grounded and constrained rebel power. Third, in most instances, subscribing to the patriot
oath of allegiance and voluntarily acquiescing to republican authority greatly facilitated
reintegration.
WILLIAM PENN’S HEIRS & THE PROPRIETARY REGIME
Proprietary rule officially ended with passage of the new Constitution of
Pennsylvania on September 28, 1776 promulgated by radicals. Political realignment
reduced the Penns to the category of common citizens and terminated the privileges they
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had long enjoyed as endowed seigniors of the province. The revolutionaries of 1776 did
not conceal their intent. After noting that the purpose of government was to provide
security and enable citizens to enjoy their natural rights, the constitutional preamble
condemned the English monarch for withdrawing protection from the commonwealth and
waging a tyrannical war against its citizenry. As a result, radical delegates at the state
constitutional convention expressly declared that “all allegiance and fealty to the said
king and his successors, are dissolved and at an end, and all power and authority derived
from him ceased in these colonies.” Article V of the new charter underscored that
government was for the “common benefit… and not for the particular emolument or
advantage of any single man, family, or sett [sic] of men who are only a part of that
community,” specifying that the community had a “right to reform, alter or abolish
government in such manner as shall be… most conducive to the public weal.”1 It was the
heirs of Quaker founder William Penn that convention representatives had in mind when
alluding to emoluments and the king’s derivative power and authority in the province. As
per the Charter of Libertie enacted under the auspices of King Charles II, the Penns had
reigned as lords of Pennsylvania since 1682. The original arrangement made William
Penn and his “heirs and assigns forever” owners of all land in the territory and free to set
up any system of government they saw fit.2 Over time the Penns sold substantial portions
of their land to settlers and established an administration headed by an appointed
governor and council on the executive side and a Quaker-dominated elected assembly on
1
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the legislative flank.3 Battles between the proprietary and Quaker “parties” defined
Pennsylvania’s colonial era. The main clashes revolved around the Penn heirs’ refusal to
allow the assembly to tax their extensive unsold and undeveloped lands and Quaker
unwillingness, based on pacifist scruples, to raise an armed force to defend the colony
during repeated military crises.4
For most of the eighteenth century, appointed governors ruled Pennsylvania on
behalf of the absentee Penn family in England. But in 1763, Thomas Penn – son of
founder William who in 1746 acquired a controlling ¾ interest in the proprietorship –
named his nephew John Penn Sr. as governor. From that date through 1776, Penn family
members directly governed the province. Younger brother Richard replaced John for a
short stint in 1771 while the elder sibling returned to England after father Richard Penn
Sr.’s death. Then in 1773, Uncle Thomas reappointed John, who obligingly returned to
Philadelphia from the mother country.5 John Penn Sr. would continue as governor in the
lead-up and through the outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain. Much like pacifist
Quakers, Governor Penn strove to toe a middle line between parliamentary overextension
and colonial self-determination. Again, it was a precarious stance. If the Penns openly
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refuted monarchical authority, they could lose the royal charter which granted them the
right to rule as proprietors in the first place. On the other hand, if they opposed colonial
resistance to imperial measures such as the Stamp, Townsend, Tea or Coercive acts, they
faced the wrath of a broad swath of the disgruntled local population. As crisis devolved
into crisis, the middle ground gradually buckled.
Three important family events preceded the dynasty’s decline. After nine years of
marriage, Thomas Penn’s wife Lady Juliana Fermor Penn gave birth to a new John in
1760, the same year George III acceded to the English throne. The boy was the couple’s
second child but the principal proprietor’s first male successor. To avoid confusion with
his governor cousin, contemporaries referred to the youngster either as John Jr. or John of
Stoke – an allusion to the English manor near London that Thomas purchased in 1760.
Then four weeks before the insurgent eruption at Lexington in 1775, Thomas died. As the
lone male heir, John Jr. inherited his father’s ¾ proprietary interest.6 Lastly, Richard Penn
Jr. – John Sr.’s brother who had remained in Pennsylvania after replacement as provincial
governor in 1773 – re-crossed the Atlantic to England once war broke out in the colonies.
Richard bore with him the Continental Congress’ “Olive Branch Petition,” the doomed
brainchild of John Dickinson and other patriot conservatives who insisted on one final
attempt at reconciliation with the motherland before independence.7 Months after the
battle of Bunker Hill had consolidated revolutionary fervor throughout the colonies,
Pennsylvania’s proprietary regime was in a state of disarray. Chief proprietor John Jr.
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was an absentee fifteen-year-old minor. Richard had said good-bye to the growing crisis
for good, joining his younger cousin in Britain. The family’s overseas destiny rested
exclusively on the shoulders of John Penn Sr.
Events quickly moved beyond the scope of his political capabilities. In response
to bottom-up revolutionary pressures, Governor Penn chose a path of cautious indecision
and delay rather than vigorous enforcement of established royal authority. John Allen’s
revealing letter to Lady Juliana Penn in England describes the proprietorship’s precarious
position. Writing from his recent New York exile on behalf of John Penn because of “the
danger there would be in his venturing to write himself,” the eldest Allen brother stressed
that the governor had “supported the authority of the Crown, in most points, long after it
had been lost in every other part of the Continent.” While doing so, Penn had acted with
such prudence that he had “baffled” the rebels who awaited any mistake to pounce upon
proprietary interests. Unable to hold out against the “frenzy of the people,” however,
John Penn had “thought it proper to retire to his house on the Schuylkill, where he has
lived in a most private manner.”8 Colonial institutions replicated his retreat. The
governor’s provincial council did not convene at all in 1776, while the legally constituted
colonial assembly voluntarily disbanded that fall after months of inaction. For all intents
and purposes, the proprietorship had ceased to function as a ruling body by mid-1776.
After Congress formally declared independence in July, homegrown revolutionaries
organized a constitutional convention which temporarily supplanted the legislature and
then closed the proprietary death spiral with passage of the new state constitution in
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September. In little more than a year, radical republicans had ended a royally sanctioned
proprietary reign of nearly a century.
The proprietorship’s tenuous position between radical revolution and kingly
fidelity is apparent in a January 1777 proposal that came to nothing. As Penn resided in
seclusion on his Schuylkill estate nine months before Howe’s attack on Pennsylvania, the
British contemplated the isolated ex-governor’s prospects from recently captured New
York. General Howe’s personal secretary, Ambrose Serle, foreseeing that “the Rebels
wd. Certainly sacrifice all Proprietorship & Charter-authority,” proposed to Andrew
Allen that John Penn should issue a royalist proclamation from his refuge. Serle
suggested a proprietary decree “for convening or electing an Assembly” that would
“firmly & expressly renounce all the Determinations of the Congress as a factious &
illegal Body,” as well as “warmly exhort all men… to profess with him [Penn] a dutiful
allegiance to His Majesty, and an Hatred of all Rebellions & treasonable Conspiracies;
and command them to give no aid or Succor to the Rebels.” In Serle’s judgment, this
proclamation would “give a Convincing Proof of Loyalty & attachment to the King &
Constitution,” which he observed “was now rather doubted at Home.” Allen left the
meeting “with the apparent Conviction of the Rectitude & Prudence of the measure, and
with the Resolution of communicating it, as an Idea of his own, to some leading people in
Pennsylvania.” That Andrew Allen ever discussed the notion with anyone else or that it
reached John Penn is not clear. Regardless, the idea had no chance of ever coming to
fruition. If undertaken, it would likely have found little resonance among Pennsylvanians.
Patriots would have repudiated it, while loyalists, conservatives or middle-of-the-roaders
had already shown themselves incapable of action, allowing the dissolution of the elected
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colonial assembly only months before. More importantly, Serle’s idea assumed a type of
royalist commitment which did not exist. The Penns held an undeniable attachment for
the Crown. They no doubt preferred the old order to the new. But their interests came
first. Amid uncertainty, the proprietors awaited events. They did not wish to antagonize
either side.9
THE ARREST & EXILE OF JOHN PENN SR.
John Penn Sr.’s retirement “in a most private manner” was short-lived. Following
the capture of New York City in the fall of 1776, Sir William Howe set his sights on
Philadelphia as the next target for the military campaign scheduled to open the following
spring. Unwilling to begin operations until he had received new equipment and supplies,
the British general leisurely organized his plans and forces. The drive did not start until
well into the summer, to the consternation of impatient loyalist exiles.10 Anticipating the
coming events, the Continental Congress passed a resolution in July recommending that
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council “make prisoners, such of the late crown and
proprietary officers” and others “as are disaffected, or may be dangerous to the public
liberty.” Delegates suggested that those arrested be either confined in the backcountry or
“enlarged upon parole, as their characters and behavior may require.” The next day the
council issued a warrant for the detainment of thirty-six colonial officials or persons
suspected of hostility to the patriot cause. The Honorable John Penn, late Governor of the
province of Pennsylvania, headed the list.11
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A tug of war between revolutionary authorities and the deposed embodiment of
colonial authority ensued. Patriot light horsemen assigned to implement the council’s
warrant arrived at John Penn’s home in the countryside after 9:00 p.m. on Monday,
August 4, with instructions to either imprison the governor or oblige him to sign a parole
confining him to an area within six miles of his home. As Penn later noted, “the
unexpected & abrupt manner of their coming at Such an unseasonable time of night threw
the family into great confusion.” The proprietor refused to sign and demanded more time.
He wrote a one-sentence note to the council indicating that he was “desirous of
considering the propriety of signing” the parole and would provide a final answer on
Friday. With that, the arresting committee left. On the appointed day, however, no one
called upon the fallen governor. It was not until the following Monday that the light
horsemen returned with a new parole expanding Penn’s confinement “to the whole
Province.” When Penn refused the new offer, warrant officers declared they had orders to
conduct him to President Thomas Wharton Jr. and the Supreme Executive Council.
“Denying their authority to summon me before them,” the proprietor asserted that he
“never could submit to… the indignity,” leaving the envoys with the sole option of
“carrying me away by force.” Unwilling to take such a provocative step, the messengers
negotiated a compromise whereby Penn agreed to go to the Philadelphia home of exChief Justice, proprietary confidant and father-in-law William Allen Sr. the next day by
noon “to receive any message the President and Council had to send.” John Penn Sr.
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arrived at William Allen’s home by the appointed time but again refused to sign a parole.
He was then arrested.12
The council first considered sending the ex-governor to Hartford, Connecticut,
then pondered Fredericksburg, Virginia. In the meantime, responsibility for the prisoner
passed to Congress’ Board of War. The changing circumstances compelled Penn to
reassess his options. Acknowledging the fierce pro-patriot “temper” of Virginians and the
resolve of his wife Anne “who was determined to share my fate,” John Penn Sr. decided
to sign the parole “as the least evil of the two.” Congress then reciprocated, ordering that
“removal to Virginia, be superseded.” The situation temporarily stabilized. But on August
26, Congress received news of the British army’s landing at Head of Elk on Chesapeake
Bay and ordered the Board of War to remove Penn – along with colonial Chief Justice
Benjamin Chew – “under guard, to a place of security out of the state of Pennsylvania.”
Once “safely secured,” they were to be “entertained agreeable to their rank and station in
life.”13 Penn received this news the next day.
In keeping with the spirit of the order, the Board of War’s letter asked him to
select a suitable place of residence for his proposed banishment. He chose the Union Iron
Works in Hunterdon County, New Jersey, an extensive property with an accommodating
12
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home owned by his in-laws, the Allens – the same locale where the three Allen brothers
had decided to join the British against the advice of sibling James. The Board of War
initially objected because of the large numbers “disaffected to the cause of America” in
that vicinity but after “some delay & a great deal of trouble,” they relented and Penn
made the transition. A few weeks into exile, patriot Governor William Livingston of New
Jersey unexpectedly dispatched the state militia with orders to escort Penn to Worcester,
Massachusetts. The ex-governor of Pennsylvania adamantly refused removal, prompting
another stalemate. After weeks of wrangling, Livingston finally rescinded the expulsion
order. According to Penn, “it seems his [Livingston’s] dignity was not a little hurt that the
Congress should send me into Jersey without his permission.” Penn overcame this
adversity when “some of the warm friends to America who lived near me” informed the
New Jersey governor that he “had behaved exceedingly well” during his time at Union.14
Beyond temperamental personalities, the incidents leading to arrest and exile show, first,
that Pennsylvania’s revolutionary government was not yet entirely confident of its
authority and, second, no one – not even the proprietor himself – was above their
interpretation of the law.
From New Jersey, John Penn maintained a low profile in the following months.
Official records reflect that obscurity. He wrote innocuously to radical Timothy Matlack
at the Pennsylvania government’s Lancaster refuge in November, asking the Secretary of
the Supreme Executive Council how to go about procuring three hundred pounds of
clover seed for a friend who had requested his intervention in the matter. In December,
council president Thomas Wharton Jr. confided to a patriot general that “respecting Mr.
14
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Penn and Mr. Chew, Council has not lately heard anything about them.” In February, the
council drew an order on the state treasury for the reimbursement of expenses the light
horsemen had incurred while carrying out the parole mission the previous year.15 With
General Howe occupying Philadelphia and Continental Army provisions in short supply
at Valley Forge, the fate of John Penn was not high on the rebel agenda.
Debate on the proprietor’s destiny began in earnest in early March, an issue
patriot officials often linked to the controversy over the Quaker exiles still in Virginia. In
keeping with the continuing dispute over jurisdiction, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive
Council asked Congress if they objected to a return of Penn and Chew “under the
authority of the state.” That body referred the matter to an investigative committee of
three.16 After some reflection, the group acknowledged that Penn and Chew had been
Crown officers prior to independence, “& yet taking no active part (that we know of
against us)… [this] renders their situation very peculiar.” In the event the prisoners were
liberated, the congressional committee foresaw three scenarios. If allowed to join the
British in Philadelphia, the Revolution’s enemies might use the proprietor’s authority to
create “mischief,” even without Penn’s consent. “Mischievous consequences” could also
arise if Penn was freed in those parts of Pennsylvania still controlled by Whigs because
“they are so intermixed with Tories.” And a transfer to Pennsylvania while still a prisoner
15
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who refused to take the requisite oath of allegiance would likely produce “discontent &
caballing.” Despite these legitimate concerns, the committee concluded that Congress had
no objection to their return to local authority “provided it can be done without danger to
the state of Pennsylvania in particular, or the United States in general.”17
The Pennsylvania government took about a week to reply to Congress’ analysis.
Their lengthy communiqué examined the contradictions of Penn’s initial arrest and, again
like the Quakers in Virginia, raised questions of jurisdiction between state and national
authorities. The council made sure to justify its earlier actions, concluding that those who
had not renounced commissions under the king “are friends to the enemies of that
[America] country” and “the arrest of those Gentlemen was unquestionably proper.”
They contemplated not only the effects of releasing the prisoners, but also considered
their continued retention. Although the council did not perceive any “injury to the general
cause of America, or to this state” that John Penn could exercise “under the pretence of
being Governor of Pennsylvania” even with Howe in Philadelphia, they could see no
benefit to Penn’s release. Should America win the war, Penn and other colonial officials
could act as a rallying point for “their dependants and connexions, and the dissatisfied of
all parties” leading to an effort “to re-establish them in government.” If Britain emerged
victorious, patriots would then “have done every thing in the power of men to do to reestablish them in their former power.” Moreover, it was “impossible” to think that Penn
and company could be “enlarged” in Pennsylvania without taking the oath of allegiance.
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Such a refusal would render them “enemies of the state.”18 The subject was momentarily
laid to rest.
The issue resurfaced two months later after the Virginia exiles had returned to
Philadelphia at the end of April and news had leaked that the British were to evacuate the
capital. Aware of the Quaker restoration, John Penn Sr. “was fearful of being detained for
some particular purpose,” a thought that left him “very uneasy” and in a “disagreeable
state of uncertainty.” On May 10, he and Benjamin Chew petitioned Congress once more
for release. Five days later, Congress finally agreed, resolving that the pair “be conveyed,
without delay, into the state of Pennsylvania, and there discharged from their parole.”
Providing no further explanation, they immediately transmitted their decision to the
Pennsylvania and New Jersey governments.19 The sudden ruling perplexed the Supreme
Executive Council at Lancaster, which replied that “we are wholly at a loss to know why
they have been discharged in this manner.” Nevertheless, the council played along,
explaining that “the respect we have for the determinations of Congress, induces us to
suppose that there may be good and sufficient reasons for it.” Governor Livingston of
New Jersey promptly arranged for a military escort to take Penn and Chew back to
Pennsylvania.20 While the Penn family’s earlier encounter with the constitutionally
18
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reconfigured patriot government had destroyed their political authority, pushed John Sr.
into involuntary seclusion and Richard into permanent retirement across the Atlantic, the
suspicions of disaffection underpinning this second major engagement with the
Revolution – even after a seemingly successful outcome allowing John Sr.’s return –
exposed the potential for a continuing degeneration of the Penns’ already humbled status,
from that of common citizens to permanent enemies of the new order. Danger lurked on
both the personal and proprietary fronts.
Pursuant to Congress’ recommendation, John Penn returned to his country estate
at Lansdown in the summer of 1778. From the family’s perspective, conditions soon
worsened: the British evacuation of Philadelphia in mid-June eliminated any prospect of
restoring the powers of the proprietorship once the rebels reoccupied the provincial
capital. Facing increased uncertainty, John Penn Sr. made the dramatic decision to take
the Pennsylvania oath of allegiance, complying on July 8. According to James Allen,
Penn had found himself “under the cruel necessity of abjuring the King & swearing
allegiance to the mob-government of Pensylvania [sic] & the united states to prevent
confiscation of his whole property.” In the end, he succumbed “by the advice of his
friends & in consequence of a letter from Mr. Baker in England, advising him to become
an American.”21 Almost two weeks after swearing allegiance to the revolutionary
government, John Penn Sr. sat down to write his first post-banishment communication to
21
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Lady Juliana in England. The brief three-paragraph missive carried by exiled Anglican
minister Thomas Coombe makes clear the duress under which the released ex-governor
then lived. “As I am obliged to send my letter open, I do not think it prudent to say
anything respecting the publick [sic] or our own private affairs,” he asserted. Reflecting
on his captivity and the changed circumstances, Penn expounded that “my time has been
spent in a very disagreeable manner for a long while past, & I still ardently wish an end
to our present troubles, when I may have an opportunity again of writing to you without
restraint.”22 It seems Penn still distrusted the rebel authorities despite his recent oath. His
instincts proved correct. For revolutionaries, deposing the Penns from the provincial seat
of power was not enough. The proprietorship retained control over vast expanses of
Pennsylvania land. Seeking a definitive break with the royalist past, radicals launched a
full-scale legal assault on proprietary holdings in 1779.
PROPRIETARY DIVESTMENT: DEFINITIVE END OF AN ERA
Inherent rights and the rule of law lay at the heart of Pennsylvania’s seizure of
proprietary lands. Proprietary ownership of unsold private lands, as granted in the royal
charter, was intrinsically at odds with the nature of republicanism. In a republic, the
government was recognized as the organized political expression of the citizenry. It was
proper that the people, not vested interests, should rule. The Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776 unseated King George III and the Penn family from power, resolving the political
aspect of this equation. Power and property, though, were not necessarily one and the
same. The uniqueness of the proprietary formula of government placed Pennsylvania
authorities in a quandary, especially after John Penn Sr. swore allegiance to the new state.
22
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As a citizen of the republic, Penn had a right to his property. The new constitution said
so: “But no part of a man’s property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public
uses, without his own consent.”23 At the same time, the Penn’s holdings were ostensibly
larger than the combined properties of all other citizens of the state. Such proportions
were clearly incompatible with a government based on an egalitarian distribution of both
rights and property. Constitutional articles V on government for the benefit of the people
and VIII on the protection of private property were therefore at odds with each other.
That citizen John Penn Sr. held a one-quarter share in the proprietorship while his
nineteen-year-old cousin and British subject John Jr., who had never set foot in America,
possessed a three-quarter interest further complicated the issue. In sum, the rights of
Pennsylvania’s republican citizens locked horns with the Penns’ chartered rights.
In examining Pennsylvania patriot reactions to the proprietary legacy, it is
important to understand that stability, order, and continuity – whenever feasible under a
republican framework – were core aspirations of revolutionary rule for both the radical
and moderate factions, although each often interpreted the meaning of those elements
differently. The tendency for continuity was best expressed in the post-constitution
legislature’s decision to grandfather in “each and every one of the laws or acts of general
assembly that were in force and binding on the inhabitants on the fourteenth day of May
last [1776]” with the exception of those measures which were “repugnant to, against or
inconsistent with the constitution of this commonwealth.” This seminal statute –
approved in a radical-controlled assembly no less – in effect transferred the body of
English common law, as well as the bulk of colonial law, into the new legal system.
23
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Unfavorably for the proprietors, the transfer omitted any law or act which “acknowledges
any authority in the heirs or devisees of William Penn, Esquire, deceased, the former
governor of the said province, or any other person whomsoever as governor.”24 Legally
speaking, the Penns in their multiple roles as proprietors and colonial governors –
including specifically John Penn Sr. – were among the “repugnant,” despite his earlier
incorporation as a sworn citizen.
Patriot discussion and activity concerning proprietary land holdings began even
before passage of the Constitution of 1776. Early into his exile, John Allen relayed to
Lady Juliana Penn that “a motion was indeed made in their convention, to seize upon the
Quitrents and vacant lands, and to apply them to the support of their new government.”
The proposal was defeated, however, as “the Injustice was too glaring to pass even
then.”25 In the winter of 1776-77, the patriot army violated proprietary land rights when
they cut down and distributed firewood to soldiers from the ungranted common areas in
the capital city, a previously recognized Penn possession, without proprietary approval.
Attorney James Tilghman protested to the revolutionary Council of Safety on behalf of
John Penn. The debate intensified in the aftermath of the British withdrawal. In early
1779, Supreme Executive Council president Joseph Reed officially opened the legislative
24
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debate on the future of proprietary holdings in a message to the Pennsylvania Assembly,
urging that body to tackle the “nature and extent of the claims or estates of the late
proprietaries, and their consistency with the interests and happiness of the people under
the late revolution.”26 John Penn hurriedly emerged from his seclusion, requesting time to
appoint counsel to consider the matter in-depth. Through the assembly adjournment two
months later, the issue of the proprietary estates came up nine times. After reading an
opinion from the Chief Justice on March 30, the legislature decided to postpone
discussion until the next session “in order that the members of the assembly may have an
opportunity of consulting their constituents on so important a question.” Even radical
representatives hesitated to embark on such a sweeping measure without popular
sanction. In the interim, the assembly resolved that the proprietors “forbear to exercise
any of those powers, which they have heretofore used” over proprietary lands and related
finances. The Penns were put on hold.27
When the assembly reconvened in the late summer, President Reed again urged
the people’s delegates “to proceed in the great business of the Proprietary estates, at least
so far as to give the next Assembly an opportunity to put the finishing hand to this
important and necessary work.” The House appointed a committee the following day to
study the proprietary question in earnest. Less than two weeks later, legislators read the
draft of a bill for the first time and proposed amendments.28 Debate was reaching a
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crescendo. Radicals then won a majority once again in the annual October elections and
led the charge in the new assembly.29 Barely a month after convening on October 25,
Pennsylvania lawmakers reassigned the bulk of the Penns’ lands to the state by a 40-7
vote in a sweeping divestiture ordinance entitled “An Act for Vesting the Estates of the
Late Proprietaries of Pennsylvania in this Commonwealth.”30 Along with their former
royal mandate to govern, Penn family control of the province’s extensive land holdings
had constituted the backbone of proprietary authority. The patriot radical faction then at
the summit of its influence thus made sure new regulations put an end once and for all to
whatever vestiges remained of that authority. There was no longer any doubt – the Penns
were out for good.
The Divestment Act is an outstanding example of patriot reliance on rights and
the rule of law as fundamental principles of the Revolution. In essence, the measure
contained three central elements. It conveyed all unsold proprietary or “public” lands to
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as of the Declaration of Independence; allowed the
Penn family to retain ownership of their private estates, as well as holdings known as the
Proprietary Tenths or Manors which were surveyed as Penn property before July 4, 1776;
and provided compensation to William Penn’s heirs in the amount of £130,000 for the
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forfeiture.31 Not surprisingly, the Penns believed the act to be patently unfair. Yet the
comparative hindsight of both eighteenth-century conflagrations such as the French
Revolution and nearly two hundred and fifty years of subsequent revolutionary turmoil
around the world lends credence to the view that the terms of the seizure were rather
benevolent. Given power dynamics and the political climate after the British evacuation,
radical authorities could simply have declared the Penns to be the king’s minions,
impounded all their proprietary and private lands, and abandoned the Penns altogether.
As the underlying notions in the Divestment Act reveal, however, revolutionaries
consciously chose not to do so because of a desire to legally justify a righteous process of
continuity – not unlike the justifications provided for the Protestant Reformation more
than two centuries before.
Five critical assumptions inspired the resolutions and procedures enacted in the
Divestment Act. The core idea of inherent rights suffused three of them. First and
foremost, the citizenry’s rights were supreme. The act’s preamble left no doubt that “the
safety and happiness of the people is the fundamental law of society.” By republican
extension, then, it was also “the right and duty of the representatives of the people to
assume the direction and management of such interest and property as belongs to the
community.” A second postulate asserted that proprietary claims to the soil and its
pecuniary derivatives such as quitrents were incompatible with popular sovereignty and
“cannot longer consist with the safety, liberty and happiness of the good people of this
commonwealth.” A single individual or family had no right to such entitlements in a
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republic. The state legislature therefore settled the issue of conflicting rights in favor of
the citizenry. Nonetheless, a third implicit premise argued that citizens’ rights must also
apply to the Penns. Radical patriots thus validated the proprietors’ personal estates, the
Proprietary Tenths or Manors, and all financial benefits stemming from these. And since
John Penn Sr. was a citizen in good standing, the family had a right to financial
compensation for its losses. These were defined in the amount of £130,000 paid in
installments to begin one year after the conclusion of the war with Great Britain.32
Concepts of continuity and the rule of law grounded the other two key
assumptions for both ideological and pragmatic reasons. As a matter of principle, the act
extolled the historical connection with the colony’s founder and accepted his successors
as appropriate bearers of that legacy. Legislators understood that “the rights of property
and powers of government thereby vested in the said William Penn and his heirs were
stipulated to be used and enjoyed as well for the benefit of the settlers as for his own
particular emolument.” They approved compensation not only in “remembrance of the
enterprising spirit which distinguished the founder of Pennsylvania” but also because the
freemen of the commonwealth were “mindful of the expectations and dependence of his
descendants on the propriety thereof… which will be wholly defeated and the parties
exposed to great disappointment and loss if no provision is made therein.” Unlike the
Quaker-Presbyterian friction of the colonial era, radicals allowed that historical bonds
with Quakers now went hand in hand with republican principles. Yet legal continuity had
practical ramifications that had to be weighed in light of republican theory. Uncontested
legal title to land was critical for revolutionaries in an agricultural society with an
32
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expanding frontier. The act thus ratified the legitimacy of all prior transactions between
proprietors and settlers: “all and every the rights, titles, estates, claims and demands
which were granted by or derived from the said proprietaries... shall be and they are
hereby confirmed, ratified and established forever.” Pennsylvanians could rest assured
that revolutionary law secured their property rights and the opportunity to prosper.33
For the Penns, the conclusion of the opening phase of reintegration stripped them
of all political power and most property. As the only family member who could claim
uncontestable citizenship, divestment permanently fixed John Penn Sr.’s status as a
republican commoner, albeit a potentially affluent one if authorities fulfilled the postwar
terms of the confiscatory act. Despite ousting the former regime, patriots as a collective
body did not display any sense of vindictiveness in their anti-proprietary posture, only an
ambition to establish egalitarian conditions for a functional republican order. The
family’s subsequent reintegrative ride substantiates this view.
THE PENNS’ QUEST FOR COMPENSATION
Radicals justified the anti-proprietary coup as a defense of citizen rights. By
carving into law compensation and retention of a portion of the Penns’ vast assets,
revolutionaries believed they had also honored and consolidated that family’s legitimate
rights. The Penns had other ideas. From divestiture forward, they avoided politics and the
public sphere except when proprietary affairs came to the forefront. Two of the family
tackled reintegration, approaching that prospect as both uniquely favored ex-proprietors
and private individuals. During this time, John Penn Jr. came of age in England. Holding
a majority three-quarter share, he assumed an increasingly prominent role and eventually
33

Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, vol. 10, Section VII (Section XII, P.L.), 37; Section III (Section VII,
P.L.), 35-36.

406

supplanted his mother Lady Juliana Penn in that branch’s proprietary pursuits. As the war
wound down, John Jr. traveled for the first time to the faraway province his ancestors had
acquired from the king. The rise to power of a more moderate political faction in
Pennsylvania animated the journey. According to Lady Juliana’s son-in-law and
proprietary partner William Baker, the Penns in London held “the most sanguine
Expectations” that the end of the war and a more friendly state government provided an
exceptional opportunity to reopen “the Proceedings by which the Property of the Family
has been so deeply affected.”34 John Jr. arrived in America in the autumn of 1783 for
what would turn out to be a five-year sojourn.
Meanwhile, from his retreat at Lansdown citizen John Penn Sr. resumed his post
as the family point person. The once banished governor led a secluded life while keeping
an eye on entreaties from state authorities which could impact an eventual financial
settlement. Of particular note were the whereabouts of missing Land Office records from
the colonial era. Various exchanges between the Pennsylvania government and John Sr.
or his representatives began in 1780, the requisite documents finding their way to
officials in due time.35 Since John Penn Sr. maintained a low profile, it comes as no
surprise that mundane incidents dominate the sources for the duration of the war. For
example, in the late summer of 1780 wife Anne Allen Penn inquired of Dr. Parke if her
ill-disposed husband should “continue taking the Bark… [and] whether he may eat
grapes, without the skins, or watermelon.” Later, John Sr. reciprocated with an invitation:
34
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“the company of Doctor Parke is requested at dinner at Lansdown on Sunday next.” In
1783, the Supreme Executive Council granted “John Penn, Mrs. Penn, and their
attendants” passports for a visit to British-occupied New York, possibly in anticipation of
John Penn Jr.’s arrival.36 Tracking down papers, illness, Sunday dinners, travel – these
were the stuff of a five-year lull.
Richard Penn – governor from 1771 to 1773 and erstwhile bearer of the Olive
Branch Petition to George III in 1775 – never returned to Pennsylvania. As a non-resident
and younger brother of John Sr., Richard collaborated with his relations but took a back
seat from afar in efforts to protect proprietary interests. The proprietary question surfaced
not only in America but also in England. In the spring of 1776, Richard dined with an
American visitor in London, expressing a hope that Hessian recruits in the British army
“might all be persuaded to join the Germans already in Pensylvania [sic], and so the back
parts of that Province be filled & settled with People.” Many later did, but as escaped war
prisoners of the patriots, not as royal settlers.37 After Yorktown but before the definitive
peace, Lady Juliana received an inquiry asking if “the two Beaver Skins would be
wanted as heretofore to present at Windsor on New Years Day” as part of the Penns’
traditional quitrent to the king.38 It was a reasonable query – the family still retained the
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Proprietary Manors or Tenths. Peace finally arrived in 1783. Renewed Penn incursions
into the public sphere ensued as the family dedicated the decade of the 1780s to seeking
financial redress for their losses. They pressed their cause along three paths. First, collect
the £130,000 due them from the commonwealth as per the Divestment Act. Second,
reopen discussion of the compensation issue among Pennsylvania legislators with an eye
towards increased reparations. And third, seek additional restitution from the British
Parliament. It appears they also initially considered but discarded a fourth route
requesting repeal of the Divestment Act itself. The Penns would encounter success in two
of the three endeavors they pursued.
As an unpublished internal draft of John Penn Sr.’s thoughts on the proprietary
issue exposes, the Penns contemplated an option to seek repeal of the Divestment Act
after the general public learned of the signing of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace but
before ratification of the Definitive Treaty ending the war.39 The fifteen-page handwritten
manuscript provides extraordinary insight into the family’s state of mind at this critical
juncture. It began with a summary of the Penns’ established rights under the royal
charter: the right to appoint governors, name a provincial council, veto or approve
assembly laws, appoint provincial officers, remedy debts, and the right of “Pre-emption
from the Natives in all Lands,” all of which were “entirely taken away by the late
Revolution.” It went on to delineate the family’s property grants: all “Vacant Lands
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throughout the Province,” the Manors or Tenths which reserved 10,000 of every 100,000
acres to the proprietorship, purchase moneys mortgaged for surveying and patenting
settler lands, quitrents for both vacant and manor lands, manor tenths on city or town lots,
and private lots or tracts the Penns’ purchased over the years. The memo then listed the
Penns’ losses as a result of the assembly’s divestment: all vacant lands, all Manor or
Tenths lands not surveyed before July 4, 1776, quitrents and arrears on both of these, and
purchase monies and arrears not within the retained Manors or Tenths. The draft included
a summary of the properties the family retained – the Manors or Tenths surveyed before
July 4, 1776, purchase monies due for Manor lands sold to settlers, quitrents from Manor
lands, and “private Estates, Lands & Hereditaments” – and cited the £130,000 in
legislated compensation.40
In a lengthy closing analysis, Penn refuted patriot motives as elucidated in the
Divestment Act preamble, admonishing that the assembly’s “conclusion does not follow
very Logically from the Premises,” for legislators had failed to show that the proprietaries
“had either abetted Great Britain in this War” or that “they had not borne their Proportion
of the Burthens… in the Prosecution of the War.” Moreover, justifications for patriot
measures “cannot be ascribed to their [the Penns’] misconduct” because the state had
proceeded “without any crime alledged [sic].” He therefore deduced that “State Necessity
is then the only Plea for these Proceedings.” The former governor ended by placing his
revived hopes on the peace treaty’s recommendations to Congress asking the individual
states to revisit property confiscations during the war, which led him to optimistically
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avow that “this business will be reviewed and the Act repealed.”41 This optimism did not
last. The Penns tossed out the repeal option when it became clear that Pennsylvania and
the other states had no intention of embracing Congress’ recommendations on forfeited
properties.42 Instead, the arguments elaborated in John Penn’s draft would later be
applied in the family’s appeals for a more adequate compensation settlement.
Even minus repeal, the provisions in the Divestment Act seemed to comprise the
low-hanging fruit on the Penn restitution agenda. Yet gathering that bounty did not prove
to be a simple task. According to the original statute’s postwar clause, already authorized
compensation installments could have begun after September 1784, one year after the
signing of the Treaty of Peace. A temporarily reconstituted radical majority in the
General Assembly, however, delayed payment until the legislature could pass a new
ordinance approving the initial disbursement of £15,000.43 Judging from subsequent
lawmaking activity, the problem may have been budgetary as well as political. A month
later the assembly approved a lengthy ordinance targeting funds for the yearly interest
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due to the national confederation government as well as the £130,000 proprietary debt.44
The Supreme Executive Council, charged with implementing divestment, called on the
Penns to appear before them and formally submit their claims, while launching an inquiry
into the legitimacy of the proprietors’ rights. Following a detailed review of the Penn
documentation by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, radical judges Thomas McKean and
George Bryan reported “that the vouchers support the said Claims as stated.”45 While
soliciting their first installment in January of 1786, questions arose regarding retroactive
interest payments due to the proprietors, one of many tangential issues to follow. In 1787,
a moderate-dominant legislature settled the matter, passing a new law authorizing interest
outlays and setting more viable procedures for disbursement of future installments.46
The collection ordeal continued through 1794. By 1790, the state government
under the soon-to-be-repealed Constitution of 1776 had completed five of the six major
installments and authorized a sixth disbursement of £25,812.10.47 The revamped
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government under the new Constitution of 1790 may have felt the need to introduce its
own procedures, for the assembly approved legislation in 1791 reauthorizing interest
payments and setting the date of September 3rd for both 1791 and 1792 to settle “the two
last installments” with accrued interest.48 A final sticking point concerned back taxes on
proprietary quitrents, for which the state comptroller-general had deducted £7,249.2.10
from the final installment until the government could rule on the issue. The legislature
under moderate control resolved the dispute in favor of the proprietaries.49
Along with inaugural overtures to collect their lawful recompense from the
Divestment Act, the Penns simultaneously pursued a reopening and renegotiation of the
entire compensation issue in the immediate aftermath of the war. Cousins John Sr. and
John Jr. joined hands in America with an absentee Richard Penn to present a memorial in
early 1784 to the state assembly arguing three fundamental points. They were patriotic
and “willing to make any necessary Sacrifice of their own private Rights to the Happiness
of the whole People.” Moreover, they “would have been contented to wave [sic] their
hereditary Rights of Government for the peoples good” much earlier if an arrangement
could have been “secured by the same charter, under which the Soil is held and the
Country had flourished for near an hundred years.” The language set pliable distinctions
between lost political power and property.
47
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Yet despite proprietary goodwill, the state’s actions had ruined them. They had
“born [sic] the Overthrow of their Government, the Sequestration of their Estates, and
almost total Wreck of their better Fortunes.” While others benefitted from the Revolution,
their family had been “left in a State of unparalleled Distress and Uncertainty respecting
every Thing on which they and their Posterity are to depend.” Consequently, they now
sought “a Compromise and final Settlement upon the prior Principles of Justice and
Equity.” If it was therefore “judged necessary and reconciliable [sic] to Justice” that a
historic right to their chartered property “should stand dissolved,” they now questioned
“whether the Compensation proposed bears any adequate Proportion to the Value of the
Property taken for the Use of the State.”50 In short, the Penns were willing to concede the
irreversible loss of power and real property but the state needed to make amends for their
sacrifice with a more satisfactory compensation package.
Despite the optimism generated by the advent of moderate government, the
crusade for more revenue stalled. The petition never garnered the support of either patriot
faction. As early as 1784, John Penn Jr. noted “the treatment of our memorial; from the
abuse of one party, by which, tho robb’d, we were almost branded as thieves, & the
others’ apparent desertion, in their answer.” A year later he added that “we did not
petition the assembly, for which there were many arguments.”51 The delay continued
until the ex-proprietors finally submitted another request three years later, hoping that the
“weighty matters” presented in the earlier memorial “may now be taken up for a final
50
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consideration and discussion” towards “an amicable and final settlement” so that the
family “may not remain longer in that state of uncertainty and distress.” The House heard
a reading of both the new letter and the earlier memorial but the matter was “ordered to
lie on the table.”52 And there it would remain. Handling of the divestment issue shows
that, once the patriot government resolved the conflict between the rights of the citizenry
and the proprietorship, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania applied a principled concern
for the rights of founder William Penn’s heirs etched into the law from beginning to end.
But this principled concern had limits which obeyed republican priorities driven by
political and economic realities. Although the Penns never received what they interpreted
as their just due, they were heard and granted due process at every step of the way. Given
the tone of the written exchanges, relations between authorities and former proprietors
were always publicly respectful and perhaps even cordial. The relatively amicable
climate contributed to the personal reintegration decisions of both John Sr. and Jr.
The Penns followed the money. When it became clear that £130,000 was all the
compensation to be had in America, the onetime proprietors decided to solicit damages
from Parliament’s Royal Claims Commission. Cousins John Sr. and John Jr. embarked
for England with that purpose in mind in the spring of 1788. By then, royal officials
investigating loyalist losses had been on the job for nearly a half decade, well on the way
to concluding their task. It is likely that the Penns postponed submitting a British claim as
long as possible because they sustained hopes that Pennsylvania would respond favorably
to the request for further restitution. This explains the underlying tone of urgency in their
1787 appeal to the Pennsylvania legislature: “it becomes everyday more necessary that
52
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there should be an arrangement and settlement of affairs...”53 Aware of the royal
commission’s approaching expiration, the Penns made a strategic decision to abandon the
Pennsylvania effort and concentrate on England. In strict financial terms, they judged
properly. The English received them with open arms. Whereas a dubious indifference to
the patriot cause had served as an obstacle in America, royalists viewed such behavior in
a much more favorable light.
This study is not the place to develop the details of the extensive case the Penns
put before Parliament, as these specifics have little bearing on citizen rights or the rule of
law in Pennsylvania or on the reintegration experiences of the protagonists other than to
furnish the family with substantial wealth. Suffice it to say that John Penn Sr. claimed a
loss of income as governor, Richard Penn a loss of income as an appointed naval officer
for the Port of Philadelphia and the destruction of his wife’s property by British troops
during the city’s occupation, and that the two brothers joined widow Lady Juliana Penn
and her son John Jr. in a massive £944,000 claim for the forfeiture of 21,592,127 acres of
land. Sympathetic commissioners granted the ex-proprietors an annuity of £4,000 per
annum, three-quarters of which went to the John Penn Jr. lineage and one-quarter to the
John Penn Sr. branch, and a massive payout of £500,000 for their expropriated properties.
The latter was by far the largest settlement the commissioners authorized, representing by
itself almost one-sixth of the £3,292,455 of total loyalist compensation cited in the
commission’s report.54 Yet it appears the amount did not entirely satisfy the Penns. “I
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understand the family have fallen short of their expectations from Parliament,” observed
James Tilghman. As a former attorney for John Penn Sr., he was privy to comments
circulating in elite social circles in America.55 Notwithstanding inflated expectations or
personal sentiment, the Penns’ English excursion had proven quite rewarding.
REINTEGRATIVE TRAJECTORIES
By swearing allegiance and securing his rights as a Pennsylvania citizen, John
Penn Sr. provided the Pennsylvania government a justification for codifying into law the
preservation of a portion of the family’s property holdings. The rights of citizens and the
rule of law thus set the stage for the personal reintegration experiences of the three Penns
with an enduring interest in the proprietorship. Each chose a distinct path. John Penn Sr.
decided he was a Pennsylvanian. John Penn Jr. toyed with the novelty of republican
America but ultimately elected to remain a British subject. And to judge from later
activities and his decision to not ever alight again on the former colony’s shores, Richard
Penn took note of Pennsylvania solely when his personal interests were at stake.
Of the three, Richard Penn’s reintegration path was the most consistent. Periodic
manifestations of resentment against his older brother, John Sr., certainly influenced his
behavior and decisions. They had a history. Following his father’s death in 1771, Richard
staked a personal legal claim to the reserved lots and manors of the proprietary legacy
during his stint as governor on the shaky advice of interested counsel. This maneuver
infuriated principal proprietor Thomas Penn and upset his older brother John Sr., who
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pressed Richard to reverse his conduct. Uncle Thomas demanded withdrawal of the legal
claim, which proved unfounded, and then in 1773 replaced Richard as governor with his
brother.56 Richard took umbrage and did not speak to John for some time. James Allen
observed in his contemporary diary that John had arrived from England “to supersede his
Brother,” a move “it is thought, will lay the foundation of a lasting animosity between the
brothers.” Two weeks later Allen noted that the two “at Club” had “met for the first time
since his [John’s] arrival, but they took no notice of each other.” Lorenzo Sabine recounts
a similar incident: “Mr. Bob Morris, the head man at the merchant’s feast, placed
Governor [John] Penn on his right hand, and his brother, the late Governor, on his left
hand, but not a word passed.” Though the two momentarily patched up differences when
Governor John offered his slighted sibling the profitable sinecure of port naval officer at
Philadelphia and their respective wives interceded, tensions between them invariably
simmered beneath the surface.57 Being forced to play second fiddle to John in the
proprietary inheritance no doubt played a significant role in nourishing this friction.
Richard, however, had been a popular governor and patriots considered him an
ally of the early revolutionary cause. Caesar Rodney wrote to Thomas Rodney on
September 24, 1774 from Philadelphia that “Mr. R. Penn is a great friend to liberty, and
has treated the gentlemen Delegates with the greatest respect. More or less of them dine
with him every day.” He was also a guest of George Washington. It is no surprise, then,
that these same delegates placed their trust in Richard Penn to deliver the sensitive Olive
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Branch Petition to King George III on his 1775 voyage to England. Nevertheless, Richard
evidently came to the conclusion that there was little for him in Pennsylvania. By his
marriage to Philadelphian Mary Masters in 1772 he had accrued portable assets. Before
embarking with his wife, sister-in-law, and mother-in-law, he confessed to Lady Juliana
that “the Happy and advantageous Marriage I have contracted in this country enables me
to live like a gentleman in England.”58
The parting proved permanent. Thus, reintegration as a transatlantic homecoming
did not seriously factor into Richard Penn’s later calculations. Instead, over the years he
limited his involvement to proprietary issues which could benefit him directly. He visited
Paris in 1782 as American independence loomed on the horizon and reestablished contact
with Congress’ envoy to France, old family nemesis Benjamin Franklin. Through his
agent Tench Francis Jr., he co-signed the Penns’ memorial to the Pennsylvania assembly
requesting renegotiation of divestment compensation. Later in the decade, he became
embroiled in a dispute with land speculator Samuel Wallis over ownership of tracts in the
Susquehanna region and also lent his cooperation from afar to his brother and cousin who
led the charge when questions arose on title to commonly held Pennsylvania properties.
After his brother died in 1795, Richard sued John’s wife Anne over proprietary funds
John had agreed to pay him from compensation sources. He lost that lawsuit in 1800.59
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Despite ancestral ties to the colony he had governed, Richard Penn chose British
subjecthood over allegiance to Pennsylvania. He died in England in 1811 at the age of
seventy-six, having twice resided in the colony his grandfather founded for a combined
total of ten years.60 Given his brother’s and cousin’s experiences, Pennsylvania would
most likely have welcomed back Richard Penn but he never pursued the citizenship the
state could have conferred, opting instead for the life of the English gentry. Moreover, the
benefits he derived from patriot adherence to the supremacy of the law as aired in the
divestment settlement were mostly the product of his brother’s accomplishments rather
than his own. In the end, he turned down the potential rights of citizenship which
revolutionary law had set for him in America.
Initially, John Penn Jr. took a diametrically opposite route. At twenty-three-yearsold, he arrived in Pennsylvania for the first time in 1783 open to the opportunities that his
coming of age, a new land, a concluding war, and the expectations of the peace treaty on
the issue of confiscated property offered. The main Penn heir found Pennsylvania to his
liking. While his primary mission was to procure added compensation from divestiture,
he explored the prospect of permanent residence. At first, John Jr. missed the motherland.
“I felt indeed, the accustomed ‘amor patriae,’ & admiration of England,” he confessed.
But “sometimes a republican enthusiasm, which attached me to America, & almost
tempted me to stay” surfaced. This burst of egalitarian zeal was short-lived, however, as
he did not receive criticism of the family’s memorial to the Pennsylvania legislature well.
431,439-440, 477-478 & 554; issues regarding the Manor of Springetsbury during 1787-1788 can be found
in the same volume, 153 & 541-542.
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“I may date my becoming wholly an Englishman from the breaking [up of the] assembly,
& publication of its minutes” in 1784, whereby the proprietors bore the wrath of historic
enemies and the abandonment of purported allies.61 Explicably, he never took the patriot
oath of allegiance.
The youngest Penn’s stay in Pennsylvania lasted five years. He built himself a
stylish home on the banks of the Schuylkill which he christened “Solitude,”62 traveled
extensively throughout the province, reconnoitered the proprietary Manors and inherited
holdings, and developed favorable relations with revolutionaries and republicans. On a
protracted journey through Pennsylvania in 1788, prominent patriots received him with
pleasure. In the countryside outside Philadelphia, John Jr. called on Frederick Augustus
Muhlenberg, Pennsylvania house speaker from 1780 to 1783 and subsequently first
speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. Daniel Clymer and “Mr. Biddle” escorted
him on a tour of surrounding farms and later dined with him. Near Reading, General
Mifflin “with agreeable frankness & affability… received us in a neat farm-house.” On
the Susquehanna, he met Mr. Harris – “owner and founder of this town” which later
became Harrisburg, the state capital. Near Carlisle, he met revolutionary officers General
Armstrong and Colonel Magaw. Although entertained cordially, John Jr.’s trips also
increasingly highlighted aspects of American life that he did not like. On a manor plot
near Reading, he encountered “fertile vallies [sic] & low places which were all settled by
encroachers.” In a conversation with a tavern-keeper, he lamented “how qualified respect
is in this democratical country.” On an excursion through Delaware, he witnessed a
61
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squabble between “two rustics completely drunk.” These were not the proper English
ways in which he had been raised among those of his class.63
Proprietary business before the Royal Claims Commission served as the pretext
for John Penn Jr.’s departure for England in 1788. As the male heir with a controlling
proprietary interest, the parliamentary commission granted him the lion’s share of the
family’s successful claim, consolidating his financial position. John decided to settle
permanently at Stoke and resumed gentry life. It does not appear he ever returned to
Pennsylvania. Over the years, he held several government positions – High Sheriff of
Buckinghamshire in 1798, member of Parliament for Helston in 1802-1803, Governor of
Portland Castle in the county of Dorset for 1805, and Captain of the Portland Island
Legion from 1804-1807 at the height of the Napoleonic Wars. In homage to his ancestral
grounds, he built Pennsylvania Castle on Portland Island. Although he founded the
Outinian Society in 1818 as a “matrimonial society intended to improve the domestic life
of married persons,” John Jr. never married.64 He participated actively in contemporary
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political debate, publishing his views on sundry issues in 1800. He also fancied himself a
man of letters. In 1796 John Penn Jr. composed a series of essays entitled Letters on the
Drama discussing drama in Athens, England, and France, along with refined subjects
such as “poetical Probability,” “the Unities,” differences between “minute and delicate
Taste,” and “the Material of Imitation.” That same year he dedicated to William Pitt an
original play touting the origins of English freedom in the era of Alfred the Great.65 He
died at Stoke Park in 1834.
Unlike his cousin Richard, John Penn Jr. experimented with the real possibility of
a permanent home in Pennsylvania. Since he had been raised in Great Britain and did not
visit America until 1783, his was more a case of post-revolutionary integration than
reintegration. Upon his return to England, however, that distinction became a moot point.
Of the three Penn males of the revolutionary period, he was the one most visibly faithful
to his English roots, the product of an eyewitness empirical comparison between the
relative advantages of the two nations. Perhaps it could not have been any other way,
given his upbringing. In any case, his was a conscious choice, with links to England
ultimately outweighing whatever gains the rights of citizenship in Pennsylvania could
confer. Despite a continued fondness for America evident in the evocation of
Pennsylvania Castle on English soil, John Penn Jr. at heart was a loyal British subject.
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It was left to John Penn Sr. to carry on the Penn presence in Pennsylvania. We
have seen how the senior John patiently lived out the war in seclusion. After the peace, he
not only swung into action when necessary in defense of the proprietary legacy but
deliberately abandoned his isolation to make visibly public appearances in an effort to
gain acceptance from the victors. As Rebecca Shoemaker explained to her loyalist
husband then exiled in New York, “that set have prudently determined, as they cannot
exist in retirement either at Landowne or any where else out of public places, to join the
others, and Gov. Penn and lady, Mrs. Allen and mother… and all their former intimates,
are now as happy at Mrs. Stewart’s, formerly M’Clanachan, at the French Minister’s, or
in any other Whig society, as ever they were in the select circle they were once the
principals of.”66 Daily life appears to have slowed down after the immediate postwar
flurry, however. A 1786 letter to Joseph Shippen Jr. is especially instructive, exuding an
air of routine and an undertone of loneliness. He was sorry his acquaintance was ill at
Lancaster, where Penn could not “suppose that you can spend your time very agreeably.”
Life there was surely dull and “your company must be very confined & not always of the
sort you would chuse [sic].” Perhaps Shippen should consider coming to Philadelphia
where “a change of air, & company might be of service to you... and raise your spirits.”
Besides, in the city there was better medical care and “you would even have inducements
for using exercise, which you cannot have where you are.”67 The missive reads more like
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a plea for company than the extension of a helping hand to a sickly friend it purports to
be.
In 1788, John Penn Sr. traveled to England as part of the family’s successful
appeal to the Royal Claims Commission. That the former governor may have envisioned
an extended or even permanent separation from America is insinuated in the auction of
his furniture and goods prior to his departure. The advertisement offered to the general
public seventy-seven types of items from nine large rooms at “his House on Chestnut
Street,” including carpets, bedsteads, mattresses, dining tables, “elegant China,” chimney
piece ornaments, calico curtains, and even “a case of excellent Sherry Wine.” The
inventory’s completeness implies a close-out sale for his city home.68
There is further circumstantial evidence to suggest that John Penn Sr. had doubts
about a return to America. For one, he and wife Anne extended their English visit well
beyond the timeline of their application to the Royal Claims Commission. In August of
1789, he informed Dr. Thomas Parke in Philadelphia that “our affairs will not be wound
up till after Christmas,” inferring that claim matters would be resolved in the late winter
or early spring of 1790. In fact, Prime Minister William Pitt brought the proprietorship’s
case before Parliament on May 14, 1790. Yet the Penns did not go back to Pennsylvania
until September, 1792. The language in the Parke letter reveals psychological distance. “I
hope your New Government may succeed,” he said referring to America’s recently
reworked constitutional framework. The “your” implies it was not his. Furthermore, John
Chester County,” September 2, 1790, Balch, ed., Letters and Papers Relating Chiefly to the Provincial
History of Pennsylvania, 294.
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Sr. was clearly displeased with republicanism. “Honor & Honesty seemed to be very
thinly sown among the worthy patriots of America… when I left you,” he chided
sardonically. The recent flow of exiles to England escaping “the miserable situation in
France” especially disturbed him. He placed ample blame for that revolution’s excesses
on republican America, alleging that French subjects “have drank so deep of the cup of
liberty in America & Holland, that they have become intoxicated with it.” In contrast, he
lauded British monarch George III. “You must long before this have been apprized of the
King’s recovery & the joy it has incited in the Nation,” declared Penn. “I have heard
nothing of him that was not praiseworthy, except from the opposition” whom he
disparaged as “gamblers without honor or money.”69
John and Anne Penn’s views continued to evolve over the next few years. While
residing at the family estate near London in late 1791, John Sr. received a letter from
Lady Juliana who confirmed that “you are making Stoke delightful” while expressing
optimism about life in his former home. “I hope your accts. from America are favorable
for the News Papers tell us much of their prosperity & I wish you to benefit by it,” she
reflected.70 In the end, the call of Pennsylvania proved too strong. Along with prospects
of good fortune, reduced status may have had something to do with the couple’s decision.
The ever observant James Tilghman “had heard in a roundabout, uncertain way, that Mrs.
Penn is not so fond of England as she expected to be. She left her consequence in
America, as most people do, who go to England. It is not always a portable commodity.”
69
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John and Anne returned to Pennsylvania in 1792. The oldest Penn heir lived out his
remaining days in the quietude of his estate. Expiring in 1795, he was buried near the
altar in Anglican – now Episcopal – Christ Church in Philadelphia.71
Despite divestment and doubts, John Penn Sr. succeeded in reintegrating back
into Pennsylvania life in all three stages he faced: during the uncertainty of his post-exile
seclusion during the war, in the half-decade following the peace, and upon his return
from England in 1792. He was never attainted or legally charged for infidelity to the
American cause. On the contrary, his avowal of allegiance in 1778 set in stone his rights
as a republican citizen while Pennsylvania’s adherence to the rule of law guaranteed not
only those rights of citizenship, but the redefined rights of the proprietorship. Although
only he of the Penn heirs chose to reintegrate, his linkages to Pennsylvania ultimately
proved brittle. Wife Anne chose to leave Bucks County for England six years after John’s
death. Her close ties to her brother, loyalist exile Andrew Allen, probably played a
leading role in her determination, overcoming earlier status concerns about reduced
“consequence.” Judging from a statement of accounts for her deceased husband’s estate
at the time, it appears she lived comfortably.72
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CONCLUSION
The Penn proprietorship lay at the heart of revolutionary transformation in
Pennsylvania. The proprietary order of the colonial era proved irreconcilable with an
egalitarian republicanism built on the will and consent of the people. The two were
intrinsically at odds. Faced with an irresolvable contradiction, radicals overthrew the
long-established royally chartered regime. The collapse of proprietary hegemony signaled
not only the beginning of a new era but an expansion of rights and a reconfiguration of
the legal order and the law under the novel republican parameters established in the
Constitution of 1776 which stressed a more equal distribution of divested land.
Revolutionary commitment to the rights of citizens and the rule of law in
Pennsylvania was not an empty slogan. Since John Penn Sr. had sworn allegiance to the
state and both patriot factions held the colony’s founding in high esteem, revolutionaries
sought accommodation with the proprietary family’s unique historical circumstances.
Besides, unlike pacifist Quakers, the Penns never publicly condemned the advent of
republican rule. The terms of the 1779 Divestment Act passed by a radical legislature
then at the zenith of its power are especially enlightening. By respecting legal due
process, allowing the Penns to retain a generous share of their landed inheritance,
establishing conditions for postwar financial compensation, and welcoming a continued
proprietary presence in the state, radicals ensured fairness within the limits imposed by a
destructive war, economic realities, and the social and political expectations of their rebel
constituents. Given these problematic challenges, it is my judgment that radicals were not
only evenhanded but quite magnanimous – despite the Penn family’s protestations to the
contrary regarding compensation. That later moderate-dominant governments did not
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augment Penn reparations or grant any other substantial concessions shows that a sense
of just restitution pervaded all revolutionary factions.
From the perspective of the proprietorship, the Revolution was a disaster. The
Penn family first lost all political power and then the greater part of their royally granted
lands – the foundation for their wealth and status. In sum, the proprietorship ceased to
exist. From the narrower viewpoint of the Penns as individuals, however, the picture is
not as somber. Richard Penn never ventured back to Pennsylvania, preferring instead the
perks of gentry life in a hierarchical kingdom. After a brief jaunt through republican
fancies, John Penn Jr. decided he was an Englishman after all and definitively returned to
the mother country. These cousins consciously chose to reject reintegration. There was no
revolutionary coercion. Hence, Penn reintegration – if there was to be any at all – rested
ultimately on John Penn Sr.’s choices. Of the three relations, he no doubt professed the
greatest affinity for the family’s ancestral homeland in America. His decisions reflect
that. Although forcibly banished in 1777, John Penn Sr. cast his lot with revolutionary
Pennsylvania at four critical junctures. He opted to stay following the British evacuation
in June 1778, despite a combustible climate laden with rebel suspicion. He voluntarily
took the patriot oath of allegiance shortly thereafter. He remained in Pennsylvania at the
peace of 1783 and tried to regain status and prestige by entering republican social circles.
After several years in Britain prompted by an appeal for compensation from Parliament,
he returned to Pennsylvania in 1792 to live out his remaining days. Although no longer
the privileged proprietor of a royalist yesteryear, the reintegration of citizen John Penn
Sr. was nonetheless largely successful. He enjoyed the privileges of a fully enfranchised
citizen. He retained sufficient wealth to live comfortably according to his “rank and
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station in life,” as his radical adversaries had counseled in his banishment order. Higherorder patriots accepted him in elite social circles. He reconnected with surviving pre-war
friends and acquaintances. In the end, John Penn Sr. willingly embraced the republic.
And the republic reciprocated.
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CLOSING SCENES AND CONCLUSIONS
A curious visitor to Philadelphia circa 1791 drawn to the novelty of popular
sovereignty through republican government would have recorded the preeminence of
William Penn’s “City of Brotherly Love” on the Delaware River in the affairs of both the
century-old state and the emerging nation. Philadelphia then served as both the provincial
and federal capitals and would continue as such for most of the decade.1 Making the
rounds of formal introductions to noteworthy figures in the republican landscape at the
local and national levels, the inquisitive guest would likely have had occasion to greet
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Edward Shippen and Benjamin Chew, President of
Pennsylvania’s High Court of Errors and Appeals.2 A few blocks away, United States
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton would have cordially received the
attentive traveler and perhaps asked Assistant Treasury Secretary Tench Coxe to escort
the caller on his way to the offices of the United States Attorney for the District of
Pennsylvania, William Rawle.3 The interested voyager would no doubt have been
impressed with the character and quality of these enterprising republicans who had
embarked on a political experiment laden with risk. Skeptics in both Europe and America
were convinced this “democratical” audition could not work and would end in disaster.
After all, who in their right mind could ever countenance a government under the
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direction of “the people”? Yet the caliber of these revolutionaries clearly contravened the
conventional wisdom spewed forth by the cynics. Our visitor would have felt reassured.
But buried beneath these heartening reflections was a hidden layer of ambiguity.
Unfamiliar with the intricacies of the revolutionary struggle in Pennsylvania, our
impressionable political examiner would have had no way of knowing that Mr. Coxe had
been attainted for high treason on May 21, 1778. Or that Judge Chew had been banished
to New Jersey with colonial Governor John Penn Sr. on the eve of the British occupation
of Philadelphia because real revolutionaries feared he would collaborate with the king’s
forces. Or that Mr. Rawle had accompanied his loyalist stepfather Samuel Shoemaker to
New York City at Sir Henry Clinton’s evacuation of the city in the summer of 1778.4 Or
that at the height of the war in the state, Judge Shippen had lived in daily fear of arrest by
radicals and signed a parole under duress ensuring his good behavior. Or that his son
Edward had joined the British army and fallen prisoner to the continentals at the decisive
battle of Trenton. Or that his daughter Peggy had married notorious traitor Benedict
Arnold and followed him into exile.5 Only someone with a detailed knowledge of the
rebellion in the province could possibly have detected all of these inconsistencies. And
yet it is precisely contradictions like these that validate the unequivocal success of the
process of reintegration in Pennsylvania.
Although evocations of tory duplicity surfaced now and then, especially in the
heat of political campaigns, reintegration as a core issue of the new republic essentially
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ceased to exist by the early 1790s. The transfer of political power from the proprietor to
the people’s representatives; the departure of elite and ordinary loyalist militants; the
non-threatening attitudes and behavior of the disaffected who stayed; the seizure of the
bulk of the Penn family’s land holdings for the benefit of patriot soldiers and settlers; the
eradication of genuine armed threats; the readiness of those opposed to revolution to
accept republican rule with the divine verdict of peace; the continued presence of upright
citizens of the new republic descended from ex-loyalists and disaffected denizens; the
triumph of Anti-Constitutionalist moderate leadership in the state; and the repeal of all
discriminatory legislation constructed on the basis of allegiance coalesced to render the
problem of reintegration extraneous to Pennsylvania society. In only a decade or so,
revolutionaries and the ex-disaffected united to solve the grave predicament of what to do
with actual or suspected enemies who had remained in Pennsylvania at the conclusion of
a terrible war or returned afterwards, arguably the most pressing challenge facing the
embryonic republic. Confronted earlier with the options of expulsion, ostracism,
accommodation or reassimilation, by 1789 patriots had joined hands with onetime
opponents and welcomed them to the republican fold – the equivalent of a mass pardon
for the unattainted. The conduct and consent of former foes of the Revolution played an
instrumental role in this success.
The Pennsylvania reintegration experience reveals key characteristics of the early
republic’s concern over the interplay between rights, citizenship, institutions, and the law.
Revolutionaries of all stripes championed a robust commitment to the inherent rights of
citizens and a legal and political system designed to defend those rights. Although
discrepancies over the nature of allegiance meant that each faction defined republican
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citizenship differently, the linkage between rights and the rule of law was indivisible for
both radicals and moderates. The diagnosis of Henry Steele Commager and Richard
Morris that “these leaders insisted that the Revolution be managed in an orderly and
lawful fashion” was manifest in Pennsylvania.6 Witness radical council president Joseph
Reed’s cavalry charge against his own radical partisans to restore order at Fort Wilson
and the strict adherence to legal due process at the trials of John Roberts and Abraham
Carlisle under radical ascendancy.7 Moreover, each party used the law to advance its
vision of what republican citizenship should look like and who should possess those
rights. For both, the debate centered exclusively on males of European ancestry. This
criterion placed ex-loyalists, the onetime disaffected, and nonjuror men at the heart of the
factional dispute.8 Clearly, citizenship was highly valued. Even Quaker nonjurors who
refused to budge on their core beliefs regarding pacifism and oath-taking recognized that
value. Observe James Pemberton’s allusion to “our just rights” in the midst of the Test
Act repeal debates and his decision to run for office with fellow Friends Miers Fisher,
Henry Drinker, and Edward Pennington only weeks after the repeal.9 The reincorporation
of the formerly disaffected steadied institutions in the early republic and aligned with a
wider move towards institutional stabilization in more centralized governments under the
6
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federal Constitution of 1787 and the new Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 endorsed by
moderates.
The reintegration process in Pennsylvania also parallels the inclusionary political
trends of the 1780s identified in the earlier studies of Coleman, Palfreyman, Brannon and
Maas. With two broadly national inquiries and now three detailed analyses of specific
states, a historical pattern emerges which signals, first, that substantial numbers of the
formerly disaffected – perhaps most – favored life under republican rule to displacement
elsewhere within the British Empire, despite their earlier hostility. They were Americans
first, not Britons. Second, resolution of the loyalist reintegration challenge opened the
way for the success of the new republic.10 The nation could now look forward and build
its future, rather than backward and worry about its past. Finally, pragmatic republicans
preferred the consequences of a reassimilation of the disaffected to the consequences of
their rejection, a choice inadvertently facilitated by the effects of loyalist militancy that
separated acceptable republican wheat from unacceptable monarchist chaff. Loyalist
militants who had either actively fought for the king or collaborated extensively with the
British feared radical reprisals and more often than not chose to depart. Rebels were more
than happy to have them quit the scene and confiscate their property. Conversely, the
disaffected who did not bear arms or whose collaboration with the British was less
conspicuous commonly sifted back into Pennsylvania society. Patriots chose to tolerate
their presence as long as they posed no threat. The passage of time and the mounting
success of the republican experiment gradually alleviated these earlier distinctions
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grounded on militancy and allowed the return or visit of even the most committed armed
opponents of revolution like Joseph Doan Jr. or the most ardently pro-British ideologues
like Andrew Allen.11 In Pennsylvania, the attitudes, behavior, and actions of the
disaffected created conditions conducive to a peaceful and successful resolution of the
challenge of reintegration by fostering the reciprocal cooperation of revolutionaries.
Like Rebecca Brannon for South Carolina and David Maas for Massachusetts, my
study inserts Pennsylvania’s distinctive revolutionary history into the national story of
reintegration. Not surprisingly, loyalism in Penn’s colony featured ingredients common
to other states such as militancy, guerrillas, executions, exile, evacuations, and all too
human characters guided by a plethora of motives ranging from selfless sacrifice to
baseless opportunism. Loyalism in Pennsylvania, however, also had attributes either
unique to the state or not commonly found elsewhere. For instance, Pennsylvania faced
more boundary disputes with neighbors than any other state. Although the drawing of the
Mason-Dixon line had quieted a quarrel with Maryland by the time of the Revolution,
conflicts with Connecticut and Virginia strongly impacted patriot-loyalist partisanship.
Colonial antagonism between Quakers and Presbyterians also played a critical role, in
tandem with the idiosyncratic response of pacifist Friends to military conflict. Nowhere
else was pacifism as noteworthy. Pennsylvania was also among the few colonies under
proprietary government and, of those, it was the one in which the proprietors played the
most visible role. Furthermore, intra-patriot factional contentiousness between radicals
and moderates in Pennsylvania was arguably the most pronounced of all the colonies. In
authoring the first study of reintegration in Pennsylvania, I have tried to underscore this
11
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historical singularity, as well as give the loyalists an active voice and stress the joint
contributions of both revolutionaries and antirevolutionaries in achieving reintegrative
redemption. In the final analysis, the representative cases of the most militant, most
pacifist and most obdurate among the disaffected merged with the most vengeful, most
accommodating and most consequential from the viewpoint of the revolutionaries to
establish the uniqueness of Pennsylvania’s process of reintegration.
Though the present study strives for thoroughness, the prospect a preliminary
database of 1,858 disaffected individuals unfurls admittedly leaves the reintegrative
drama as told here incomplete, for each and every loyalist or disaffected Pennsylvanian
has his or her own personal chronicle to relate. I have tried to select for these pages the
historical actors who most appropriately explain the key ingredients that contributed to
successful reintegration in Pennsylvania. Yet the most explicatory characters are not
necessarily the most intriguing. Among the noteworthy for future scrutiny – in addition to
Tench Coxe, Benjamin Chew, Edward Shippen IV and William Rawle – are the wives of
loyalist exiles who purposely stayed behind in an attempt to preserve family property.
Their struggles with patriot authorities are especially poignant. Prominent among these
women were Grace Growden Galloway, wife of loyalist militant Joseph, and Rebecca
Shoemaker, wife of Samuel, General Howe’s Magistrate of Police during the British
occupation. The successful reintegration of the wives of the Quakers banished to Virginia
is likewise significant. Elizabeth Drinker, Mary Pleasants, Susanna Jones and Phoebe
Pemberton who actively petitioned for release of the Virginia exiles merit special
attention. Particularly intriguing are women like Jane Bartram and Elizabeth Graeme
Fergusson who publicly rebuffed the loyalism of their exiled husbands, remained in
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Pennsylvania while claiming an affinity for the patriot cause, then wrangled with the
revolutionary legal system to avoid eviction and retain possession of the property they
inhabited. Their appeal as republicans to a republic that did not recognize their legal
status as full citizens on the basis of gender exposed the contradictions of an ideology not
yet willing to accept its professedly self-evident notion of equality under the law for all.
The case of Susannah Adams, the only attainted woman out of nearly five hundred
loyalists decreed as such in Pennsylvania, also deserves consideration.
The singular circumstances of Pennsylvania’s black loyalists warrant attention.
Research for this study has identified at least 79 individuals of African heritage in the
state whom patriots considered disaffected. Of these, 27 were women. Of the 74 whose
legal status is known, nine were born free, sixty-two escaped their masters and joined the
British at varying times, and three went into exile as slaves of loyalists after the 1778
evacuation of Philadelphia. Thus, British authorities emancipated 62 of the 65 known to
be enslaved, raising the incongruity of a purportedly oppressive monarchy and not
republican revolution acting as guarantor of the freedom of Americans of African
ancestry. That no evidence has yet materialized that any black loyalists who sided with
the British stayed behind after the evacuation or later returned adds to the need for
investigation, as do their scattered exile experiences in the royal Canadian provinces,
England, and in isolated cases, the formation of Britain’s Sierra Leone colony for former
slaves on the west coast of Africa. Questions likewise surface on the other side of the
coin in the few Pennsylvania instances where the British allowed loyalists with slaves to
retain them as property after departing for exile elsewhere in the empire.
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Generational conflicts across the loyalist/patriot axis command attention. The split
between renowned patriot Benjamin Franklin and his diehard loyalist son William who
became royal governor of New Jersey with the aid of his father’s intercession needs to be
examined with an eye turned towards reintegration. Similarly, revolutionary James
Young, brother-in-law of Elizabeth Graeme Fergusson, had a permanent falling-out with
his loyalist son, John, who joined the British and was attainted in May 1778. Also worth
exploring are loyalist father Jared Ingersoll Sr., the king’s vice-admiralty court judge at
Philadelphia, and his patriot son Jared Ingersoll Jr., an attorney friend of radical council
president Joseph Reed who convinced him to settle at Philadelphia. Jared Jr. became one
of the most important legal figures in the state in the early republic.12 The contrasting
trajectories of Charles Humphreys and Thomas Willing, the two men who voted against
independence as Pennsylvania delegates to the Continental Congress in July 1776, are
worth exploring at length. Humphreys later got into trouble with radical authorities for
disaffection while Willing integrated harmoniously and became the first president of the
Bank of North America in 1782. Why the difference?
Those who expediently switched sides back and forth defy sectarian logic, not
only for their ideological mutation but for their ability to pull off the alterations. Printer
and newspaper editor Benjamin Towne was the most artful of these chameleons. He
deftly navigated his Pennsylvania Evening Post from a pro-patriot tri-weekly to a vocal
loyalist mouthpiece during the nine month British occupation of Philadelphia and
reversed course again after the evacuation as a pro-rebel publication. Merchant Joseph
Stansbury – best known for his loyalist verses and association with Benedict Arnold,
12

Jared Ingersoll Jr.’s return to Philadelphia is in Lawrence Henry Gipson, American Loyalist: Jared
Ingersoll (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 363.
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military commandant of Philadelphia appointed by General Washington when
revolutionaries retook the city in 1778 – dithered into the postwar period between
residence in Philadelphia and forced exile and eventually earned the dubious distinction
of having his claim before Parliament rejected outright because the royal commissioners
deemed him twice a traitor.
Attainted returnees who received pardons present glimpses into the evolution of
patriot clemency as well as the competing calls of England and America for loyalist exile
fidelity. Delegates to the First Continental Congress designated Anglican minister Jacob
Duché to inaugurate the sacred work of that body in 1774 and he was named chaplain to
Congress after the Declaration of Independence. But Duché faltered when the British
captured Philadelphia and wrote George Washington an ill-timed letter describing the
futility of further resistance and asking the patriot commander-in-chief to use his personal
influence to reconcile the country with Great Britain. Rebuffed by both Washington and
Congress, and jailed briefly by Sir William Howe who shipped him off to his Church of
England superiors in Britain, Duché lived to return and die in Philadelphia. Attorney
Phineas Bond was among the suspected tories targeted in the radical round-up preceding
the invasion of 1777 but avoided deportation. He evacuated with the British army the
next year. From his London exile, Bond found his way back to Philadelphia through a
controversial royal appointment as British Consul for the Middle States. Those who tried
to toe a middle line between revolution and disaffection, failed, and then succeeded in
returning merit analysis. Among these, Jewish merchant David Franks and Anglican
minister Provost William Smith stand out. The trials and tribulations of pacifist German
Pietists such as Moravian John Ettwein, Schwenkfelder George Kriebel, and Dunkard
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Christopher Sower – similar to their pacifist Quaker brethren in some ways and yet
distinct in others – also deserve special scrutiny. Lastly, a comprehensive study of the
488 citizens who were officially attainted during the course of the war can likewise add
depth to the reintegration saga in Pennsylvania.
The cases outlined above further elaborate the findings in this study. Disaffected
residents such as Coxe, Chew, Shippen, Rawle and others who chose to take the oath of
allegiance found the path to republican acceptance much more expeditious and less
hazardous than those like the Quaker pacifists who refused the oath. Yet oath-takers had
to reassure patriots of their commitment by avoiding the suspicion of antirevolutionary
activity. The likes of Stansbury or Franks who failed to do so suffered patriot reprisals in
due course. While German pacifists resisted the taking of oaths and the payment of fines
for failure to serve militarily, they were not as unyielding as reformist Friends. Their
struggle to find a middle ground between patriot requirements and the tenets of their faith
resulted, for the most part, in greater acquiescence and less retribution from rebels. These
instances reaffirm that the attitude, behavior and actions of the disaffected proved
decisive in shaping patriot treatment of the disaffected. At the same time, the experiences
of loyalist women and pro-British blacks ratify that revolutionary radicals and moderates
both circumscribed the lines of republican citizenship to males of European descent,
thereby limiting a more comprehensive application of the Revolution’s achievements.
I will end on a personal note. When I began exploring graduate study in history in
2009, I was drawn to the underlying reasons for the strength of America’s governmental
institutions which had maintained democratic stability for two-and-a-half centuries while
enduring a vicious civil war, grave armed threats from abroad, and contentious social
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unrest from within. As a onetime refugee from the ravages of an armed revolution that
witnessed the total collapse of a nation’s institutions and the establishment of totalitarian
dictatorship, I decided to focus on American history at the founding as my specialty to
attempt to address this larger issue in contemporary terms. Specifically, I wanted to
examine the intrinsic qualities of America’s political institutions that had endowed them
with a lasting solidity.
The study of loyalism and disaffection in Pennsylvania during the American
Revolution has reaffirmed my original view of the strength of the American republic’s
institutions. But I have discovered to my surprise that this strength is not intrinsic to the
institutions themselves. Instead, I have come to realize that two critical substrata underlie
America’s governmental structure and sustain its institutions. The first is the rule of law.
The present-day American system is designed to be fair and evenhanded, equally
applicable to all across the board, allowing the nation’s institutions to operate under a
known set of guidelines which everyone accepts. It doesn’t always meet this lofty ideal
but that is its designed intent nonetheless. Yet the rule of law by itself is woefully
insufficient, for totalitarian dictatorships also create coherent legal structures while using
the law to destroy or limit liberty rather than reinforce it. The difference is the foundation
on which the rule of law rests.
At the core of the current American political structure lies an almost universal
belief in inherent rights among the country’s citizens. This underlying premise more
often than not is taken for granted – a trait that verifies its foundational essence. Citizens’
rights are so ingrained among Americans that they merit almost no discussion or are
relegated to the realm of “civics.” They are accepted as a given, like the air we breathe.
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This seminal conviction commands an equal application of the rule of law for all citizens.
In practice, the issue of rights only seems to surface when they are violated or when the
law is unequally applied. This blend of faith in inherent rights and the equal application
of the law in turn sustain the American republic’s institutions. The institutions function
because people believe in them and in their core components underneath. Democracy is
ultimately the product of the citizenry’s faith in their rights. The lesson I have drawn
from the study of loyalism, disaffection, and revolution in Pennsylvania is that only when
a country’s citizens believe they have a right to rights, can they hope to secure and
preserve them.
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